The Father moves for attorneys' fees based upon the litigation in this matter thus far and for prospective fees, including a recent hearing on pendente lite custody and parenting time. The Attorney for the Child joined the application to the extent of requesting this Court direct the Mother to pay her outstanding bill. The Mother submitted a cross-motion and opposition and the Father submitted a reply.

The cross-motion seeks this Court to hold the Father's application in abeyance or otherwise deny the fee application due to the Father's purported inappropriate use of marital funds during the marriage. She further seeks to have this Court direct the Father to attest under [*2]oath how he obtained impeachment evidence used at the pendente lite hearing, directing payment for forensic evaluation of the Mother's hard drive the Father has in his possession from which the impeachment evidence was obtained, and a direction that the Father cease surveilling the Mother.

To begin with, the Mother's application as it relates to the impeachment evidence obtained by the Father is partially meritless. The Father immediately disclosed through his counsel in court how the evidence was obtained. The Father is in possession of the marital hard drive as the Mother implicitly authorized him to take the device that held the hard drive by leaving it with his belongings when he was moving out of the marital residence. Her request that he submit a sworn affirmation regarding these facts is thus perplexing. Indeed, the Mother's prior counsel at the hearing lodged an objection against the impeachment evidence based upon the circumstances of how it was obtained. Further demonstrative of this concern is that the transcript lays out clearly not only how the actual hard drive came into the Father's possession, but also how he obtained the specific communication data at issue. To now claim to not know how the evidence came to be is thus meritless.

Moreover, the Mother's citations to the Penal Law are hollow as Penal Law sections 250.30, 250.25 and 250.05 all require the information at issue to be obtained without authorization. Here, the Father obtained the hard drive because the Mother left it with his belongings when he was moving; none of the data was protected by a password nor was differentiated between the parties so there can be no claim that the access was unauthorized. This, again, was all explained on the record. Most telling is that there is no civil remedy in a matrimonial action arising from any of the aforesaid statutes. (See generally, FCA §§ 812, 821; Doe L.N. v Copperman, 2023 NY Misc LEXIS 22229 [Sup Ct, Queens County 2023]; Buchwalter v Dayton Management Corp., 139 Misc 2d 297, 299-300 [Sup Ct, Queens County 1988]).

Notwithstanding, and due to the broad discovery rules governing matrimonial actions, the Court grants the Mother's request to the extent that the Father shall share the hard drive with her so that it can be copied. The Mother has only speculated that the Father is somehow committing bad acts with the hard drive; her speculation is not sufficient to support a direction that he pays for the hard drive to be examined by an expert — she may do so if she deems it appropriate.

The Mother requests a direction to have the Father cease surveilling her. This accusation is tethered to the marital hard drive and how the Father obtained the impeachment evidence, which was data of a communication between the Mother and her friend. Domestic Relations Law section 234 authorizes this Court to make directions concerning "possession of property, as in the court's discretion justice requires." (DRL § 234). Digital data is property subject to DRL § 234 like any other intangible property. Accordingly, the Court grants the Mother's request regarding surveillance in so far as neither party shall modify, delete, alter, or reproduce any data held on any marital electronic devices, hard drives, floppy disks, or flash drives, except as is in the ordinary course (i.e., work, legal, or customary activities such as ordinary internet and online game use).

Accordingly, the branch of the Mother's Cross-Motion as it relates to the hard drive is GRANTED IN-PART and DENIED IN-PART to the extent detailed herein.

The Mother's cross-motion is heavily focused on reviewing the Father's expenditure and seeks to have his request for fees denied based upon purported fraud on the Court. This "fraud" is alleged to be that the Father represented to this Court he needs funds, and such representations were the basis for the previously awarded advance on equitable distribution and interim counsel fees.

At the outset, the Court must note it engaged in a searching and time-consuming review of the papers, exhibits, and transcripts in this matter based upon the Mother's alarming accusations. After a thorough review, this Court finds the Mother's argument must fail because it misrepresents the very transcript provisions used to build her argument and is otherwise not appropriately raised.

