Appellate Advocates (Russ Altman-Merino of counsel), for appellant. Richmond County District Attorney (Thomas B. Litsky and Rhys Johnson of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Richmond County (Ann D. Thompson, J.), rendered August 18, 2022. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a plea of guilty, of petit larceny, and imposed sentence. The appeal from the judgment of conviction brings up for review the propriety of a final order of protection issued at the time of sentencing.

ORDERED that, upon the appeal from the judgment of conviction, the final order of protection is vacated, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice; and it is further,

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Defendant was charged in a felony complaint with eight counts of grand larceny in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 155.30 [4]), eight counts of criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 165.45 [2]), two counts of petit larceny (Penal Law § 155.25), three counts of unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree (Penal Law § 165.05), two counts of criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree (Penal Law § 165.40), and one count of attempted petit larceny (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 155.25). The accusatory instrument [*2]alleged that defendant stole property from vehicles owned by James Barton and Jack Cotogno-Buchan, and "disturb[ed] and rummag[ed]" through a vehicle owned by Richard Orazem. After the felony charges of grand larceny in the fourth degree and criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree were dismissed and defendant waived prosecution by information, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of petit larceny in satisfaction of the accusatory instrument. The Criminal Court (Ann D. Thompson, J.) sentenced defendant and simultaneously issued a five-year final order of protection in favor of the complainants, James Barton, Jack Cotogno-Buchan, and Richard Orazem.

On appeal, defendant contends that the Criminal Court was not authorized to issue an order of protection in favor of any of the complainants, since it is unclear from the record which complainant was the victim of the crime to which defendant pleaded guilty. Although defendant's claim is unpreserved, since defendant did not raise this contention before the Criminal Court (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Ramos, 164 AD3d 922, 923 [2018]; People v Kumar, 127 AD3d 882, 883 [2015]; People v Khan, 101 AD3d 903, 903 [2012]), we exercise our discretion to consider it in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [a]; People v Gonzalez, 217 AD3d 965, 966 [2023]; People v Cooke, 119 AD3d 1399, 1401 [2014]).

As a trial court does not have the "authority to issue an order of protection in favor of individuals who were neither victims of the crime nor witnesses to the crime to which the defendant pleaded guilty," the Criminal Court was not authorized to issue the order of protection, since defendant did not specify in his guilty plea which complainant was the victim of the petit larceny count to which he pleaded guilty, and the court did not inquire (People v Hanniford, 174 AD3d 921, 922 [2019]; see CPL 530.13 [4]; People v Fletcher, 220 AD3d 805, 805 [2023]; Gonzalez, 217 AD3d at 966; People v Ortiz, 183 AD3d 918, 918 [2020]; People v Manalang, 54 Misc 3d 138[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50146[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2017]). Further, the accusatory instrument does not allege that any of the complainants was a witness to the petit larceny. Consequently, as the People concede, the order of protection should be vacated.

Accordingly, upon the appeal from the judgment of conviction, the final order of protection is vacated. The judgment convicting defendant of petit larceny is affirmed.

MUNDY, J.P., BUGGS and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.