Plaintiff James Booth ("Plaintiff") commenced this action against the Defendant Margaret O'Leary ("Defendant") to recover damages under the causes of action of unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and constructive trust.^[FN1]

The Plaintiff and Defendant were involved in a long-term intimate relationship. The Plaintiff and Defendant were never married. The Defendant owned the home at issue, (the "Floral Park home"), and ownership was never conveyed to the Plaintiff. The parties agreed to cohabitate at the Floral Park home. The parties never entered into a written cohabitation agreement prior to cohabitating. Moreover, the parties did not execute a cohabitation agreement after they began cohabitating with each other.

The Plaintiff alleges that prior to cohabitation, the Plaintiff and Defendant agreed that the Plaintiff would provide money to renovate and improve the Defendant's home and that they would occupy the premises together with the Defendant's children, from a prior relationship. The Plaintiff and Defendant do not have children together.

Plaintiff alleges that the parties agreed that they would occupy the Floral Park home together until the Defendant's youngest child graduated from high school and the Defendant would sell the property and move to the State of Florida. The Plaintiff testified that he planned to marry the Defendant in the future.

Plaintiff alleges that in exchange for his commitment to provide money to renovate and improve the Floral Park home, that the Defendant agreed that when her property was sold, she would split the net proceeds with the Plaintiff equally.

The Plaintiff and the Defendant resided together at the Floral Park home. During the cohabitation, the Plaintiff spent monies on furniture, maintenance, and renovations with respect to the Floral Park home in the amount of $151,285.16.

The Defendant denies that she entered into the foregoing financial agreement with the Plaintiff.

The Defendant interposed an answer denying the allegations in the complaint and asserted the following affirmative defenses: failure to state a cause of action, statute of frauds, waiver & estoppel, accord & satisfaction, and the damages were caused by his own actions.

Moreover, in the Defendant's answer, she asserted a counterclaim. The Defendant's counterclaim states that on October 3, 2019, the parties entered into a promissory note whereby the Plaintiff agreed to pay the sum of $5,000.00 to the Defendant. The Defendant asserts that the Plaintiff failed to honor and perform his obligations pursuant to the promissory note.

A nonjury trial was held before this Court. Both parties testified at trial. Subsequently, both parties submitted post-trial memorandum (NYSCEF DOC Nos. 26 & 27). The Court now makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Findings of Fact

The Plaintiff and the Defendant met at a Grateful Dead concert in about the year 2006. The Plaintiff and the Defendant shared a first kiss at a funeral. The parties were in an intimate relationship for approximately 14 years. The parties were never married. The Plaintiff testified that he planned to marry the Defendant in the future. The Defendant testified that the Plaintiff was her "boyfriend." The Defendant testified that she had no business arrangement or ancillary business dealings with the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff lived in Massapequa Park prior to moving into the Defendant's home. The Defendant was married to another man. The Defendant's divorce was finalized in June of 2017. The Defendant testified that she used funds from her divorce to renovate the bathroom at the Floral Park home.

The Floral Park home was owned by the Defendant. The Defendant never transferred her ownership interest to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff has never had an ownership interest in the Floral Park home.

The Plaintiff moved into the Floral Park home in 2017. When the Plaintiff moved into the Floral Park home, the Defendant's ex-husband did not reside at the Floral Park home.

The parties never entered into a pre or post cohabitation written agreement. During the course of the relationship, the parties never entered into any written agreement regarding the furniture, maintenance, construction, or renovations. There was no written agreement whatsoever between the parties regarding the terms and conditions of their living arrangements.

When the Plaintiff moved into the Floral Park home, the Plaintiff resided in the home with the Defendant and her three children ages 12, 14, and 15 respectively. The Plaintiff testified that when he moved into the Floral Park home, he personally paid for the repair of the property by paying for home renovations and purchasing furniture.

