Pending before the Court is a special proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, brought by Petitioners Roser Communications Network, Inc. d/b/a WUTQ-FM/100.7 and Rocco LaDuca against Respondents County of Oneida, its Records Management Officer Mary Finegan, and its Freedom of Information Law ("FOIL") Appeals Officer Charles Klein. The action was commenced by Verified Petition and Order to Show Cause, filed on November 10, 2025. Petitioners seek to compel Respondents to disclose records pursuant to New York Public Officers Law article 6, §§ 84 et seq. (the FOIL statute) in connection with the investigation and arrest of the current Mayor of the City of Rome, Jeffrey Lanigan, on a charge of Harassment in the Second Degree (see Penal Law § 240.26 [1]), a violation-level offense.

This Court has examined and considered the Petitioners' submissions, including the Verified Petition, the Affirmation of Petitioner Rocco LaDuca with Exhibits 1-10, and the Memorandum of Law Michael J. Grygiel, Esq. (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 1-14). This Court also has examined and considered the papers filed by Respondents, including the Verified Answer and Objections in Point of Law, the Certification of Return of Respondent Mary Finegan with Exhibits A-F, the Affirmation of Respondent Charles Klein, and the Memorandum of Law of Andrew M. Dean, Esq. (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 18-27). In Reply, Petitioners offered another Memorandum of Law from Attorney Grygiel (NYSCEF Doc. No. 39), which this Court also duly considered. In addition, this Court considered an Attorney Affirmation and Memorandum of Law filed by Robert F. Julian, Esq., as counsel for Intervenor Jeffrey Lanigan (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 30-31).

This Court issued two preliminary rulings in this case, both of which were set forth in a letter-form Decision and Order dated November 19, 2025 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 36). First, the Court granted Intervenor status to Rome Mayor Jeffrey Lanigan, the individual facing the charge that is the subject of the instant FOIL request. Second, the Court addressed Petitioners' contention that Respondents and Intervenor should not be permitted to argue that the FOIL exemption in Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (e) (ii) was applicable; on that issue, the Court ruled that it would permit all parties to make their respective arguments on the record at oral argument.

On November 21, 2025, this Court entertained a lengthy oral argument from the parties. During that argument, the Court determined that Respondents had relied upon both Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (e) (i) and Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (e) (ii) in denying Petitioners' FOIL request, and that both exemptions therefore were at play in this proceeding. Additionally, counsel for Petitioners verbally amended Petitioners' FOIL request, now limiting it only a single item—the video surveillance footage of the subject altercation at Teugega Country Club on June 3, 2025—rather than the 62 responsive records previously identified by Respondents. This Court directed Respondents to provide that video footage to the Court for in camera inspection (see e.g. Matter of M. Farbman & Sons, Inc. v New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 62 NY2d 75, [*2]83 [1984] [authorizing the use of in camera inspections in an article 78 FOIL proceeding]). On Tuesday, November 24, 2025, counsel for Respondents provided such footage to this Court for in camera inspection. This Court reviewed the footage that very day.

At the conclusion of oral argument on November 21, 2025, this Court offered counsel an opportunity to file letter memoranda specifically addressing any case law on the interpretation and application of the exemption set forth in Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (e) (ii). The Court made these submissions due December 3, 2025. All three attorneys timely filed such memoranda (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 41-44), and the Court has reviewed same.

In a Letter Order dated December 5, 2025, this Court denied Petitioners' Verified Petition and dismissed the proceeding, concluding "that Respondents appropriately determined that the video in question was exempt from disclosure under FOIL pursuant to both Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (e) (i) and Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (e) (ii), for the reasons stated in the September 22, 2025 appeal denial letter issued by Charles Klein" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 45). The Letter Order advised the parties that this Court would be issuing a decision further expounding upon its logic for this ruling. The instant Decision and Order aims to serve that purpose.

On August 8, 2025, Petitioner Rocco LaDuca submitted a FOIL request to the Records Management Officer for Oneida County, Respondent Mary Finegan. The FOIL request sought all records in the custody and possession of the Oneida County Sheriff's Office, Oneida County District Attorney's Office, and the Oneida County Executive's Office, covering the period from June 3, 2025 to the present, regarding the investigation and arrest of Rome Mayor Jeffrey Lanigan. On September 5, 2025, Respondent Finegan denied Petitioner LaDuca's FOIL request via email, saying that because Mayor Lanigan's case remained pending, the information LaDuca requested "would interfere with a judicial proceeding" and therefore was exempt from FOIL disclosure under Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (e) (i).

