On May 27, 2024, defendant was arrested and charged with one count each of Vehicle and Traffic Law ("VTL") §§ 1192 (2) (driving while intoxicated, per se), 1192 (3) and driving while intoxicated (common law), both misdemeanors, and 1192 (1) (driving while impaired), a violation.

On September 5, 2024, the People consented to pre-trial hearings pursuant to Dunaway v New York, 442 US 200 (1979), People v Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 (1965), Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961), and pursuant to VTL § 1194.

On November 1, 2024, the Dunaway/Huntley/Mapp/VTL § 1194 hearings were held. The People called two witnesses, Sergeant ("Sgt') Wayne Darden and Police Officer ("Officer") Richard Dashi, whom the Court found to be credible witnesses. The defense did not call any witnesses. For the reasons stated herein:

1. The Dunaway motion is DENIED;

2. The Huntley motion is DENIED;

3. The Mapp motion is DENIED; and

4. The VTL § 1194 motion is DENIED.

Sgt. Wayne Darden, shield number 3291, has been employed by the NYPD for 11 years, the last two of which he has been assigned to the 43rd Precinct. Sgt. Darden has been the arresting officer in approximately 64 arrests and participated and/or assisted in approximately 100 arrests, approximately 30 of which involved intoxicated driving. He has observed someone consume alcohol both in his professional and personal capacity (see Tr. November 1, 2024 at 8:24, 9:2). On May 27, 2024, at approximately 8:15 p.m., weather conditions were dry, and the area lit by artificial streetlamps when, while out on patrol with his partner, Officer Farrell, Sgt. [*2]Darden stopped defendant at 348 White Plains Road, Bronx, NY after observing her drive a black Subaru SUV through a steady red light (see Tr. November 1, 2024 at 12:18, 14:3-25, 16:19-21). Defendant had been traveling westbound on O'Brien Avenue when she made a right hand turn to White Plains Road traveling northbound (see Tr. November 1, 2024 at 16:25, 17:1).

After Sgt. Darden approached the vehicle, he repeatedly asked the driver to roll down the windows and he observed that "the defendant's processing seemed a bit slower. She dropped it a little bit and she was directed to drop it a little further, the window" (see Tr. November 1, 2024 at 18:12-15). Defendant's eyes were bloodshot and watery, and Sgt. Darden found that "her processes regarding following simple commands was a bit delayed" (see Tr. November 1, 2024 at 18:21-23). Defendant's vehicle appeared damaged because her passenger side mirror was hanging off and "had indications of a recent accident" including "scraping alongside of the passenger side door" (see Tr. November 1, 2024 at 19:12-15, 19).

At the time of the encounter, defendant was not under arrest and Sgt. Darden determined that defendant, identified as Tameka Ferguson, was operating the motor vehicle he had stopped because she was behind the wheel and the ignition was running (see Tr. November 1, 2024 at 19:25, 20:1-2, 6-7, 28:25). When Sgt. Darden attempted to ascertain defendant's identification, her "response time was significantly delayed when it came to following simple commands" and she was asked to exit the vehicle (see Tr. November 1, 2024 at 21:1-8). Defendant's speech was slow, and Sgt. Darden noticed a strong odor of alcohol on her breath from less than a foot away (see Tr. November 1, 2024 at 21:4, 15-19).

The People introduced Sgt. Darden's Body Worn Camera ("BWC") recording of the interaction that took place between defendant and the police at the time and place of occurrence (People's Exhibit 1). The footage depicts Sgt. Darden approaching the car while defendant is behind the wheel and repeatedly asking defendant to lower her window. When Sgt. Darden asks defendant for her identification, she appears flummoxed as she searches through her pockets and the center console and looks at and scrolls her phone before offering Sgt. Darden first a hanging car window flag and then what he describes as a laundry card. After several attempts to obtain defendant's license, she is directed to exit and stand at the rear of her vehicle, and she asks Sgt. Darden and Officer Farrell if she could call her mother. In response to the officers' repeated requests for identification defendant, still appearing flummoxed, states that she was on her way to do laundry. After defendant provides her name and address to Sgt. Darden, and he asks her if she had anything to drink, defendant states that she had a Bacardi Black. Almost 14 minutes after the initial car stop, defendant was unable to produce a license and was placed under arrest. Based upon the odor emanating from her breath and the statement she made about having imbibed one drink prior to driving, Sgt. Darden believed defendant had committed the offense of driving while under the influence (see Tr. November 1, 2024 at 30:20-25, 31:2-3).

