On August 5, 2024, the defendant was arraigned in Bronx Criminal Court on firearms-related charges wherein the People alleged that, on or about August 4, 2024, at approximately 5:24 a.m., the defendant possessed a loaded, operable firearm in the vicinity of Archer Street and Taylor Avenue, in Bronx County.

As relevant here, at the criminal court arraignment, the People served notice under Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 710.30 (1) (b), noticing their intent to use, at trial, a point-out identification of the defendant, made by a civilian witness to Police Officer (PO) Sharovski Azconaruiz, that occurred on August 4, 2024, at 5:14 a.m., in front of 1xxx Taylor Avenue, in Bronx County. In addition, the People served notice under CPL 710.30 (1) (a), noticing their intent to use, at trial, a statement made at the 43 precinct by the defendant to PO Anelsy Baez, memorialized in an NYPD video recording, on August 4, 2024, at 10:35 a.m., in sum and substance: "I FOUND IT AT CORTONA [sic] PARK SEVERAL MONTHS AGO."

On September 12, 2024, the defendant was arraigned in Bronx Supreme Court. The indictment against the defendant contained the following charges: criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]), criminal possession of a firearm (Penal Law § 265.01-b [1]), and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 265.01 [1]). In the People's Notices and Voluntary Disclosure Form that accompanied the indictment, the People supplemented their statement notice under CPL 710.30 (1) (a) by indicating that their intent was to use, at trial, a videotaped statement that the defendant provided to PO Baez, on August 4, 2024, at 10:40 a.m., which was in sum and substance: "I FOUND THE GUN IN CROTONA PARK SEVERAL MONTHS AGO."

During motion practice, the defendant moved to suppress the noticed identification procedure, the defendant's statement, and any property that was recovered from the defendant. In a decision and order filed on November 14, 2024, the court ordered, on consent of the People, Mapp/Wade/Huntley/Dunaway hearings to litigate evidentiary issues raised by the defendant. Pursuant to said order, a combined Mapp/Wade/Huntley/Dunaway hearing commenced on March [*2]6, 2025, continued to March 7, 2025, and concluded on March 12, 2025.^[FN1]

At the hearing, the People called two witnesses: PO Baez, shield #12337, 43 precinct detective squad, and PO Azconaruiz, shield #23013, 43 precinct. The defendant did not call any witnesses and did not offer any exhibits. At the hearing, the court accepted into evidence, without objection from the defendant, People's Exhibit 1 (NYPD video recording of the defendant's interview),^[FN2] People's Exhibit 2 (PO Azconaruiz's body-worn camera [BWC] footage),^[FN3] People's Exhibit 3 (photograph of a firearm and four rounds of ammunition), and People's Exhibit 4 (transcription and translation of People's Exhibit 1).

Based on the evidence adduced at the hearing, the oral arguments set forth by the parties, the court file, and relevant legal authority, the court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

The court finds PO Baez and PO Azconaruiz credible and credits their hearing testimony on all material points.

PO Azconaruiz had worked for the NYPD for two and a half years and was assigned to the 43 precinct. On August 4, 2024, he was on patrol within the confines of the 43 precinct with his partner, PO Vucetovic, both in uniform, in a marked car, when they responded to a radio run of "an assault of a family in progress."

When PO Azconaruiz and PO Vucetovic arrived at the vicinity of Archer Street and Taylor Avenue, in Bronx County, they were approached by a civilian who was later identified as M.D. Mr. D. informed the officers that he was the one who called the police. In response to the officers asking him what was going on, he told the officers that he "called because [his] sister just got assaulted by that individual over there." As Mr. D. stated this to the officers, he pointed at the defendant, who was across the street, in visible distance to the officers. Mr. D. then "warn[ed] [the officer] to be careful, he's carrying a firearm."