On September 8, 2025, within the thirty-day appeal period, Petitioner LaDuca appealed this FOIL denial to Respondent Charles Klein, the FOIL Appeals Officer for Oneida County. On September 22, 2025, Respondent Klein responded by letter to Petitioner LaDuca, affirming the FOIL denial issued by Respondent Finegan. Klein explained his reasoning as follows:

"Disclosure of the requested records at this time would interfere with an active criminal proceeding and risk compromising the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. New York courts, including the Court of Appeals, have consistently held that law enforcement and prosecution-related materials may be withheld under Public Officers Law § 87(2)(e)(i) while a criminal matter remains pending.

In this case, the County reviewed 62 responsive records, which consist of:

• Video footage (surveillance and body-worn camera)

• Photographs

• Communications (emails and similar correspondence)

• Documents (including investigative reports)

Release of these records is barred for the following reasons:

• They describe or depict the events underlying the prosecution, and public release could affect witness memory or testimony.

• Many include witness interviews, the disclosure of which would reveal witness identities and statements prematurely.

• Even where a matter proceeds to a bench trial, premature disclosure risks tainting the [*3]factfinder or creating the appearance of bias, as evidence must be introduced in court under controlled procedures.

Importantly, the potential impact on a jury pool is not the sole factor in evaluating whether disclosure would interfere with judicial proceedings. Even in matters that will not be tried before a jury, premature release of records can compromise the fairness and integrity of the process by exposing the public to information that may later be ruled inadmissible, undermining the management of witnesses and trial strategy, influencing plea negotiations, and prejudicing requests for sealing or other protective measures that may be made during the proceeding.

Further, the law does not require record-by-record particularization in these circumstances. Agencies may articulate, as was done here, the generic categories of records and the risks of disclosure. Each of the concerns identified above presents a substantial risk of undermining the fairness of the pending proceeding, irrespective of whether the matter is ultimately tried before a judge or a jury.

Accordingly, pursuant to Public Officers Law §§ 87(2)(e)(i) and 89(4)(b), your appeal is denied. A copy of this determination is being forwarded to the Committee on Open Government as required by Public Officers Law § 89(4)(a)."

On November 10, 2025, Petitioners commenced this special proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, seeking disclosure of all 62 responsive documents, photographs, communications, and videos identified by Respondent Klein in his FOIL appeal denial letter.^[FN1] Petitioners also seek fees, costs, disbursements, and attorney's fees pursuant to Public Officers Law § 89 (4) (c). Respondents and Intervenor Lanigan have opposed Petitioners' requests. As noted above, this Court heard oral argument on November 21, 2025, then issued a Letter Order on December 5, 2025.

On the morning of December 12, 2025, after this Court issued its Letter Order but prior to the issuance of this Decision and Order, Intervenor Lanigan appeared with counsel in Rome City Court and pleaded guilty to Harassment in the Second Degree, the sole charge pending against him. As part of the plea, civil litigation brought by former Rome Mayor James Brown, the victim of Mayor Lanigan's harassment, was dismissed. The same day, several media members, including Petitioner LaDuca, filed new FOIL requests with Respondents County of Oneida and Finegan seeking the subject video footage. In response, Respondents provided Petitioner LaDuca (and other media outlets) with such footage. According to counsel for Respondents, the conclusion of the proceedings in Rome City Court, along with Intervenor Lanigan consenting to Respondents' release of the footage, led Respondents to determine "that the release of the video would no longer jeopardize a pending judicial proceeding or deprive [Lanigan] of his right to a fair trial" (see Letter of Attorney Dean, NYSCEF Doc. No. 49).

Although Petitioners now have received the surveillance footage they asked this Court to direct release of pursuant to FOIL, and although that new development moots this proceeding (see infra Section III.B.), this Court nevertheless will issue a decision on the merits. Addressing this issue on the merits is necessary to give the parties the clarification this Court previously [*4]promised in its December 5, 2025 Letter Order and to provide much-needed clarity on the law, particularly related to Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (e) (ii).