She argues the Father committed fraud upon the Court, "[w]hen we appeared before the Court at the October 7, 2024 conference, Defendant sat silent when his attorney advised the Court that there was no basis to any inquiry concerning why Defendant claimed to have no money, despite earning more than $1.6 million during our marriage, and blamed me for a refusal to settle without financial disclosure. Defendant had a legal and ethical obligation to provide this Court with a full picture of his financial circumstances at a time when he was asking the Court to direct me to give him money." (Pl. aff. ¶ X [NYSCEF Doc. No. XXX]). She attaches transcripts from October 7, 2024, and numerous financial documentary exhibits. To clarify, the two financial awards given after that appearance were: (1) an award of counsel fees; and (2) an advance on equitable distribution.

In the first instance, the Mother's argument neglects to state that the $25,000.00 advance on equitable distribution was on consent. As her prior counsel put it, "[the Mother] should not have to pay [counsel fees], particularly when she's handing him over $25,000.00 just so she can live safely in her home." (Id. at 22:5-8 [internal emphasis supplied]). If there is any doubt, in her further oral argument against the Husband's request for interim counsel fees, the Mother's prior counsel affirmatively represented the advance was on consent when she argued "given that [the Mother] has just consented to give him $25,000.00 to move out when we firmly believe that at the end there will be no equitable distribution [. . . ]." (Id. at XXX [internal emphasis supplied]).

The purported statement that the Mother argues the Father somehow had a duty to correct was when his Counsel argued,

[. . .] I had alluded to before the position that [the Mother] was talking with respect to the division of assets which, obviously, has caused the discussion between counsel and the litigation to increase, because it's seemingly baseless. [. . .] Obviously, if there are concerns about where Mr. Duncan's earnings have been going or if there's alleged acts of financial impropriety, that will come out in paper discovery and depositions, et cetera. You can't just say and expect the Court to believe that money is missing without that actually supported or without any actual knowledge. (Id. at XXX).

Here, the "alluded" to position of the Mother was that "we don't believe there was any economic partnership created during this very short marriage [. . .] I am simply previewing for the Court what our position is as to ultimate equitable distribution in this action." (Id. at [*3]XXX [internal emphasis supplied]).^[FN1] This position's lack of merit is addressed below in the counsel fees section — but, simply, this position borders on frivolous.

The Father's Counsel's statements were directly in response to the argument that no economic partnership existed. The statements were not with respect to interim fees or an advance on equitable distribution but rather "as to ultimate equitable distribution in this action." The Mother's prior counsel knew this and raised persuasive objections to the counsel fee request such as the equities of this case weighing against an award because the Mother consented to an advance on equitable distribution (id. at XXX) and that the Husband was being overly litigious and instigating the litigation (id. at XXX). Notably, the Mother's current opposition seems to not find those arguments worth pursuing and has instead decided to take the very "scorched earth" approach she accuses the Father of taking.

To be clear, the Mother did not raise her concern with the Father's financial circumstances in relation to either the advance on equitable distribution or interim counsel fees; rather, she raised it after the Court, astonished by the Mother's position, said, "I have to return to this for a second. How can there be that there's no equitable distribution?" (Id. at XXX). It was then that the Mother's Counsel stated they did not have adequate information related to the Father's finances. Critically, this was after the Mother had already consented to the advance on equitable distribution and argued against counsel fees. In sum, the Mother's current papers seek to rewrite the transcript and graft this tangential response on the issue of "ultimate equitable distribution" (which was not the subject of any motion sequence) as the center argument raised against the advance on equitable distribution request that she consented to and the prior interim counsel fee request.

These already troublesome issues with the Mother's fraud argument do not end with the Mother's misrepresentation of the transcript. The Court also notes that, even taken as true, a lengthy review by this Court of the alleged wasteful expenses does not support the Mother's argument.

