Recitation being made in accordance with CPLR 2219 (a), the following papers were read and considered on the New York State Courts Electronic Filing System ("NYSCEF") in connection with the motion made by defendant Christine Bueti for an order, pursuant to CPLR 2304, to quash the So-Ordered Nonparty Judicial Subpoena directed to Deputy Christopher Tompkins of the Putnam County Sheriff's Office (which was so ordered by this Court on September 12, 2025); for a protective order, pursuant to CPLR 3103, barring any further attempt by plaintiff Marvin Espana Ventura to obtain defendant's sealed criminal records in the Justice Court of the Town of Southeast, to preclude taking the testimony of Deputy Tompkins, and to preclude any mention of defendant Christine Bueti's alleged intoxication and arrest; in addition to other ancillary relief sought by defendant Christine Bueti in her motion:

• Notice of Motion; Counsel's Affirmation in Support, Exhibits A-I

• Letter Correspondence from Plaintiff's Counsel (dated November 10, 2025)

• Counsel's Affirmation in Opposition and Purported Cross-Motion, Exhibits 1-3

• Counsel's Affirmation in Reply

• Letter Correspondence from Plaintiff's Counsel (dated November 18, 2025), Exhibit A

Upon review of the aforesaid papers,^[FN1] the Court finds, holds, and determines as follows:

This is a tort action to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiff in a motor vehicle accident on May 31, 2024 involving the parties. The accident occurred on Route 22 in the Village of Brewster, within the Town of Southeast, when plaintiff was operating his motorcycle heading northbound and collided with defendant's vehicle who was heading southbound. Plaintiff commenced this action, on July 29, 2024, by filing a summons and complaint. He claims that defendant was negligent in causing the underlying accident since she failed to yield the right of way by prematurely making an improper left turn. Defendant alleges in the complaint that defendant "was impaired or intoxicated at the time of the collision having recently ingest[ed] alcohol" immediately prior to the underlying accident (NY St Cts Elec Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 1, verified complaint, ¶ 15).

On September 9, 2024, defendant interposed an answer asserting six affirmative defenses, including, as relevant here, that plaintiff is comparatively negligent and wholly or partially at fault. Couched as her first affirmative defense, it states as follows: "[t]hat the accident of occurrence referred to in the Plaintiff's Complaint and the injuries claimed were caused in whole or in part by the carelessness, contributory negligence[,] or the assumption of risk of the Plaintiff and the answering Defendant demands that the Plaintiff's damages be accordingly diminished or denied" (NY St Cts Elec Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 3, verified answer, ¶ 5 [emphasis added]).

After a preliminary conference held before the Court on September 12, 2025,^[FN2] the Court so ordered plaintiff's proposed "non[]party judicial subpoena," directing Christopher Tompkins, a deputy with the Putnam County Sheriff's Office, to give testimony at an examination before trial (hereinafter EBT) on behalf of plaintiff and "to "produce [the] accident scene photographs, the accident reconstruction report[,] any and all police documents underlying the arrest of defendant." After some back-and-forth letter correspondences between the parties' attorneys that prompted court responses, defendant, on October 20, 2025, filed a motion to quash the aforesaid subpoena that is at issue here, in addition to seeking other associated relief. Plaintiff, in turn, filed opposition papers on November 10, 2025. Defendant filed reply papers on November 18, 2025. Defendant's motion is thus fully submitted and ripe for decision.

A. Discovery Standards

We first begin with the fundamental purpose of discovery in civil actions. It is axiomatic that full disclosure is necessary with respect to relevant and material issues to narrow the issues at trial (see CPLR 3101). Discovery in civil actions is governed by CPLR 3101 (a), which directs that "[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof."

The New York Court of Appeals has expressed that "[w]hat is 'material and necessary' is left to the sound discretion of the [trial court] and includes any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity" (Andon v 302-304 Mott St. Assoc., 94 NY2d 740, 746 [2000] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). "The test is one of usefulness and reason" (id.). "A party seeking discovery must satisfy the threshold requirement that the request is reasonably calculated to yield information that is 'material and necessary' — i.e., relevant — regardless of whether discovery is sought from another party or a nonparty" (Forman v Henkin, 30 NY3d 656, 661 [2018] [internal citation omitted]; see Lurie v Lurie, 226 AD3d 992, 994-995 [2d Dept 2024]).