FOIL, as codified in article 6 of the Public Officers Law, "is based on a presumption of access in accordance with the underlying 'premise that the public is vested with an inherent right to know and that official secrecy is anathematic to our form of government'" (Matter of Madeiros v New York State Educ. Dept., 30 NY3d 67, 73 [2017], quoting Matter of Fink v Lefkowitz, 47 NY2d 567, 571 [1979]). Consequently, "FOIL generally requires government agencies to make available for public inspection and copying all records subject to a number of exemptions'" (Madeiros, 30 NY3d at 73, quoting Matter of Harbatkin v New York City Dept. of Records & Info. Servs., 19 NY3d 373, 379 [2012]). "The exemptions set forth in the statute are interpreted narrowly in order to effect the purpose of the statutory scheme" (Madeiros, 30 NY3d at 73).

Public Officers Law § 87 (2) sets forth the exemptions to FOIL disclosure under which an agency can deny access to certain records. Two such exemptions are potentially applicable in this case: Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (e) (i), which exempts from disclosure records "compiled for law enforcement purposes . . . to the extent that disclosure would interfere with law enforcement investigations or judicial proceedings" (hereinafter, "the investigation or judicial proceeding exemption"); and Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (e) (ii), which exempts from disclosure records "compiled for law enforcement purposes . . . to the extent that disclosure would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication" (hereinafter, "the fair trial exemption"). These exemptions are a creature of statute in New York State, having been passed by the Assembly and Senate and signed by the Governor. Although the Court of Appeals has ruled that "'FOIL is to be liberally construed and its exemptions narrowly interpreted so that the public is granted maximum access to the records of government'" (Matter of Newsday, Inc. v Sise, 71 NY2d 146, 150 [1987], quoting Matter of Capital Newspapers v Whalen, 69 NY2d 246, 252 [1987]), there is little doubt that these exemptions are included in the FOIL statute for a reason.

The subject exemptions are modeled after comparable exemptions found in the federal counterpart to FOIL, the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") (see 5 USC §§ 552 [b] [7] [A]-[B]). Looking to federal law for guidance is especially helpful in this case because the legislative history and case law related to Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (e) (ii) is virtually nonexistent. Notably, the FOIA counterpart to Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (e) (ii)—5 USC § 552 (b) (7) (B)—has been addressed by federal courts. This federal statute exempts from FOIA disclosure: "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes . . . to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information . . . would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication" (5 USC § 552 [b] [7] [B]). This language is identical, for all relevant purposes, to the exemption set forth in Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (e) (ii).

In a case of first impression regarding the interpretation of 5 USC § 552 (b) (7) (B), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in Washington Post Co. v United States Dept. of Justice (863 F 2d 96 [1988]), observed: "In framing a test [for this exemption], we write on a virtually clean slate. Few courts have decided (7) (B) questions and the legislative history on this provision is scant. The wording of the statute is all Congress has given us to work with" (id. at 101). The same appears to be true here with respect to Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (e) (ii); the text of the statute is, at this point, all this Court can work with.

Despite the absence of prior guidance, the D.C. Circuit, in the Washington Post case, set forth a two-part test for determining when the fair trial exemption applies.

"Today, we hold that to withstand a challenge to the applicability of (7) (B) the government bears the burden of showing: (1) that a trial or adjudication is pending or truly imminent; and (2) that it is more probable than not that disclosure of the material sought would seriously interfere with the fairness of those proceedings. Where the government is denying access to material generated by someone else, as here, the government must be able to confirm, to its own satisfaction, whether by affidavit or otherwise, that (1) and (2) above are satisfied" (id. at 102).

Although the Court in Washington Post remitted the matter for factual findings related to this test, it did note that facts relevant to this inquiry would include whether "any criminal proceedings [are] pending or imminent" and whether any related civil litigation remains open (id.). This two-part test has been cited with approval and applied in later federal cases interpreting 5 USC § 552 (b) (7) (B), as well (see e.g. Chiquita Brands Intl., Inc. v SEC, 805 F 3d 289, 294 [DC Cir 2015]; New York Times Co. v United States Dept. of Justice, 2017 WL 4712636, at *8 [SDNY 2017]; Dow Jones Co., Inc. v FERC, 219 FRD 167, 174 [CD Cal 2003]).