First, the expenses provided date back to 2019. There is no reasonable way to say that 2019 expenses speak to whether the Father needed funds for emergency custody litigation in late 2024. More importantly, the total amount of funds spent between January 2024 and October 2024, as reported on the Mother's summary sheet, was $7,825.00. Thus, even if the Father had not spent any of this money in 2024, he would have saved a total of $7,825.00. There is no reasonable way to argue that $7,825.00 over a ten (10) month period would have impacted the appropriate and necessary financial awards made during the October 7th proceedings.

Additionally, the Mother's argument that the Father previously earned "more than $1.6 million during our marriage" is unavailing. It is not disputed that the Father took a pay cut to move to Washington, D.C., and work as an attorney for [REDACTED]. This decision was made years before the divorce. The Mother may dispute whether that was a joint decision, but the objective facts demonstrate she acquiesced to this arrangement. By way of example, at the [*4]hearing she testified to how parenting was altered based on this decision and the Mother, her sister, and the Father all testified as to how the Father would return to New York to see his family and how he connected with his family while he was residing in Washington, D.C. Further, the Mother did not file for divorce until after the Father returned to New York in 2024.

The record powerfully shows that the parties ordered their lives for years around this familial decision that the Father would pursue work in public service. The Mother cannot argue that the Father should now be expected to earn a salary the parties forbore in favor of the Father working in public service now that a divorce has been filed. The fact that a divorce action has been filed does not affect the fact that this partnership decision was made and relied upon by the Father in pursuing public interest work which necessarily reduced his income capacity.

Indeed, the Court struggles to see what purpose this line of argument serves other than to place what one would consider scandalous evidence about the Father before this Court. Whatever moral import such conduct may have it is legally irrelevant in dispensing with the Father's interim fee request. Contrary to the Mother's claims, there is no fraud upon this Court.^[FN2]

Outside of the actual proof before this Court, the law on this issue is crystal clear that, "where the payments are made before either party is anticipating the end of the marriage, and there is no fraud or concealment, courts should not look back and try to compensate for the fact that the net effect of the payments may, in some cases, have resulted in the reduction of marital assets." (Mahoney-Buntzman v Buntzman, 12 NY3d 415, 421 [2009]). Thus, while there is no fraud against this court, if there is any relief for the Mother in relation to this line of argument it lies in a marital waste claim explored at trial. Accordingly, the branches of the Mother's Cross-Motion related to purported fraud are DENIED except to the extent that they may be asserted at the equitable distribution trial as marital waste claims.

Prior to reaching the counsel fee analysis, the Court rejects the Mother's request to hold this application in abeyance because, "courts should not defer requests for interim counsel fees to the trial court, and should normally exercise their discretion to grant such a request made by the nonmonied spouse, in the absence of good cause—for example, where the requested fees are unsubstantiated or clearly disproportionate to the amount of legal work required in the case—articulated by the court in a written decision." (Prichep v Prichep, 52 A3d 61, 65-66 [2d Dept 2008]). None of the Mother's arguments, even taken as true, speak to "unsubstantiated or clearly disproportionate to the amount of legal work required in the case" (id.) and are thus are unpersuasive in the context of a request for interim fees. Accordingly, this Court, as counseled by the Appellate Division, will not defer the issue of interim fees any longer and the Mother's request for same is DENIED.

Finally, as to the branch of the Mother's cross-motion related to the tax issue, the Mother argues for renumeration in relation to a purported deficiency in the parties' tax payments. These requests are not appropriately resolved on papers as the court has insufficient information at this juncture and their resolution is thus referred to the equitable distribution trial in this matter. Accordingly, the Mother's request for repayment is REFERRED TO THE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION TRIAL.

The Father moves for interim legal fees, past and prospective. Further, he seeks to have the Mother pay his portion of the AFC's outstanding bill through December 12, 2024. The Attorney for the Child submitted an affirmation and joined the Father's application in so far as she stated her position was that "it appears the Plaintiff is in a better position to pay my bill than the Defendant [. . ..] I believe that my bill should be paid either from marital funds, or if there is a dispute regarding marital funds, then it should be paid by the monied spouse[.]" (AFC affm. ¶¶ XX [NYSCEF Doc. No. XXX]).