Specifically, the Plaintiff contends, in part, that he made the following expenditures towards the Floral Park home:

1. Date: 3/1/2017 Payment to Margaret O'Leary $5,000.00

2. Date: 3/27/2017 Payment to Village Kitchen & Bath (1/2 payment) $13,516.30

3. Date: 5/1/2017 Payment to Golden Hammer $10,000.00

4. Date: 5/15/2017 Payment to DJ Home Improvements-invoice # 2179 $12,000.00

5. Date: 9/5/2017 Payment to Incorporated Village of Floral Park for permit $500.00

6. Date: 7/31/2017 Payment to Volka Supply $308.74

7. Date: 9/23/2017 Payment to Margaret O'Leary $5,000.00

8. Date: 9/29/2017 Payment to Margaret O'Leary $10,000.00

9. Date: 11/22/2017 Payment to Stairbuilders $1,300.00

10. Date: 11/22/2017 Payment in cash for windows $300.00

11. Date: 12/5/2017 Payment to DJ Home Improvements $2,235.00

12. Date: 1/22/2018 Payment to Margaret O'Leary $3,400.00

13. Date: 2/1/2018 Payment to Conkel for landscaping $2,344.26

14. Date: 6/5/2018 Payment to Floral Park HVAC $5,600.00

15. Date: 6/25/2018 Payment to Floral Park HVAC $5,800.00

16. Date: 7/18/2018 Payment to Gold Coast Pavers $3,500.00

17. Date: 7/30/2018 Payment to Gold Coast Pavers $9,000.00

The Plaintiff testified that he paid for the foregoing repairs and renovations because it was his understating that once the Defendant's children were grown and out of the house, then the parties would sell the Floral Park home, split the proceeds, and move to Florida. The Defendant denied those contentions at trial. The Defendant testified that she never discussed or promised repayment for the furniture, renovations, or construction costs that the Plaintiff spent on the Floral Park house. The Defendant testified that she never discussed or promised repayment of the money that Plaintiff spent to renovate the Floral Park home.

The Defendant testified that she "was born and raised" in Floral Park and that she never had a desire to leave Floral Park. The Defendant testified that she never agreed to move to Florida. The Defendant testified that after her divorce from Mr. O'Leary, she had no intention of ever remarrying another man.

The Plaintiff and the Defendant lived inside the Floral Park home during the entire time period at issue. The Plaintiff never paid rent to the Defendant to live at the Floral Park home. There is no written rental agreement between the parties. Defendant testified that she does not recall asking the Plaintiff to pay rent. Defendant testified that she paid the deposit for the Basset furniture. Defendant testified that she is not sure who paid for the remainder of the bill for the Basset furniture.

The Plaintiff lived at the Floral Park home for approximately three years (2017 to 2019).

The Defendant described the relationship as being tumultuous and volatile. The Defendant testified that the Plaintiff engaged in excessive illegal drug use during their relationship. The Defendant also testified to infidelity on the part of the Plaintiff. Specifically, the Defendant testified that their relationship soured because letters were being mailed to her home which indicated that the Plaintiff was involved in another intimate relationship with another woman.

The Defendant officially broke off the relationship with the Plaintiff on or about Labor Day 2019. The Plaintiff moved out of the Floral Park home on or about Labor Day of 2019 permanently. The Plaintiff testified that the relationship had a "hard end" on Labor Day of 2019. [*2]The Plaintiff testified that he left the Floral Park home with his "clothes on his back." The Plaintiff indicated that he was not permitted to return to the Floral Park home.

After the demise and dissolution of the relationship, the Plaintiff still had clothes and other personal property and personal belongings at the Floral Park home. The Plaintiff testified that he made diligent efforts to try to retrieve his belongings. However, the Plaintiff was unsuccessful in obtaining all his personal belongings from the Floral Park home.

Subsequently, the parties entered into a written agreement regarding $5,000.00 on October 3, 2019 ("The Promissory Note"). The Plaintiff testified that he signed the agreement because he had personal belongings at the Defendant's home and that he did not have access to the Floral Park home. The Plaintiff testified that he executed the agreement because he was denied access to his important personal belongings by the Defendant.

The Plaintiff asserts an unjust enrichment claim. It is well settled under the law, that unjust enrichment is an equitable form of relief. The law recognizes several quasi-contractual remedies. Unjust enrichment contemplates an obligation imposed by equity to prevent injustice, in the absence of an actual agreement between the parties, Columbia Memorial Hospital v Hinds, 38 NY3d 253 (2022); Georgia Malone & Co., Inc. v Rieder, 19 NY3d 511, 950 NYS2d 333, 973 NE2d 743 (2012); IDT Corp. v Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 NY3d 132, 879 NYS2d 355, 907 NE2d 268 (2009). In the instant case, there was no written agreement between the parties pertaining to the furniture and renovations at issue.

Unjust enrichment occurs when one person has obtained money, property or a benefit, because of the work or the efforts of another person under such circumstances that, in fairness and good conscience, the money, property or benefit should not be retained. In those circumstances, the law requires that person to repay, return to or compensate the other person.

