| Matter of Barton (G. Family Trust) |
| 2025 NY Slip Op 50679(U) [85 Misc 3d 1270(A)] |
| Decided on March 14, 2025 |
| Surrogate's Court, Suffolk County |
| Messina, Jr., S. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Accounting by
David H. Barton as the
Trustee of the G. Family Trust c/u/a dated October 10, 2014. |
Upon the following papers read on this motion to strike Keelin G.'s Notice of Appearance and related relief: Notice of Motion and supporting papers (1-4); Answering Affirmations and supporting papers(5-6); Replying Affirmations and supporting papers(7); as well as prior pleadings filed herein; and upon the following papers read on these motions to quash subpoenas duces tecum: Notices of Motion and supporting papers (1-12); Answering Affirmations and supporting papers (13-25); Replying Affirmations and supporting papers (26-29); as well as prior pleadings filed herein it is
ORDERED that, the motion to strike Keelin G.'s Notice of Appearance as guardian of the property of Kiara as well as all CPLR Article 31 Discovery demands served by Keelin G., including the subpoena served upon HSBC, is granted; and it is further
ORDERED that, the motions to quash the subpoena served upon HSBC Bank are granted; and it is further
ORDERED that, all examinations of the trustee pursuant to SCPA 2211 are to be completed by May 13, 2025, and that any objections are to be filed on or before June 3, 2025.
In this intermediate accounting proceeding, the court has before it four motions, three seeking to quash a subpoena served by a potential objectant to the accounting, and the fourth seeking to strike the appearance by this same potential objectant. For the reasons set forth below, the motion to strike Keelin's Notice of Appearance is granted and the motions to quash are denied as moot.
Philippe G. is the grantor of the G. Family Trust (the "trust"), which was established by agreement dated October 10, 2014. David H. Barton serves as trustee and on February 29, 2024 he filed an accounting of his actions as trustee for the period of December 17, 2021 through December 27, 2023. The parties entered into a stipulation setting forth the dates by which SCPA 2211 examinations of petitioner would be conducted and any objections should be filed. Prior to the examinations, Keeling G. served a subpoena on HSBC Bank, which are the subject of the motions before the court.
The record reflects that the grantor, Philippe G., is married to Keelin G. and they are currently involved in a divorce proceeding that was filed in Supreme Court in June of 2022. Philippe and Keelin have four children: Kolton, Keegan, Kyrie and Kiara. Kiara is a minor and a guardian ad litem has been appointed to represent her interests herein.
The accounting indicates that the trust has received principal in the amount of $3,192,240.10 and has a balance on hand of $3,058,480.24. The beneficiaries of the trust are the four children of Philippe and Keelin. It appears from the accounting that the assets of the trust are: real estate located in Cold Spring Harbor (a property referred to as the "Carriage House"); cash, two boats, and as an investment in Axel Teknology, LLC, an entity connected to Philippe.
In June of 2023 Keelin filed a separate proceeding in Supreme Court to enjoin the trustee from listing, selling, encumbering or otherwise transferring the Carriage House, or initiating a proceeding to evict Keelin from the Carriage House, pending the outcome of the divorce proceeding. Also pending before this court is an intermediate accounting filed by petitioner, [*2]David H. Barton, as trustee of the G. Estate Trust. Robert G. is the grantor of the Estate Trust which was established by an agreement dated November 20, 2017. There are several motions pending before the court in the Estate Trust which are being addressed separately.
Prior to conducting the SCPA examinations, respondent, Keelin G., the guardian of the property of one of the infant beneficiaries of the trust, served a subpoena upon HSBC Bank seeking a variety of information. Petitioner, Philippe G., and Robert G., have each moved to quash the subpoena served upon HSBC Bank. The grounds upon which they seek to quash the subpoena are similar, with movants arguing that Keelin is seeking disclosure that has no bearing on the accounting filed, but rather is personal banking information and other information that is related to her pending divorce proceeding. Further, movants argue that the subpoena is so overly broad and "open ended" that the proper remedy is to quash same, rather than to tailor the demands.
