| Chass Props., LLC v Cobb |
| 2025 NY Slip Op 50171(U) [85 Misc 3d 128(A)] |
| Decided on January 17, 2025 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Alter & Barbaro (Bernard Mitchell Alter of counsel), for appellant. Novick, Edelstein, Lubell, Reisman, Wasserman & Leventhal, PC (Gregory S. Bougopoulos of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from a final judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Hannah Cohen, J.), entered August 1, 2022. The final judgment, entered pursuant to an order of that court entered August 1, 2022 which denied occupant's motion to dismiss the petition and granted petitioner's cross-motion for summary judgment, awarded petitioner possession in a holdover summary proceeding.
ORDERED that the final judgment is affirmed, without costs.
In this holdover proceeding to recover possession of a cooperative apartment, occupant, the former proprietary lessee of the subject apartment as former owner of the shares appurtenant to the apartment, moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that a holdover proceeding does not lie. Petitioner, the new proprietary lessee of the subject apartment after purchasing the appurtenant shares at a non-judicial foreclosure sale resulting from occupant's failure to pay maintenance charges, cross-moved for summary judgment. By order dated August 1, 2022, the Civil Court (Hannah Cohen, J.) granted petitioner's cross-motion and denied occupant's motion, finding that petitioner, as a new lessee entitled to possession, could maintain the proceeding and that it had established its entitlement to possession. Occupant's sole contention on appeal is that [*2]petitioner could not maintain this proceeding.
RPAPL 711 (1) provides that a summary proceeding may be maintained when a "tenant continues in possession of any portion of the premises after the expiration of his term, without the permission of the landlord or, in a case where a new lessee is entitled to possession, without the permission of the new lessee." Additionally, RPAPL 721 (10), which is entitled "Person who may maintain proceeding," provides that a "proceeding may be brought by . . . [t]he lessee of the premises, entitled to possession." Here, petitioner established that occupant, as prior proprietary lessee to the subject apartment, had been a tenant of 1710 Caroll Owners Corp., the owner of the premises; that occupant's proprietary lease had been canceled and a new proprietary lease for the subject apartment had been conveyed to petitioner; and that occupant remained in the subject apartment without the permission of petitioner, the new lessee entitled to possession. Consequently, the Civil Court did not err in finding that petitioner could maintain the subject holdover proceeding (cf. Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v Simmons, 48 Misc 3d 24 [App Term, 1st Dept 2015]; Federal Home Loan Mtge. Assn. v Perez, 40 Misc 3d 1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2013]).
Accordingly, the final judgment is affirmed.
MUNDY, J.P., BUGGS and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.
ENTER: