Defendant's motion is granted to the extent of ordering a change of venue of this action to the Syracuse City Court for the reasons and in the manner set forth below, and otherwise denied.

Plaintiff commenced this action, seeking the alleged $6,990.42 unpaid balance of invoices for waste disposal services rendered to defendant (a business located and operating in Syracuse, Onondaga County) and served defendant via the Secretary of State on January 2, 2020. (Aff. of Service, at 1). Defendant timely answered the complaint and served a demand for change of venue to Onondaga County dated February 4, 2020. In those papers and by its present motion, defendant seeks dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it neither resides nor was served within the City of New York or, alternatively, for a change of venue to an appropriate court in Onondaga County. The Court addresses those applications in turn.

Defendant asserts that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Civil Court Act because defendant resides in Onondaga County and the contract at issue concerns services performed outside the City of New York. (Mem. of Law in Supp., at 3-4). However, [*2]while defendant acknowledges a contractual relationship, defendant has not located (and thus has not provided) a copy of the relevant contract. (Aff. in Supp., ¶ 8). Moreover, defendant did not cite any caselaw (whether binding or persuasive) in support of its subject matter jurisdiction argument.

At the outset, the Court's territorial jurisdiction over this action commenced in the general civil part of the Court (as opposed to the small claims part) is a question of personal, not subject matter jurisdiction.^[FN1] See, Spinnell v. Doris L. Sassower, P.C., 155 Misc 2d 147, 153 (Civ. Ct., New York Co. 1992) (finding that the Court's territorial jurisdiction was "like any other objection to personal jurisdiction," subject to waiver); and In House Grp. Inc. v. Maleque, 2024 NY Misc. LEXIS 2329, *2-3 (Civ. Ct., New York Co. Mar. 25, 2024) (discussing subject matter jurisdictional distinction between general civil claims and small claims).

The Court's long-arm jurisdiction is defined by CCA § 404, and the Court "may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-resident of the city of New York if, in person or through an agent, he: 1) transacts any business within the city of New York or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the city of New York; or 2) commits a tortious act within the city of New York, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character ; or 3) owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the city of New York." In considering the Court's jurisdiction, "[c]ourts in New York have the longstanding precedent that New York has committed itself to a full exploitation of jurisdiction, in taking an expansive view of jurisdiction consistent with New York's role as a center of commerce." Ivanov v. O'Connor, NYLJ, Oct. 3, 2024 at p.17, col.1, 84 Misc 3d 1202(A), *2 (Civ. Ct., New York Co. 2024) (denying motion to dismiss) (quotation and citation omitted). Although a handful of cases have interpreted CCA § 404 more narrowly, they have done on grounds sounding more (as discussed late in this decision) in inconvenient venue or distinguishing private non-profitmaking activity rather than true lack of jurisdiction, and predate Ivanov and the authorities upon which Ivanov relies in any event.See, e.g., Crystal Lake Camp Corp. v. Silver, 63 Misc. 562, 565 (Civ. Ct., Queens Co. 1970) (finding that court lacked personal jurisdiction over contract executed in Queens by Nassau resident with a New York County corporation to send child to summer camp in Sullivan County as noncommercial activity); and Scruggs v. Intl. Invest., Ltd., 74 Misc 3d 250, 253 (Civ. Ct., New York Co. 1973) (finding that business agreement execution in New York was sufficient alone).

Here, plaintiff correctly notes that, despite being a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business in Arizona and having designated an address in Texas to receive process from the Secretary of State, plaintiff is legally a resident of New York County for jurisdictional purposes. (Summons, at 1; Aff. in Opp., ¶ 8 Ex. 4). See, Collins v. Trigen Energy Corp., 210 AD2d 283, 283 (2d Dept. 1994) (finding that foreign corporation's designating county in authorization papers is sufficient to establish residency in that county). Further, plaintiff has offered a verified pleading that facially asserts jurisdiction. (Verified Complaint, ¶ 3). Absent evidence compelling a different result, the Court will not easily slam the courthouse door shut to a resident of the very county in which the Court sits, and finds personal jurisdiction over this action. Accordingly, that branch of the motion is denied.