PO Azconaruiz and PO Vucetovic got back in their car and drove less than half a block to where the defendant was standing on a sidewalk. As the officers exited their car, PO Azconaruiz witnessed the defendant duck behind a parked car that was between him and the officers, out of the officers' line of sight, for two or three seconds. As they exited their car and approached, the officers immediately drew their firearms and ordered the defendant to place himself on the ground.^[FN4] When the defendant did not comply, PO Azconaruiz forced him to the ground where the officer handcuffed him.

After PO Azconaruiz handcuffed the defendant, additional officers arrived and began searching the ground near the parked car for a firearm. PO Azconaruiz asked that the officers search underneath the parked car, as PO Azconaruiz believed that the defendant "had dropped the firearm underneath the car or threw it underneath the car when[] he ducked."

PO Azconaruiz also searched the defendant's person while he was still face-down on the ground, around his waistband and groin area, and pulled out various items from his pants pockets. Thereafter, with the assistance of another officer, PO Azconaruiz picked up the defendant and had the defendant stand. He then ran his hands over the defendant's lower legs, where he found the firearm, wrapped in a diaper, near the defendant's left ankle. As captured in People's Exhibit 2, upon recovering the diaper, PO Azconaruiz immediately ascertained that it contained a firearm, telling PO Vucetovic that he "got it," to which she asked, "a firearm?" and he responded, "yup."

Approximately 13 minutes after seizing the diaper from the defendant, PO Azconaruiz went to the apartment where the domestic assault allegedly occurred. There, he interviewed the complainant in the Spanish language, took photos of the complainant's injuries, and had her sign a domestic incident report (DIR).

On the same day, the defendant was interviewed in the Spanish language by PO Baez at the 43 precinct, which was memorialized in a video recording. PO Baez was assigned to the 43 precinct detective squad to assist in gun enhancements that day. PO Baez, who had been assigned to the 43 precinct for nine years, is fluent in the Spanish language, having spoken the language her entire life, and has been certified as a Spanish language interpreter for the NYPD since her time at the police academy.

According to People's Exhibit 1, as the defendant entered the interview room, PO Azconaruiz removed the defendant's handcuffs. The defendant then sat across a table from PO Baez. After obtaining pedigree information, PO Baez read the defendant his Miranda rights, in the Spanish language, off a prepared sheet of paper, and elicited an affirmative, verbal response to each question from the defendant. PO Baez then proceeded to ask the defendant questions regarding his argument with the complainant and the firearm in question, leading to the People's noticed statement.

As to the Rodriguez/Wade portion of the hearing, the court finds that the identification of the defendant was a witness-initiated procedure (see People v Burgos, 219 AD2d 504, 505 [1st Dept 1995], lv denied 86 NY2d 872 [1995]). Therefore, the People did not need to serve notice under CPL 710.30 (1) (b) (see People v Baptiste, 248 AD2d 479, 480 [2d Dept 1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 847 [1998]). That the People did serve timely notice in this regard does not alter this court's determination that there was not a police-arranged identification procedure (see e.g. People v Shoukron, 234 AD2d 400, 400 [2d Dept 1996], lv denied 89 NY2d 1015 [1997]).

Given the court's finding that there was no police-sponsored identification, the defendant's motion to suppress the identification of the defendant is denied. Relatedly, the court denies the defendant's request for an independent source hearing.

At a Mapp hearing, the People have the burden of going forward with evidence demonstrating the legality of the police conduct (People v Berrios, 28 NY2d 361, 367-368 [1971]; see People v Johnson, 134 Misc 2d 474, 476 [Crim Ct, Queens County 1987], citing Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 [1961]). Upon the People meeting this burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish the illegality of the conduct (Berrios, 28 NY2d at 367). At a Dunaway hearing held to determine whether there was probable cause for an arrest without a warrant, the People bear the burden of proving a defendant's arrest was lawful (Dunaway v New York, 442 US 200 [1979]; see People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223 [1976]). An officer has probable cause to arrest a person for committing an offense when "[it] appear[s] to be at least more probable than not that a crime has taken place and that the one arrested is its perpetrator, for conduct equally compatible with guilt or innocence will not suffice" (People v Carrasquillo, 54 NY2d 248, 254 [1981]).

