The following documents were considered in connection with Plaintiff's motion, dated March 6, 2025, (hereinafter "Motion Sequence # 11"), seeking the entry of an Order granting the following relief:

1. Modifying the Judgment of Divorce to extend the Plaintiff's exclusive use and occupancy of the former marital residence beyond March 1, 2025, until the youngest child reaches 18 years of age and achieves financial stability;

2. Set a date for a hearing on this matter;

3. Awarding Plaintiff with such other and further relief as this Court may seem just and proper;

And considered in connection with Defendant's cross motion, dated March 21, 2025, (hereinafter "Motion Sequence No. 12"), seeking the entry of an Order:

1. Directing Plaintiff, NY, to immediately list the former marital residence located at XXXX, for sale as per the terms of the Court's Trial Decision and Order dated November 3, 2021, the Court's Ancillary Decision and Order dated April 6, 2022, which terms were incorporated by reference, but not merged into the Judgment of Divorce dated May 10, 2022 (entered into the office of the County Clerk on May 12, 2022), and

2. Directing Plaintiff to immediately cooperate with the Court-Ordered listing broker (Houlihan Lawrence of Bronxville — Ley Real Estate) in the signing of all listing documents and contracts of sale and directing Plaintiff to cooperate with the [*2]recommendations of the real estate broker in regard to scheduling "open houses", as well as ensuring that Plaintiff keeps the residence in a clean presentable fashion to all potential purchases;

OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE,

3. In the event that Plaintiff fails to immediately list the former marital residence for sale within five (5) days of the issuance of this Court's Order and/or fails to cooperate with the listing broker in the "open house" process or fails to maintain the residence in a neat and presentable condition; and cooperate with the broker in the signing of all necessary documents including, but not limited to, listing documents and contracts of sale, Defendant, G.W., or any third-party Referee be appointed, assigned, and empowered by the Court to act in Plaintiff's stead with full authority to sign all documents and papers necessary to close on the residence and requiring Plaintiff to assume all costs associated with the appointment of any third-party; and

4. Awarding Defendant, G.W., attorney's fees in the amount of $8,000.00 with leave to seek additional fees if this matter should have to proceed to a hearing, or if further actions are made necessary; and

5. Such other and further relief as to the Court deems just and proper.

On February 20, 2018, this action was commenced with the filing of a Summons with Notice (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1) and a Complaint (NYSCEF Doc. No. 2) (hereinafter "Complaint"), seeking the entry of a judgment of divorce dissolving the parties' marriage and granting Plaintiff exclusive use and occupancy of the marital domicile located at XXXX (hereinafter "Marital Domicile"). The Complaint further asserted that there were four children of the marriage being: (1) L.W. (D.O.B.: XX/XX/XXXX); (2) O.W. (D.O.B.: XX/XX/XXXX); (3) M.W. (D.O.B.: XX/XX/XXXX); and (4) R.W. (D.O.B.: XX/XX/XXXX) (hereinafter collectively "Children").

On March 5, 2018, Defendant's then counsel filed a Notice of Appearance (NYSCEF Doc. No. 3).

On September 19, 2018, following a preliminary conference, an order appointing attorney for the Children (NYSCEF Doc. No. 18) was entered appointing Lisa Zeiderman, Esq., as attorney for the Children (hereinafter "Attorney for the Children"). The referee report of Court Attorney-Referee Carol Swidler (NYSCEF Doc. No. 20) (hereinafter "First Referee Report") indicates that the Children were then engaged in therapy.

On November 8, 2018, an order appointing neutral forensic evaluator (NYSCEF Doc. No. 30) (hereinafter "Order Appointing Forensic Evaluator") was entered appointing Dr. Marc S. [*3]Mednick, Ph.D., to complete a forensic evaluation pertaining to the parties and Children, and to submit to the Court a report pertaining to the issues of custody, domestic violence, mental illness, visitation/access and interference with parental rights.

On December 13, 2018, a so ordered move out and access agreement: withdrawal of petitions (NYSCEF Doc. No. 33) (hereinafter "Moveout Agreement") was filed which included the following agreements reached pertaining to the Marital Domicile:

"WHEREAS, the Parties were married to each other on the 9th day of February 2002 in the Town of Hillsdale, County of Columbia, State of New York; and

WHEREAS, the Parties have four (4) unemancipated children of the marriage: L.W., born XX/XX/XXXX; O.W., born XX/XX/XXXX; R.W., born XX/XX/XXXX and M.W., born XX/XX/XXXX (hereinafter the "Children" or singly as a "Child"), and there are no other children expected of this marriage; and

WHEREAS, the Parties are presently involved in the above-captioned matrimonial matter presently pending in the Supreme Court, County of Westchester (the "Action"); and

WHEREAS, all four (4) children are represented by Lisa Zeiderman, Esq., who has been appointed as Attorney for the Children ("AFC") and Dr. Marc Mednick is in the process of being appointed as a neutral forensic evaluator;

WHEREAS, there is a Temporary Order of Protection ("TOP") against the Father in effect which resulted from a Petition for a permanent Order of Protection filed by the Mother in Yonkers Family Court (Docket XXXX, File #XXXX) which is currently pending a hearing; and there is another Petition filed by the Mother against the Father claiming a violation of the Temporary Order of Protection ("TOP") pending in Yonkers Family Court (Docket XXXX, File XXXX);

WHEREAS, the Parties and counsel await the determination of a Child Protective Services ("CPS") investigation of the Father; and

WHEREAS, O.W., M.W., and R.W. currently attend the Children of Divorce Program at Weill Cornell Hospital in White Plains, New York, each of the Parties is participating in the parent portion of the Children of Divorce Program, and L.W. participates in individual therapy with Marilyn Kotcher, LCSW; and

WHEREAS, the Father has commenced individual therapy to address issues relating to the pending matrimonial action and his relationship with the Children; and

WHEREAS, the Husband shall move from XXXX (the "Marital Residence") no later than November 30, 201ho during the pendency of the above-captioned Action and the Mother shall enjoy exclusive use and occupancy of the Marital Residence thereafter; and

WHEREAS, the Parties have agreed to a temporary access schedule to govern the Father's time with the Children until further agreement of the Parties or Court Order; and

WHEREAS, the Parties each reserve all rights related to equitable distribution of the Marital Residence and the contents thereof; and

* * *

ARTICLE I

THE PARTIES' INTENDED LIVING SITUATION

1. The Husband shall vacate the Marital Residence-on-or-before-November 30, 20l8. The Wife shall have exclusive use and occupancy of the Marital Residence after Husband has vacated same, pending further agreement of the Parties or Court Order. After vacating the [*4]Marital Residence pursuant to the terms of this Agreement, the Husband shall not enter the residence without written permission of the Wife (email sufficing).

