Recitation, as required by CPLR § 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of this motion for summary judgment:

In this motor vehicle negligence action, co-defendant Rigo Limo-Auto, Corp. Inc. ("Rigo"), requests summary judgment and the dismissal of the complaint herein on the ground that, as an owner engaged exclusively in the business of leasing and renting vehicles, all claims for vicarious liability against it are preempted by 49 USC § 30106 (the "Graves Amendment"). Plaintiff Sarah Huntt ("Plaintiff") opposes asserting that Rigo has failed to establish prima facie that it is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of whether it leased or rented the vehicle being operated by co-defendant Angel Amparo ("Amparo"). For the reasons stated below, Rigo's motion is denied.

Plaintiff's cause of action arises from personal injuries she allegedly sustained on December 27, 2021, when a 2016 Toyota registered to Rigo and operated by Amparo, in which plaintiff was a passenger, came in contact with a vehicle owned and operated by co-defendant [*2]Rosa Rosariorosario ("Rosario")^[FN1] at the intersection of Creston and East Tremont Avenues in Bronx County, New York (NYSCEF Doc No 54). As a result of the initial collision, the Rigo-Amparo vehicle came in contact with a third, parked vehicle operated by non-party Maribel Abreu and owned by non-party Bronx Works, Inc.

In support of its motion, Rigo proffers, among other things, the Affidavit of James Gutierrez ("Gutierrez"), its Director of Claims (NYSCEF Doc No 57), a copy of a Commercial Vehicle Lease Agreement ("Lease Agreement") (NYSCEF Doc No 56), and the Title and Registration for the 2016 Toyota (NYSCEF Doc No 58). According to Gutierrez, Rigo "is in the business of renting or leasing motor vehicles to the general public under the name Buggy" (NYSCEF Doc No 57 at ¶ 5). According to Gutierrez, the Lease Agreement was "entered into by Defendant Angel Amparo and Rigo Limo-Auto Corp. d/b/a Buggy on September 29, 2016" (id. at ¶ 6); and Rigo was both the titled and registered owner of the 2016 Toyota at issue (id. at ¶ 8).

Plaintiff opposes the motion asserting that Rigo's submissions fail to reflect either Rigo or Rigo d/b/a Buggy as a party to the lease for the vehicle driven by Amparo, in which plaintiff was a passenger at the time of the underlying accident. Rather, the September 29, 2016, Lease Agreement annexed by Rigo to the motion reflects an entity identified as "FTL 1002, LLC" as the "Lessor" and Amparo as the "Lessee" party (NYSCEF Doc No 56). Plaintiff's opposition highlights the same regarding the title and registration for the vehicle driven by Amparo — FTL1002, LLC is listed as the title owner of the 2016 Toyota notwithstanding that it appears to be registered to Rigo. In short, plaintiff argues that Rigo's role as a lessor or renter of motor vehicles cannot be ascertained for the purposes of the instant motion, and thus, requires its denial.

In an apparent acknowledgement of the gaps in its evidentiary submission, on reply, Rigo submits a supplemental affidavit from Gutierrez in which, for the first time, he attempts to explain the relationship between Rigo and FTL 1002 as it relates to Amparo's leasing of the 2016 Toyota from Rigo. In the supplemental affidavit, Gutierrez attempts to establish a connection between Rigo and the Toyota by arguing that Rigo and FTL 1002 are affiliates wholly owned by another company, Fast Track Mobility, LLC ("Fast Track"), all of whom are purportedly "engaged in the business of renting and leasing motion vehicles to members of the general public" (NYSCEF Doc No 68 at ¶ 2).

Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and will not be granted if there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable issue. (Andre v Pomeroy, 35 NY2d 361 [1974]). Even the color of a triable issue forecloses the remedy (Newin Corp. v Hartford Acci. & Indem. Co., 62 NY2d 916 [1984]). The evidence will be construed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party (see, Rodriguez v Parkchester South Condominium, Inc., 178 AD2d 231-32 [1st Dept 1991][finding that "[o]n defendants' motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable inferences in her favor"]). The proponent of a motion for summary judgment carries the initial burden of presenting sufficient evidence to demonstrate as a matter of law the absence of a material issue of fact (Alvarez v Prospect Hospital, 68 NY2d 320 [1986]). Once the proponent has met its burden, the opponent must now produce competent evidence in admissible form to establish the existence of a triable issue of fact (see, Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d [*3]557 [1980]).

Upon review of the record before the court, the movant's submission has failed to establish that Rigo qualifies as the leasing and/or rental enterprise that leased the subject vehicle to Amparo. In this regard, the reparative arguments advanced by Gutierrez for Rigo in its reply papers purporting to clarify Rigo's role in this litigation must be ignored as a late submission (see, Migdol v City of New York, 291 AD2d 201 [1st Dept 2002]["appellant's reply papers [were] properly rejected by the motion court since it sought to remedy basic deficiencies in appellant's prima facie showing rather than respond to arguments in plaintiff's opposition papers]).

Additionally, and contrary to Gutierrez's initial affidavit on the issue, Rigo's submissions show FTL 1002 to be the title owner of the vehicle notwithstanding that Rigo registered it in its name with the state. Finally, the Lease Agreement fails to reference Rigo at all, raising questions about Rigo's ultimate role as the registered owner of the vehicle. In sum, Rigo failed to establish its prima facie burden on the motion, requiring its denial regardless of the sufficiency of plaintiff's opposition papers (see, Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr, 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]). Stated otherwise, given the deficiencies in Rigo's motion, this Court is bound to find that it has failed to make its prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law. Thus, denial of the application is warranted.

Accordingly, it is:

ORDERED that defendant Rigo Limo-Auto, Corp. Inc.'s motion for summary judgment is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that plaintiff Sarah Huntt shall serve a copy of this Order with Notice of Entry within thirty (30) days of entry of this Order.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.