Officer Richard Dashi, shield number 2676, has been employed by the NYPD for two years and assigned to the 43rd Precinct as a patrol officer. He has been the arresting officer in approximately 64 arrests and participated and/or assisted in approximately 66 arrests, approximately 10 of which involved intoxicated driving. Officer Dashi received eight hours of training by the NYPD regarding recognizing intoxication, he was trained on the operation of a breathalyzer, and has observed someone consume alcohol in his professional and personal capacity (see Tr. November 1, 2024 at 36:2-4, 10-13). On the date of the incident, Officer Dashi was notified by his supervisor, Sgt. Darden, that he was going to be the arresting officer on a suspected DWI case, and upon his arrival, he spoke to defendant and advised her that he would [*3]transport her to the Intoxicated Driver Testing Unit ("IDTU") (see Tr. November 1, 2024 at 39:7-9, 40:13-14). Officer Dashi observed that "defendant was slow to answer simple questions," that she had bloodshot and watery eyes, and that she was "a little unstable on her feet" when she exited the police vehicle (see Tr. November 1, 2024 at 40:17-18, 41:2-3, 8-10).

The People introduced Officer Dashi's BWC recording of the interaction that took place between defendant and the police at the 43rd Precinct (People's Exhibit 2). The footage depicts Officer Dashi transporting defendant to the precinct. Officer Dashi observed defendant to be nervous and to have "trouble getting certain words out," and he noticed the smell of alcohol inside of the police vehicle after defendant got in (see Tr. November 1, 2024 at 49:20-25, 50:5-8). When Officer Dashi made these observations, defendant was an arm's length away, seated behind him on the driver's side (see Tr. November 1, 2024 at 49:20-25, 50:5-8, 13-14). Defendant was read her rights regarding the chemical breath test, which was offered at "9:40ish," and she agreed to take the test which was administered by Officer Lybchenko "around 9:47" (see Tr. November 1, 2024 at 54:9, 23, 55:1, 4-10). Officer Dashi testified that based upon his training and observations, he was of the opinion that defendant was intoxicated while driving (see Tr. November 1, 2024 at 55:20-21).

The People next introduced the video of the interaction with defendant in the IDTU room at the 43rd Precinct (People's Exhibit 3). Officer Lybchenko is depicted explaining to defendant how the breathalyzer machine works and demonstrating to defendant how to hold the mouthpiece. Defendant is compliant, asks questions about the functioning of the machine and then blows until directed to stop by Officer Lybchenko, who announces the result was .152 blood alcohol content ("BAC"). As Officer Dashi administers Miranda warnings to defendant, she responds that she understands, and then in response to questioning states that she was en route to buy laundry detergent, she had only been driving for two seconds before she was stopped, she had a double shot of Bacardi neat, which she began drinking at 4-5:00 p.m., she had eaten fish and rice, she had not taken any drugs, including insulin, and she had no disabilities nor did her vehicle have any malfunctioning. The test concluded at 10:02 p.m.

Defendant avers that officers lacked probable cause to arrest her for driving while intoxicated. Defendant contends that where the prosecution bears the burden for establishing the legality of the arrest, the People failed to present evidence to demonstrate that defendant's ability to drive was impaired. Defendant argues that the record is devoid of any evidence of Sgt. Darden's training and experience concerning recognizing the indicia of driving while intoxicated. Defendant maintains that Sgt. Darden's sole pretext for arresting defendant was that he smelled alcohol and defendant admitted that she had had one drink. After observing defendant for approximately 20 minutes, without confirming whether she had eaten or slept, or quantifying how much alcohol was in her one drink, defendant was arrested. Thus, defendant argues that the People have failed to satisfy controlling precedent which provides that mere consumption of alcohol is not enough to create probable cause for impairment.