* * *

1. Within ten (10) days of the Parties' signing this Agreement, the Wife shall file an Order to Show Cause in Family Court, Yonkers, to withdraw her pending petitions (Docket XXXX and Docket XXXX, File XXXX) seeking an Order of Protection, removal of the Husband from the Marital Residence, and a contempt finding against Husband for alleged violations of the Temporary Order of Protection. Wife shall abandon prosecution of these Petitions without prejudice.

2. Upon the execution of this Agreement, the parties shall each obey the following conditions of behavior:

a. Once G.W. has vacated the Marital Residence, each Party shall stay away from the home of the other, except for during the exchange of the Children, which shall be curbside at the Wife's home;"^[FN1]

On June 26, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 70-82) (hereinafter "Motion Sequence No. 3"), seeking relief, inter alia, granting Plaintiff and Children an order of protection against Defendant directing Defendant to stay away from the home of the Plaintiff and Children. In support of this application Plaintiff filed an affidavit in support (NYSCEF Doc. No. 71) (hereinafter "Plaintiff Affidavit #1") which asserted:

"Despite the financial realities of this case, Defendant refuses to settle since it is his expressed intention to financially destroy the family, force us to move from the marital home located at XXXX all in retaliation for his self-created toxic relationship with his four children. Presently, Defendant spends about seven hours weekly with the children, no overnights. Defendant has no access time with our eldest daughter, L.W., due to his past horrific actions against her. The children do not enjoy being with their Father since Defendant uses their time together to disparage me and otherwise directly involve the children in the divorce action.

* * *

I believe Defendant suffers from anger management and control issues and is complete denial of the harmful effect his behavior has on the children, which is why this divorce has dragged out and drained the family of its finances.

* * *

A forensic psychological evaluation of the family and collaterals was conducted with Dr. Marc Mednick, the report having been filed with this court on or about April 16, 2019.

* * *

Defendant denies any wrongdoing on his part for his broken relationship with the children, but Dr. Mednick's report reads like a horror novel about how he treated our children, especially L.W.

* * *

In Addition to this very public negative campaign, the past trauma of Defendant's abuse is very preent in the children's minds and affects them every day.

* * *

Without an order of protection and therapeutic supervised access, Defendant will continue his harmful actions against all the children as detailed above. I strongly believe the children need to be immediately protected from Defendant. I do not want the rest of the children to wind up as damaged as L.W., our eldest child who is very fragile."^[FN2]

On August 6, 2019, a so ordered parenting agreement (NYSCEF Doc. No. 113) (hereinafter "Parenting Agreement") was filed which provided sole legal and physical custody of the Children to Plaintiff subject to access of Defendant set forth therein.^[FN3] The Parenting Agreement acknowledged the need for the Children to continue therapeutic services noting, "This parenting Agreement anticipates substantial therapeutic services for the family,"^[FN4] and continues, "The children shall each have their own therapist pursuant to the protocols set forth herein."^[FN5] Plaintiff was provided the right to make all major decisions pertaining to the Children after having informed Defendant:

"As to all Major, non-emergency decisions (Major Decision) concerning any of the Children, the Mother shall make the Major Decision and inform the Father of such Major Decision via e-mail within 48 hours of making such Major Decision which shall include any Major Decision regarding the Children's Health/Medical/Therapeutic, Psychiatric, Dental, Orthodontic, Educational, Extracurricular, Camp, Summer Program, Religious Decision."^[FN6]

On March 8, 2021, following a trial before this Court [Ecker, J], Plaintiff's post trial memorandum (NYSCEF Doc. No. 307) (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Post Trial Memorandum") was filed providing a summary of Plaintiff's requests of the Court, prior to a decision after trial being entered which included the following for consideration by the Court:

"Custody was resolved on consent, pursuant to the parties' Parenting Agreement, So Ordered August 6, 2019, (Hon. L. Lubell) granting Plaintiff sole legal and physical custody with supervised access to Defendant.

* * *

Should the Court grant her request, Plaintiff will be able to maintain the former marital residence for the children, which she believes is crucial for their continued emotional stability after the years of emotional and physical abuse they suffered from the Defendant, especially L.W. who has documented psychiatric and speech issues.

* * *

Plaintiff also requests the exclusive right to reside in XXXX with the parties' four children, for at least six years to permit Plaintiff time to refinance or sell the home in order to remove Defendant from deed and mortgage."^[FN7]

On November 3, 2021, a Decision After Trial (NYSCEF Doc. No. 357) (hereinafter "Trial Decision #1") was entered acknowledging the respective trial positions of both parties pertaining to the Marital Domicile:

"The parties purchased XXXX, a one family residence ("the Marital Residence") on June 10, 2014, at a cost of $1,650,000 USD, paid $330,000 USD by cash and $1,320,000 USD by adjustable-rate purchase money mortgage loan from Citibank, N.A. (see closing statement for purchase, Ex. EEE). The outstanding principal amount, as of the trial date, was $1,200,000 USD. Plaintiff and the children have resided there since defendant vacated the premises in 2018. Plaintiff has demanded that she had the children remain as the exclusive occupants for six years; defendant argues that she cannot afford to maintain the premises, such that it should be immediately placed on the market for sale, with the net proceeds divided equally."^[FN8]

The Court then shared the manner within which it made a determination pertaining to the equitable distribution and exclusive occupancy request of Plaintiff regarding the Marital Domicile taking into consideration the divergent positions of the parties and factors to be measured:

"The court must consider whether the needs of the children to remain in the XXXX school system, assuming plaintiff is able to maintain the residence, outweigh defendant's demand that it be sold immediately. Clearly, whenever appropriate, children deserve to remain in the residence and school district to which they are accustomed. Plaintiff states she will be able to maintain the residence based upon her income, gifts from her mother, loans from business associates, other assets, and the child support due from Defendant. The principal amortization/interest payments, real estate taxes and property insurance alone amount to almost $10,000 USD per month. Neither party offered proof of the less expensive housing market in XXXX, which is essentially a single-family residence community with some coops, condos and rental apartments. However, finding a residence that can accommodate a four children household will not be an easy feat."^[FN9]

In deciding that Plaintiff would remain in exclusive occupancy of the Marital Domicile with the Children, the Court directed that this would be for a finite period within which Plaintiff would be required to timely make the monthly mortgage payments of the existing mortgage encumbering the property and if Plaintiff was unable to refinance the mortgage to effectuate a buy-out of Defendant's interest in the Marital Domicile, the property would be sold as set forth [*5]by the Court:

"Nevertheless, the court finds plaintiff is to be afforded the opportunity to remain in the Marital Residence until August 31, 2025. By that date, she must have taken such steps to refinance the existing mortgage and remove defendant's name as an obligor. He will be entitled to an amount equal to one half of the net equity at the time of the refinance. The value of the Marital Residence shall be established by the appraisal value used by the lender providing the funds for the refinance. Should plaintiff fail to keep all payments owing and due on a monthly basis for any two months, consecutive or non-consecutive, during any one year (November to October) from now until August 31, 2025, then upon such occurrence the Marital Residence shall be listed for sale. This condition shall be operable only if defendant is in full compliance with his child support obligations infra.

Should plaintiff not arrange for the re-finance of the existing mortgage by August 31, 2025, or if she fails to keep up with the monthly payments as required supra, then the Marital Residence shall be placed on the market for sale by MLS listing, immediately upon default but in no event later than March 1, 2025. The parties shall utilize the services of Houlihan-Lawrence Bronxville-Ley Real Estate as the listing broker, unless they otherwise agree. The opinion of the listing broker as to the listing price and terms shall be binding upon the parties, unless they otherwise agree. If either party shall unreasonably fail to cooperate in the signing of the sale contract or the closing documents, she or he, as the case may be, shall be liable for any losses sustained, together with her/his attorneys' fees, costs and disbursements. At the sale, after deduction of all outstanding indebtedness, and ordinary and customary expenses of sale, the net proceeds shall be divided as provided supra."^[FN10]

Taking into consideration the needs of the Children, the Court then imposed directives upon Plaintiff as to what steps would be taken by her in the event relocation of Plaintiff and the Children from the Marital Domicile was required:

"The court advises plaintiff that it is incumbent upon her, in conjunction with the children's therapists, to prepare the children for their relocation should same be necessitated. In the event relocation is required, plaintiff shall be limited to relocating to a replacement residence in the State of New York, within twenty miles of XXXX, unless otherwise agreed, or otherwise ordered by a Court of competent jurisdiction."^[FN11]

On March 9, 2022, a conference was held before this Court [Ecker, J], wherein all parties and then counsel appeared, during which modifications agreed to by both parties through their then counsel were made to Trial Decision #1 as reflected by the filed court transcript (NYSCEF Doc. No. 385) (hereinafter "Trial Stipulation"), which includes the following agreements made pertaining to the Marital Domicile which were read onto the record by Plaintiff's then counsel:

"THE COURT: . . . The only issue is whether there's any nuts and bolts that need to be tightened. Otherwise, do you know what, I'll leave it as and I'll prepare the judgment and [*6]findings of fact and conclusions of law, and you can go to the Appellate Division."^[FN12]

* * *

THE COURT: Back on the record: What is the next item?

MR. BURROWS: Judge —

MS. MARIN: Why does he get to say it always?

MR. BURROWS: You can do it, Go ahead.

THE COURT: Go ahead. What's the next item?

MS. MARIN: Okay.

THE COUT: I'm looking at you.

MS. MARIN: Thank you. Your Honor.

MR. BURROWS: But it's on the items we've agreed to.

THE COURT: Hold on. I'm looking only at you.

MS. MARIN: Thank you.

THE COURT: I'm totally focused, totally.

MS. MARIN: I appreciate it. The XXXX, the listing—

THE COURT: What about it?

MS. MARIN: The listing, we agreed to modify the decision and order after trial that the listing date shall be the first March 1st, 2025, to the extent that no other provision of the trial decision on this issue is otherwise modified. We've agreed to that.

THE COURT: List date March 1st, 2025?

MS. MARIN: Yes. The Court did have two different dates. We agreed that it would be the March 1st date.

THE COURT: Very good. Mr. Burrows?

MR. BURROWS: That is agreed, Judge.^[FN13]

* * *

MS. MARIN: So I believe that this is the entire stipulation except that the parties agree that, except for as we modified it here today, the trial decision remains in full force and effect.

THE COURT: I'll take care of that.^[FN14]

* * *

THE COURT: For the record: Other than the two outstanding issues to which the Court has reserved, when the Court issues its final decision on the two outstanding issues, at that point, the parties, the Court will direct in its subsequent order the date by which the judgments shall be settled based upon today's transcript as well as the ruling to ensue based upon the submission of the letter of memoranda on March 23, 2022."^[FN15]

On April 6, 2022, this Court [Ecker, J], entered an Ancillary Trial Decision/Order (NYSCEF Doc. No. 386) (hereinafter "Trial Decision #2"), which confirmed the Trial Stipulation terms and provided the following:

"Pursuant to order dated January 28, 2022 [NYSCEF Doc. No. 347], counsel and the parties appeared for further proceedings in court on March 9, 2022. The purpose of this appearance was necessitated by the parties inability to resolve all issues raised by them, subsequent to the court's issuance of the Trial Decision/Order dated November 3, 2021 (the decision/order) [NYSCEF Doc. No. 357], which the parties contend required re-consideration or clarification, and which as of January 28, 2022, or further submissions, had yet to be resolved. As the court appearance on March 9, 2022, some outstanding issues were settled, with others left for further consideration.

* * *

This Ancillary Trial Decision/Order includes directives as to the settled issues, and directives as to those issues left for the court's final consideration, such that all issues are included in the Findings of Fact/Conclusions of Law and Judgment of Divorce, which must be signed prior to the court's "second and final" retirement, effective midnight, June 8."^[FN16]

* * *

It is against this background that the court makes the following rulings and orders which shall be incorporated in the final divorce documents. It is noted that wheresoever inconsistent with the decision/order issued November 3, 2021, the terms hereof shall supersede, but in all other respect, the terms and conditions of the decision/order shall remain fill force and effect.

* * *

By stipulation, the date of the listing for sale of the former marital premises known as XXXX, as directed at page 12 of the decision/order, shall remain March 1, 2025 and further, that plaintiff's refinance of the existing mortgage shall occur by March 1, 2025.^[FN17]

* * *

This matter shall appear on the court's calendar on April 27, 2022, for submission of the Findings of Fact/Conclusions of Law and Judgment of Divorce. In the event the parties' cannot do so by agreement, then each party shall submit on that date, her/his version for the court's consideration, highlighting the differences between each version."^[FN18]

On May 10, 2022, Plaintiff's then counsel filed a proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law (NYSCEF Doc. No. 396), which was re-filed that same day by Defendant's counsel who had signed the last page of the proposed document, indicting that it was being submitted on consent (NYSCEF Doc. No. 400), which was then entered by the Court [Ecker, J.] (NYSCEF Doc. No. 403) (hereinafter "Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law"), providing the [*7]following:

"Now, after reading and considering the papers submitted and reading the testimony of the trial heard before me on September 12, 2019, September 20, 2019, November 14, 2019, December 19, 2019, March 10, 2020, March 11, 2020, March 12, 2020, July 20, 2020, July 22, 2020, July 27, 2020 and July 28, 2020, and taking into consideration the two after trial decisions (dated November 3, 2021 and April 6, 2022) as well as the subsequent agreement of the parties to clarify the debits and credits, I do hereby make the following findings of essential facts which I deem established by the evidence and reach the following conclusions of law,^[FN19]

* * *

THIRTEENTH: Equitable distribution and ancillary issues are decided pursuant to the decision and order of this court dated November 3, 2021, and as further stated or modified in the April 6, 2022 Ancillary Trial Decision/Order as well as the subsequent agreement of the parties, which terms are summarized herein.

1. Plaintiff is awarded exclusive use and occupancy of the former marital residence located at XXXX. The Plaintiff has until March 1, 2025, to arrange for the re-finance of the existing mortgage, or, if she fails to keep up with the monthly payment as described in the November 3, 2021, Decision and Order after Trial, then the Marital Residence shall be listed for sale no later than March 1, 2025. This condition shall be operable only if Defendant is in full compliance with his child support obligations as stated in the November 3, 2021, Decision and Order After Trial.

2. In the event of sale, the Marital Residence shall be placed on the market for sale by MLS listing and the parties shall utilize the services of Houlihan Lawrence Bronxville-Ley Real Estate, as the listing broker, unless they otherwise agree. The opinion of the listing broker as to the listing price and terms shall be binding upon the parties, unless they otherwise agree. If either party shall unreasonably fail to cooperate in the signing of the sale contract of the closing documents, she or he, as the case may be, shall be liable for any losses sustained, together with her/his attorney's fees, costs and disbursement. At the sale, after decision of all outstanding indebtedness. And ordinary and customary expenses of sale, the net proceeds shall be divided as provided in the November 3, 2021, Decision and Order After Trial and the April 6, 2022 Ancillary Trial Decision and Order. In the event a relocation is necessary Plaintiff shall be limited to relocating to a replacement residence in the State of New York within twenty miles of XXXX, unless otherwise agreed, or otherwise ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction.^[FN20]

* * *

SEVENTH: If DRL § 170 subd. (7) is the ground alleged, then all economic issues of equitable distribution of marital property, the payment or waiver of spousal support, the payment of child support, the payment of counsel, expert and appraisal fees and expenses as well as the custody and visitation with the minor children of the marriage have been resolved by the court in its November 3, 2021 Decision and Order After Trial and the [*8]April 6, 2022 Ancillary Trial Decision/Order, the terms of which are incorporated herein and in the judgment of divorce signed or even date herewith, shall both survive and not be merged."^[FN21]

On May 10, 2022, Plaintiff's then counsel filed a proposed judgment of divorce (NYSCEF Doc. No. 395), which was re-filed that same day by Defendant's counsel who had signed the last page of the proposed document indicting that they were being submitted on consent (NYSCEF Doc. No. 401), which was then entered by the Court (NYSCEF Doc. No. 402) (hereinafter "Judgment of Divorce"), providing the following:

"ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the terms of the November 3, 2021 Decision and Order After Trial (HON. LAWRENCE H. ECKER); and the April 6, 2022 Ancillary Trial Decision/Order (HON. LAWRENCE H. ECKER) are hereby confirmed; and it is further

* * *

ORDERED AND ADJUGED that the parties entered into a Parenting Agreement So Ordered by the court on August 6, 2019, (HON. L.J. LUBELL), said Order which shall survive, continue and not be merged into this Judgment in accordance with the terms of said order the Plaintiff has sole legal and physical custody of the children with therapeutic supervised access to Defendant . . .^[FN22]

* * *

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff is awarded exclusive use and occupancy of the former marital residence located at XXXX under the terms and conditions described in the November 3, 2021 Decision and Order After Trial; and it is further ^[FN23]

* * *

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: that all other issues of Equitable Distribution have been determined as set forth in the November 3, 2021 Decision and Order After Trial (HON. LWRENCE H. ECKER) and the April 6, 2022 Ancillary Trial Decision/Order (HON. LAWRENCE H. ECKER) the terms of both which are hereby incorporated in this Judgment of Divorce, in their entirety, the terms of each summarized in the annexed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law signed of even date herewith; and it is further ^[FN24]

* * *

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the court's November 3, 2021 Decision After Trial, and April 6, 2022 Ancillary Trial Decision/Order (HON. LAWRENCE H. ECKER), true copies of each are annexed to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, are both hereby incorporated into this Judgment of Divorce, their terms shall not merge but shall [*9]survive as if set forth in their entirety herein; and it is further"^[FN25]

On May 14, 2022, Plaintiff's then counsel filed proof of service on Defendant of a copy of the Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law and Judgment of Divorce with a notice of entry (NYSCEF Doc. No. 406).

On July 4, 2022, Plaintiff, then acting as a self-represented litigant, filed a motion by order to show cause (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 434-440) (hereinafter "Motion Sequence No. 9) which sought the entry of an order granting relief including, inter alia, the following related to the Marital Domicile: (1) for an order directing I do not have to refinance the former marital home, XXXX, given Defendant's is not in "full compliance of his child support obligations as stated in the November 3, 2021, Decision and Order After Trial"; (2) for an order modifying the Judgment of Divorce to remove any requirement that I am responsible for Gordon Burrow's debt owed by the Defendant given Defendant's failure to be in full compliance of his child support obligations, which relieves me of my obligation to refinance the marital residence; (3) For an order to remove Burrows' ability to put a lien on XXXX or to leave him to decide whether or not I can refinance XXXX, since he will never admit Defendant is not in compliance with his child support obligations, as he is now, since it will be against Burrows' financial interest, thereby putting him in direct conflict with Defendant's best interest, a conflict of interest that cannot be overcome; (4) For an order to clarify the Judgment of Divorce to clarify my obligations to finance Defendant's attorney's fees, given Defendant's default in paying child support, which relieves me of my obligation to refinance the marital residence and the court's obvious mistake in granting Burrows that exclusive authority; and (5) for an order permitting me to modify the judgment of divorce as hereinabove requested based upon the court's obvious mistakes requiring me to be responsible for Defendant's attorneys' fees.

On January 5, 2022, this Court [Quinones, T] entered an order (NYSCEF Doc. No. 442) wherein it set forth the basis to decline to sign Motion Sequence No. 9, "Decline to sign as procedurally defective. The relief sought in this application may only be achieved through an appeal or leave to reargue/renew before the Hon. Ecker."

On March 5, 2025, Plaintiff filed, by order to show cause, Motion Sequence No. 11 (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 453-458), including an affidavit of Plaintiff (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Affidavit") (NYSCEF Doc. No. 454), which was conformed on March 6, 2025 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 457) directing: (1) by March 7, 2025, Plaintiff shall serve on Defendant with Motion Sequence No. 11, via overnight traceable delivery; (2) By March 21, 2025, Defendant shall file with the Court and serve on Plaintiff's counsel, via overnight traceable delivery, opposition submissions and/or cross motions; (3) by April 4, 2025, Plaintiff shall file with the Court and serve Defendant, via overnight traceable delivery, opposition submissions to any cross motions filed; (4) directing that no reply submissions were to be accepted; and (5) directing April 4, 2025, to serve as the return date for Motion Sequence No. 11 and any cross motions filed.

On March 21, 2025, Defendant filed Motion Sequence No. 12 as a cross motion (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 459-470).

On April 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed submissions on opposition to Motion Sequence No. 12 (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 471-476), including an Affidavit of Plaintiff (hereinafter "Plaintiff's [*10]Affidavit #2) (NYSCEF Doc. No. 471).

No other submissions were made pertaining to Motion Sequence Nos. 11 and 12.

Plaintiff acknowledges that she was awarded exclusive use and occupancy of the Marital Domicile pursuant to the Judgment of Divorce, which required her to arrange for the refinance of the existing mortgage by March 1, 2025, or list the Marital Domicile for sale if she failed to keep up with the monthly mortgage payments and that this deadline was contingent upon Defendant's compliance with his child support obligations.^[FN26] Curiously, Plaintiff's counsel appears to take a contrary position from that of her client asserting that the date by which to sell or refinance is August 1, 2025, as noted in the affirmation of Plaintiff's counsel (NYSCEF Doc. No. 456) (hereinafter "Affirmation of Plaintiff's Counsel #1") and affirmation of Plaintiff's counsel (NYSCEF Doc. No. 476) (hereinafter "Affirmation of Plaintiff's Counsel #2").^[FN27]

Plaintiff concedes that Defendant has complied with his child support obligations.^[FN28] In response to Defendant's claims that she has not made the mortgage payments timely, her response confirms that they were not made on time but within "the grace period permitted by the mortgage agreement,"^[FN29] and asks the Court to consider two documents which she argues prove her timely payments (hereinafter collectively "Equifax Documents") (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 473 & 474). Nonetheless, Plaintiff argues that her request to remain in exclusive use and occupancy of the Marital Domicile is warranted due to her financial situation which prevents her refinance of the mortgage and lack of alternative housing options.^[FN30] Plaintiff further requests that the Court, "consider the best interests of my children,"^[FN31] asserting that remaining in the Marital Domicile [*11]would promote their well-being:

"The Court, in its divorce findings, acknowledged and recognized that the current family home provides them with the safety, stability, and environment necessary for their healing process. Relocating them during these critical years would expose them to further instability, which could severely hinder their well-being. The home in itself offers a refuge where they feel secure and where they have developed strong relationships with the local community. These relationships are crucial for their ongoing emotional recovery. Moving would cause additional disruption, potentially exacerbating the trauma they have already experienced. The alternative-forcing us to relocate-would cause unnecessary disruption and hardship. potentially undoing the progress my children have made in their recovery. The school district has been identified by the prior Attorney for the Children and their therapists as essential for my children's well-being, particularly in light of their past experiences of domestic abuse. Each child receives therapeutic support and has a 504-plan tailored to their emotional and academic needs. The school district has been instrumental in their recovery, and the administration has actively supported them, including banning their father from school grounds after reports of abuse to Child Protective Services. The children can only remain in this school district if we continue residing in the XXXX area. Moving out would render them ineligible for enrollment, significantly disrupting their academic, social and emotional well-being."^[FN32]

Plaintiff then makes a series of requests for relief not set forth in the order to show cause pertaining to Motion Sequence No. 11 (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Additional Requested Relief") including the following:

"Upon the eventual sale of the marital property, all proceeds will be allocated to fully fund the college education of all four children. Of the remaining proceeds before the 50/50 split with the ex-spouse I request 50% reimbursement for all mortgage payments, house insurance, and property taxes made to the property since its purchase in 2014. I request 50% reimbursement for all maintenance, upkeep, and any necessary repairs made to the property since its purchase in 2014."^[FN33]

Defendant asserts that following Plaintiff' commencement of this action, her outrageous demands and unsupported claims against him prevented any settlement. Defendant argues that Trial Decision #1 and #2 set forth clear directives regarding the Marital Residence, taking into consideration the needs of the Children to remain in the residence and school district to which they were accustomed, noting that the Court advised Plaintiff that it was incumbent upon her to prepare the Children for their relocation should such be required. Asserting that Plaintiff's exclusive use and occupancy of the Marital Domicile was conditioned upon her timely payment of the monthly mortgage obligations, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claim that she has remained current in the mortgage payments is false pointing to Defendant's Exhibit D (NYSCEF Doc. No. 465) (hereinafter "Delinquency Notices").

Upon review of the ten Delinquency Notices, they span in date from February of 2024 through January of 2025, with each addressed to the parties at the Marital Domicile. Each notice contains the following warning to the parties, "If your payment is not received by the end of the current month, we may report information about your account to credit bureaus. Late payments, missed payments, or other defaults on your account may be reflected on your credit report." The Delinquency Notices reflect the following information:

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has been aware of her required refinance or sale of the Marital Domicile by March 1, 2025, directing the Court to Defendant's Exhibit E, being an e-mail sent to Plaintiff by his counsel providing a reminder, a response for which was never received, which notes:

"N.Y.---Good Morning.

* * *

As you are aware you are required to list the former marital residence for sale in the Spring of 2025 or in the alternative buy out G.W.'s interest by refinancing the existing mortgage.

* * *

You have had over three years to prepare for this moment and any delays will not be tolerated . . .

* * *

I wait your comments to this e-mail."

Defendant requests that this Court direct the immediate sale of the Marital Domicile and to grant the additional relief to prevent Plaintiff from sabotaging the sale of the residence through dilatory execution of the listing agreement and other documents necessary to effectuate the transfer of the property. Defendant further requests that this Court direct Plaintiff to cooperate in the marketing of the Marital Domicile including keeping the property in clear condition and cooperating with the realtors. In the event Plaintiff fails to comply with the Court's directives, Defendant requests the appointment of he or another selected by the Court to act as referee to effectuate the sale of the Marital Domicile. With respect to Plaintiff's Additional Requested Relief, Defendant argues that such relief should not be granted as it was not made in the order to show cause pertaining to Plaintiffs motion, was not made at trial and Plaintiff failed to appeal the decisions made after trial. Finally, Defendant requests that an award of attorneys' fees should be granted against Plaintiff in favor of Defendant, as Plaintiff's motion is without merit.

"Civil Practice Law and Rules § 2214(a) provides that "[a] notice of motion shall specify ... the relief demanded and the grounds therefor." However, the court "may grant relief that is warranted by the facts plainly appearing on the papers on both sides, if the relief granted is not too dramatically unlike the relief sought, the proof offered supports it, and there is no prejudice to any party" (Evans v. Argent Mort. Co., LLC, 120 AD3d 618 [2d Dept 2014], quoting, Frankel v. Stavsky, 40 AD3d 918 [2d Dept 2007]).

Here, as Plaintiff's Additional Requested Relief were not included in the order to show cause pertaining to Motion Sequence No. 11, this Court declines to consider such relief having determined that is too dramatically unlike the relief requested in the order to show cause and Plaintiff has presented no proof to support such requested relief.

Letters which are unsworn are not admissible proof and therefore have no evidentiary value (Simms v. North Shore University Hosp., 192 AD2d 700 [2d Dept 1993]; see also, Brodie v. Board of Managers, 226 AD3d 555, [1st Dept 2024]; Timothy M.M. v. Doreen R., 188 AD3d 1711 [4th Dept 2020]; Patricia "YY" v. Albany County Department of Social Services, 238 AD2d 672, [3rd Dept 1997]. Here, Plaintiff has submitted the Unsworn Letters which have no evidentiary value and have not been considered by this Court when making the determinations set forth herein pertaining to the instant motions.

However, the Court will note that one of these letters appears to have been written by the parties' eldest child wherein she seems to have been called upon to repeat the alleged positions of [*12]her minor siblings with respect to this litigation. This calls into question if Plaintiff has been improperly involving the Children in this litigation in violation of the Parenting Agreement which directs that, "Neither parent shall discuss either this divorce case or any subsequent court case regarding the parties with the children, or permit any third party to do so."^[FN34]

Years ago the Court of Appeals wisely noted, "It requires no great knowledge of child psychology to recognize that a child, already suffering from the trauma of a broken home, should not be placed in the position of having its relationship with either parent further jeopardized by having to publicly relate its difficulties with them or be required to openly choose between them" (Lincoln v. Lincoln, 24 NY2d 270 [1969]). This is unquestionably relevant here where the parties and Court have recognized the challenges faced by the Children. Accordingly, both parties should consider adherence to this wisdom imparted by the Court of Appeals by preventing their Children from being placed in the middle of their parents with respect to litigation between them which in no way can serve their best interests and may possibly harm their relationship with both parties.

When presiding over contested matrimonial actions it is not uncommon for trial courts to be called upon to make difficult determinations as to the equitable distribution of the homes of divorcing parties. While attorneys will often refer to these properties as "marital domiciles" they are more than mere real estate holdings of parties involved in litigation. They are people's homes where they have in many cases raised their children, enjoyed life's milestones and developed precious memories. However, when faced with the financial realities of divorce, the fate of the parties' home is often an issue that must be decided by the Court if they cannot come to a resolution of their own design. Much has been written about the anxiety that the financial aspects of divorce may cause litigants and the need for attorneys involved in such cases to take the appropriate action of educating their clients early in the litigation process,^[FN35] including through the use of neutral financial consultants to advise parties as to divorce-related financial matters.^[FN36]

In the State of New York an abundance of case law has been developed pertaining to how courts are to evaluate if a parties' residence is to be sold following the divorce or if the custodial parent and children shall continue to occupy the home following the entry of judgment of divorce. "Ordinarily, the sale of the marital residence should be ordered sold at the time of the divorce judgment absent extenuating circumstances" (Tanner v. Tanner, 107 AD2d 980 [3d [*13]Dept], quoting, Wobster v. Wobster, 91 AD2d 826 [4th Dept 1982]). The Appellate Division Second Department has noted:

"Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(5)(f) provides that the court may, in its discretion, make an order regarding the use and occupancy of the marital home "without regard to the form of ownership of such property." In addition, exclusive possession of the marital residence is usually granted to the spouse who has custody of the minor children of the marriage. However, the need of the custodial parent to occupy the marital residence is weighed against the financial need **34 of the parties." [internal citations omitted]

(Goldblum v. Goldblum, 301 AD2d 567 [2d Dept 2003]).

In making this review, factors assessed by the Court include if the custodial parent can obtain comparable housing at a lower cost, if the custodial parent is financially capable of maintaining the marital residence and if either spouse is in immediate need of their share of the sale proceeds (Leabo v. Leabo, 2032 AD2d 254 [2d Dept 1994]); see also, Campbell v. Campbell, 286 AD2d 467 [2d Dept 2001]; Crane v. Crane, 264 AD2d 749 [2d Dept 1999]; Sotnik v. Zavilyansky, 101 AD3d 1102 [2d Dept 2012]). Also taken into consideration is if any of the subject children have special needs to remain in the marital home due to disability requiring stability (Marino v. Marino, 183 AD3d [2d Dept 2020]).