CPLR 3101 "embodies the policy determination that liberal discovery encourages fair and effective resolution of disputes on the merits, minimizing the possibility for ambush and unfair surprise" (Forman v Henkin, 30 NY3d at 661 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). That said, "[t]he right to disclosure, although broad, is not unlimited" (id.). With these principles in mind, we now turn to defendant's motion.

B. Defendant's Motion to Quash the Subpoena Pursuant to CPLR 2304

Relying largely on Section 160.50 of the Criminal Procedure Law, defendant argues that the subpoena at issue should be quashed because the criminal/vehicular charges against her in connection with the subject accident were dismissed, her arrest record was expunged, and because an order was entered by the criminal court judge sealing her criminal records relative to her arrest and all documents related thereto, after the charges against her were dismissed. According to defendant, she is the "sole and exclusive holder" of such records and without her waiver under the sealing statute, she enjoys unfettered privilege to have them remain sealed pursuant to the sealing order.

Defendant maintains that irrespective of this civil action commenced by plaintiff, the sealing order trumps the so-ordered subpoena at issue, the police's official records and reports are not subject to disclosure, that plaintiff is not entitled to such records, and Deputy Tompkins is prohibited from testifying about them in this particular case. Defendant posits that the sealing order bars production of all of the records generated and created by the Putnam County Sheriff's Office in connection with defendant's arrest, including any accident scene photographs, an accident reconstruction report, and/or all documents pertaining to her arrest on or about May 31, 2024.

Defendant argues that given what transpired, this matter does not present as a special or extraordinary circumstance requiring production of the police records in connection with her arrest and none of the six narrowly defined exceptions delineated in CPL 160.50 (1) (d) apply here. Defendant surmises that the parties can simply testify about how the underlying accident occurred without mentioning defendant's arrest or alleged intoxication, since those matters are precluded by [*3]the sealing order. Defendant thus insists that she maintains her statutory privilege under CPL 160.50 (1) (c) to have the arrest records kept under seal; consequently, plaintiff's nonparty subpoena directed at Deputy Tompkins must be quashed, that a protective order be issued to bar his testimony at an EBT, to bar plaintiff from attempting to obtain the sealed criminal records, and to preclude any mention of her alleged intoxication and arrest.

In addition, defendant maintains that she has not expressly waived the privilege and protections afforded to her by CPL 160.50 in connection with the sealed criminal records. On this point, defendant asserts that plaintiff, not her, has affirmatively placed her conduct at issue by commencing this civil action and that she did not bring this civil lawsuit, but she is compelled to defend the claims against her.

Plaintiff, in opposition, contends that defendant cannot use the sealing order as a "shield and a sword" in this case and that termination of her criminal case has no bearing on the evidence that should be available to the parties in this civil action. Plaintiff presses that he is claiming here that defendant was negligent because she simultaneously violated Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1141 and 1192 (1) based on her alleged failure to yield to his right-of-way at the intersection where the underlying accident occurred and due to defendant's operation of a motor vehicle while she was allegedly impaired by alcohol at the time of the accident.^[FN3] As to the latter, plaintiff points out that defense counsel volunteered in open court during the preliminary conference that defendant's blood alcohol content (BAC) level was .06 percent at the time of the accident, which constitutes a waiver of defendant's rights under CPL 160.50; and therefore, defendant should not be allowed to "cherry pick" certain sealed documents that are favorable to him, while trying to block disclosure of the remaining records. Plaintiff further asserts that because defendant's alleged traffic violations occurred concurrently, the police records in connection with defendant's arrest are relevant and material to establish liability on defendant's part and prove that she was negligent at the time of the accident. Also, plaintiff advances that because defendant has raised a claim that he was comparatively negligent based on the first affirmative defense raised in her answer, her pleading negates "whatever protection she seeks from [CPL] 160.50"; and so, she cannot use it as a sword against him in this action.

"In matters of statutory interpretation, our primary consideration is to discern and give effect to the Legislature's intention" (Matter of Albany Law School v New York State Off. of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 19 NY3d 106, 120 [2012] [citation omitted]). To that end, the statutory text "is the clearest indicator of legislative intent and courts should construe unambiguous language to give effect to its plain meaning" (Matter of DaimlerChrysler Corp. v Spitzer, 7 NY3d [*4]653, 660 [2006]). In addition, courts should also consider "the spirit and purpose of the legislation, which requires examination of the statutory context of the provision as well as its legislative history" (Nostrom v A.W. Chesterton Co., 15 NY3d 502, 507 [2010] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). The Court thus begins with examining the statutory text at play here.