Next, defendant states that the BWC footage provides no evidence that defendant was impaired because her gait was not unsteady, and she was polite and honest. Moreover, defendant asserts that Sgt. Darden's belief that defendant was slow to respond to his commands is also not evidence that her motor skills were impaired where the record lacks any testimony by Sgt. Darden that defendant's speech was slurred, or that she failed to follow his orders and where the police elected not to perform field sobriety tests nor request a portable breath test ("PBT") at the [*4]scene. Defendant further contends that her purported slowness in presenting her license to the officers is not presumptively evidence of guilt where she was nervous because she was being questioned by two officers. Defendant further argues that testimony that defendant was speeding or turning from lanes without signaling is not dispositive of whether her ability to drive was impaired by one drink, nor was damage to her vehicle evidence of intoxication.

Lastly, defendant contends that the statements she made while standing outside of her vehicle after being directed to exit her car should be suppressed because the officers interrogated defendant without issuing her Miranda rights. Specifically, defendant asserts that Sgt. Darden and Officer Farrell directed defendant to place her back against her car and keep her hands out of her pockets while repeatedly demanding her identification, and then asking defendant if she had anything to drink because they were suspicious and that these actions constituted a custodial stop where defendant was nervous and felt that she was not free to leave the scene.

The People maintain that police had probable cause to arrest based upon the observations made by Sgt. Darden. Initially, the police had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's vehicle because she was observed driving through a red light. Next, Sgt. Darden observed defendant's passenger side mirror hanging off the side as if recently damaged, and defendant was in the driver's seat while the car ignition running. Further, Sgt. Darden smelled a strong odor of alcohol on defendant's breath, she admitted to having a Bacardi drink and she struggled with answering simple questions such as the officers' request for identification. Consequently, the prosecution argues that given the totality of circumstances there was probable cause to arrest defendant.

Concerning defendant's Huntley challenge, the People assert that defendant was lawfully stopped after she was observed committing a traffic infraction and, thus, her temporary detainment was not a custodial stop which warranted Miranda rights.

The People have the burden of presenting sufficient evidence of reasonable cause to show the legality of police conduct at suppression hearings (see People v Baldwin, 25 NY2d 66 [1969]; People v Malinsky, 15 NY2d 86 [1965]). This burden is met when they present credible evidence and facts- not just conclusions or beliefs of their witnesses (see People v Berrios, 28 NY2d 361 [1971]). Moreover, the People must demonstrate that the circumstances surrounding the officer's observations provided the officer with the authority to act. Once the People meet their initial burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, the illegality of the police conduct in question (see People v Berrios, supra). Illegally obtained evidence is inadmissible at trial (see Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 [1961]).

As a threshold matter, the determination of whether someone has driven or is driving while intoxicated is informed by whether it is "more probable than not that the defendant [was] actually impaired" and an arrest for driving while intoxicated is lawful if there is evidence that an officer has determined that there is reasonable cause to believe that the driver was intoxicated (see People v Vandover, 20 NY3d 235, 239 [2012]). However, it is well-settled that conduct which is equally compatible with guilt or innocence will not suffice to establish probable cause for the arrest (see People v Carrasquillo, 54 NY2d 248, 254 [1981]).