Domestic Relations Law section 237 creates a rebuttable presumption that the monied spouse shall pay for the reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in connection with the matrimonial action. (DRL § 237[a]).

"In determining whether to award counsel fees, the court may consider such factors as the relative financial circumstances of the parties, the complexity of the case and the extent of legal services rendered, 'together with all the other circumstances of the case, which may include the relative merit of the parties' positions.'" (Armstrong v Armstrong, 72 AD3d 1409, 1416 [3d Dept 2010] citing DeCabrera v Cabrera-Rosete, 70 NY2d 879, 881 [1987]).

It is established in this matter that the Father works in public interest law and the Mother works in "Big Law." The Father earns approximately "$179,194.00" as an attorney at [REDACTED]. On the other hand, the Mother earns "$492,749.00" as an attorney at [REDACTED LAW FIRM] Accordingly, there is no actual or genuine dispute the Mother is the monied spouse in this matter.

The presumption is rebuttable as pointed out by the Mother; however, she has failed to present any persuasive argument why she, the spouse that makes over double the Husband and close to half a million dollars per year, should not be responsible for portions of fees that were necessitated by a hearing the Mother requested. The Court must also note that the cross-motion under this sequence has surely increased legal fees substantially for the Father given the severity of the accusations raised, despite them having little merit.

The Mother has demonstrated a dilatory approach to issues of custody throughout this proceeding. It bears noting that the Mother's position throughout conferences and even when this Court first announced its intent to hold a pendente lite hearing was to make the hearing expansive and litigate the Family Offense issues as well. The Court had to issue a hearing scheduling order narrowing the issues to avoid the expansive hearing the Mother's prior counsel sought.

The complexity and extent of legal services rendered here supports a fee award as there have been now five motion sequences (with numerous cross-motions), appellate practice, a [*5]hearing, and appearances in two different courts in this matter and the parties do not even seem close to settlement.

Further, the legal services did not end in the courtroom, as evinced by the record of extensive services which were incurred by the AFC and the Father outside of the hearing in trying to resolve parenting issues that arose prior to and after the hearing. Indeed, the Court, at its conference to plan the hearing, attempted to have the parties enter a 2-2-3 schedule, as was recommended by the AFC and consented to by the Father, but the Mother refused. Despite this, the Mother did in fact agree to such an arrangement by the time the hearing commenced.

The Court must note the AFC's fees and Father's fees were increased because of the Mother's prior counsel's unnecessarily extensive and frequent telephone calls and emails.

At the hearing, the Mother was markedly incredible. As noted on the record, her responses seemed rehearsed and not genuine. She was often unable to see the Father as an equal parent. Most telling was the Mother's extremely restrictive proffered parenting time schedule. She sought the vast majority of the days with the Child, whereas the Father sought an equal parenting time schedule. Further, the AFC proffered an arrangement closer to the Father's arguing the Mother should have one more day than the Father. The Court ultimately found the evidence supported the Father's proposed disposition. Thus, the Mother's lack of merit at the hearing she demanded counsels towards an interim fee award.

The Mother's argument regarding the motions to dismiss in this matter unduly minimizes the Court's analysis of her Petition. As noted in this Court's decision, the Mother's Petition was tangential to a high degree. Her entire Petition on its face reads as retaliatory because it is framed more as an Answer to the Father's Petition rather than as her own petition seeking protection. Most concerning as it relates to her actual belief in the allegations in the Petition, is the fact that despite her persistent efforts to paint the Father as an abuser, she allowed the temporary order of protection to lapse and never requested an extension.

After the hearing, a dispute arose regarding selection of the schools the Child would apply to for the upcoming academic school year. The parties reached out at the last-minute requesting aid from the Court, which the Court declined based upon the untimely nature of the request. The Mother argues, and her counsel's email evinces, that she believes this Court's Order directing the use of a Parenting Coordinator (PC) bound the parties to the PC's recommendation absent court order to the contrary. While the Mother seeks to show this is evidence of dilatory and meritless positions taken by the Husband, it is in fact the opposite.