Here, upon review of the procedural history set forth above, in the decisions entered after trial, this Court engaged in the appropriate evaluation of both parties' positions pertaining to the Marital Domicile, including the request of Plaintiff that the property not be sold and that she as the custodial parent of the Children be permitted to remain with the Children in the property. Following an eleven-day trial, Judge Ecker entered Trial Decision #1 which set forth his determination pertaining to the Marital Domicile wherein he recognized the competing interests of Plaintiff seeking exclusive occupancy versus Defendant's request for an immediate sale. He then made the ultimate determination that Plaintiff would be granted exclusive occupancy of the Marital Domicile for a period to end on March 1, 2025, to the extent Plaintiff made timely mortgage payments and Defendant complied with his support obligations.

Following the parties and then counsel seeking clarification and re-argument of certain aspects of Trial Decision #1, Judge Ecker held a conference wherein the parties appeared with counsel and several agreements were placed upon the record as reflected in the Trial Stipulation. Among these agreements was that the date whereby Plaintiff was to either refinance the mortgage on the Marital Domicile or to list the property for sale was March 1, 2025. Notably, Plaintiff's then counsel was the individual who placed this term on the record in the presence of all counsel and parties, including Plaintiff. Thereafter, Trial Decision #2 was entered referencing the Trial Stipulation and that any determinations made therein would supersede those made in the Trial Decision #1. Plaintiff's then counsel prepared and submitted, on consent of Defendant's counsel, the Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law and Judgment of Divorce (hereinafter "Ecker Decisions"), after which Plaintiff's then counsel served for both a Notice of Entry.

Thereafter, Plaintiff has failed to timely file any motions pertaining to the Ecker Decisions, nor has Plaintiff perfected any appeals pertaining to same. Accordingly, to the extent that Motion Sequence No. 11 seeks to reargue or renew the Ecker Decisions, Plaintiff's application is denied. The time to file an application to reargue has long passed and this Court [*14]will not grant any extension of time to do so,^[FN37] a motion to renew a final judgment is improper,^[FN38] and the time to appeal has long passed.^[FN39] Moreover, ""Pursuant to CPLR 5019(a), a trial court has the discretion to correct an order or judgment which contains a mistake, defect, or irregularity not affecting a substantial right of a party, or is inconsistent with the decision upon which it is based. However, a trial court has no revisory or appellate jurisdiction, sua sponte, to vacate its own order or judgment" (see, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. v. Kaplan, 227 AD3d 647 [2 Dept 2024], quoting, Adams v. Fellingham, 52 AD3d 443 [2d Dept 2008]; see also, Portano v. Portano, 85 AD2d 622 [2d Dept 1981] "Where a change of substance in a judgment is sought, the remedy is a direct appeal or a motion to vacate the judgment, not a motion to amend the judgment").

Accordingly, while this Court will not disturb the determinations made in the Ecker Decisions, to the extent Plaintiff seeks a modification of the provisions pertaining to Plaintiff's exclusive use and occupancy of the Marital Domicile, this Court must determine if Plaintiff has proven that a substantial change in circumstances exists warranting such a modification (Laddy v. Laddy, 260 AD2d 354 [2d Dept 1999]). Based upon a review of the submissions made to this Court, it is determined that Plaintiff has failed to prove that any such substantial change in circumstances has occurred. Quite to the contrary, Plaintiff's requested extension of her exclusive occupancy of the Marital Domicile is rooted in the same arguments she made throughout this case as reflected in Plaintiff Affidavit #1 and Plaintiff's Post Trial Memorandum.

As noted above, in recognizing the therapeutic needs of the Children and that Plaintiff had sole legal custody of the Children, Judge Ecker tasked Plaintiff with the responsibility of preparing the Children for relocation in conjunction with the Children's therapists. Despite this directive, while Plaintiff's current submission is replete with significant allegations against Defendant pertaining to the Children and asserts concern for their well-being if forced to relocate, the Court has not been presented with any compelling evidence to support the finding that Plaintiff has taken any steps to protect the Children to prepare for their relocation. Instead, as noted above, the Court is concerned that in seeking to advance her own litigation posture Plaintiff has violated the terms of the Parenting Agreement by involving the Children in this litigation, which would not only run afoul of their best interests by may have the additional effect of damaging their parent-child relationship with Defendant.

The Court is further concerned with Plaintiff's apparent lack concern regarding her obligation to provide timely mortgage payments for the Marital Domicile as the Delinquency Notices reflect a pattern of defaults spanning a period of nearly one year of the parties' payment [*15]obligations pertaining to the mortgage. This concern is not alleviated upon Plaintiff's submission of the Equifax Documents which make no reference to Plaintiff or the Marital Domicile. Even in the event they did, this would not erase the fact that the mortgage payments have been untimely as evidenced by the Delinquency Notices and confirmed by Plaintiff herself. At most, all that the Equifax Documents would prove is that at this time, Equifax (being only one credit bureau) has yet to register the untimely payments. This, in and of itself, would require the immediate listing of the property pursuant to the Judgment of Divorce.

Accordingly, based upon the submissions made to this Court, Motion Sequence No. 11 is denied to the extent that it seeks the entry of an order modifying the Judgment of Divorce to extend the Plaintiff's exclusive use and occupancy of the former marital residence beyond March 1, 2025, until the youngest child reaches 18 years of age and achieves financial stability.

Accordingly, based upon the submissions made to this Court, Motion Sequence No. 12 is granted, to the extent that Plaintiff is directed to comply with the Judgment of Divorce in all respects, including but not limited to, the listing and sale of the Marital Domicile. To effectuate this directive, by April 14, 2025, Plaintiff's counsel shall file with the Court the following documents pertaining to the Marital Domicile which shall be fully executed by the parties: (1) Listing Agreement, (2) Agency Disclosures, and; (3) any other documents needed for a New York State Real Estate Broker to list a real property in the State of New York. Further, a Status Conference shall be held on April 15, 2025, at 9:00 a.m., wherein all parties and counsel shall appear in person, to confirm the parties' compliance with the Judgment of Divorce and, this Decision and Order.

The appointment of a Receiver may be made pursuant to New York State Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR") § 6401, which provides:

"(a) Appointment of temporary Receiver; joinder of moving party. Upon motion of a person having an apparent interest in property which is the subject of an action in the supreme or a county court, a temporary Receiver of the property may be appointed, before or after service of summons and at any time prior to judgment, or during the pendency of an appeal, where there is danger that the property will be removed from the state, or lost, materially injured or destroyed. A motion made by a person not already a party to the action constitutes an appearance in the action and the person shall be joined as a party.