CPL 160.50 mandates sealing of records where a criminal proceeding has been terminated in favor of the accused. "[T]he purpose of CPL 160.50 is to protect accused individuals from the unauthorized use of their records (Green v Montgomery, 95 NY2d 693, 701 [2001]).

Criminal Procedure Law § 160.50 — entitled "Order upon termination of criminal action in favor of the accused" — provides that when an action has been terminated in favor of the accused, "the record of [an] action or proceeding shall be sealed" (CPL 160.50 [1]). The statute further specifies that where a criminal action or proceeding terminates in favor of the accused, "all official records and papers, including judgments and orders of a court . . . relating to the arrest or prosecution, including all duplicates and copies thereof, on file with the division of criminal justice services, any court, police agency, or prosecutor's office shall be sealed and not made available to any person or public or private agency" (CPL 160.50 [1] [c] [emphasis added]). "The statute 'serves a laudable goal of insuring that one who is charged but not convicted of an offense suffers no stigma as a result of his [or her] having once been the object of an unsustained accusation'" (Leah W. v Keith W., — AD3d —, —, 2025 NY Slip Op 05041, *1 [1st Dept 2025], quoting Matter of Hynes v Karassik, 47 NY2d 659, 662 [1979]; see Matter of Joseph M. [New York City Bd. of Educ.], 82 NY2d 128, 132 [1993]). "[T]he legislative objective was to remove any 'stigma' flowing from an accusation of criminal conduct terminated in favor of the accused, thereby affording protection (i.e., the presumption of innocence) to such accused in the pursuit of employment, education, professional licensing[,] and insurance opportunities" (People v Patterson, 78 NY2d 711, 716 [1991]).

"By its plain terms, CPL 160.50 seals official court records pertaining to the arrest and prosecution" (Kokoska v Joe Tahan's Furniture Liquidation Ctrs., Inc., — AD3d —, —, 2025 NY Slip Op 04130, *4 [3d Dept 2025]). "In addition to the accused and the accused's designated agent, a court may make sealed records available only: to (1) a 'prosecutor in any proceeding in which the accused' has moved for an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal in a case involving marijuana charges below felony grade (CPL 160.50 [1] [d] [i]); (2) 'a law enforcement agency upon ex parte motion in any superior court, if such agency demonstrates to the satisfaction of the court that justice requires' release (CPL 160.50 [1] [d] [ii]); (3) state or local gun licensing agencies when the accused applies for a gun license (see CPL 160.50 [1] [d] [iii]); (4) the Division of Parole when the arrest occurred while the accused was under parole supervision (see CPL 160.50 [1] [d] [iv]); (5) the prospective employer of a police officer or peace officer, so long as the applicant is provided with a copy of all records and given an opportunity to explain (see CPL 160.50 [1] [d] [v]); and (6) any probation department responsible for the accused's supervision at the time of his or her arrest (see CPL 160.50 [1] [d] [vi])" (People v Isaacs, 239 AD3d 183, 188 [2d Dept 2025]).

"However, a former defendant's interest in preventing the disclosure of official records and papers is not absolute. The Legislature has acknowledged the existence of countervailing considerations to the sealing of such records and papers as reflected in express statutory exceptions set forth in CPL 160.50 (1) (d)" (People v Isaacs, 239 AD3d at 187 [internal quotation marks, brackets, ellipses, and citations omitted]). Moreover, "a party who 'affirmatively places the underlying conduct at issue by bringing a civil suit' waives the statutory protection afforded by CPL 160.50, which 'may not be used as a sword to gain an advantage in a civil action'" (Matter of Jeffrey [*5]O. v New York State Off. of Children & Family Servs., 207 AD3d 900, 904 [3d Dept 2022], quoting Green v Montgomery, 95 NY2d at 701). "[N]ot all documents or records constitute 'official records' under CPL 160.50" (Leah W. v Keith W., 2025 NY Slip Op 05041 at *1; see Matter of Harper v Angiolillo, 89 NY2d 761, 766 [1997]). "Although the statute 'specifies judgments and orders of a court as items 'included' in the category of official records and papers, the statute is otherwise silent on the nature of such 'official' material'" (Leah W. v Keith W., 2025 NY Slip Op 05041 at *1, quoting Matter of Harper v Angiolillo, 89 NY2d at 765-766).

In support of his motion, defendant submits, among other things, a document titled "CPL 160.50 Seal Order" that is signed by a court clerk, reflecting it was issued out of the Justice Court of the Town of Southeast, Putnam County (Gregory L. Folchetti, J.). The document, dated September 16, 2025, is addressed to the Putnam County Sheriff's Office and states that the criminal case "was terminated in favor of the defendant" (referring to the same defendant in this civil action). It includes the criminal case number of one of the traffic infractions which defendant was ordered to pay "fine[s]/fee[s]," the date of defendant's arrest being May 31, 2024, and the date of adjudication of her criminal matter as September 12, 2024 — the same date when the four other charges were apparently dismissed and sealed.

Also relevant here, that document reflects that defendant pled guilty to violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1141 (entitled "Vehicle turning left") in relation to the underlying accident.^[FN4] The Court notes that a violation of this statute under tort principles usually constitutes negligence per se (see Peels v Elsayed, 241 AD3d 575, 576 [2d Dept 2025]; Katikireddy v Espinal, 137 AD3d 866, 867 [2d Dept 2016]). The document concludes by advising the Sheriff's Office that "[p]urusant to CPL 160.50[,] you are hereby ordered to follows all of the steps outlined in the [that section] . . . to seal and return the appropriate records for [this] case."

"The Supreme Court has broad discretion in supervising disclosure and in resolving discovery disputes" (Tyson v Diallo, 238 AD3d 932, 934 [2d Dept 2025] [internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted]). "CPLR 3101 (a) (4), concerning disclosure from nonparties to an action, provides that there shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof, by . . . any other person, upon notice stating the circumstances or reasons such disclosure is sought or required. Under that statute, the party who served the subpoena has an initial minimal obligation to show that the nonparty was apprised of the circumstances or reasons that the disclosure is sought. Once that is satisfied, it is then the burden of the person moving to quash a subpoena to establish either that the requested disclosure is utterly irrelevant to the action or that the futility of the process to uncover anything legitimate is inevitable or obvious. Should the movant meet this burden, the subpoenaing party must then establish that the discovery sought is material and necessary to the prosecution or defense of the action" (Dorman v Luva of NY, LLC, — AD3d —, —, 2025 NY Slip Op 06155, *2 [2d Dept 2025] [internal quotation marks, brackets, ellipses, and citations omitted]; see CPLR 2304; Nunez [*6]v Peikarian, 208 AD3d 670, 670-671 [2d Dept 2022]).

Here, the parties do not dispute that plaintiff established that he provided defendant with adequate notice of the circumstances and reasons requiring the disclosure of the defendant's sealed criminal records vis-à-vis the so-ordered judicial subpoena at issue, thereby shifting the burden to defendant to establish that the disclosure sought was irrelevant to the action. The Court holds that defendant satisfied her burden by demonstrating that her criminal records are sealed and not subject to automatic disclosure because she has not waived the statutory privilege conferred by CPL 160.50.

"Where a party puts into issue in a civil action elements [that are] common both to the civil action and to a criminal prosecution, that party waives the privilege conferred by CPL 160.50" (Lundell v Ford Motor Co., 120 AD2d 575, 576 [2d Dept 1986]; accord Taylor v New York City Tr. Auth., 131 AD2d 460, 462 [2d Dept 1987]). The protections of CPL 160.50 "may not be used . . . to gain advantage in a civil action" (Kalogris v Roberts, 185 AD2d 335, 336 [2d Dept 1992]; see Green v Montgomery, 95 NY2d at 701). "The privilege of CPL 160.50 may not be used as a sword to gain an advantage in a civil action" (id. [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

"The well-established purpose of the CPL 160.50 record sealing provision for persons acquitted of criminal charges is to ensure confidentiality and to protect the individual from the potential public stigma associated with a criminal prosecution. However, it is clear that this benefit, which is considered a statutory privilege, is not absolute; it is subject to specific statutory exceptions and can be abrogated in situations where a court in its discretion determines that the interest of justice so requires. This protection is also capable of being waived by the individual. One such recognized instance of waiver occurs where the protected individual commences a civil action or proceeding and, in so doing, affirmatively places in issue elements that are common or related to the prior criminal action" (Matter of Abrams v Skolnik, 185 AD2d 407, 408 [3d Dept 1992] [internal citations omitted]).