In determining whether the People have established that the police had probable cause to arrest a driver for operating a vehicle while intoxicated in violation of VTL § 1192, a court must [*5]consider whether the prosecution has proffered evidence of physical or mental impairment from alcohol which may manifest, for example, as slurred speech and unsteadiness, unexplained erratic driving, rambling, traffic violations indicative of impairment, or an accident consistent with losing control (see People v Cruz, 48 NY2d 419, 426 [1979]; see also People v Gullo, 51 Misc 3d 150[A], at *1 [App Term 2d Dep't 2016]; People v Hillman, 71 Misc 3d127[A], *2 [App Term, 2d Dep't 2021]; People v Crane, 156 AD 704 [2d Dep't 1989]; People v Freeman, 37 Misc 3d 142[A], *2 [App Term, 2d Dep't 2012]; People v Hogue, 136 AD3d 1351 [4th Dep't 2016]). Additionally, admissions by the defendant can also be a factor to consider (see People v Cullison, 8 Misc 3d 128[A] [App Term 9th and 10th Dists 2005]; People v Millet, 57 Misc 3d 1225[A] [Crim Ct, NY County 2017]).

Here, given the totality of circumstances, the People have provided sufficient evidence to establish that at the time that defendant was arrested, Sgt. Darden had probable cause to believe that she had been operating a vehicle while intoxicated in violation of VTL § 1192. Initially, Sgt. Darden testified credibly that defendant was observed running a red light and, as such, the prosecution established that the police stop of defendant's vehicle was lawful (see People v Hinshaw, 35 NY3d 427, 430 [2020]).

Additionally, Sgt. Darden's testimony is corroborated by his BWC video which demonstrates that defendant appeared dazed and confused as he repeatedly knocked on her car window and repeatedly asked her to lower it, to no avail. And contrary to defense counsel's contention that defendant's delayed response to the officers is unremarkable because people often forget their license, defendant's speaking was rambling and her answers nonresponsive, and when she was repeatedly asked to provide her identification, she initially handed Sgt. Darden her laundry card. The People also elicited credible evidence from Sgt. Darden that defendant's eyes were bloodshot, her breath smelled strongly of alcohol and that he believed the broken passenger side window and scraping on defendant's vehicle suggested indicia of a recent car accident.

The Court agrees with defense counsel that defendant's gait was not unsteady, and that the mere consumption of alcohol does not presumptively demonstrate impairment by alcohol where, despite defendant's admission that she imbibed one Bacardi Black, the record is void of any evidence that could have confirmed Sgt. Darden's findings such as a field sobriety test or a PBT.

However, defendant did not appear to be in control of her faculties and, considered cumulatively, the pre-arrest observations that defendant's "eyes were bloodshot and watery" and "her processes regarding following simple commands was a bit delayed" (see Tr. November 1, 2024 at 18:21-23); that her vehicle "had indications of a recent accident" including "scraping alongside of the passenger side door" (see Tr. November 1, 2024 at 19:12-15, 19); that defendant was "behind the wheel and the ignition was running" (see Tr. November 1, 2024 at 19:25, 20:1-2, 6-7, 28:25); that defendant's speech was "slow" and Sgt. Darden noticed a strong odor of alcohol on her breath from less than a foot away (see Tr. November 1, 2024 at 21:4, 15-19); that defendant appeared flummoxed as she handed officers her laundry card when asked for her license; and that defendant imbibed "a Bacardi Black" all provided Sgt. Darden with specific and articulable facts in support of the finding of probable cause to believe that defendant exhibited actual impairment to the physical and mental abilities which a person is expected to possess to operate a vehicle as a reasonable and prudent driver (see Dunaway, supra; People v DeBour, 40 NY2d 210 [1976]; People v Ellis, 169 AD2d 838 [2d Dept 1991]; People v Wohlers, 138 AD2d [*6]957 [4th Dept 1988]; People v Mathis, 136 AD2d 746 [2d Dept 1988]; People v Simmons, 58 AD2d 524, 395 NYS2d 188 [1st Dept 1977]; People v Hanson, 5 Misc 3d 67 [2d Dept App Term 2004]).

The evidence adduced at the hearing was sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest defendant for violating VTL § 1192. Accordingly, defendant's Dunaway motion to suppress evidence is denied.