(b) Powers of temporary Receiver. The court appointing a Receiver may authorize him to take and hold real and personal property, and sue for, collect and sell debts or claims, upon such conditions and for such purposes as the court shall direct. A Receiver shall have no power to employ counsel unless expressly so authorized by order of the court. Upon motion of the Receiver or a party, powers granted to a temporary Receiver may be extended or limited or the Receivership may be extended to another action involving the property.

(c) Duration of temporary Receivership. A temporary Receivership shall not continue after final judgment unless otherwise directed by the court."

Pursuant to CPLR § 6402 following appointment, a receiver shall file with the Court an Oath and if directed, provide an undertaking pursuant to CPLR § 6403 (Coscia v. Eljamal, 48 Misc 3d 361 [Sup Ct, Westchester 2015]).

Although the appointment of a Receiver is an extreme remedy, which should not be lightly granted, sufficient evidence to support such an appointment will exist when evidence exists of a party's inability or refusal to meet the party's financial obligations promptly to the extent that marital property is in danger of being dissipated (Hildenbiddle v. Hildenbiddle, 110 AD2d 1985, [2d Dept 1985]; Hoffman v. Hoffman, 81 AD3d 601 [2d Dept 2011]). Where a party's conduct results in the need for the appointment of a Receiver that party may be required to pay all of the fees of the Receiver. (Somer v. Somer, 155 AD2d 591, [2d Dept 1989]; Wagenmann v. Wagenmann, 96 A.D. 534, [2d Dept 1983]).

Here, the Court is concerned about Plaintiff's history of failing to comply with the Court's directives and shares Defendant's fear that Plaintiff may not cooperate in the listing and marketing of the Marital Domicile despite this Decision and Order resulting in the danger of dissipation of marital property and possible damage to Defendant's credit.

Accordingly, based upon the submissions made to this Court, Motion Sequence No. 12 is granted to the extent that the Court hereby appoints Robert C. Hertman, Esq., as receiver empowered to complete the listing, marketing and sale of the Marital Domicile pursuant to the directives set forth in the Judgment of Divorce. However, this appointment shall be conditional and subject to the Court's future determination that Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Judgment of Divorce and this Decision and Order, at which time a separate Order of Appointment of Receiver shall be entered effectuating this appointment.

The Appellate Division Second Department has noted how trial court should determine if an award of attorneys' fees is warranted in a matrimonial action:

"In a matrimonial action, an award of attorney's fees is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the issue is controlled by the equities and circumstances of each particular case (see Prochilo v. Prochilo, 165 AD3d 1304, 84 N.Y.S.3d 786; Patete v Rodriguez, 109 AD3d 595, 599, 971 N.Y.S.2d 109). The purpose of Domestic Relations Law § 237(a) is to redress the economic disparity between the monied spouse and the nonmonied spouse by ensuring that the latter will be able to litigate the action on equal footing with the former (see Chesner v. Chesner, 95 AD3d 1252, 1253, 945 N.Y.S.2d 409; Finnan v. Finnan, 95 AD3d 821, 943 N.Y.S.2d 559; Prichep v. Prichep, 52 AD3d 61, 64—65, 858 N.Y.S.2d 667).

In determining whether to award attorney's fees, the court should review the financial circumstances of both parties, together with all of the other circumstances of the case, including, inter alia, the relative merit of the parties' positions, and whether either party has engaged in conduct or taken positions resulting in a delay of the proceedings or unnecessary litigation (see Prochilo v. Prochilo, 165 AD3d 1304, 84 N.Y.S.3d 786; Chesner v. Chesner, 95 AD3d 1252, 945 N.Y.S.2d 409; Prichep v. Prichep, 52 AD3d at 64—65, 858 N.Y.S.2d 667)."

(Brockner v Brockner, 174 AD3d 567, 568 [2d Dept. 2019]).

When seeking an award of attorneys' fees, parties are required to submit itemized billing [*16]statements as proof of the attorneys' fees incurred, both to demonstrate substantial compliance with 22 NYCRR 1400.2 and 1400.3 and to establish the "extent and value of [the] services" rendered (Yakobowitz v. Yakobowicz, 217 AD3d 733 [2d Dept 2023] [internal citations omitted]).

Here, beyond this Court having the inherent authority to grant an award of attorneys' fees upon application, the Decision After Trial #1 specifically included a provision pertaining to the possible grant of attorneys' fees to the extent a party failed to comply with the sale of the Marital Domicile, "If either party shall unreasonably fail to cooperate in the signing of the sale contract or the closing documents, she or he, as the case may be, shall be liable for any losses sustained, together with her/his attorneys' fees, costs and disbursements [emphasis added]." Through the filing of Motion Sequence No. 11, having no basis for the relief requested therein while failing to list the Marital Domicile as directed, the Court determines Plaintiff to be in violation of the Judgement of Divorce warranting an award of attorneys' fees from Plaintiff to Defendant arising out of this post judgment litigation.

In support of his request for attorneys' fees, Defendant submitted a Retainer Agreement with Statement of Clients Rights & Responsibilities (NYSCEF Doc. No. 467) and invoices for legal fees (NYSCEF Doc. No. 468) reflecting a total amount of legal fees incurred in the amount of $5,500.00.

Accordingly, based upon the submissions made to this Court, Motion Sequence No. 12 is granted to the extent that Defendant's request is granted to the extent that Defendant is awarded attorneys' fees from Plaintiff in the amount of $5,500.00, which shall be paid by Plaintiff to Defendant by April 14, 2025, and in the event payment is not made in full by that date, Defendant shall have leave of the Court to file, with notice of settlement and proof of service on Plaintiff, a proposed money judgement for the then outstanding balance. To the extent Defendant incurred additional attorneys' fees related to this motion practice beyond what was awarded herein, Defendant shall have leave of the Court to file an application for additional fees by order to show cause.

To the extent relief has been requested and not granted or otherwise addressed herein, it is hereby denied.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that Motion Sequence Nos. 11 and 12 are decided as set forth herein; and it is further

ORDERED that a Status Conference shall be held on April 15, 2025, at 9:00 a.m., wherein all parties and counsel shall appear in person, to confirm the parties' compliance with the Judgment of Divorce and, this Decision and Order; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant's counsel shall serve this Decision and Order with Notice of Entry on Plaintiff's counsel and Plaintiff via NYSCEF filing by April 10, 2025, and shall file an Affidavit of Service by that date; and it is further

ORDERED that to the extent any relief sought has not been granted, it is expressly denied.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.