The Mother materially misunderstands the PC provisions of the Court's Order. Nowhere within the Order does it direct that the PC's recommendation is binding upon either party; rather, as argued by the Father, the PC serves to offer recommendations and facilitate conversations on parenting issues. (Decision & Order at X [NSYCEF Doc. Nos. XXX]). This was an intentional decision by the Court as it has done in many recent matters. (See M.L. v O.L., 2024 Slip Op 51840[U][Sup Ct, NY County 2024, Chesler, J.]; V.B. v R.B.D., 83 Misc 3d 1272[A][Sup Ct, NY County 2024, Chesler, J.]). Thus, as with the hearing, the Mother fails to appreciate how her conduct, here specifically misapprehending the plain meaning of the Order, has caused delay and increased litigation costs. Indeed, it is beyond dispute that fees were incurred by the Father's counsel in attempting to correctly clarify the terms of the Order after the Mother argued the PC's recommendation was binding. Despite the Father's objection, and his counsel's correct interpretation, the Mother nonetheless applied to the school without joint agreement and in direct violation of the joint-decision making protocols that were just recently set forth by this Court. [*6]This unilateral misconduct speaks to the equitable considerations this Court makes in an interim fee award and supports an award of fees to the Father.

In a similar vein, the Mother looks to Justice Cooper's (ret.) reasoning in Sykes to aid her opposition. Yet, it does not. Sykes v Sykes is the "skin in the game" case. (43 Misc 3d 1220[A] [Sup Ct, NY County 2014, Cooper, J.]["The term, which at this point I fear may very well end up being inscribed on my gravestone, is 'skin in the game.'"]). It is almost invariably invoked in every opposition to counsel fees. Despite its ubiquitous invocation, it is largely misinterpreted. Sykes, at its core, concerns how interim fees should be awarded when parties are litigating irresponsibly. "'[S]kin in the game' refers to the belief that the best way to [e]nsure that a party to a divorce will litigate reasonably and responsibly is to require the party to share in the cost of the litigation." (P.S. v M.S. 2016 NY Slip Op 51803[U], at *5, n. 3 [Sup Ct, Orange County 2016, Vazquez-Doles, J.]; citing, Sykes v Sykes, 41 Misc 3d 1061 [Sup Ct, NY County 2013][Cooper, J.]). Here, the record does not reveal unreasonable or irresponsible litigation by the Father; to the contrary, it appears the Mother is the party to be charged with unreasonable conduct by, inter alia, distorting the words of this Court's Order on a serious educational decision, coming to this Court with a misleading and contrived claim of fraud on the court, and offering serial inconsistent positions on serious issues in this matter, specifically, ultimate equitable distribution and custody.

Further, the Court cannot ignore the clearly meritless position taken by the Mother in this matter that equitable distribution is not at issue because there was "no economic partnership" in this five (5) year marriage between two attorneys. The Mother's Counsel stated, "[s]o we don't believe there was any economic partnership created during this very short marriage [. . .] I am simply previewing for the Court what our position is as to ultimate equitable distribution in this action." (Pl. Ex. X at X [NYSCEF Doc. No. XXX]).

This Court is not aware of any authority that would allow a party to argue that no economic partnership arose out of a marriage, nor has the Mother produced any. The plain language of Domestic Relations Law sections 236 and 270(7) and the case law of this State uniformly and wholly reject such an unreasonable position. (See e.g., DRL §§ 236, 270[7]; Szypula v Szypula, 2024 NY LEXIS 1630, at *7 [2024]["Our decision recognizes that marriage is an economic partnership in which each spouse is entitled to share in 'things of value arising out of the marital relationship.'"] citing O'Brien v O'Brien, 66 NY2d 576, 583 [1985]; Fields v Fields, 15 NY3d 158, 170 [2010]["In recognizing marriage as an economic partnership, Domestic Relations Law § 236 mandates that the equitable distribution of marital assets be based on the circumstances of the particular case and directs the courts to consider a number of statutory factors."]; O'Brien v O'Brien, supra at 587 ["The function of equitable distribution is to recognize that when a marriage ends, each of the spouses, based on the totality of the contributions made to it, has a stake in and right to a share of the marital assets accumulated while it endured, not because that share is needed, but because those assets represent the capital product of what was essentially a partnership entity."][internal citations omitted]).