Whether the police may legally seize a defendant depends upon whether the police possess the requisite information to justify the seizure under De Bour, 40 NY2d at 223. The Court of Appeals recognized, in laying out De Bour's four-tiered analysis, "that police-citizen encounters are dynamic situations during which the degree of belief possessed at the point of [*3]inception may blossom by virtue of responses or other matters which authorize and indeed require additional action as the scenario unfolds" (id. at 225; see People v Hollman, 79 NY2d 181, 191 [1992]). Further, "[t]here are no bright lines separating various types of police activity. Determining whether a seizure occurs during the course of a street encounter between the police and a private citizen involves an analysis of the 'most subtle aspects of our constitutional guarantees'" (People v Bora, 83 NY2d 531, 535 [1994]; People v Cantor, 36 NY2d 106, 112 [1975]).

Evaluating the propriety of a seizure based upon information provided by an informant, even a known informant, requires the court to apply the two-part Aguilar-Spinelli test (see People v DiFalco, 80 NY2d 693, 696 [1993]; Aguilar v Texas, 378 US 108 [1964]; Spinelli v United States, 393 US 410 [1969]). The two-part test requires: (1) "the veracity or reliability of the source of the information," and (2) "the basis of the informant's knowledge" (People v Griminger, 71 NY2d 635, 639 [1988]; DiFalco, 80 NY2d at 696-697).

In this case, the defendant argued that the People failed to meet their burden under Aguilar-Spinelli. In particular, citing to, inter alia, People v Parris, 83 NY2d 342, 346-348 (1994), and People v Elwell, 50 NY2d 231, 234-235 (1980), the defendant urged the court to find that the People failed to meet their burden regarding the informant's basis of knowledge. The defendant argued that, as the informant, Mr. D., did not mention the source of his information and there were no confirmatory details corroborating the informant's statement prior to the stop of the defendant, the People could not satisfy the second prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test. The court disagrees with defendant's assertion in this regard.

A gunpoint stop, such as the one before the court, falls squarely within De Bour's third level and therefore requires that the police possess a reasonable suspicion that a particular person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit, a crime (People v Moore, 6 NY3d 496, 498-499 [2006]). A lower burden than probable cause, "[r]easonable suspicion is the quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious man under the circumstances to believe criminal activity is at hand" (Cantor, 36 NY2d at 112-113). Under Aguilar-Spinelli, "[w]here police action requires reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause, a lesser showing with respect to an informant's reliability and basis of knowledge suffices" (People v Brown, 288 AD2d 152, 152 [1st Dept 2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 727 [2002]).

As to the first prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, the reliability of the informant, the court is satisfied that the burden has been met. The informant in this instance called the police, and when the officers arrived, he was present at the scene and identified himself. He pointed out the defendant who was also present on scene. During the search of the defendant, the informant came to the scene of the search, less than a half a block from the first informant-police encounter, and remained with the police throughout, accompanying them later to the scene of the alleged domestic assault. The court finds no reason to upset the presumption that "[a]n identified citizen informant is presumed to be personally reliable" (Parris, 83 NY2d at 350).

As to the second prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, an evaluation of the informant's basis of knowledge, the court similarly finds that the burden has been met. Given the emergent nature of the interaction between the informant and the officers, and "[b]ecause the information itself supported the conclusion that the informant was in close proximity to, and had some intimate knowledge of, an ongoing dispute, it can be fairly inferred, at least for purposes of establishing reasonable suspicion, that the informant's report of a man with a gun was based on the informant's own personal observations" (People v Herold, 282 AD2d 1, 7 [1st Dept 2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 682 [2001]; see Brown, 288 AD2d at 152-153 ["Under the circumstances, the police were entitled to take immediate action without first ascertaining whether the informant was actually a witness to the robbery"]). That the informant's statement was made in response to an ongoing situation, provides a further guarantee of the reliability of the informant's information (see also People v Rivera, 84 AD3d 636, 636 [1st Dept 2011] [finding that reports made in response to being threatened enhanced the reliability of the informant's information], lv denied 17 NY3d 904 [2011]).