That the Court has jurisdiction does not end the inquiry here however. Pursuant to CPLR 510(3), "the court, upon motion, may change the place of trial of an action where the convenience of material witnesses and the ends of justice will be promoted by the change." The law imposes a demanding standard in changing venue however. See, e.g., Ivanov, at *2. Defendant asserts, and plaintiff does not challenge, that all material witnesses are located in Onondaga County (Aff. in Supp., ¶¶ 6-27). Defendant notes that "Syracuse, New York is about 250 miles from New York City."^[FN2] (Aff. in Supp., ¶ 15). On that basis, defendant asserts that venue should be transferred to the Onondaga County Supreme Court. (Aff. in Supp., ¶ 29). Although defendant is incorrect that this action can or should be transferred to Onondaga County Supreme Court, and the Legislature has not passed legislation enabling the Court to exercise its otherwise-constitutional transfer powers, this action is dismissed without prejudice to plaintiff re-commencing this action in Syracuse City Court.

In opposition, plaintiff relies solely upon its legal residency in New York County. (Aff. in Opp., ¶ 4). However, the Court of Appeals has held that an address listing in a regulatory filing is not sufficient to resist a change of venue motion. See, Lividini v. Goldstein, 37 NY3d 1047, 1050 (2021) (dispute between two Westchester residents over treatment received in Westchester County was not properly venued in Bronx County based upon defendant's registration with the State Education Department). Much like in Lividini, this action principally concerns activity that occurred in Onondaga County between two entities with real and relevant presence in Onondaga County. Just because the New York County Civil Court could be a venue does not make it the appropriate venue. Defendant convincingly argues that the burden such litigation in New York County would impose on witnesses would be unjust and unnecessary in the circumstances presented, with potentially multiple witnesses being haled hundreds of miles each way with concomitant transportation, lodging and associated travel expenses, to say nothing of the lost business opportunity from missing work. (Aff. in Supp., ¶ 26). The Court will not compel that level of expense to litigate what is, for all intents and purposes, a commercial small claims action. See, CCA § 1801-a.

That said, the Court cannot properly transfer this action either. Because the Court has jurisdiction over this action, the Court cannot transfer this action to Onondaga County Supreme Court pursuant to NY Const. Art. VI, § 19(f). In any event, the amount at issue in this action is well within the jurisdiction of the Court's local City Court equivalent in Syracuse. See, UCCA § 202 and CPLR 325(d). While NY Const. Art. VI, § 19(h), would permit the Court to "[a]s may be provided by law transfer any action or proceeding, other than one which has previously been transferred to it, to any other court, except the supreme court, having jurisdiction of the subject matter in any other judicial district or county provided that such other court has jurisdiction over the classes of persons named as parties," the appellate term that binds the Court has found that the Legislature has not enacted the necessary enabling legislation to utilize NY Const. Art. VI, § 19(h). See, Medicorp v. Avis Corp., 122 Misc 2d 813, 815 (App. Term, 1st [*4]Dept. 1984); and Office Kei Inc. v. Rubens, 29 Misc 3d 126(A), *1 (App. Term, 1st Dept. 2010). Because New York and Onondaga Counties do not adjoin, CPLR 325(g) is inapplicable. Thus, to effect the change of venue correctly sought here, the Court is constrained to dismiss this action without prejudice under the guise of forum non conveniens. See, Medicorp, supra. The Court is aware of the unnecessary cost in money and time that dismissal and re-commencement will create, but is bound to follow the law as it is presently interpreted. See, Scavetta v. Weschler, 149 AD3d 202, 203 (1st Dept. 2017).

Following Medicorp and Scavetta, the branch of defendant's motion seeking a change of venue is granted to the extent of dismissing this action without prejudice to re-commencing this action in Syracuse City Court.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the branch of defendant's motion to dismiss this action is for lack of jurisdiction is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of defendant's motion to change the venue of this action is granted to the extent of dismissing this action without prejudice to plaintiff re-commencing this action in the Syracuse City Court; and it is further

ORDERED that defendant's motion is otherwise denied.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.