Appellate Advocates (Joshua M. Levine of counsel), for appellant. Queens County District Attorney (Johnnette Traill and Danielle M. O'Boyle of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Marty J. Lentz, J.), rendered June 9, 2022. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a plea of guilty, of criminal contempt in the second degree, and imposed sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

After waiving prosecution by information, defendant pleaded guilty to the sole charge of criminal contempt in the second degree (Penal Law § 215.50 [3]). On appeal, defendant challenges the facial sufficiency of the accusatory instrument.

"A valid and sufficient accusatory instrument is a nonwaivable jurisdictional prerequisite to a criminal prosecution" (People v Case, 42 NY2d 98, 99 [1977]; see People v Dumay, 23 NY3d 518, 522 [2014]; People v Dreyden, 15 NY3d 100, 103 [2010]). Thus, the facial insufficiency of an accusatory instrument constitutes a jurisdictional defect which is not forfeited by a defendant's guilty plea (see People v Thiam, 34 NY3d 1040 [2019]; Dreyden, 15 NY3d at 103; People v Konieczny, 2 NY3d 569, 573 [2004]). Furthermore, since defendant expressly waived the right to be prosecuted by information, the relevant count of the accusatory instrument [*2]must be evaluated under the standards that govern a misdemeanor complaint, which can be based upon hearsay and which is sufficient on its face when it alleges facts of an evidentiary character supporting or tending to support the charge (see CPL 100.15 [3]) and provides reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the crime charged (see CPL 100.40 [4] [b]; Dumay, 23 NY3d at 524; People v Dumas, 68 NY2d 729, 731 [1986]). While the law does not require that the accusatory instrument contain the most precise words or phrases most clearly expressing the charges, the offense and factual bases therefor must be sufficiently alleged (see Konieczny, 2 NY3d at 575). "So long as the factual allegations of an [accusatory instrument] give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, they should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading" (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]; see Konieczny, 2 NY3d at 575).

The essential elements of the crime of criminal contempt in the second degree in violation of Penal Law § 215.50 (3) are that a lawful order of the court was in effect, that the defendant had knowledge of the order, and that the defendant intentionally disobeyed it (see Matter of McCormick v Axelrod, 59 NY2d 574, 583 [1983], amended 60 NY2d 652 [1983]; Matter of Holtzman v Beatty, 97 AD2d 79 [1983]; People v Moses, 67 Misc 3d 128[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 50399[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2020]; People v Martin, 52 Misc 3d 140[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 51166[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]). Here, the accusatory instrument alleged that a police officer reviewed an order of protection that had been issued by the Queens County Family Court to defendant on June 15, 2017, which order does not expire until February 24, 2026, and one which had been issued by the Queens County Criminal Court to defendant on July 7, 2017, which order did not expire until July 16, 2022. Both of the orders of protection ordered defendant to stay away from the protected person's home and school and to refrain from communication or any other contact with her by any means. Thus, lawful orders of the court were in effect when defendant was alleged to have violated them on or about November 25, 2021 (see Moses, 2020 NY Slip Op 50399[U]). Additionally, the accusatory instrument alleged that defendant was aware of these orders of protection because both orders of protection indicated that defendant had been advised in court of their issuance and the orders were signed by defendant. Consequently, the accusatory instrument provided sufficient factual allegations demonstrating that lawful orders of the court were in effect and that defendant had knowledge of those orders (see Matter of McCormick, 59 NY2d at 583; Moses, 2020 NY Slip Op 50399[U]).

The additional facts alleged in the accusatory instrument were that the police officer was informed by an eyewitness, the mother of the 13-year-old child in whose favor the orders of protection had been issued, that, on or about November 25, 2021, at around 2:00 p.m, she observed defendant with her daughter at a location for which a specific address was given but which was otherwise unidentified. While the mere factual allegations that the mother saw defendant at a certain address with her daughter does not establish that he knowingly and intentionally disobeyed the portion of the orders of protection requiring him to stay away from the protected person's home or school, it does sufficiently allege that he knowingly and intentionally disobeyed the directive in each order of protection to refrain from contact with the [*3]protected person by any means. Thus, the accusatory instrument provided adequate factual allegations demonstrating reasonable cause to believe that defendant had violated the orders of protection. Consequently, the charge of criminal contempt in the second degree was facially sufficient (see Moses, 2020 NY Slip Op 50399[U]; People v Arnaud, 66 Misc 3d 126[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 52023[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]; People v Contreras, 58 Misc 3d 132[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 51776[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2017]).

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., BUGGS and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.