The Plaintiff has the burden of proving the unjust enrichment claim. In the instant case, the Plaintiff has the burden of proving that all the money he spent on the furniture and the renovations of the home, should be returned to him.

The Court must decide whether the Defendant was unjustly enriched at the Plaintiff's expense, see Clark v Locey, 196 AD3d 794, 151 NYS3d 456 (3d Dept 2021) ("core question of fact" as to whether Defendant unjustly enriched by Plaintiff's alleged provision of labor); whether a net benefit was conferred on Defendant by Plaintiff's mistake of law or fact, see Wood Realty Trust v N. Storonske Cooperage Co., Inc., 229 AD2d 821, 646 NYS2d 410 (3d Dept 1996); or whether under the facts of the case equity would favor permitting Defendant to retain a particular benefit, See Betz v Blatt, 160 AD3d 696, 74 NYS3d 75 (2d Dept 2018).

The Court finds the testimony of the Defendant credible when she testified that there was no agreement whatsoever between her and the Plaintiff regarding future repayment for the costs of the furniture and renovations. The Defendant testified that it was never her understanding that she had to repay the Plaintiff for the payment of the furniture and renovations. The Defendant testified that she never had an understanding of repayment based on her dealings with the Plaintiff. The testimony from the Defendant is clear and unequivocal: the Plaintiff had never informed her that he wanted to be paid back in the future for his contributions to the Floral Park home.

As the Defendant points out in their post-trial submission, the doctrine of unjust [*3]enrichment is a narrow one; it is not a catchall cause of action to be used when others fail, Columbia Memorial Hospital v Hinds, 38 NY3d 253 (2022); E.J. Brooks Company v Cambridge Security Seals, 31 NY3d 441, 80 NYS3d 162, 105 NE3d 301 (2018); Corsello v Verizon New York, Inc., 18 NY3d 777, 944 NYS2d 732, 967 NE2d 1177 (2012); Iberdrola Energy Projects v MUFG Union Bank, N.A., 218 AD3d 409, 194 NYS3d 204 (1st Dept 2023); Crestview SPV, LLC v Crestview Financial, LLC, 217 AD3d 473, 191 NYS3d 361 (1st Dept 2023).

A possible defense to a wrongful payment action is the common-law voluntary payment doctrine, see New York Eye and Ear Infirmary v Bowne, 200 AD3d 467, 160 NYS3d 4 (1st Dept 2021) (employee's voluntary payment defense to employer's action for wrongful payment of full-time benefits and salary after employee switched to part-time status). The common-law doctrine of voluntary payment bars recovery of payments voluntarily made with full knowledge of the facts, and in the absence of fraud or mistake of material fact or law, Dillon v U-A Columbia Cablevision of Westchester, Inc., 100 NY2d 525, 760 NYS2d 726, 790 NE2d 1155 (2003); Utica Mutual Insurance Company v American Re-Insurance Company, 218 AD3d 1283, 193 NYS3d 594 (4th Dept 2023); WFE Ventures, Inc. v GBD Lake Placid, LLC, 197 AD3d 824, 153 NYS3d 214 (3d Dept 2021).

The Defendant cites to the voluntary payment doctrine in their post-trial submission. The Court finds that the Plaintiff forged through with the payments on his own volition. Moreover, the Court finds no fraud on the part of the Defendant.

It should be noted that the Plaintiff did not pay rent when he resided at the Floral Park home. The Plaintiff lived at the Defendant's home without any financial costs to him. The Court believes that it would not be fair and equitable for the Plaintiff to be paid back when he received the use and enjoyment of the Floral Park home. Since Plaintiff resided in the Floral Park home, as the renovations were happening, he should be stopped from asserting unjust enrichment.

It is important to note that the Defendant testified that the money she received from her divorce settlement was used to partially pay for the costs of the construction project at the Floral Park home. The fact that the Defendant received a benefit is itself insufficient; the Plaintiff must show that the enrichment was unjust, Columbia Memorial Hospital v Hinds, 38 NY3d 253, 172 NYS3d 649, 192 NE3d 1128 (2022); Silipo v Wiley, 138 AD3d 1178, 30 NYS3d 716 (3d Dept 2016); Goel v Ramachandran, 111 AD3d 783, 975 NYS2d 428 (2d Dept 2013). The Court concludes that the Defendant was not unjustly enriched at the Plaintiff's expense.