The Father presents a retainer agreement showing that he paid a retainer of $7,500. He also attaches invoices showing that through December 31, 2024 he had an unpaid balance of $99,111. Invoices extending through January 31, 2025 show a total balance of $112,546. In contrast, the Mother had been able to pay her prior counsel $168,975. She also retained and paid additional sums to her current counsel. The Father's counsel also submits an affirmation including his qualifications and nature of the services provided.

In addition, the Father explains the additional work needed to be done in this matter, including preparing responses to Plaintiff's discovery demands, reviewing the discovery already provided by Plaintiff's attorneys and drafting deficiency notices, preparing for and attending party and third party depositions, preparing subpoenas and reviewing the materials responsive thereto, correspondence with Defendant and with opposing counsel, and preparation for and attendance at various compliance conferences. With regard to such work, he requests $60,000 in prospective fees.

The AFC presents billing statements showing that the Mother owed her $24,480 as of the end of 2024 and the Father had an unpaid balance of $8,160 at the end of 2024. She also advises that the Mother paid an the initial retainer of $7,500 plus an additional amount of $7,500 which she requested for the hearing. The Father paid the initial retainer of $2,500 and then another $2,500 for the hearing.

The Court notes it has already awarded the Father $20,000.00 in interim fees under an earlier motion sequence. The Mother's papers acknowledge $23,750.00 were paid toward the Husband's legal fees pursuant to the prior order; thus, this award adjusts for that surplus. (Pl. affm ¶ X [NYSCEF Doc. No. XXX]).

As it relates to the Attorney for the Child's fees the Court also credits the Mother's statement that she paid the AFC $25,000.00. (Pl. aff. ¶ X [NYSCEF Doc. No. XXX]).

The Mother seeks to show she has no funds to meet a legal fee award; however, her submissions tell a different story. She attaches three (3) promissory notes for $28,800.00, $60,000.00, and $75,000.00, respectively. (Pl. Ex. X [NYSCEF Doc. No. XXX]). Critically, none of these notes have any interest provisions and they are payable to the Mother's father and are accordingly more appropriately characterized as "soft loans." Thus, it appears the Mother's litigation costs have been substantially funded not by herself but by her parent. Indeed, these interest-free "soft loans" demonstrate a financial gain for the Mother because the principal amount will depreciate relative to its current dollar-value due to inflation. Therefore, she is saving on her current expenses by paying them in the future when their dollar value will be lessened. Notwithstanding these "soft loans," a thorough review of the Mother's updated Net Worth Statement do reveal the Mother's claimed lack of excessive funds bares merit, especially when the Court looks at the Mother's current liquidity.

The Mother's affidavit and financial documentation demonstrate she is the monied spouse, but they equally show she does not have access to immense liquid funds to comply with an lump-sum order of fees to the magnitude sought by the Father. The parties are attorneys; this Court agrees with the Mother that this is not a "high asset" case. The Court must keep this in mind in assessing the award because "[a]n award of counsel fees should not be punitive and should be granted to assure adequate legal representation." (Schomber v Schomber, 173 Misc 2d 750, 753 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 1997]).

With the above considerations in mind, the Court finds it appropriate to award the Father $90,000 for fees incurred and an additional $50,000 for prospective fees, for a total of $140,000 as and for interim counsel fees under motion sequence 005. The Court awards this amount in installments based on consideration of the Mother's current financial circumstances. (See Sasha T. v Barry T., 66 Misc 3d 1206[A][Sup Ct, NY County 2020, Hoffman, J.][Granting legal fees in installment payments]). To the extent the Mother has made excess payment of the prior counsel fee award she is entitled to a credit for same.

