Recitation, as required by CPLR § 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of this motion to amend and dismiss:

In this motor vehicle negligence action, defendants, Brad Haughton and Joan Spencer ("Defendants"), seek an Order, pursuant to CPLR § 3025(b), granting leave to amend their answer to include the affirmative defense of release and payment, and, pursuant to CPLR §§ 3211(a)(1) and (a)(5), dismissing plaintiff, Jose Lora's ("Plaintiff"), complaint on the ground that he was paid and released defendants from all claims. Plaintiff opposes the motion asserting that it would be prejudicial to his cause of action if the amendment is allowed, and that the release defendants rely on is inadmissible. For the reasons stated below, defendants' motion is granted.

Plaintiff's cause of action arises from personal injuries he allegedly sustained on February 8, 2023, when a vehicle owned and operated by defendants came in contact with a vehicle owned [*2]and operated by plaintiff in the area of 236th Street near its intersection with Byron Avenue in Bronx County, New York (NYSCEF Doc No 1).

In support of their motion, defendants submit a Release in Full of All Claims ("Release"), ostensibly signed by plaintiff (NYSCEF Doc No 15). The Release states, in relevant part, that plaintiff received $2,500.00 to "release and forever discharge . . . [defendants] . . . from any and every claim, demand, right or cause of action, of whatever nature, on account of or in any way growing out of any and all personal injuries . . . and any and all property damage resulting or to result from an accident that occurred on or about the 8th day of February, 2023, at or near Bronx, NY, and especially all liability arising out of said accident" (Id.). The Release forms the basis for defendants' request to amend their answer to add the applicable affirmative defense and to dismiss plaintiff's complaint based on that defense.

Plaintiff opposes the application asserting that the amendment would "greatly prejudice" him, and that the Release is not authenticated, and thus, may not form the basis for the dismissal of his complaint. In this regard, plaintiff submits his affidavit wherein he acknowledges having signed the Release, but adds, "I am Spanish [s]peaking and I have difficulty understanding concepts in English beyond simple words" (NYSCEF Doc No 25 at ¶¶ 5, 6). He further averred that he believed that "the document that [he] signed and the money that [he] received was for the damage to [his] vehicle only," and that "the defendants' insurance company used trickery to take advantage of [his] poor knowledge of the English language" (id. at ¶ 6).

Respecting the amendment, it is well settled, pursuant to CPLR § 3025(b), that leave to amend pleadings shall be freely given absent surprise or prejudice to an opposing party and the proposed amendment is not palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit (Ferrer v Go NY Tours Inc., 221 AD3d 499, 500 [1st Dept 2023]). Here, the only possibility of prejudice advanced by plaintiff is that granting the amendment "at this late juncture clearly prejudices the plaintiff" (NYSCEF Doc No 24 at ¶ 6). This court disagrees. This action is in the middle of discovery and no note of issue has been filed. Furthermore, the fact that plaintiff signed a document helpful to the defense of his claims cannot surprise him. Finally, the prejudice posed to a plaintiff-party by amending a responsive pleading to include a substantively meritorious affirmative defense is not the sort of prejudice that CPLR § 3025(b) seeks to avoid. Rather, it is prejudice caused by any delay in seeking the leave to amend (see, Ferrer, 221 AD3d at 500 ["prejudice resulting from the delay"]).

Secondarily, a party may move for judgment dismissing one or more causes of action asserted against him on the ground that: a defense is founded upon documentary evidence; or . . . the cause of action may not be maintained because of . . . payment [and/or] release, . . . ." (CPLR §§ 3211(a)(1) and (5)). Generally, a valid release constitutes a complete bar to an action on a claim which is the subject of the release (Allen v Riese Org., Inc., 106 AD3d 514, 516 [1st Dept 2013]). Where the language is clear and unambiguous, the release is binding on the parties unless it is shown that it was procured by fraud, duress, overreaching, illegality or mutual mistake (Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v América Móvil, S.A.B. de C.V., 17 NY3d 269, 276 [2011]). The amendment shall be granted.

Plaintiff has also failed to show that defendants are not entitled to have his complaint dismissed based on the affirmative defense of payment and release. Plaintiff does not argue that the language of the Release is unclear or ambiguous. Rather, he asserts that the Release has not been authenticated and that he was taken advantage of due to his limited grasp of English. As an initial matter, he acknowledged having signed the Release in his affidavit (NYSCEF Doc No 25 at ¶ 6). In any event, this court presumes the authenticity of the Release, which plaintiff has failed to rebut (see CPLR § 4540-a). Next, a party who signs a document without any valid excuse for having failed to read it is conclusively bound by its terms (In re Aoki v Aoki, 117 AD3d 499, 503 [1st Dept 2014]). Pertinent here, plaintiff's affidavit is silent as to whether he made any attempts to have the Release read and explained to him given his claimed unfamiliarity with the English language, or that he was coerced to execute the document. Hence, any allegation of fraud or duress in the signing of the agreement must fail (see, Aoki, 117 AD3d at 503).

Accordingly, it is hereby:

ORDERED that defendants, Brad Haughton and Joan Spencer's, motion for an Order, pursuant to CPLR § 3025(b), granting leave to amend their Answer to include the Affirmative Defense of release and payment is GRANTED; it is further;

ORDERED that defendants, Brad Haughton and Joan Spencer's, motion for an Order, pursuant to CPLR §§ 3211(a)(1) and (a)(5), dismissing plaintiff, Jose Lora's, Complaint, on the ground that plaintiff was paid and released defendants from all claims related to the accident identified in the complaint is GRANTED; and it is further;

ORDERED that defendants, Brad Haughton and Joan Spencer, shall serve a copy of this Order with Notice of Entry within thirty (30) days of entry of this Order.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.