It should be noted that the Plaintiff's post-trial submission cites to no case law to support its claim for unjust enrichment.

In conclusion, the Court holds that equity does not require the repayment or return of the monies that the Plaintiff spent on furniture and home renovations. The Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden and as a result, the unjust enrichment claim fails. Therefore, Plaintiff's claim for unjust enrichment should be denied in its entirety.

The Plaintiff asserts a quantum meruit claim. In order to make out a claim in quantum meruit, plaintiff must establish (1) the performance of the services in good faith, (2) the acceptance of the services by the person to whom they are rendered, (3) an expectation of compensation, and (4) the reasonable value of the services, Gould v Decolater, Cohen & [*4]DiPrisco, LLP, 197 AD3d 1242, 153 NYS3d 562 (2d Dept 2021); Miranco Contracting, Inc. v Perel, 57 AD3d 956, 871 NYS2d 310 (2d Dept 2008) (actual job costs plus an allowance for overhead and profit minus amounts paid); see also Skillgames, LLC v Brody, 1 AD3d 247, 767 NYS2d 418 (1st Dept 2003) (no recovery under quantum meruit where plaintiff provided money, as opposed to services, to defendant); Estate of Goth v Tremble, 59 AD3d 839, 873 NYS2d 364 (3d Dept 2009) (debtor not entitled to quantum meruit recovery where he did not expect to be paid for his services).

The first step in a quantum meruit analysis is the performance of the services by the Plaintiff. Recovery on a quantum meruit claim is ordinarily limited to the reasonable value of the services rendered by Plaintiff, Davis v Cornerstone Telephone Co., LLC, 78 AD3d 1263, 910 NYS2d 254 (3d Dept 2010); Collins Tuttle and Co., Inc. v Leucadia, Inc., 153 AD2d 526, 544 NYS2d 604 (1st Dept 1989).

The testimony and exhibits at trial did not contain any evidence that the Plaintiff performed services. The Court finds that the first step of the analysis is not satisfied. This case is completely distinguishable from a scenario whereby a contractor went into the Floral Park home and engaged in services and was subsequently denied payment for services.

To further support the notion that the Plaintiff did not supply services to the Defendant, it should be noted that the Plaintiff and Defendant were involved in a romantic relationship at the time when Plaintiff provided the payment for the furniture and the home improvements. Due to their intimate relationship, the Court finds that the performance of services has not been established within the meaning of the first step in the quantum meruit analysis.

When addressing the quantum meruit issue, the Plaintiff's post-trial submission states that "Plaintiff's money was not used for ordinary repairs and maintenance but for items that undeniably increased the value of Defendant's residence which, as it turned out, was for her sole exclusive benefit." The Court disagrees with the latter portion of that statement. The testimony at trial reveals that the Defendant did not exclusively benefit from the furniture and home improvements, but the Plaintiff did as well. The Plaintiff lived at the house and therefore was a beneficiary. The instant case is not a situation where an individual provided furniture and paid for home improvements for a house where they did not reside. Simply stated, the Plaintiff benefited from the use and enjoyment of the furniture and the home improvements at the Floral Park home.

It should be noted that the Plaintiff's post-trial submission cites to no case law to support its claim for quantum meruit.

In summary, in the absence of the performance of a service, there is no need to consider the remaining elements under quantum meruit.

The Plaintiff seeks relief under the doctrine of constructive trust. The purpose of a constructive trust is to prevent unjust enrichment, Simonds v Simonds, 45 NY2d 233, 408 NYS2d 359, 380 NE2d 189 (1978).

Generally, there are four requirements for the imposition of a constructive trust: a confidential or fiduciary relationship, a promise, a transfer in reliance upon the promise, and unjust enrichment, Simonds v Simonds, supra; Sharp v Kosmalski, 40 NY2d 119, 386 NYS2d 72, 351 NE2d 721 (1976); Matter of Newman, 231 AD3d 12, 214 NYS3d 354 (1st Dept 2024); [*5]Morales v Rolon, supra; Koumantaros v Koumantaros, supra; Canas v Oshiro, 221 AD3d 650, 199 NYS3d 161 (2d Dept 2023); Quartararo v Quartararo, 221 AD3d 627, 199 NYS3d 141 (2d Dept 2023); Toobian v Golzad, supra; Baker v Harrison, 180 AD3d 1210, 120 NYS3d 191 (3d Dept 2020); Rafferty Sand & Gravel, LLC v Kalvaitis, 116 AD3d 1290, 984 NYS2d 462 (3d Dept 2014); Rock v Rock, 100 AD3d 614, 953 NYS2d 165 (2d Dept 2012); A.G. Homes, LLC v Gerstein, supra; see Reingold v Bowins, 180 AD3d 722, 119 NYS3d 487 (2d Dept 2020).

It is axiomatic that the parties were involved in a confidential relationship for a prolonged period. As a result, the first step in the analysis is satisfied. The second requirement brings a point of contention between the parties. The Plaintiff testified that he expected to be compensated for his contributions to the Floral Park home. However, the Defendant testified unequivocally that no promise or agreement to pay back any funds were made by her to the Plaintiff. Contrary to the Plaintiff's contentions, the Defendant testified that she never said anything to the Plaintiff during their relationship that would give rise to an expectation of repayment. The Court finds the Defendant to be credible in her assertions and testimony. The Court holds that there was no promise and as a result the second requirement is not satisfied.

In their post-trial submission, the Defendant cites to Rock v Rock, 100 AD3d 614, 953 NYS2d 165 (2d Dept 2012). In Rock, the Court denied the imposition of a constructive trust on real property between parents and a child. It should be noted that the Plaintiff failed to cite any case law in their post-trial submission to support their cause of action for a constructive trust.

As an academic point, even if the constructive trust analysis were continued at this point, the unjust enrichment requirement would be unsatisfied based on the foregoing analysis. In conclusion, the Plaintiff's cause of action for a constructive trust is denied.

The Defendant asserts a counterclaim in her answer for breach of a promissory note dated October 3, 2019. The Plaintiff's reply to the counterclaim was the defense of failure of consideration. A copy of the promissory note was stipulated into evidence by the parties as Exhibit J.

The promissory note required the Plaintiff to pay $5,000.00 to the Defendant. The Defendant testified that the promissory note reflected a $5,000.00 debt for the Basset furniture. The Plaintiff never paid the $5,000.00 to the Defendant. During his testimony, the Plaintiff admitted to executing the document.

The Plaintiff testified that he executed the agreement solely to retrieve his personal belongings from the Floral Park home. As indicated previously in this decision, the Plaintiff testified that he left the Floral Park home with the "clothes on his back." The Court finds that portion of the Plaintiff's testimony to be credible. The Plaintiff unequivocally testified that he signed the document because the Defendant told him that unless he signed the document, she would deny him access to his clothes and other personal property. The Plaintiff refers to this argument in their post-trial submission to the Court.

The duress doctrine has been recognized where one party has possession or control of the tproperty of another, and refuses to surrender it to the control and use of the owner, except upon compliance with an unlawful demand, a contract made by the owner under such circumstances to emancipate the property is to be regarded as made under compulsion and duress. Weiner v. Tele [*6]King Corporation 123 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1953). See Morant v. Rodgers 118 AD3d 703 (2014) (The Court found petitioner sufficiently alleged duress when surrender agreement was executed, in part, under the influence of drugs).

Applying the foregoing law to the facts of this case, the Court finds that the promissory note was signed under duress. The Plaintiff testified that the promissory note was drafted by the Defendant. The agreement was entered into and executed by the parties after the dissolution of their relationship. The Plaintiff was left with no resort to obtain his personal belongings from the Floral Park home that he had no access. The Plaintiff has the burden of proving duress. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has met his burden with respect to this defense. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that the Plaintiff executed the document under duress.

The Defendant testified that the promissory note reflected a $5,000.00 debt owed to her for the Basset furniture. It should be noted that nowhere within the four corners of the document (Exhibit J) does it refer to "Bassett furniture." The purported promissory note does not expressly indicate that the payment of money ($5,000.00) is for the "Bassett furniture." Simply stated, on the face of the document, there is no nexus between the document and the Bassett furniture. Moreover, the Defendant retained the furniture at the Floral Park home. The Plaintiff's post-trial submission points out that "there was a failure of consideration for the giving of the promissory note" since the Defendant retained the furniture. In light of the foregoing, the promissory note is unenforceable.

In conclusion, the Defendant's counterclaim is denied by the Court.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED, the Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed in its entirety, and it is further

ORDERED, the Defendant's counterclaim is dismissed in its entirety.

This Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

This shall constitute the Decision and Order of the Court.