Upon careful examination of the motion papers, and the record as presently constructed, the Court grants, in part, defendant's motion to quash the subpoena at issue. The Court holds that plaintiff is authorized to depose Deputy Tompkins at an EBT. However, Deputy Tompkins need not bring or produce any of the documents listed in the subpoena, including "the accident scene photographs, the accident reconstruction report[,] any and all police documents underlying the arrest of defendant" since those documents are still sealed pursuant to the order of the Justice Court of the Town of Southeast.

The protection of CPL 160.50 may not be waived if the person who is protected by the sealing statute did not commence the civil action (see Wilson v City of New York, 240 AD2d 266, 267-268 [1st Dept 1997]; compare Prag v Prag, 161 AD3d 1364, 1364-1365 [3d Dept 2018]).^[FN5] "[W]here an individual commences a civil action and affirmatively places the information protected by CPL 160.50 into issue, the privilege is effectively waived. The privilege, which is intended to protect the accused, may not be used as a sword to gain advantage in a civil action" (Kalogris v [*7]Roberts, 185 AD2d at 336).

Applying the governing legal principles, there is no question that plaintiff — not defendant — commenced this lawsuit by bringing this negligence action seeking monetary damages from her. There is no dispute defendant did not commence or bring this civil action (see Green v Montgomery, 95 NY2d at 701; Best v 2170 5th Ave. Corp., 60 AD3d 405, 405-506 [1st Dept 2009]; see also Commercial Union Ins. Co. v Jones, 216 AD2d 967, 967-968 [4th Dept 1995]). Thus, the Court concludes that defendant has maintained, not waived, her statutory privilege accorded by CPL 160.50.

The Court cites Rodriguez v Ford Motor Co. (301 AD2d 372 [1st Dept 2003]), as a case of relevance, where the First Department affirmed the motion court's finding that a defendant-driver "affirmatively put the circumstances surrounding the driver's arrest and indictment in issue[] and thus waived the protection afforded by CPL 160.50" . . . "by denying that intoxication caused the [defendant-]driver to lose control of the car" (id.). Importantly, the nuance in Rodriguez was that the defendant-appellants also asserted a cross-claim against the car manufacturer by "seeking to put the blame for the accident on the car manufacturer" (id.). But as the First Department noted in Rodriguez, the appellants "effectively made themselves 'plaintiffs' by asserting a cross claim against the [car] manufacturer" (id.; see CPLR 3019 [d]; Doe v D'Angelo, 154 AD3d 1300, 1301 [4th Dept 2017]).

In short, case law reveals that a party affirmatively waives the statutory protection afforded by CPL 160.50 when the person protected by that sealing statute commences an action and proceeding or asserts a counterclaim or a cross-claim in a civil action or proceeding (see CPLR 3019; see also Doe v D'Angelo, 154 AD3d at 1301 [statutory privilege found to be waived when asserting a cross-claim against another codefendant]; Pink v Ricci, 74 AD3d at 1774 [statutory privilege waived when asserting a counterclaim against a plaintiff]; Rodriguez v Ford Motor Co., 301 AD2d at 372 [statutory privilege deemed waived when asserting a cross-claim against another codefendant]; Lundell v Ford Motor Co., 120 AD2d at 576 [statutory privilege waived when commencing an action to recover damages for personal injuries]).

Here, Ms. Bueti — as the sole defendant in this action — has not asserted any counterclaim against plaintiff. Defendant therefore maintains her statutory privilege of confidentiality under the sealing statute (see Pink v Ricci, 74 AD3d 1773, 1774 [4th Dept 2010]; see also CPL 160.50). That being said, the Court is compelled to note that defendant has "denie[d]" in her answer (NYSCEF Doc No. 3, verified answer, ¶ 3), the specific allegation in plaintiff's complaint that she allegedly "was impaired or intoxicated at the time of the collision having recently ingest[ed] alcohol" prior to the accident (NYSCEF Doc No. 1, verified complaint, at ¶ 15). Notwithstanding this general denial in her answer, the Court finds that defendant has not "affirmatively place[d] the information protected by CPL 160.50 into issue" and "effectively waived" her privilege under that sealing statute (Kalogris v Roberts, 185 AD2d at 336; Wright v Snow, 175 AD2d 451, 452 [3d Dept 1991], appeal dismissed 79 NY2d 822 [1991]; Lundell v Ford Motor Co., 120 AD2d at 576). Likewise, it also cannot be said that defendant is utilizing her statutory privilege as "a sword to gain advantage" in this negligence action because she was brought into this lawsuit at the behest of plaintiff to defend the claims lodged against her (Kalogris v Roberts, 185 AD2d at 336).^[FN6] This is further confirmed by [*8]the fact that defendant has not asserted a counterclaim against plaintiff (see NYSCEF Doc No. 3, verified answer).

If anything, defendant is using her statutory privilege as a "shield" to protect her confidential information from being disclosed, which the law apparently allows. Therefore, the Court concludes that defendant has not affirmatively waived her statutory privilege under CPL 160.50, despite a general, blanket denial of being intoxicated and her boilerplate affirmative defense in her answer which is grounded, in part, upon her claim that she was not responsible or entirely at fault in causing the accident (see NYSCEF Doc No. 3, verified answer, ¶ 3, 5).

In the Court's view, based on this limited record, there is no reason that the EBT of Deputy Tompkins cannot go forward where he can ably testify about matters involving the underlying accident to the best of his recollection — subject to any viable objections as to any questions that may directly concern defendant's sealed criminal records. To the extent that the so-ordered subpoena at issue directs Deputy Tompkins to produce "accident scene photographs," "the accident reconstruction report," and "any and all police documents underlying the arrest of defendant" in connection with her sealed criminal case in the Justice Court of the Town of Southeast, that portion is struck and denied. Accordingly, the Court grants that branch of defendant's motion, in part, to quash the subpoena, as is expressly determined herein.

C. Plaintiff's Purported Cross-Motion to Unseal Defendant's Criminal Records

Plaintiff purportedly cross-moves to unseal "all records" in connection with defendant's arrest and prosecution in the Justice Court of the Town of Southeast for purposes of Deputy Tompkins' EBT and reproduction of those documents by the parties. His application in this regard is defective and denied in its entirety.

As a preliminary matter, plaintiff did not properly file a cross-motion as required by CPLR 2215 since he failed to formally notice the application to defendant that he would be cross-moving in accordance with the CPLR for affirmative relief by requesting a court order to unseal defendant's criminal records (see CPLR 2214 [b]; 2215). If he followed the correct procedure, plaintiff would have been required to pay a $45 filing fee by properly filing his cross-motion with the court (see CPLR 8020 [a]; Doe v State of New York, 11 AD3d 579, 579 [2d Dept 2004]; cf. Rodriguez v 2526 Valentine LLC, 133 AD3d 528, 528 [1st Dept 2015]). "The express language of CPLR 2215 is clear that cross-motions are solely for seeking relief against the initial moving party" (Pizzo v Lustig, 216 AD3d 38, 43 [2d Dept 2023]).

In any event, the Court declines to excuse plaintiff's mistake and denies the ultimate relief sought in his purported cross-motion (see CPLR 2001). The Court underscores the legal principle that "[t]he right to disclosure, although broad, is not unlimited and competing interests must always be balanced" (Gilbert v Hackett, 183 AD3d 654 [2d Dept 2020] [emphasis added]; see Vargas v Lee, 170 AD3d 1073, 1076 [2d Dept 2019]). "Although New York's discovery provisions have been liberally construed to favor disclosure, 'litigants are not without protection against [their] unnecessarily onerous application" (Andon v 302-304 Mott St. Assoc., 94 NY2d at 746, quoting Kavanagh v Ogden Allied Maintenance Corp., 92 NY2d 952, 954 [1998]).

The Court recites the applicable statute here which mandates that the sealed records constitute privileged material. When a criminal action or proceeding is terminated in favor of an accused, "all official records and papers . . . relating to the arrest or prosecution . . . on file with the division of criminal justice services, any court, police agency, or prosecutor's office shall be sealed and not made available to any person or public or private agency" (CPL 160.50 [1] [c]). "The statute specifies only six narrow, 'precisely drawn' exceptions to the general proscription against releasing official records and papers once they are sealed" (Matter of City of Elmira v Doe, 39 AD3d 942, 943 [3d Dept 2007], affd 11 NY3d 799 [2008], quoting Matter of Katherine B. v Cataldo, 5 NY3d 196, 203 [2005]). The Court of Appeals has reiterated as much. "These six statutory exceptions are precisely drawn. This underscores the Legislature's commitment to prohibiting disclosure of sealed records — once initial sealing has not been forestalled by the court in the interests of justice — except where the statute explicitly provides otherwise" (Matter of Katherine B. v Cataldo, 5 NY3d at 203).^[FN7]

