[*1]
Parra v 99 John Deco Lofts Condominiums
2025 NY Slip Op 50943(U) [86 Misc 3d 1215(A)]
Decided on June 7, 2025
Supreme Court, New York County
Lebovits, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on June 7, 2025
Supreme Court, New York County


Gabriel Bernal Parra, Plaintiff,

against

99 John Deco Lofts Condominiums, Defendant.



99 JOHN DECO LOFTS CONDOMINIUMS, Plaintiff,

against

SKYLINE RESTORATION INC, Defendant.




Index No. 154156/2024



Pollack Pollack Isaac & DeCicco LLP, New York, NY (Joshua Block of counsel), for plaintiff.

Mintzer, Sarowitz, Zeris & Willis, Hicksville, NY (Courtney A. Bihn of counsel), for third-party defendant Skyline Restoration Inc.


Gerald Lebovits, J.

This is a Scaffold Law personal-injury action, brought by plaintiff, Gabriel Bernal Parra, against defendant 99 John Deco Lofts Condominiums. Defendant impleaded a third-party defendant, Skyline Restoration Inc.

On motion sequence 001, plaintiff moves for a protective order striking a notice to admit served on him by third-party defendant, and for sanctions under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1. (See NYSCEF No. 50.) On motion sequence 002, plaintiff moves to strike affirmative defenses and counterclaims, sounding in fraud, that have been asserted against plaintiff by both defendant and third-party defendant. Plaintiff's request for a protective order is granted; the accompanying request for sanctions is denied. Plaintiff's motion to strike the affirmative defenses and counterclaims is granted.

1. A notice to admit may request the truth of any factual matters on which the requesting party reasonably believes there can be "no substantial dispute at the trial and which are within the knowledge of such other party or can be ascertained by him upon reasonable inquiry." (CPLR 3123 [a].) A notice to admit can also seek admissions pertaining to the "genuineness of any papers or documents." (Id.) Thus, a notice to admit can be used only to dispose of "uncontroverted questions of fact or those that are easily provable" (The Hawthorne Group, LLC v RRE Ventures, 7 AD3d 320, 324 [1st Dept 2004].) Notices to admit should not involve "material issues in the case." (Fetahu v N.J. Jersey Transit Corp., 167 AD3d 514, 515 [1st Dept 2018].) Nor may they "be employed as a substitute for other disclosure devices." (Taylor v Blair, 116 AD2d 204, 206 [1st Dept 1986].)

Here, it is clear on the face of the notice to admit in question that third-party defendant is seeking to use it to obtain admissions from plaintiff on issues that are deeply controverted and go to a material issue in the case—namely, whether plaintiff genuinely suffered the injuries for which he is now seeking to recover damages. (See e.g. NYSCEF No. 23 at ¶¶ 4-6.) In opposing the motion, third-party defendant's counsel asserts that she "cannot understand why the plaintiff moved to strike the Notice to Admit," because the questions in the notice "should be very easy to deny if one is not participating in illegal and/or fraudulent behavior upon the Courts." (NYSCEF No. 53 at ¶ 12.) But counsel's sentiments notwithstanding, plaintiff is not required to respond to an improper notice to admit. Put differently, plaintiff is not obliged to provide a litigation adversary "fodder for cross-examination when this matter proceeds to trial," in the form of responses to a notice to admit. (Id. at ¶ 17.) That is not the proper role for notices to admit under the CPLR. Plaintiff need not respond to this notice.

Although this court has little difficulty concluding that the notice to admit in this case should be stricken as improper, this court is not persuaded that third-party defendant's service of the notice was frivolous or vexatious within the meaning of 22 NYCRR 130-1.1. Plaintiff's request for sanctions is denied.

2. In moving to strike defendants' affirmative defenses and counterclaims alleging fraud, plaintiff argues that these defenses and counterclaims are subject to dismissal for failure to state a cause of action and failure to satisfy the particularity requirement of CPLR 3016 (b).

This court agrees that the defenses and counterclaims are insufficiently particular: They are pleaded in entirely generic terms, lacking any allegations specific to this plaintiff.[FN1] (See NYSCEF No. 6 at ¶¶ 40-51 [defendant's affirmative defense/counterclaim]; NYSCEF No. 20 at ¶ 39, ¶¶ 63-70 [third-party defendant's affirmative defense/counterclaim].) Additionally, neither defendant nor third-party-defendant have sufficiently pleaded that they justifiably relied on plaintiff's alleged misrepresentations made to them, or that they were injured as a result of any justifiable reliance. (See Breton v Dishi, 235 AD3d 432, 432-433 [1st Dept 2025] [reversing the grant of leave to amend to assert a counterclaim based on plaintiff's alleged fraud in asserting personal-injury claims based on allegedly nonexistent injuries].) The motion to strike is granted.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the branch of plaintiff's motion seeking to strike third-party-defendant's notice to admit and for a protective order (mot seq 001) is granted; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of plaintiff's motion seeking an award of sanctions under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that the branches of plaintiff's motion seeking to dismiss the fraud-related affirmative defenses and counterclaims asserted by defendant and by third-party defendant (mot seq 002) is granted, and defendant's 18th affirmative defense and associated counterclaim, and third-party defendant's 19th affirmative defense and its counterclaim for fraud, are dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED that the parties appear before this court for a telephonic preliminary conference on June 23, 2025.

DATE 6/7/2025

Footnotes


Footnote 1:Defendant's affirmative defense/counterclaim is also pleaded on information and belief without identifying the source of the information or belief. (See NYSCEF No. 6 at ¶¶ 40-46.) That deficiency alone would render the affirmative defense/counterclaim subject to dismissal at the pleading stage. (See Elmrock Opportunity Master Fund I, L.P. v Citicorp N. Am., Inc., 155 AD3d 411, 412 [1st Dept 2017]; DDJ Management, LLC v Rhone Grp. LLC, 78 AD3d 442, 443 [1st Dept 2010].)