Keelin opposes the motions to quash and argues that the documents sought are relevant bank records that will provide clarity into the funding and administration of the Family Trust. Keelin argues that the documents sought are directly relevant to Keelin's seminal claim in this proceeding: that the cash used to fund the Family Trust are marital assets that Philippe moved to the Family Trust as part of a purported money laundering scheme, which included the use of his father's account at HSBC Bank. Keelin further argues that the motions should be denied as movants did not comply with the Uniform Rules for the Supreme and County Courts, 22 NYCRR 202.7(a), and because movants have not met their burden of proof to show that the subpoena would cause unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage, or other prejudice. Additionally, Keelin argues that the matrimonial court instructed her to seek any discovery related to the trust in this court, and would not allow any discovery concerning the trust in the matrimonial action. Keelin argues that Philippe has repeatedly deflected discovery regarding the trusts in the matrimonial proceeding on the grounds that any such discovery should be conducted in Surrogate's Court, and he should not be allowed to deflect disclosure entirely by taking a contrary position in this court.
To support her belief that the trusts were funded by marital assets Keelin has submitted her own affidavit wherein she asserts that she has known her father-in-law, Robert, for years, and that he has never had significant wealth, whereas Philippe has made tens of millions of dollars, and frequently traveled to Hong Kong, sometimes with Robert. Keelin states that she knew that Philippe had a Chinese bank account in Robert's name as he had spoken about the account with her. Keelin states that she found a HSBC bank card bearing Robert's name as well as HSBC security devices in Philippe's home office, even though Robert had never visited the family at that home.
Petitioner has also filed a motion to strike Keelin's notice appearance as well as any CPLR Article 31 Discovery demands served by her in the instant proceeding, arguing that she is not a party interested in the trust, and lacks standing to appear in her individual capacity. Although Keelin has filed a notice of appearance as guardian of the property of her infant [*3]children,[FN1] petitioner argues that a guardian ad litem has been appointed to represent the infant child, and Keelin's pecuniary interests in the trust is in direct conflict with the interests of her children, in that she is essentially seeking to strip the trusts of assets, and thus her appearance must be stricken. Petitioner also argues that pursuant to SCPA 402(1) and the Uniform Rules of the Surrogate's Court 22 NYCRR 207.51, if Keelin were to appear on behalf of her infant child, she is required to indicate to the court that she has no interest in the proceeding that is adverse to the infant's, which she has not and can not do.
Keelin opposes the motion to strike her appearance and argues that her interests are currently aligned with those of her daughter, and that she has standing to appear as guardian of the property of her daughter. Keelin also argues that as she has standing as a creditor of the trust although the accounting improperly failed to list her as an interested party in that capacity. Keelin argues that her discovery demands are proper and seek information relevant to instant proceeding. Finally, to the extent that there is a potential conflict of interest Keelin asserts that the court has appointed a guardian ad litem to represent Kiara's interests.
As to the motion seeking to strike Keelin's appearance as well as any CPLR Article 31 demands made by her, while SCPA 402 and CPLR 1201 provide that an infant may appear by the guardian of his property, CPLR 1201 further provides that the court may appoint a guardian ad litem where there is a conflict of interest. A custodial parent may be removed as the child's representative in an action where the parent has an interest adverse to the child (see Boyd v. Trent, 287 AD2d 475; Stahl v. Rhee, 220 AD2d 39; Ganiev v. Nazi, 189 Misc 2d 83; Bluntt v O'Connor, 291 AD2d 106; Stahl v Rhee, 220 AD2d 39).
In the instant proceeding, Keelin's self-stated seminal claim, that the money used to fund the Family Trust are marital assets, places her pecuniary interest in conflict with those of her child, potentially resulting in prejudice to her child's interests. Keelin's CPLR Article 31 discovery demands, which seem to be primarily in service of her potential claim against trust assets, have already engendered significant motion practice in this matter. The information sought by Keelin, which relates primarily to the source of the trust's funding is on its face, at this juncture, beyond the scope of the issues currently before the court in this accounting, specifically, the actions taken by the trustee for the time period of December 17, 2021 through December 27, 2023.
Further, upon these papers, it is clear that Keelin's purported claim is against Philippe individually, whom she asserts has wrongfully disposed of marital assets, and not against the trustee. Thus, it is clear that Keelin's interests in this proceeding are in conflict with the interests of her child, and she should be precluded from appearing as guardian of the property of her daughter in the instant matter (see Boyd v. Trent, supra; Stahl v. Rhee, 220 supra; Ganiev v. Nazi, 189 Misc 2d 83). Thus, petitioner's motion to strike her appearance as guardian of the property of her infant child and related relief is granted.
In light of the foregoing dismissal, the the motions to quash are granted.