Here, the informant provided the police with at least reasonable suspicion that the defendant was committing two crimes: the domestic assault to which they initially responded, and possession of a firearm (see People v Shala, 222 AD2d 352, 352 [1st Dept 1995] ["probable cause was provided by an identified, and presumably reliable, citizen-witness . . . . It is of no moment that the witness's information derived partly from his own observations and partly from the witness's conversation with the complainant, whose reliability is also presumed"], lv denied 88 NY2d 969 [1996]). Once informed that there was "a dispute involving an armed man, the officers were duty bound to investigate" (Herold, 282 AD2d at 4). And, once they had stopped the defendant on reasonable suspicion, the officers were legally permitted to frisk the defendant (see People v Johnson, 40 NY3d 172, 175-176 [2023]). The record borne out at the hearing also described an emergent circumstance where officers reasonably suspected that they were in danger of physical injury. As PO Azconaruiz testified, the officers were in possession of information that the defendant was possibly armed, and he ducked out of their view upon their approach (CPL 140.50; People v Stroller, 42 NY2d 1052, 1053 [1977] ["the officer could then make a limited pat down search in the nature of a frisk, not to discover evidence of a crime, but in order to pursue his investigation without fear of violence"]). Therefore, because the officers had the requisite reasonable suspicion, the seizure of the defendant and subsequent frisk were legal.

As for the police seizure of the diaper containing the gun, under the circumstances, the court finds it proper (see People v Batista, 261 AD2d 218, 220 [1st Dept 1999] ["the incriminating nature of this package was 'immediately apparent' so as to permit its warrantless seizure under the plain view doctrine"], lv denied 94 NY2d 819 [1999]; People v Maldonado, 76 AD2d 691, 695-699 [2d Dept 1980] ["The propriety of the search will often depend on the manner in which the container is secured and the circumstances under which it was discovered"]). Merely minutes prior to discovering the diaper on the defendant's person, PO Azconaruiz was warned that the defendant was possibly armed. When the officers approached the defendant, they saw the defendant duck out of their line of sight for several seconds, and it was reasonable for the officers to believe that the defendant had attempted to conceal a firearm. After PO Azconaruiz frisked the defendant and found the diaper, he immediately told PO Vucetovic that it was a firearm. Combined, these facts place the diaper within the category of containers that "by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance" (see People v Aqudelo, 150 AD2d 284, 286 [1st Dept 1989]; Batista, 261 AD2d at 223 ["it was hardly a hunch for the police to associate the package with the illicit . . . activity"]). Therefore, once he recovered the diaper, PO Azconaruiz had probable cause to seize the package.

Further, even if the defendant had possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the diaper, the court finds that there were exigent circumstances justifying the seizure and subsequent search of the object (see People v Gokey, 60 NY2d 309, 312 [1983] ["When an individual subjected to arrest has a privacy interest in property within his or her immediate control or 'grabbable area,' this court has identified two interests that may justify the warrantless search of that property incident to a lawful arrest: the safety of the public and the arresting officer; and the protection of evidence from destruction or concealment"]). In this case, the property in question was found around the defendant's ankle, within the defendant's grabbable area. Given the officers' belief that the defendant was armed based on direct information provided by a civilian informant on scene, the defendant's movement prior to his seizure, and the discovery of an object wrapped in a diaper, the officers had a reasonable fear of a threat to their safety and the safety of the public sufficient to justify a seizure of the diaper.

Once the diaper was properly seized, the exigency of the situation at the time of the stop of the defendant combined with the officers' observations rendered the subsequent search legal, even in the absence of a warrant (see People v Bowden, 87 AD3d 402, 404 [1st Dept 2011], appeal dismissed 18 NY3d 980 [2012]). The Bowden court differentiated searches for firearms from less dangerous searches by stating, "Gokey does not deal with circumstances in which police, upon taking hold of a defendant's bag immediately after detaining that defendant, have [*4]reason to be concerned that it contains a gun, and upon palpitation, can feel the presence of a gun within" (id. at 405). That the police "had reason to suspect the presence of a gun at that moment is enough" (id.). As the firearm was found pursuant to a legal search, the defendant's motion to suppress the physical evidence is denied.

