The following numbered papers were used on this motion:

Upon the foregoing papers, and having heard oral argument, and due deliberation having been had, the within motion is determined as follows.

This action was commenced by Plaintiff 421 Crown Street HDFC, which is a Housing Development Fund Corporation cooperative owning a premises located at on Crown Street, Brooklyn, New York. Plaintiff was organized under Article 11 of the New York Private Housing Finance Law. The premises are occupied by low income shareholders who are issued proprietary leases for the apartments for which they own appurtenant shares. An HDFC building enables its shareholders to reside in a lower-cost setting, without the burden of paying higher, market value rents which would otherwise inure to the profit garnered by a private individual- or entity-owner.

The action sought a declaratory judgment, ejectment, and damages against Defendants Tshatiqua Farrar-Baddal and Rendel Baddal. According to Defendant Farrar-Baddal, her husband Rendel Baddal no longer resides with her at [the premises] and is down in Florida.

Defendant Farrar-Baddal's grandmother Barbara Hannaham had owned Apartment X in the premises. Defendants had resided in Apartment X. In 2005, Ms. Hannaham died. Ivan Carty, who was issued letters of administration for the Estate of Barbara Hannaham, renounced his rights to any interest in Apartment X. In 2017, the board of directors of Plaintiff granted Defendants' request to move from Apartment X to Apartment Y, which was larger; it had three bedrooms, compared to two in Apartment X. The approval for Defendants was for them to lease, not own the shares of, Apartment X.

Defendants claim that they obtained the shares for Apartment Y. They base this upon a purported share certificate which bears names of officers of Plaintiff, Norris Johnson and Miriam Bennett, but not signatures. Plaintiff has disputed Defendants' claim to own the shares of Apartment Y. Plaintiff claims that the purported share certificate proffered by Defendants is not a legal one. Plaintiff in fact claims that there was no purchase price or consideration paid for the shares of Apartment Y. Plaintiff also claims that the shares appurtenant to Apartment Y could not have been transferred since the estate of the deceased 50% owner of that apartment, Millicent McLean, had not been probated or otherwise administered; thus, the purported share certificate was a legal nullity (Plaintiff owns the other 50% for Apartment Y, having purchased it from Leita Chisolm, Millicent McLean's daughter). Defendants have been occupying Apartment Y, but neither rent nor use and occupancy has been paid since 2019.

On August 5, 2024, an order to show cause bringing on a motion by Plaintiff was signed by the Court. The motion sought to compel Defendants to pay $31,397.60 in arrears for occupying Apartment Y and to pay use and occupancy pendente lite. On September 6, 2024, an order was issued directing Defendants to pay $32,946.40 in arrears up to September 30, 2024; Defendants' payment of use and occupancy in the amount of $774.40 per month was also [*3]directed. This order was not appealed.

On November 25, 2024, an order to show cause bringing on a motion by Plaintiff was signed by the Court. This motion sought a money judgment in the amount of $32,946.40 (which had been directed in the previous order and was not paid), a judgment of possession to Apartment Y in favor of Plaintiff, and a writ of assistance of eviction under RPAPL § 221 due to Defendants' willful violation of the September 6, 2024 order. On January 17, 2025, finding that Defendants willfully failed to pay the ordered $32,946.40, the Court issued a judgment of possession to Plaintiff for Apartment Y. It was not appealed. A writ of assistance also was issued by the Court on January 17, 2025, with eviction to take place after 5:01 p.m. of February 18, 2025.

The said writ of assistance omitted a direction to the Sheriff of Kings County. Another writ of assistance was issued by the Court on March 19, 2025, containing the direction to the Sheriff, with the eviction to take place after 5:01 p.m. of April 21, 2025.

A Sheriff's 14-Day Eviction Notice was issued on April 16, 2025, notifying Defendants that the eviction would take place any time after 14 days, i.e., April 30, 2025.

Defendant Farrar-Baddal, who previously had a lawyer, is now representing herself. Apparently with Defendant Baddal no longer in occupancy of Apartment Y, leaving Defendant Farrar-Baddal and several children to reside there, Defendant Farrar-Baddal moved by order to show cause this past Monday, April 21, 2025, seeking a stay of eviction. The Court conducted a hearing today on her motion.

"Except where otherwise prescribed by law, the court in which an action is pending may grant a stay of proceedings in a proper case, upon such terms as may be just" (CPLR 2201). Stays of eviction are considered appropriate under CPLR 2201, but five months is not a reasonable time because "Stays granted should not be for an eternity" (MacLeod v Shapiro, 20 AD2d 424, 428 [1st Dept 1964]). "A prudent tenant in respondent's position should have immediately started planning and effecting [her] relocation" (64 B Venture v American Realty Co., 179 AD2d 374, 375 [1st Dept 1992]).

