Alexandra Branciforte, appellant pro se. Atlantic Automotive Group (John G. Gentile of counsel), for respondents Ravel Mejia and Millennium Hyundai, LLC.

Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Nassau County, First District (Geoffrey N. Prime, J.), entered August 25, 2023. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, dismissed the action.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

In this small claims action to recover the sum of $4,385.83, plaintiff asserts that an individual insured by the Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty) totaled a car that plaintiff had leased from one of the defendants. At a nonjury trial, defendants Ravel Mejia and Millennium Hyundai appeared and the remaining defendants defaulted.

At a combined trial and inquest, plaintiff testified, and the appearing defendants did not dispute, that Liberty had paid one of the defendants approximately $23,181 in compensation for the car's destruction, which sum covered the balance owed by plaintiff on the lease plus an additional $3,885.83. Plaintiff sought to recover the $3,885.83 sum, which she described as the "payout overage," together with consequential damages of $500. She introduced the lease for the car into evidence, as well as a log of telephone conversations she had had with various of defendants' employees who, she testified, had assured her that the payout overage would be transmitted to her, before another employee informed plaintiff that the payout overage would not be sent to her. Following the trial, the District Court (Geoffrey N. Prime, J.) dismissed the action against all defendants. A judgment was entered on August 25, 2023. On appeal, plaintiff contends that she established her entitlement to a judgment on the merits, and, in addition, that [*2]she was entitled to a judgment against the defendants that failed to appear based on their default.

In a small claims action, our review is limited to a determination of whether "substantial justice has . . . been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law" (UDCA 1807; see UDCA 1804; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125, 126 [2000]).

Upon a default, a court must determine that a viable cause of action exists (see Woodson v Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 NY2d 62, 71 [2003]). At an inquest in the Small Claims Part of the court, the plaintiff is required to make out a prima facie case, failing which dismissal is warranted (see Dentici v South Shore Hyundai, 64 Misc 3d 146[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 51353[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2019]; see also Scher v 24 Hour Fitness, 81 Misc 3d 129[A], 2023 NY Slip Op 51245[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2023]). The car lease plaintiff introduced into evidence prohibited oral modifications and stated that the lessor was "entitled to all insurance proceeds for physical damage to or loss of the Vehicle, even if the amount of the proceeds exceeds the Adjusted Lease Balance or other amounts you owe under this Lease." Thus, under the lease, the lessor was entitled to retain all insurance proceeds and plaintiff was not entitled to rely on oral modifications to that provision. In this circumstance, since plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case, we conclude that the dismissal of the action against both the appearing and the defaulting defendants rendered substantial justice between the parties (see UDCA 1804, 1807).

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

GARGUILO, P.J., DRISCOLL and GOLDBERG-VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.