Once the police properly frisked the defendant, they found a revolver. This gun provided them with probable cause to arrest the defendant for the charge of possession of a firearm (see People v Salinas, 286 AD2d 601, 602 [1st Dept 2001]). As the court finds that the arrest of the defendant was made with the requisite probable cause, the defendant's motion to suppress evidence on the grounds that the officers lacked probable cause is denied.

As to the Huntley portion of the hearing, the People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's statements were voluntary (People v Anderson, 42 NY2d 35, 38 [1977]; People v Huntley, 15 NY2d 72, 78 [1965]), and that the defendant, if subjected to custodial interrogation, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights prior to making the statements (Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 444 [1966]; People v Williams, 62 NY2d 285, 288-289 [1984]; CPL 60.45 [2]). When determining whether one is in custody, the court must consider "whether a reasonable person innocent of any wrongdoing would have believed that he or she was not free to leave" (People v Paulman, 5 NY3d 122, 129 [2005]). To determine if the defendant was interrogated, the court must determine if they were "subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent" (Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 300-301 [1980]).

Here, the defendant provided an oral statement, which was videotaped, several hours after his arrest and in response to express questioning by PO Baez. Given the defendant's recent arrest, a reasonable person, innocent of any wrongdoing, would not believe that he was free to leave, and given the express questioning of the defendant by PO Baez, this was unquestionably a custodial interrogation. Nor is this fact in dispute by the parties.

Prior to interrogating the defendant, PO Baez properly read a list of Miranda rights from a prepared text in the Spanish language and elicited a verbal affirmative from the defendant to each of her questions. The defendant responded in the Spanish language that he understood his Miranda rights and indicated that he wished to answer the officer's questions.

Under these circumstances, the court finds that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights prior to giving a statement to the police. Furthermore, as to all statements, the court finds that no promises were made, no threats made, and no coercion involved that would have induced the defendant to make any such statements and were thus made voluntarily.

On March 7, 2025, prior to the testimony of the People's second witness, PO Azconaruiz, the defendant raised a certificate of compliance (COC) challenge, based on missing discovery, namely 911 and radio run recordings. The People had filed their initial COC and statement of readiness (SOR) on January 7, 2025.

Defense counsel stated that prior to the hearings commencing on March 6, 2025, she raised the issue of potentially missing 911 and radio run recordings with the ADA. Upon further conferral with the ADA throughout the day, the parties concluded that the disclosure had not been made with the People's initial COC.

On March 7, 2025, the defendant raised the issue for the first time with the court. Pursuant to the non-disclosure of the aforementioned items, the defendant made three requests: 1) they asked for leave to file a written motion challenging the initial COC filed on January 7, 2025; 2) they asked for the People to be deemed "not ready" from their previously noted readiness as of March 6, 2025, when the defendant brought the non-disclosure of these items to the attention of the People; and 3) they asked for an adjournment to receive and review the missing materials before commencing cross-examination of the responding officer, PO Azconaruiz. The People acknowledged the items' omission from their initial COC but were unclear as to their existence (i.e. whether the items were preserved past a certain timeframe or [*5]whether they had been previously requested, received and thereafter lost or destroyed), or whether the request to preserve was even made when the initial COC was filed. The People represented that they had made a "new request" on March 6, 2025, to obtain the items.

At the conclusion of the direct examination of PO Azconaruiz on March 7, 2025, the court granted the defendant's request for an adjournment, to receive and review the missing items before cross-examination commenced, to March 12, 2025. The court gave further directions for the People to follow up on the items.