It is settled law that a breathalyzer test result is evidence as contemplated by Mapp, supra (see People v Johnson, 134 Misc 2d 474, 476 [Crim Ct, Queens County 1987] ["It is (the breathalyzer results), in fact, significant evidence and may not be proffered if it is the result of an illegal search]). However, as stated herein, the police had probable cause to stop defendant's vehicle because she ran a red light. Accordingly, the Court has no basis to find that the results of defendant's breathalyzer test should be suppressed and, thus, defendant's Mapp motion to suppress is denied.

The People have the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that any statements made by a defendant to law enforcement authorities were made freely and voluntarily and not coerced through force, intimidation, or false statements or promises which can result in false confessions or the inability of the defendant to make clear and free choices regarding whether to make statements on their behalf (see CPL § 60.45; see also People v Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 [1965]; People v Chase, 85 NY2d 493 [1995]; People v Yarter, 41 NY2d 830 [1977]).

Accordingly, the prosecution must establish that any statements it intends to use at trial were not obtained in violation of the accused's Miranda rights (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966)] ["(T)he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination"]). Courts apply the "totality of the circumstances" standard to determine the voluntariness of a statement (see US v Bye, 919 F2d 6 [2d Cir 1990]; People v Anderson, 42 NY2d 35 [1977]).

It is well-settled that unlike instances where a suspect is placed in police custody for interrogation, Miranda rights do not attach to commonplace traffic stops (see Berkemer v McCarty, 468 US 420, 421 [1984] ["(R)oadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop does not constitute "custodial interrogation" for the purposes of the Miranda rule. Although an ordinary traffic stop curtails the "freedom of action" of the detained motorist and imposes some pressures on the detainee to answer questions, such pressures do not sufficiently impair the detainee's exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights"]).

Here, defendant was stopped after the police observed her committing a traffic infraction. Defense counsel maintains that defendant was in custody when she was repeatedly asked for identification, removed from her car, and surrounded by Sgt. Darden and Officer Farrell for almost 20 minutes prior to her arrest. It is further argued that defendant, who did not feel free to leave, was questioned in a manner designed to elicit an incriminating response concerning whether she had anything to drink. However, the record at bar establishes that the officers' questions were investigatory, not accusatory, in nature and much of this time was spent merely trying to confirm defendant's identity, a delay occasioned by her inability to comply with the officers' simple request for her license. The Court finds that the statements made by defendant [*7]to the police prior to her arrest were the result of temporary detention and, thus, Miranda warnings were not required.

Insofar as defendant specifically addressed her Huntley motion to suppress statements made at the car stop, and she is not contesting the post-Miranda statements made at the 43rd Precinct, the Court has no need to address the admissibility of statements defendant made in the IDTU room. Accordingly, defendant's Huntley motion to suppress pre-arrest statements is denied.

It is well-settled that the People have the burden of proof concerning a defendant's voluntary consent to a breathalyzer test (see People v Medel-Dominquez, 58 Misc 3d 130[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 51747[U], *1 [1st Dept 2017]. Once they have met that burden, the defendant bears the burden of negating consent (see People v Capraella, 165 Misc 2d 639 [Crim Court, Queens County 1995].

Here, the IDTU video (People's exhibit 3) coupled with the testimony elicited at the hearing established by a preponderance of the evidence that the chemical test was offered to be administered within two hours of defendant's arrest because defendant was placed under arrest at 8:16 p.m., and the breathalyzer test was administered at 9:45 p.m.

Furthermore, this Court finds that there was nothing coercive about the officers' interactions with defendant in the IDTU room. Officer Dashi's testimony was credible, and the video recording (People's exhibit 3) demonstrates that Officer Lybchenko took the time to explain to defendant what was happening at every stage of the testing, and neither officer did anything to pressure defendant.

The People have met their burden, and defendant has failed to proffer any evidence that the breathalyzer was not timely administered or that defendant's consent was involuntary. The defendant's motion to suppress is denied in its entirety.

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.