The Court adds that "the list of parties permitted to seek the unsealing of records under CPL 160.50 (1) (d) has been expanded in extraordinary circumstances upon a showing of a compelling demonstration that disclosure [is] necessary" (Matter of James v Donovan, 130 AD3d 1032, 1036 [2d Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1049 [2015] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Importantly though, the Second Department has explained that such "is not intended by this Court. . . to expand access . . . to make 'unsealing of records the rule rather than a narrowly confined exception'" (People v Isaacs, 239 AD3d at 189, quoting Matter of New York State Commn. on Jud. Conduct v Rubenstein, 23 NY3d 570, 581 [2014]; see Matter of New York State Police v Charles Q., 192 AD2d 142, 145 [1993]; Matter of James v Donovan, 130 AD3d at 1036). More Specifically, the Court of Appeals has expressed that "courts have inherent authority to unseal criminal records in rare and extraordinary circumstances when necessary to serve fairness and justice," but it has "confined that authority to the 'Appellate Division's responsibility for discipline of attorneys pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90,' a responsibility [which is clearly] not implicated in this case" (Matter of City of Elmira v Doe, 39 AD3d 942, 944 [3d Dept 2007], quoting Matter of Katherine B. v Cataldo, 5 NY3d at 203; see Matter of Joseph M. [New York City Bd. of Educ.], 82 NY2d at 134).

Here, plaintiff clearly does not qualify as one of the persons or entities listed in CPL 160.50 (1) (d) who may be entitled to unseal defendant's criminal records. Nor does plaintiff even squarely argue that defendant's sealed criminal records may be made available by the Putnam County Sheriff's Office, pursuant to CPL 160.50 (1) (d) (ii), which permits release to "a law enforcement agency . . . if such agency demonstrates to the satisfaction of the court that justice requires that such records be made available to it" (cf. Matter of City of Elmira v Doe, 39 AD3d at 943). Plaintiff's purported cross-motion to unseal defendant's criminal records in connection with her 2024 arrest is, in effect, foreclosed by CPL 160.50 (1) (d). It cannot be interpreted on this scant record that defendant, expressly or implicitly, waived her privacy protections under CPL 160.50 (1) in this action.

Similarly, the Court does not find that plaintiff has demonstrated extraordinary circumstances exist by showing a compelling need for the disclosure sought of defendant's criminal records (see People v Anonymous, 34 NY3d 631, 644-645 [2020]; People v Isaacs, 239 AD3d at 188-189; People v Alexander, 67 Misc 3d 620, 622-623 [Sup Ct, Queens County 2020]. Thus, the interest of justice do not clearly outweigh the protections afforded to defendant under CPL 160.50, since that authority seems to be confined to attorney disciplinary matters and other extraordinary circumstances, which are not present here (see Matter of New York State Commn. on Jud. Conduct v Rubenstein, 23 NY3d at 580; Fernandez v State of New York, 79 Misc 3d 1235[A], *3 [Ct Cl 2023]; compare e.g. Matter of Abrams v Skolnik, 185 AD2d at 408-409 [where the Third Department found that the protected individual waived his privacy rights under CPL 160.50 by commencing a civil tax action, thereby affirmatively placing in issue elements common or related to his prior criminal tax indictment]). Based on this limited record, defendant, herself, has not affirmatively placed in issue elements that are common or related to her prior criminal case involving a traffic infraction.

The Court lastly adds that plaintiff's purported cross-motion is overly broad (cf. Matter of City of Elmira v Doe, 39 AD3d at 945). For these reasons, the Court denies plaintiff's purported cross-motion to unseal defendants' criminal records (see Matter of New York Times Co. v District Attorney of Kings County, 179 AD3d 115, 121-124 [2d Dept 2019]; Matter of City of Elmira v Doe, 39 AD3d at 943-944; Matter of Clark, 87 Misc 3d 1207[A], *22 [Sup Ct, Oneida County 2025]).

