Statement Pursuant to CPLR § 2219

The following papers, numbered via NYSCEF, to wit: 180-208, were read on this motion. Oral argument was conducted in person at the courthouse on April 10, 2025. This is a final Decision and Order on Motion Sequence #009.

The parties were married in June 2006 and separated in August 2019. They are the parents of two children. This action was commenced in 2021 and is now postured for trial. The litigation has been marked by extensive motion practice and a demonstrable financial imbalance between the parties. Plaintiff, RA, retains sole dominion over a marital estate valued at approximately $23 million, including more than $10 million in liquid assets. His reported annual income exceeds $1.2 million, derived from employment and investments. Defendant, DA, has no access to marital assets, no independent source of income, and has not been employed during the marriage due to Cooley's Anemia, a serious and chronic hematologic condition requiring biweekly transfusions and ongoing at-home infusions. She remains medically and functionally incapable of employment and is wholly dependent on the Court's pendente lite orders for basic support and legal fees.

The Court has previously awarded Defendant interim counsel fees in the amounts of $50,000.00 and $187,487.62. Nevertheless, Defendant is in arrears to counsel in excess of $260,000.00. Her attorneys have received no payments for over fourteen months and have not been provided with a trial retainer, notwithstanding the imminence of trial. In contrast, Plaintiff has paid more than $500,000.00 to his own legal team through July 2024.

On April 10, 2025, the Court heard oral argument on Defendant's motion for further interim counsel fees. Plaintiff opposed the request, arguing that any additional fee award should be offset against Defendant's equitable distribution upon final judgment.

Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a] authorizes the Court to direct one spouse to pay interim counsel fees on behalf of the other, "as, in the court's discretion, justice requires, having regard to the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties." The statute is rooted in the principle that meaningful access to legal representation must not be a function of economic [*2]advantage and that both parties to a matrimonial action are entitled to a fair opportunity to assert and defend their claims.

In DeCabrera v. Cabrera-Rosete (70 NY2d 879 [1987]), the Court of Appeals confirmed that counsel fee awards must be based on the totality of the parties' financial circumstances and the equities of the case. The Second Department, in Prichep v. Prichep (52 AD3d 61 [2d Dept 2008]), emphasized that interim fee awards are not merely discretionary—they are essential where a less-monied spouse lacks the resources to meaningfully litigate. The failure to grant such relief in a timely manner risks undermining the integrity of the proceedings themselves.

The presumption in favor of awarding interim counsel fees is strong where, as here, the record reflects stark financial asymmetry and an imminent threat to continued legal representation.

The economic disparity between the parties is beyond serious dispute. Plaintiff retains full control of substantial marital assets, has sustained litigation through high-cost legal counsel, and continues to finance his defense without impediment. Defendant, by contrast, has no such resources, is in significant arrears to her attorneys, and faces the very real prospect of being unrepresented at trial. Her inability to fund her representation is not strategic—it is structural. Her chronic illness is well-documented and severe. Cooley's Anemia is not only disabling but resource-intensive, imposing significant physical demands. The facts of record compel the conclusion that Defendant is unable to pay for counsel without judicial intervention.

Plaintiff's argument that any further fee award should be treated as an advance against equitable distribution relies principally on Sykes v. Sykes (41 Misc 3d 1061 [Sup Ct New York County 2013]). However, Sykes does not support the proposition that interim counsel fee awards must be automatically deducted from a spouse's distributive share at the time they are made. Rather, the Court in Sykes expressly acknowledged that such awards may be revisited at the conclusion of trial, when a full accounting of the marital estate can be considered in context. Moreover, Plaintiff's reliance upon Sykes is misplaced. Not only is Sykes a trial-level decision from the First Judicial Department and therefore non-binding on this Court sitting in Richmond County within the Second Judicial Department, it offers neither binding authority nor persuasive precedent on the issue presently before the Court.

The Court declines to adopt Plaintiff's theory, which would impermissibly transform interim litigation support into a preemptive property division. Such a reading would nullify the statutory presumption under DRL § 237 [a], render interim relief illusory, and invite monied spouses to leverage resource disparity as a tactical advantage. To allow Plaintiff to withhold necessary funds on the speculative premise that Defendant may ultimately receive sufficient assets post-trial would be to abdicate the Court's duty to ensure that the litigation proceeds on fair terms. Interim counsel fees are not a windfall; they are the essential scaffolding of adversarial justice.

Nothing in this decision shall be construed to foreclose the Court's continuing equitable jurisdiction to revisit the allocation of counsel fees at the conclusion of trial. Upon full adjudication of the facts and an evidentiary review of the parties' post-trial financial circumstances, the Court may determine whether any interim awards should be adjusted, reapportioned, or credited in the context of final relief. That authority remains expressly preserved.

The Court, having considered the full procedural history, the evidentiary record, the [*3]undisputed financial disparity between the parties, and the governing legal standards under Domestic Relations Law § 237[a], concludes that an additional interim award of counsel fees is not only warranted but essential to safeguard the integrity of the proceedings. To deny Defendant the means to secure continued representation in the face of such a stark economic imbalance would subvert both the purpose of the statute and the equitable responsibilities of the Court.

Accordingly, it is hereby:

ORDERED, that Plaintiff shall remit to "Claire Cody Miller, Esq. as attorney" (to be deposited into her IOLA Account) the amount of Three Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars and No Cents ($375,000.00) within twenty (20) days of service of this Decision and Order with Notice of Entry; and it is further,

ORDERED, that said sum is directed to be allocated and distributed forthwith by Claire Cody Miller, Esq. between Claire Cody Miller, Esq., and Alter Wolff Foley & Stutman, LLP in amounts consistent with the billing statements and summaries supplied on this motion; and it is further,

ORDERED, that the remaining funds, constituting a trial retainer are to be held and distributed based upon 60 day billing cycles between Claire Cody Miller, Esq. and Alter Wolff Foley & Stutman, LLP, upon Defendant's review and ratification of the billing pursuant to all ethical rules (i.e. but not limited to New York Rules of Professional Conduct 1.5 and 1.15) and court rules (i.e. but not limited to 22 NYCRR Part 1400), in amounts consistent with the ratified billing, if any; and it is further,

ORDERED, that said award is made pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a], based upon the Court's finding of profound financial asymmetry between the parties, and for the express purpose of preserving Defendant's access to effective legal representation in advance of trial; and it is further,

ORDERED, that this interim award shall be subject to reallocation at the conclusion of trial, upon full review of the evidentiary record and in accordance with the equities as then determined by the Court; and it is further,

ORDERED, that Defendant shall retain the right to renew her application for additional interim counsel fees as may be necessary throughout the pendency of trial and any post-trial proceedings.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the court, and the clerk shall enter judgment accordingly.