The Court notes that Defendants have failed to appeal the January 17, 2025 judgment of possession. They also did not appeal the September 6, 2024 order. Had they done so, the Court might have been more inclined to grant a stay pending determination by the Appellate Division. By not filing a notice of appeal, Defendants did not avail themselves of other remedies.

Today, during oral argument, Defendant Farrar-Baddal (Defendant Baddal did not appear, as he may be in Florida, as per Defendant Farrar-Baddal) took the position that she wants more than a stay of eviction — rather, she seeks a court determination that she can live in Apartment Y forever with the expectation of the "share certificate" to that apartment with the printed names being honored.

" 'The fact[or]s the court will consider in determining a stay motion include the apparent merit or lack of merit of the appeal, the harm that might result to the appellant if the stay is denied, and the potential prejudice to the respondent if the stay is granted' (Davies, Stecich & Gold, New York Civil Appellate Practice § 9:4 [3d ed, 8 West's NY Prac Series, June 2024 update]; 1 Newman, New York Appellate Practice § 6.04 [2023])" (Gur Assoc. LLC v Convenience on Eight Corp., 83 Misc 3d 903, 906 [Civ Ct, NY County 2024]).

The Court finds here that there is no merit to Defendant Farrar-Baddal's position. She is occupying an apartment, Y, which was rented to her. She has no connection to the prior 50% occupant-owner who is deceased. Her claim to Apartment Y rests upon a purported share certificate bearing printed names of Norris Johnson and Miriam Bennett but no signatures (see NYSCEF Doc No. 53 & Def exh). No official corporation records confirm a transfer of shares appurtenant to Apartment Y and, indeed, there could have been no sale of the shares if the 50% owner-occupant dies without letters having been issued by the Surrogate's Court. Defendant Farrar-Baddal might have a claim to occupy Apartment X — but only if her grandmother's estate transferred the shares appurtenant to that apartment to her and only if she were approved by the board of directors to assume ownership. This action, however, concerns her occupancy of Apartment Y and her nonpayment of rent or use and occupancy since 2019, concerning which she now owes $38,367.20.

At today's hearing, Defendant Farrar-Baddal stated that she cannot afford to pay the $38,367.20. She could afford to pay $10,000 and wanted a payment plan for the remainder — which she told the Court — which leads this Court to consider the equities of the situation, i.e., the harm to her if she is evicted versus the prejudice to Plaintiff. Defendant Farrar-Baddal may find it difficult to locate another place to reside in, especially considering her financial circumstances. On the other hand, the Court must consider the fact that Plaintiff is an HDFC corporation designed to enable persons of limited financial means to reside in a building which they cooperatively own and manage. Defendant Farrar-Baddal's use and occupancy presently is $775.00 per month, which she has not been paying for years ($704.00 when the arrears started). The other residents, be they shareholders, tenants, or otherwise, in effect must subsidize Apartment Y's share of the budget. And these are all persons of limited means. The burden imposed on them is severe. If Defendant Farrar-Baddal is evicted, Plaintiff can rent the apartment to someone who will pay rent or use and occupancy.

The Court has sympathy for Defendant Farrar-Baddal's children, who will be evicted with her. But frankly speaking, she has brought this on by not making payments in lieu of maintenance for five to six years in an amount which is exceedingly less than what market rent would be for a three-bedroom apartment in a privately-owned apartment building in the Crown Heights neighborhood of Brooklyn. The Court must take into account how this impacts the shareholders of the building. This Court has no confidence that Defendant Farrar-Baddal has the willingness or wherewithal to maintain the requisite monthly payment necessary to reside in the building. She has known since mid-January that she would have to vacate Apartment Y.

Plaintiff raised an issue concerning a new Mazda vehicle that Defendants recently purchased and argues that this fact detracts from any sympathy one might have for them. Defendant Farrar-Baddal maintains that the car is her husband's and he uses it in Florida to drive around. Plaintiff claims the vehicle was observed on the street near the building. The Court does not factor into account the issue of the vehicle since there was no first-hand evidence regarding it. Plaintiff does argue that at one point, Defendant Farrar-Baddal's attorney stated that his client would pay all the arrears in exchange for Plaintiff recognizing her ownership of Apartment Y's shares. (This contravenes Defendant Farrar-Baddal's in-court concession today that she could not pay all the arrears.) However, Plaintiff cannot simply declare her the shareholder. There would have to be a formal purchase by Defendant Farrar-Baddal — they simply cannot be allocated to her; board approval would also be necessary.

Accordingly, on balance, taking into account all of the above factors, the equities lie with [*4]Plaintiff and its shareholders. In sum, until the ownership of shares of Apartment Y is finalized, Plaintiff and its shareholders are entitled to receive income from occupancy of the apartment by someone and, therefore, regrettably, the Sheriff's implementation of the writ of assistance should not be stayed.

Defendant Farrar-Baddal's motion for a stay is DENIED, and no further notice need be served on Defendants by the Sheriff unless required by law.

The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of this Court.