On March 12, 2025, the hearing continued. On that day, the People represented that they obtained two 911 calls and a radio run recording and disclosed the same on March 7, 2025, believed to be the entirety of the omitted materials in question, and filed a supplemental COC on March 10, 2025, announcing those disclosures. Defense counsel acknowledged receipt and confirmed that she was ready to proceed with the cross-examination. In addition to maintaining their three requests made on March 7, 2025, defense counsel made additional requests of the court: 1) that the People be precluded from introducing any of the 911 or radio run recordings at the trial; and 2) to strike the initial SOR filed on January 7, 2025. The court reserved judgment on all other issues regarding the COC and concluded the testimony portion of the second and last witness, PO Azconaruiz.

When the court pointedly inquired of the People as to the reason for the belated disclosure of these items, the ADA stated that his recollection was that the officers may have been flagged down by the civilian witness rather than responding to a 911 call. Defense counsel countered that the grand jury minutes that were disclosed to them noted the presence of a 911 call. Regardless, the court finds that, based upon the representations made by each side, and the court's review of the evidence at the suppression hearing, it should have been readily apparent to both sides that 911 recordings may have existed, or at a minimum, that a radio run recording was generated.

Upon hearing oral arguments on the suppression issue, the court denied defense counsel's application to make a motion in writing to strike the People's COC and instead allowed the motion to be made orally. The court thereafter orally heard defense counsel's application to invalidate the People's COC and denied said motion. As such, the court further denied the defendant's motion to find the People's previous SORs illusory, both the off-calendar SOR filed on January 7, 2025, with their initial COC, and their on-calendar SOR made on March 6, 2025, the date the People answered ready for the suppression hearings. The court now expounds on its oral rulings issued on March 12, 2025.

Under CPL 30.30, the People satisfy their obligation once they announce their readiness for trial (People v Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331, 337 [1985]). The People are ready for trial when they serve "either a statement of readiness by the prosecutor in open court, transcribed by a stenographer, or recorded by the clerk or a written notice of readiness sent by the prosecutor to both defense counsel and the appropriate court clerk" (People v Chavis, 91 NY2d 500, 505 [1998]). Contemporaneously, the People must be actually ready to proceed to trial (id. at 506). The People are actually ready for trial when "the People have done all that is required of them to bring the case to a point where it may be tried" (People v Brown, 28 NY3d 392, 404 [2016]).

Effective January of 2020, new legislation went into effect requiring that the People certify compliance with their discovery obligation and undergo inquiry from the court on the record to confirm their "actual readiness" (CPL 245.20; 245.50; 30.30 [5]). Henceforth, trial readiness has required meeting discovery obligations, "such that discovery compliance [has become] a condition precedent to a valid announcement of readiness for trial" (People v Lobato, 66 Misc 3d 1230[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 50322[U], *4 [Crim Ct, Kings County 2020]). Congruently, the language in CPL 245.50 and 245.20 (2) "echoes" the trial statute CPL 30.30 (5) requirements (People v Bruni, 71 Misc 3d 913, 918 [County Ct, Albany County 2021]). Criminal Procedure Law 30.30 (5) now provides that "[a]ny statement of trial readiness must be accompanied or preceded by a certification of good faith compliance with the disclosure requirements of section 245.20."

The statutory landscape discussion above demonstrates that a court must determine the [*6]propriety of the People's COC, which hinges on the soundness of the People's discovery compliance (People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 209-210 [2023]). The People must make a "diligent, good faith effort to ascertain the existence of material or information" subject to discovery (CPL 245.20 [2]; 245.50 [1]). For "all known material and information subject to discovery" in the "possession, custody, or control of the prosecution or persons under the prosecution's direction or control," the People must disclose and make that material available to the defendant, "except for discovery that is lost or destroyed" (CPL 245.50 [1]; 245.20 [1], [2]). For all known items that are not within the People's possession, custody, or control, the People must "cause such material or information to be made available for discovery" with the exception that if the defendant could do the same, the People are not required to obtain what they do not possess by subpoena duces tecum (CPL 245.20 [2]).

