Upon the foregoing cited papers and after oral argument, the Decision/Order on Plaintiff's Motion to Renew and Reargue pursuant to CPLR §2221 is hereby Denied.

Although there is no specific time limit for motion to renew unlike to reargue, nevertheless such time is not limitless (see Redeye v Progressive Ins. Co., 158 AD3d 1208, 1208-1209 [4th Dept 2018]). Reargue is inapplicable here, where new law is the basis (CPLR 2221 [d]). There must be finality of litigation matters in controversy. It is inconceivable and inconsistent with such finality that the CPLR 2221(e) 1999 amendments' legislative intent and history is to allow for post-final disposition emergent new law as the basis to renew in perpetuity. As a matter of course, new statutes or amendments mandate specific effective dates and whether may be applied retroactively. Generally, precedential stare decisis common law does not. Rather, the holding setting forth the new law is prospective. "After the statute was amended in 1999 to specify that a motion based on a change in the law is a motion for leave to renew, courts have nevertheless properly continued to impose a time limit on motions based on a change in law As explained in Glicksman, 'there is no indication in the legislative history of an intention to change the rule regarding the finality of judgments' (id., citing Glicksman v Bd. of Educ./Central Sch. Bd., 278 AD2d 364, 366 [2d Dept 2000]). Here, the case was no longer pending when plaintiff made his motion for leave to renew based on a change in the law, and we therefore conclude that the motion insofar as it sought leave to renew was untimely" (Redeye. at 1208, citing Daniels v Millar El. Indus., Inc., 44 AD3d 895, 895-896 [2d Dept 2007]; Glicksman [*2]at 366). Herein, Plaintiff seeks to renew a seven-year-old Trial Decision not subject to appeal. Thus, this matter is not pending but rather final. Plaintiff's motion to renew is untimely and is hereby Denied.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.