The investigation or judicial proceeding exemption under Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (e) (i), by contrast, has received greater judicial attention over the years. In Madeiros, the Court of Appeals described this exemption as requiring a two-part analysis: "(1) whether the records were compiled for law enforcement purposes; and (2) whether disclosure of the records would interfere with law enforcement investigations or judicial proceedings" (Madeiros, 30 NY3d at 75). In several relevant cases involving pending prosecutions, discussed immediately below, appellate courts have upheld agency decisions denying record access.

In Pittari v Pirro (258 AD2d 202 [2d Dept 1999]), the Second Department held that a District Attorney's Office "properly denied" FOIL disclosure of documents "pertaining to the arrest and prosecution" of the petitioner's client, under Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (e) (i), because the subject criminal action remained pending, meaning "a generic determination could be made that disclosure under FOIL would cause interference" (id. at 206).

The First Department ruled similarly in Matter of Legal Aid Society v New York City Police Dept. (274 AD2d 207 [1st Dept 2000]), upholding the NYPD's denial of FOIL requests brought by "defendants in pending criminal prosecutions" who were seeking "records compiled by the [NYPD] in connection with their prosecutions" (id. at 209). The Court, citing Pittari, explained that an agency stating that the disclosure of records related to "a pending criminal prosecution would interfere with that proceeding is a sufficiently particularized justification for the denial of access to those records under Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (e) (i)" (id. at 214). The Court added: "We also agree with the Second Department's holding in Pittari that 'a generic determination' could be made that disclosure under FOIL of documents pertaining to a petitioner's arrest and prosecution would interfere with the pending criminal proceeding" (id.).

In two other cases, appellate courts found that the Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (e) (i) exemption could be applied to deny FOIL disclosure even when the criminal trial in question was complete, but the prosecution remained pending on appeal (see Matter of Crowe v Guccione, 171 AD3d 1170, 1172 [2d Dept 2019] [citing Pittari, the Court ruled that a District Attorney's Office's denial of a criminal defendant's FOIL request for medical records used in his prosecution, made after he was convicted but while his appeal was pending, was appropriate [*5]under Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (e) (i)]; Matter of Whitley v New York County Dist. Attorney's Off., 101 AD3d 455, 455 [1st Dept 2012] [where petitioner sought "certain documents concerning the investigation and prosecution of a crime for which petitioner was convicted," the Court upheld the denial of a FOIL request, stating that the agency "correctly determined that disclosure of the requested documents would have interfered with petitioner's then-pending criminal appeal and any subsequent proceedings in the underlying criminal case"]).

To establish that documents or records were "compiled for law enforcement purposes," the "agency must establish a rational nexus between the agency's activity in compiling the documents and 'its law enforcement duties'" (Brennan Ctr. for Justice v Dept. of Homeland Security, 331 F Supp 3d 74, 97 [SDNY 2018], quoting Keys v United States Dept. of Justice, 880 F 2d 337, 340 [D.C. Cir. 1987]). Information gathered while investigating a crime generally will satisfy the requirement that such information was "compiled for law enforcement purposes" (see Keys, 880 F 2d at 340-343 [discussing broad scope of this phrase with respect to the documents at issue in that case]). When law enforcement gathers surveillance footage as part of a criminal investigation, such footage will be deemed "compiled for law enforcement purposes" (see Gun Owners of Am., Inc. v Fed. Bur. of Investigation, 2024 WL 195829, at *3 [DDC 2024]).

The agency denying access under FOIL "carries the burden of demonstrating that the exemption applies to the FOIL request," and it must do so "in more than just a 'plausible fashion'" (Matter of Data Tree, LLC v Romaine, 9 NY3d 454, 462 [2007]). The agency "must show that the requested information 'falls squarely within a FOIL exemption by articulating a particularized and specific justification for denying access'" (id. at 462-463, quoting Matter of Capital Newspapers v Burns, 67 NY2d 562, 566 [1986]). Where an agency relies upon Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (e) (i), however, it need only "identify the generic kinds of documents for which the exemption is claimed, and the generic risks posed by disclosure of these categories of documents" (Matter of Lesher v Hynes, 19 NY3d 57, 67 [2012]). In other words, although the agency must "articulate a factual basis for the exemption," a generic identification of the types of risks disclosure may pose is sufficient for Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (e) (i) purposes (id.). Thus, "in the case of a pending criminal investigation or prosecution, a law enforcement agency is not required to make a specific evidentiary showing relating to the likelihood that disclosure of records would pose any unique or unusual danger of interference in the individual case that is the subject of the request" (Abdur-Rashid v New York City Police Dept., 31 NY3d 217, 226-227 [2018] [emphasis added]).

In an article 78 proceeding challenging the denial of a FOIL request, the standard of review is whether such denial "'was affected by an error of law'" (Mulgrew v Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of NY, 87 AD3d 506, 507 [1st Dept 2011], quoting CPLR 7803 [3]).

As an initial observation, this Court finds it telling how far the legislature went to guard against FOIL disclosures interfering with judicial proceedings. In Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (e) (i), the legislature shielded from disclosure any law enforcement records that would interfere with "judicial proceedings." Then, in Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (e) (ii), the legislature added that law enforcement records that would "deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication" likewise are shielded from disclosure. The legislature's use of three different phrases to codify these protections—interference with "judicial proceedings," "right to a fair trial," and "right to [an] impartial adjudication"—suggests that the legislature took very [*6]seriously the need to protect information relating to pending court proceedings. Thus, although FOIL should be approached with a presumption in favor of disclosure (see Madeiros, 30 NY3d at 73), that must be balanced against the fact that the legislature has indicated an unequivocal intent to protect the fairness and impartiality of judicial proceedings, trials, and adjudications.

The Court observes that even though the trial in question (Intervenor Lanigan's trial in Rome City Court) did not involve a jury, the FOIL exemptions here are not limited to jury trials, instead referring more broadly to "judicial proceedings," "trials," and "adjudications." Each of these terms could encompass a bench trial, as none are limited only to jury trials (see Black's Law Dictionary [12th ed 2024], judicial proceeding ["Any court proceeding; any proceeding initiated to procure an order or decree, whether in law or in equity"]; id., trial [defining numerous types of trial, including both jury trials and bench trials]; id., adjudication ["The legal process of resolving a dispute; the process of judicially deciding a case"]). Contrary to Petitioners' argument, therefore, the fact that the proceeding to which the records relate did not involve a jury does not mean that these exemptions are any less applicable or relevant.

Turning to the two exemptions relied upon by Respondents (see Public Officers Law §§ 87 [2] [e] [i]-[ii]), the Court finds that Respondents' determination that such exemptions applied was not affected by any errors of law. The parties do not dispute that the subject surveillance footage was gathered by the police as part of their investigation into the Lanigan-Brown altercation and was then provided to the prosecution to use in their case against Intervenor Lanigan. As such, the subject video footage constitutes a record "compiled for law enforcement purposes" (see Gun Owners of Am., 2024 WL 195829 at *3). This satisfies the first prong of the Madeiros two-prong test for Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (e) (i). It also satisfies the "law enforcement purpose" requirement for the fair trial exemption (Public Officers Law § 87 [2] [e] [ii]).

Likewise, there is no dispute that at the time the instant FOIL application was brought, at the time it was denied by Respondents, at the time Petitioners commenced this proceeding, and at the time this proceeding was argued before this Court, "a trial or adjudication [was] pending or truly imminent," as required under the first prong of the fair trial exemption test (Washington Post, 863 F 2d at 102). Petitioner LaDuca brought the FOIL request on August 8, 2025, roughly four months before Intervenor Lanigan's trial was to begin on December 12, 2025. Respondents' first denial was issued on September 5, 2025, about three months before trial, and Respondents' second denial was issued on September 22, 2025, about two-and-one-half months before trial. Petitioners brought this article 78 proceeding on November 10, 2025, one month prior to Intervenor Lanigan's trial. When this Court heard oral argument on November 21, 2025, the trial was only three weeks away. By any measure, the trial in question was both "pending" and "truly imminent."

The disputed issues here, therefore, arise under the second prongs of the respective tests for these two exemptions, namely "whether disclosure of the records would interfere with law enforcement investigations or judicial proceedings" for purposes of Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (e) (i) (Madeiros, 30 NY3d at 75) and whether "it is more probable than not that disclosure of the material sought would seriously interfere with the fairness of" the pending trial or adjudication for purposes of Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (e) (ii) (Washington Post, 863 F 2d at 102).

The Court concludes that Respondents met their burden of showing, for purposes of Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (e) (i), that disclosure of the surveillance footage would "interfere [*7]with" Intervenor Lanigan's "judicial proceeding" in Rome City Court. The reasoning articulated in the September 22, 2025 letter from Respondent Klein, in this Court's estimation, adequately identified "the generic kinds of documents for which the exemption [was] claimed, and the generic risks posed by disclosure of these categories of documents" (Lesher, 19 NY3d at 67). Specifically, Klein noted that release of the footage "could affect witness memory or testimony," could "risk[] tainting the factfinder or creating the appearance of bias," could "undermin[e] the management of witnesses and trial strategy," and could "prejudice[e] requests for sealing or other protective measures that may be made during the proceeding" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 25). Pointing out these sorts of generalized risks suffices, as Respondents did not need to prove that such risks necessarily would occur "in th[is] individual case" (Abdur-Rashid, 31 NY3d at 227).

This Court finds that the risks with which Respondents were concerned were valid. If a witness were to see the subject surveillance footage prior to testifying, it is conceivable that doing so could change that witness's testimony or alter what they believed they remembered. Relatedly, the attorneys conceivably could have to change their strategies in terms of how they approach questioning such witnesses, knowing that such witnesses likely would have had the opportunity to view the footage prior to testifying. For example, impeachment of such witnesses' memories, through use of the video footage, may have to be approached in a different manner. Moreover, if Intervenor Lanigan proceeded to trial and was acquitted, the video footage would be subject to automatic sealing under CPL 160.50, but if the footage were publicly released prior to trial, Intervenor Lanigan's right to sealing of that footage would be undermined.

For the same reasons, the Court finds that Petitioners have shown that it was "more probable than not that disclosure of the material sought would seriously interfere with the fairness of" Intervenor Lanigan's then-pending trial, for purposes of Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (e) (ii) (Washington Post, 863 F 2d at 102). The above-stated concerns regarding influencing witness testimony and memory, the possibility of influencing the factfinder, the possibility of the attorneys needing to change their trial strategies, and the possibility of interfering with sealing requirements in the event of acquittal, also posed serious risks of depriving Intervenor Lanigan of a fair trial. As such, denial under the fair trial exemption likewise was appropriate.

The arguments of Petitioners to the contrary are unavailing. The Court will address these arguments in turn. First, Petitioners contend that the areas of concern cited by Respondents were too conclusory, speculative, and generalized in nature to meet Respondents' burden for denying FOIL disclosure. On this score, Petitioners note that Respondents could not say with any degree of certainty that these concerns would come to fruition—only that they could possibly occur. As noted above, however, it was enough for Respondents to articulate "the generic risks posed by disclosure" (Lesher, 19 NY3d at 67), and Respondents did not need to definitively establish that the potential risks they identified necessarily would occur in this "individual case" (Abdur-Rashid, 31 NY3d at 227). Moreover, in assessing whether disclosure would "interfere with . . . judicial proceedings" (Public Officers Law § 87 [2] [e] [i]) or "deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication" (Public Officers Law § 87 [2] [e] [ii]), an agency always must engage in some degree of prognostication, because nobody ever can be certain how a judicial proceeding will unfold. Trials are inherently unpredictable. Without a crystal ball, an agency's stated reasons for denying disclosure under these exemptions will always be somewhat speculative. Thus, if the agency's stated reasons for fearing interference and/or stated reasons for concern about the fairness of a trial are reasonably conceivable, nothing more can be demanded.

Second, Petitioners argue that disclosing the subject footage could not possibly raise the [*8]risk of biasing or influencing the trier of fact—here the judge—at Intervenor Lanigan's trial. They submit, without support, that the judge already saw the footage and could not possibly be influenced by its public disclosure. In addition to being unsupported by any proof, this contention also fails to account for the reality that judges are human and are not necessarily immune from being influenced by pretrial exposure to evidence and from public pressure that may result from the public disclosure, prior to trial, of certain evidence (cf. People v Suazo, 120 AD3d 1270, 1272 [2d Dept 2014] [noting that "judges are human" and are "not immune from psychological and unconscious influences"]; People v Clifford, 82 Misc 3d 1068, 1085 [Sup Ct, NY County 2024] [noting that "judges do not function like machines . . . , but rather are cognizant of, and governed by, countless human variables"]).

Third, Petitioners assert that because Intervenor Lanigan's trial was to be conducted before a judge, rather than a jury, the possibility that disclosure would interfere with the trial or risk depriving Lanigan of a fair trial was somehow lessened or nonexistent. As this Court explained above, however, Public Officers Law §§ 87 (2) (e) (i)-(ii) are not limited to jury trials, but instead collectively cover trials, adjudications, and judicial proceedings, terms that are broad enough to encompass a nonjury trial. In other words, the fact that the proceeding to which the video footage relates did not involve a jury does not mean that the exemptions relied upon by Respondents are any less applicable or relevant.