The People's belated disclosure of discovery or a miscalculation of the breadth of their discovery obligations need not automatically render a COC invalid (People v Rodriguez, 73 Misc 3d 411, 416 [Sup Ct, Queens County 2021]; People v Erby, 68 Misc 3d 625, 633 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 2020]; see People v Barralaga, 73 Misc 3d 510, 514 [Crim Ct, NY County 2021] [stating, "(The statute) does not demand that every scrap of discoverable information be turned over before the People may file a certificate of their compliance with discovery. But it does demand that the People use diligence, act in good faith, and take reasonable steps to ensure that discoverable material is turned over before filing a COC" (internal citations omitted)]. Thus, when there is any challenge under CPL article 245, an evaluation of a COC is grounded upon "good faith, due diligence, and reasonableness under the circumstances" (Rodriguez, 73 Misc 3d at 417; see People v Georgiopoulos, 71 Misc 3d 1215[A], 2021 NY Slip Op 50380[U], *2-3 [Sup Ct, Queens County 2021]). In that regard, it is incumbent on the prosecution to supply the court with sufficient facts to assess their efforts (People v Rodriguez, 77 Misc 3d 23, 24-25 [App Term, 1st Dept 2022]; People v Rosario, 70 Misc 3d 753, 764 [County Ct, Albany County 2020]).

When assessing the prosecution's discovery compliance, "the key question . . . is whether the prosecution has exercis[ed] due diligence and ma[de] reasonable inquiries to ascertain the existence of material and information subject to discovery" (Bay, 41 NY3d at 211 [internal quotation marks omitted]; CPL 245.20 [2]; 245.50 [1], [3]). The statutory directive in analyzing reasonableness is a "case-specific" analysis and "will turn on the circumstances presented" (Bay, 41 NY3d at 212). While the statute is not a "strict liability" statute and is not seeking a "perfect prosecutor," good faith, standing alone, is insufficient without the accompaniment of due diligence (id.). While not an exhaustive list, in citing some factors for assessing due diligence, the Court of Appeals listed:

"the efforts made by the prosecution . . . to comply with the statutory requirements, the volume of discovery provided and outstanding, the complexity of the case, how obvious any missing material would likely have been to a prosecutor exercising due diligence, the explanation for any discovery lapse, and the People's response when apprised of any missing discovery" (id.).

When there is a challenge to the People's COC, "the People bear the burden of establishing that they did, in fact, exercise due diligence and made reasonable inquiries prior to filing the initial COC despite a belated or missing disclosure" (Bay, 41 NY3d at 213).

The People have demonstrated here that the ADA in good faith, exercised due diligence in providing the defendant with discovery materials prior to filing their January 7, 2025 COC. [*7]Given the volume of discovery in this felony matter,^[FN5] at most, the failure to provide the defendant with the outstanding singular category of items was an oversight. Moreover, the People acted immediately once alerted to its omission and produced the items within days of being notified of their absence. The People then expeditiously filed a supplemental COC on March 10, 2025, two days prior to the end of the hearing. When viewing the circumstances through the lens of reasonableness, to invalidate the COC in this case would create an "inescapable trap" for a diligent prosecutor who has demonstrated good faith and due diligence and create a result the legislature did not intend (see Erby, 68 Misc 3d at 633). To hold otherwise would be in contravention of what the legislature sought to achieve—to encourage and facilitate the People's continuing obligation to ascertain, disclose and share information with the defendant (CPL 245.60) rather than discourage them from doing so.

In conclusion, the court declines to invalidate the January 7, 2025 COC, or to render their readiness invalid. There is nothing in the record, beyond a single mistake, to dissipate the good faith, due diligence, and reasonableness the People have demonstrated when they filed their initial COC, which would warrant the altering of the court's finding of a valid COC based on this sole challenge, belatedly raised.

The court grants the defendant's request to preclude these items at trial and thus precludes the use of the belatedly disclosed materials (i.e., the actual recordings) in the People's case-in-chief. The court also refers any further sanctions to the trial court (CPL 245.80).

Based on the foregoing, the defendant's motion to suppress evidence is denied in its entirety.

The foregoing constitutes the opinion, decision, and order of the court.