The following papers numbered 1 to 4 were read on this motion:

This Court previously issued a Decision and Order in September 2024 in which it granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint (the "September Decision and Order"). In the September Decision and Order, the Court held that "plaintiff is granted summary judgment pursuant to CPLR § 3213 regarding the $375,000 in principal under the Promissory Notes as well as $24,709.52 in interest accrued thereunder as of August 15, 2024." Thereafter, in October 2024, the Court issued an Order and Partial Judgment in plaintiff's favor memorializing the September Decision and Order. The County Clerk filed a Judgment in the amount of $409,300.88 on November 14, 2024 (the "Judgment").

Plaintiff immediately thereafter filed this motion, seeking (1) a receiver pursuant to CPLR § 5228 for judgment debtor JOY-CPW, INC. ("Joy"), including all of its tangible and intangible assets, to satisfy the Judgment, plus post-judgment interest and costs, with the Court selecting the receiver to operate, preserve, and/or liquidate Joy; (2) an order authorizing the [*2]receiver to take immediate control of Joy, including all of its assets, and to liquidate, manage, or operate Joy as necessary, to satisfy the Judgment, post-judgment interest, attorneys' fees, and costs of the receivership; (3) an order empowering the receiver to access and secure all of Joy's financial and business records; direct its operations to preserve and maximize its value; liquidate or sell its assets; execute necessary documents; and to take any other actions required to enforce this Court's orders and fulfill the duties of the receivership; (4) an order directing defendants to cooperate fully with the receiver, including providing immediate access to all of Joy's books, records, financial statements and property and forbidding any interference with the receiver's duties; (5) an order dispensing with any requirement of a bond or other undertaking on the part of the receiver; (6) an order directing that all of the proceeds or payments made from Joy's accounts or assets be paid directly to the receiver pursuant to CPLR § 5228, for the purpose of satisfying the Judgment, post-judgment interest, attorneys' fees, and costs; (7) an order authorizing the receiver to employ legal counsel or other professionals as necessary to fulfill its duties, with such costs, including the receiver's compensation, to be paid from Joy's assets or from the proceeds of the liquidation of its property; (8) an order directing that any proceeds from the liquidation of Joy's assets in excess of the amounts required to satisfy the Judgment, including post-judgment interest, costs, and attorneys' fees, be returned to Joy; (9) an order releasing the receiver from liability for any lost investment returns, missed opportunities, or diminution in value of Joy's assets as a result of the receiver's lawful actions pursuant to this Order; and (10) reasonable attorneys' fees and costs on this motion and interest on the underlying Judgment.

In support of his motion, plaintiff states, without contradiction, that in the month since he received the Judgment, defendants have made no payments towards the Judgment. In fact, according to plaintiff, defendants have taken affirmative steps to thwart plaintiff from enforcing the Judgment. Specifically, plaintiff states that after he served an information subpoena with restraining order on a bank, defendants contacted that bank and indicated that a stay would be forthcoming, based on a new action that defendants commenced in New York County in December 2024. Defendants also filed an Order to Show Cause seeking to stay the enforcement of the Judgment. The Court in the New York County action refused to sign the Order to Show Cause, stating that movant had presented the Court with no basis on which to stay a Westchester action.

Plaintiff now states that a receiver is necessary because of defendants' "evasive conduct and the complex nature of JOY-CPW, INC.'s business, inter-mingling of bank accounts and assets, which include intellectual property, archives, royalties, commissions, revenue-generating contracts, and other intangible assets requiring skilled management for liquidation."

In response, defendants argue that plaintiff's best option for being repaid is through a bankruptcy proceeding filed by a non-party, defendant's wife, Joyce. Defendants assert that "Plaintiff has used the bankruptcy court to bully, lie and intimidate," and then used this Court to ruin defendants. Defendants state that plaintiff "knows that there are no bank accounts, other than those for operating expenses, nor 'real property' to seize, but pursued this vendetta for the sole purpose of destroying the asset."

Without presenting any evidence to support their assertions, defendants claim that "Plaintiff will be paid 100% with strong interest in our payment plan, but would never be paid by sequestering the company, which relies entirely on goodwill, unique skill, decades of experience and high reputation; all based on my participation. This is intellectual property, not a [*3]manufacturing plant." Defendants contend it would be "reckless" to appoint a receiver because doing so will "immediately destroy the asset, the lives of those dependent on it from hundreds of station personnel to our production team and, of course, myself and Joyce, whose lives have been fully dedicated to the asset" because a "receiver will not have the specialized knowledge that I have gained over decades, being intimately involved with all aspects of production and ad revenue generation. . . . In fact, it is fairer to say the appointment of a receiver would be detrimental, not only to Game Time's viability but also to the interest of creditors like the SBA and IRS whose repayment depends on the continued success of Game Time." Defendants urge the Court to deny the application, and urge plaintiff to "be a little patient and wait like the other creditors." The Court notes that defendants present the Court with no indication of a timeline for repayments to plaintiff, or any evidence of how defendant's wife's bankruptcy would result in payments to plaintiff.

The appointment of a receiver is governed by CPLR § 5228: "Upon motion of a judgment creditor . . . the court may appoint a receiver who may be authorized to administer, collect, improve, lease, repair or sell any real or personal property in which the judgment debtor has an interest or to do any other acts designed to satisfy the judgment." The Court of Appeals has explained that the appointment of a receiver pursuant to this section "is a matter within the court's discretion. A motion to appoint a receiver should only be granted when a special reason appears to justify one. In deciding whether the appointment of receiver is justified, courts have considered the (1) alternative remedies available to the creditor; (2) the degree to which receivership will increase the likelihood of satisfaction; and (3) the risk of fraud or insolvency if a receiver is not appointed. A receivership has been held especially appropriate when the property interest involved is intangible, lacks a ready market, and presents nothing that a sheriff can work with at an auction. . . . Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 14 NY3d 303, 317 (2010).

At this very early stage in judgment enforcement efforts, plaintiff "failed to demonstrate that a 'special reason' existed to justify the appointment of a receiver," Lew v. Sobel, 192 AD3d 797, 798, 139 N.Y.S.3d 900, 901 (2d Dept. 2021), among other things. As in the First Department case of Galen Tech. Sols., Inc. v. VectorMAX Corp., 107 AD3d 435, 436, 967 N.Y.S.2d 327, 328 (1st Dept. 2013), so here too, "Plaintiff failed to show that it had exhausted all its alternative remedies, since it took no action to collect its judgment, other than serving restraining notices and information subpoenas. There was no showing that a receivership would increase the likelihood that the judgment would be satisfied. . . ." Id.

The Court finds that the motion for a receiver is premature, and denies it in its entirety. That being said, the Court directs plaintiff to (re)serve his restraining notices and information subpoenas as soon as practicable. Defendants are ordered to respond timely, as set forth in the CPLR. They are also directed to refrain from hindering any enforcement efforts. Should defendants again obstruct any legitimate means of enforcing the Judgment, the Court will entertain a second motion for a receiver.

The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the Court.^[FN1]