[*1]
People v Antoine
2025 NY Slip Op 50080(U) [85 Misc 3d 1203(A)]
Decided on January 10, 2025
Criminal Court Of The City Of New York, Queens County
Licitra, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on January 10, 2025
Criminal Court of the City of New York, Queens County


The People of the State of New York

against

Antoine, Defendant.




Docket No. CR-011759-24QN


For the People: Melinda Katz, District Attorney of Queens County (by Maryam Sheikh & Sarah Coon)

For Ms. Antoine: Dan Friedman, Esq.


Wanda L. Licitra, J.

Pending before the court is a C.P.L. § 30.30 motion to dismiss alleging that the prosecution exhausted its statutory readiness time. Under C.P.L. § 30.30[1][b], the prosecution's readiness limit here was ninety days.

The prosecution commenced this case against Ms. Antoine on April 10, 2024. Ninety days later, at 5:25 p.m., the prosecution filed their certificate of discovery compliance, (cf. C.P.L. § 245.10[1][a]), and stated ready for trial for the first time, (cf. People v. England, 84 NY2d 1, 5 [1994]; People v. Goss, 87 NY2d 792, 798 [1996]). On October 1, 2024, the defense moved to dismiss under C.P.L. § 30.30. They argued that the prosecution's statement of readiness was illusory because the prosecutors had improperly certified discovery compliance. On October 31, 2024, this court ordered supplemental briefs from each side and set one due date for both: November 14, 2024. The defense filed and served their supplemental brief on November 13, 2024. To date, the prosecution has never filed theirs, nor have they responded to any email inquiries from the court.

The prosecution's tactics and delay in this case are inexcusable. First, without explanation or permission, they disregarded the discovery statute's timelines for production. (See C.P.L. § 245.10[1][a]). Second, they stated ready for trial after business hours on the last day of their readiness deadline, rendering a "trial within the statutory period impossible." (See Goss, 87 NY2d at 798 [prosecutors may not state ready for trial at a time which would make "trial within the statutory period impossible"]).[FN1] Third, their certificate of compliance was illusory and false. [*2]Despite purporting to "certify" that they had "disclosed and made available all existing known material and information subject to discovery," (Cert. of Compl. at 1), as the statute requires, (C.P.L. § 245.50[1]), they knew their certification was not true. Specifically, they knew they had not yet disclosed one police officer's memobook, another officer's body-worn camera footage, and the police department's scratch arrest report. Again, to be clear, this is all material that the prosecution knew existed and knew they had not yet disclosed. And it should go without saying: "The People cannot in good faith certify a statement that they know is false." (See People v. Henry, 82 Misc 3d 828, 829 [Crim. Ct., Queens County 2024]). These circumstances suggest the prosecution "certified" they had "disclosed and made available all existing known material" simply because they wanted to improperly toll their readiness clock. Finally, the prosecution failed to submit their supplemental brief as ordered by the court on November 14, 2024; failed to respond to emails from the court; and failed to provide any reasonable explanation for their radio silence at two calendar calls afterwards. (See, e.g., People ex rel. Ferro v. Brann, 197 AD3d 787, 788 [2d Dep't 2021] ["Thus, the People are chargeable with the time between court-imposed deadline to respond to the omnibus motion and the date on which the People actually filed a response."]).

In sum, the prosecution's certificate of compliance was false, their statement of readiness was illusory, and they unreasonably delayed proceedings on the pending motion. They are responsible for the delay between April 10, 2024, and October 1, 2024, and then from November 14, 2024, to today, January 10, 2025. That is 231 days, more than the ninety they are allowed.

Therefore, the case must be dismissed. (See C.P.L. § 30.30[1][b]).

The foregoing constitutes the order and decision of the court.

Dated: January 10, 2025
Queens, NY
Wanda L. Licitra, J.C.C.

Footnotes


Footnote 1:This court disagrees with lower courts that have allowed prosecutors to state ready for the first time after business hours on the last C.P.L. § 30.30 day, which plainly violates the Court of Appeals' clear directive in People v. England, 84 NY2d 1, 5 [1994], and People v. Goss, 87 NY2d 792, 798 [1996]. The High Court has ruled that prosecutors cannot state ready at a time that makes "trial within the statutory period impossible." (Goss, 87 NY2d at 798 [discussing England] [emphasis added]). The advent of EDDS is irrelevant to this doctrine. It allows for documents to be filed after hours, not for trials to be conducted at night. Thus, while a statement of readiness may "objectively establish[] [the prosecution's] readiness" after hours, the statement "will be considered meaningless" if trial "within the statutory time period is impossible." (See People v. Prunier, 100 AD3d 1269, 1270 [3d Dep't 2012] [noting the same about supreme court arraignments, which are a necessary precondition for trial]; Goss, 87 NY2d at 798 [the prosecution's statement of readiness in England was "meaningless" because "'the People had made arraignment within the statutory period impossible,' which in turn made trial within the statutory period impossible"] [quoting England, 87 NY2d at 798] [emphasis added]).