Fourth, Petitioners argue that the disclosure of the surveillance video is needed to balance the public narrative because Intervenor Lanigan released a public statement providing his own account of the altercation with former Mayor Brown. This argument fails on both legal and factual bases. Legally, nothing permits this Court, on review of a FOIL denial, to consider or decide whether the "public narrative" about a certain incident has received a "balanced" or "skewed" treatment in local media. In any event, this Court rejects as dubious Petitioners' factual claim that the public narrative as to this incident is unbalanced. It is true that on June 4, 2025, Intervenor Lanigan released a public statement on City of Rome letterhead in which he provided his account of the June 3, 2025 interaction with former Mayor Brown (see NYSCEF Doc. No. 5). It is also true, however, that former Mayor Brown made a Supporting Deposition to police that was publicly reported, and that Petitioners had Mayor Brown on their Radio Show, Talk of the Town, on several occasions to discuss the incident. From the Court's perspective, both parties to this incident appear to have had their respective sides of the story adequately covered in the media.

Fifth, Petitioners argue that releasing the subject video footage would improve witnesses' memories, credibility, and reliability, thereby serving to safeguard the truth of testimony offered at trial. The problem with this argument is that the trial judge, as the trier of fact, is the one tasked with assessing witness credibility, and should be free to make that determination without any witness having had their natural memory bolstered prior to trial. In other words, the likelihood that witnesses may be influenced or have their memory refreshed prior to testifying is a reason why the video should not be disclosed prior to trial—not a reason why it should. The video could be introduced into evidence at trial and used to impeach witnesses or correct their mistaken memory about what transpired, as needed, but releasing it prior to trial would potentially undermine that typical process of questioning, cross-examination, and impeachment.

Sixth, and similarly, Petitioners contend that releasing the surveillance footage would not be likely to influence witness testimony because any reasonable attorney, in preparing their respective witnesses for trial, would review that footage with such witnesses. The issue, [*9]however, is not just that the footage would be publicly disclosed; the issue is that the footage would be analyzed, critiqued, opined on, and commented on across local media platforms, including on Petitioners' radio show and associated Facebook page. Releasing such footage would risk not just that trial witnesses might see the footage prior to trial—which indeed they might do anyway—but also that trial witnesses may see or hear media and public commentary regarding what that footage shows, what it does not show, and how it should be interpreted, both legally and factually. The risk in terms of potential influence of witnesses, in other words, goes far beyond the mere release of the video footage itself.

Finally, Petitioners argue that the reasons offered by Respondents for denying their FOIL request are insufficient because the County's FOIL officers did not have "direct knowledge of the judicial proceeding at issue," thus rendering their stated concerns speculative and conclusory. On this point, Petitioners cite New York Times Co. v New York State Exec. Chamber (57 Misc 3d 405, 419-422 [Sup Ct, Albany County 2017]), in which the court found an agency's bases for denying a FOIL application to be "speculative" rather than "factual" where the agency had "no personal knowledge of prosecutorial strategy" and lacked "access to the necessary information concerning the prosecutor's case." Under the facts of the instant case, however, this Court finds Petitioners' analogy to the New York Times case to be strained.

As Counsel for Petitioner stated in the Verified Petition (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1) and Petitioner LaDuca stated in his affirmation (NYSCEF Doc. No. 3), the Special Prosecutor for Intervenor Lanigan's case, Jeffrey Carpenter,^[FN2] "agreed to allow Oneida County to respond to FOIL requests for the video footage in accordance with the County's standard procedures" because "his office lacked the technology required" to process the video for potential redactions (see id. at ¶ 11; see also NYSCEF Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 25). Thus, Special Prosecutor Carpenter, by delegating his role, put Respondents in the position of having to respond to this FOIL request. Where, as here, the prosecutor abdicated his role by delegating the FOIL response to another agency, Petitioners should not be able to use the fact of such delegation to criticize the agency's lack of personal knowledge of the case. In other words, the person who did have personal knowledge about the case chose to let an agency with less knowledge about the case respond to the FOIL request; in this Court's view, that fact should not, by itself, mandate disclosure.