D. Defendant's Motion for a Protective Order

Next, the Court denies that branch of defendant's motion, made pursuant to CPLR 3103, barring any further attempt by plaintiff to obtain the sealed records, to preclude taking the testimony of Deputy Tompkins, and to preclude any mention of defendant's alleged intoxication and arrest. Pursuant to CPLR 3103 (a), "[t]he court may . . . make a protective order denying, limiting, conditioning[,] or regulating the use of any disclosure device." "For a protective order to be issued, the party seeking such an order must make a factual showing of 'unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage, or other prejudice'" (Nunez v Peikarian, 208 AD3d at 671, quoting CPLR 3103 [a]; Hartheimer v Clipper, 288 AD2d 263, 263 [2d Dept 2001]).

"Trial courts are vested with broad discretion to issue appropriate protective orders to limit discovery. This discretion is to be exercised with the competing interests of the parties and the truth-finding goal of the discovery process in mind. The supervision of disclosure and the setting of reasonable terms and conditions therefor rests within the sound discretion of the trial court" (C.B. v Park Ave. Pub. Sch., 172 AD3d 980, 981 [2d Dept 2019] [internal quotation marks, brackets, ellipses, and citations omitted]).

Applying the governing legal principles, the Court finds that defendant failed to make the requisite showing, pursuant to CPLR 3103 (a), to warrant the issuance of a protective order to forever bar plaintiff's attempt to obtain the sealed records, to preclude taking the testimony of Deputy Tompkins, and to preclude any mention of defendant's alleged intoxication and arrest. Defendant's criminal records remain sealed at this time and plaintiff may investigate whether he has any other avenues available to unseal defendant's criminal records in the Justice Court of the Town of Southeast. Under the circumstances of this case, the Court holds that defendant failed to make the requisite showing pursuant to CPLR 3103 (a) to warrant the issuance of a protective order (see Nunez v Peikarian, 208 AD3d at 671; Cascardo v Cascardo, 136 AD3d 729, 729-730 [2d Dept [*9]2016]; Hartheimer v Clipper, 288 AD2d at 263). The EBT of Deputy Tompkins should continue until completion; and he should, at minimum, be permitted to testify about what he recollects, subject to objections regarding the sealed criminal records.

Defendant's remaining contention regarding summary dismissal of plaintiff's claim for punitive damages is not properly before this Court in the context of her discovery motion (see generally CPLR 2214; 3212). Thus, the Court declines to address it at this time and denies any relief associated with such claim.

To the extent not specifically mentioned herein, the parties remaining arguments have been examined and determined to be without merit. Any other relief requested that is not squarely addressed herein is either rendered academic or denied based on this decision. Accordingly, it is hereby:

Ordered that the underlying motion of Defendant Christine Bueti for an order, pursuant to CPLR 2304, to quash the So-Ordered Nonparty Judicial Subpoena directed to Deputy Christopher Tompkins of the Putnam County Sheriff's Office (so ordered by this Court on September 12, 2025), is granted in part, as expressly determined herein; and it is further

Ordered that the EBT of the nonparty, Deputy Christopher Tompkins, may proceed forward where he shall be permitted to testify about matters involving the underlying accident only, but not regarding any records and papers in connection with Defendant Christine Bueti's arrest and prosecution in the Justice Court of the Town of Southeast; and it is further

Ordered that the nonparty, Deputy Christopher Tompkins, should not bring or produce any "official records and papers" that are sealed pursuant to the order of the Justice Court of the Town of Southeast in connection with Defendant Christine Bueti's prior criminal case, including, but not limited to, the accident scene photographs, the accident reconstruction report, and any and all police documents underlying the arrest of Defendant Christine Bueti; and it is further

Ordered that that branch of Defendant Christine Bueti's motion, made pursuant to CPLR 3103, for a protective order barring any further attempt by Plaintiff to obtain the sealed records and to preclude taking the testimony of Deputy Tompkins and any mention of Defendant's alleged intoxication and arrest is DENIED in its entirety; and it is further

Ordered that Plaintiff Marvin Espana Ventura's purported cross-motion to unseal Defendant Christine Bueti's prior criminal records is DENIED in its entirety; and it is further

Ordered that Plaintiff Marvin Espana Ventura may submit a proposed amended judicial subpoena to be so ordered in connection with the EBT of Deputy Christopher Tompkins (of the Putnam County Sheriff's Office) that is not inconsistent with this Decision and Order; and it is further

Ordered that the attorneys shall appear for a Compliance Conference before the undersigned on Friday, January 16, 2026, at 10 a.m.

The foregoing decision constitutes the order of the Court.