The Court further grants the AFC's request to have the Mother pay her full outstanding [*7]bill. The Order of Appointment's allocation was made "subject to reallocation by the court at anytime" and the Court hereby does so to the extent of directing the Mother to pay directly to the AFC her the total sum representing both parents share of the AFC bill as of December 31, 2024. The Court does not modify the pro-rata distribution moving forward and all sums incurred thereafter shall follow the continued 25% to the Father and 75% to the Mother distribution. The Court makes this specific award because of a review of the AFC's bills which clearly demonstrate that a large amount of her fees was due to frequent contact from the Mother's prior counsel and handling many negligible concerns raised by the Mother. Further, the Mother's opposition did not meaningfully rebut the Attorney for the Child's argument that the Mother should, at this juncture, pay her outstanding bill.

Justice Cooper, in Sykes, stated, "I would like to think that what I decided in the interim fee decision had a beneficial effect on the course and scope of the litigation." (43 Misc 3d 1220[A] [Sup Ct, NY County 2014]). This Court shares in those sentiments and the temperature in this litigation (as is irrefutably evident from the face of the papers) must come down, not only for the betterment of the parties' wallets, but for the one person who matters most in this proceeding — the parties four (4) year old daughter. Accordingly, it is hereby:

ORDERED, that the Father's Order to Show Cause is GRANTED to the extent detailed herein; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Mother's Cross-Motion is GRANTED IN-PART and DENIED IN-PART to the extent detailed herein; and it is further

ORDERED, that on or before March 17, 2025, the Mother shall remit $46,666.67 to the Father's Counsel, Pryor Cashman, to be paid from the Mother's post-commencement earnings or undisputed separate property; and it is further

ORDERED, that on or before May 2, 2025, the Mother shall remit $46,666.67 to the Father's Counsel, Pryor Cashman, to be paid from the Mother's post-commencement earnings or undisputed separate property; and it is further

ORDERED, that on or before June 2, 2025, the Mother shall remit $46,666.67 to the Father's Counsel, Pryor Cashman, to be paid from the Mother's post-commencement earnings or undisputed separate property; and it is further

ORDERED, that within seven (7) days of this Order the Mother shall pay to the Attorney for the Child, Sandra L. Schpoont, Esq. of Sandra Schpoont & Associates, P.C., the total outstanding sum due as of December 31, 2024 as and for both parents share of interim AFC fees, to be paid from the Mother's post-commencement earnings or undisputed separate property, with all sums thereafter being apportioned as directed in the unmodified Order of Appointment (to wit, 75% to the Mother and 25% to the Father); and it is further

ORDERED, that all sums of counsel fees paid herein are made subject to reallocation after trial and are without prejudice to either party's claims in the future for interim and final counsel fees in this matter; and it is further

ORDERED, that within five (5) business days of this Order, the Father shall produce to the Mother's counsel the hard drive at issue to be examined by the Mother at her own cost and the hard drive shall then be returned to the Father not later than March 14, 2025, the aforeasid analysis shall not be deemed a violation of this Order's provisions regarding data preservation; and it is further

ORDERED, that neither party shall modify, delete, alter, or reproduce any data held on any marital electronic devices, hard drives, floppy disks, or flash drives, except as is in the ordinary course (i.e., work, legal, or customary activities such as ordinary internet and online game use); and it is further

ORDERED, that the Mother's request as it relates to a purported tax payment deficiency is referred to the equitable distribution trial in this matter; and it is further

ORDERED, that the relief granted herein is without prejudice to any marital waste claims the Mother may raise at the equitable distribution trial in this matter; and it is further

ORDERED, that any relief not explicitly described herein is DENIED WITHOUT PREJDUICE.

This constitutes a decision and order of this Court on Motion Sequence 005.