In the end, this Court agrees with Respondents and Intervenor Lanigan that if Respondents had released the surveillance footage, there is a realistic likelihood that doing so would have interfered with Intervenor's right to a fair trial. The Court has reviewed the [*10]surveillance footage, which depicts the precise act which is the subject of the charge against Intervenor Lanigan; that footage was going to be the crucial piece of evidence at trial. A right to a fair trial is the sine qua non of our judicial system. That right encompasses other rights, including the right to an impartial factfinder, the presumption of innocence, the right to a public trial, the right to a speedy trial, the right to counsel, the right to be notified of charges, the right to present evidence, the right to confront witnesses, and the right to remain silent. Disclosing this video footage, the key piece of evidence in this case, just prior to trial, would invite public commentary, dissection, analysis, and internet play-by-play. In this Court's view, providing the public with that opportunity just prior to trial would run a serious risk of interfering with a judicial proceeding and depriving Intervenor of a fair trial. Although the exact manner in which release of the video might interfere with Intervenor's right to a fair trial is difficult to specifically predict and articulate, the risk of such interference, in this Court's estimation, is conspicuous and unmistakable. In the immortal words of Justice Potter Stewart, this Court knows a risk to a fair trial when it sees it.

This Court has elected to resolve this issue on the merits for the benefit of the parties, and to more fully explain the reasoning underlying its December 4, 2025 Letter Order. This Court also believes that addressing this issue on the merits will benefit other litigants who may confront similar FOIL cases in the future. This Court would be remiss, however, if it did not recognize that this proceeding recently has been rendered moot. As noted above, Respondents Oneida County and Finegan disclosed the subject footage on December 12, 2025, in response to new FOIL requests from Petitioner LaDuca and other media outlets (see NYSCEF Doc. No. 49). The Court notes that the video was being played on local news outlets and covered by local print media that very day, a fact about which this Court is entitled to take judicial notice (see e.g. Matter of Betthi S., 43 Misc 3d 1226[A], at *3 [Fam Ct, Kings County 2014]; Pamela H. v Cordell W., Jr., 12 Misc 3d 1159[A], at *2 [Fam Ct, Monroe County 2006]).^[FN3]

Under these circumstances, Petitioners' current proceeding has been rendered moot (see Prisoners' Legal Serv. of New York v New York State Dept. of Corr. and Community Supervision, 209 AD3d 1208, 1210-1211 [3d Dept 2022] [petitioner's FOIL request for video footage was denied, but the footage later was released during the pendency of petitioner's article 78 proceeding challenging that FOIL denial; under those circumstances, the article 78 proceeding was deemed moot]; DeFreitas v New York State Police Crime Lab, 141 AD3d 1043, 1044 [3d Dept 2016] ["Where a petitioner receives an adequate response to a FOIL request during the pendency of his or her CPLR article 78 proceeding, the proceeding should be dismissed as moot because a determination will not affect the rights of the parties"]).

This Court denies Petitioners' request for attorney's fees. In the context presented here, [*11]this Court can award attorney's fees only if Petitioners have "substantially prevailed and the court finds that the agency had no reasonable basis for denying access" (Public Officers Law § 89 [4] [c]; see Beechwood Restorative Ctr. v Signor, 11 AD3d 987, 988 [4th Dept 2004], affd 5 NY3d 435 [2005]). "Even if the party meets those requirements, the award of attorney's fees remains discretionary with Supreme Court" (Beechwood, 11 AD3d at 988). Here, Petitioners have not substantially prevailed, and this Court has concluded that Respondents had reasonable bases for denying access, so an award of attorney's fees is not warranted.

For the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes that Respondents met their burden of proving that their denials of Petitioners' FOIL request were appropriate under the exemptions in Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (e) (i) and Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (e) (ii). Now, therefore, in accordance with the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED that the Verified Petition (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1) and Order to Show Cause (NYSCEF Motion #01) are DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that this proceeding is DISMISSED with prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED that Petitioners' request for attorney's fees is DENIED.

This shall constitute the Decision and Order. The original Decision and Order is returned to Assistant County Attorney Dean, on behalf of Respondents. All other papers are being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing. The signing of this Decision and Order does not constitute entry or filing under CPLR 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable provisions of that rule with respect to filing, entry, and notice of entry.