[*1]
LB v GB
2025 NY Slip Op 51028(U) [86 Misc 3d 1225(A)]
Decided on June 10, 2025
Supreme Court, Richmond County
Castorina, Jr., J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on June 10, 2025
Supreme Court, Richmond County


LB, Plaintiff,

against

GB, Defendant.




Index No. REDACTED



Attorney for the Plaintiff
Avram S Turkel
Ballon Stoll, P.C.
810 7th Avenue Suite 405
New York, NY 10019
Phone: (212) 575-7900
E-mail: [email protected]

Attorney for the Defendant
Dorothy M. Going
Dorothy M. Going, Attorney at Law
101 E Park Ave Unit 939
Long Beach, NY 11561
Phone: (516) 399-1992
E-mail: [email protected]


Ronald Castorina, Jr., J.

Before the Court is Plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR § 2221 [d] and [e] for leave to reargue and/or renew this Court's prior Decision and Order dated May 15, 2025 (the "D&O"). That D&O adjudged Plaintiff in civil contempt, directed the listing and sale of the former marital residence located at XX XXX Avenue, Staten Island, New York (the "Property"), and awarded Defendant counsel fees.

Plaintiff now seeks to reargue and/or renew, asserting that the Court overlooked matters [*2]of fact and law, and that new facts not previously presented warrant modification of the prior determination. Defendant opposes.

Upon due consideration of the submissions of the Parties and the record herein, the motion is DENIED for the reasons set forth below.


Facts

The Parties' Stipulation of Settlement dated March 31, 2016, incorporated but not merged into the Judgment of Divorce, governs the disposition of the Property. The Stipulation afforded Plaintiff the option to elect whether to purchase Defendant's interest or to cause the Property to be listed for sale, providing:

"On or before June 1, 2024 the WIFE shall notify the HUSBAND as to whether she shall buy out his interest in the premises or the premises shall be placed on the market for sale."

It further provided that Defendant's equitable interest in the Property is "subject to credits and debits," and imposed additional obligations regarding support, mortgage payments, and related matters.

Plaintiff duly notified Defendant of her election to buy out his interest in or about May 2024.

However, Plaintiff failed thereafter to take any concrete steps to consummate the buyout, despite follow-up inquiries from Defendant and his counsel, and despite being placed on notice of default by letter dated January 31, 2025. Rather, Plaintiff ceased communications and offered varying post hoc explanations for her inaction, including the erroneous assertion that a broker's market analysis was required before proceeding—an argument unsupported by the plain text of the Stipulation.

On March 10, 2025, Defendant moved to hold Plaintiff in contempt and to compel the sale of the Property. By D&O dated May 15, 2025, this Court found that Plaintiff's conduct constituted a willful and unjustified repudiation of her obligations under the Stipulation, thereby warranting a finding of civil contempt and corresponding relief.


Conclusions of Law

A motion for leave to reargue under CPLR § 2221 [d] is not a vehicle to relitigate issues previously decided, nor to present arguments previously rejected. It lies solely to correct matters of fact or law allegedly overlooked or misapprehended.

A motion to renew under CPLR § 2221 [e] must be based upon new facts not previously presented, which would change the prior determination, and must include a reasonable justification for the failure to present such facts earlier.

Upon careful review, the Court finds no basis to grant reargument or renewal.



I. No Matter of Fact or Law Overlooked

Plaintiff contends that the Court overlooked the absence of an explicit deadline in the Stipulation for consummation of the buyout. This argument is unavailing.

The D&O did not predicate the finding of contempt upon a deadline not present in the Stipulation. Rather, it properly focused on Plaintiff's prolonged, willful inaction after her election to buy out Defendant's interest—inaction that persisted even after Defendant issued a written notice of default. The Court expressly found that Plaintiff ceased communications and failed to take any affirmative steps toward performance of her elected obligation, constituting a [*3]repudiation of the bargain struck.

Such conduct, under well-settled principles, may constitute a waiver or forfeiture of contractual rights (Pace v Robertson, 235 AD3d 989 [2d Dept 2025]; Golfo v Kycia Assocs., Inc., 45 AD3d 531 [2d Dept 2007]). The Court committed no error in so holding.

Moreover, Plaintiff's reliance on the pending child support dispute as a purported justification for inaction is misplaced. The record reflects that Plaintiff failed to assert this ground as an obstacle to consummating the buyout at the relevant time, and in fact offered alternative, unsupportable excuses, such as an alleged requirement for a broker's market analysis.

It is axiomatic that parties may not rely upon defenses they failed to assert contemporaneously with the alleged breach, nor may they evade performance of clear contractual obligations by invoking unrelated disputes resolved subsequent to their breach.



II. No New Facts Justifying Renewal

Plaintiff further argues that the February 25, 2025 So-Ordered Stipulation resolving a child support dispute constitutes new evidence warranting renewal. This argument is meritless.

First, the February 25, 2025 order was a matter of record prior to the Court's May 15, 2025 D&O and could have been, but was not, affirmatively placed before the Court by Plaintiff in opposition to the contempt motion. Plaintiff's assertion that she believed the Court was aware of the order does not constitute a reasonable justification for her failure to submit it formally as required by CPLR § 2221 [e] [3].

Second, and more fundamentally, the February 25, 2025 order does not alter the essential fact that Plaintiff elected the buyout and then willfully failed to act to effectuate it for many months thereafter. The existence of disputes regarding credits and debits did not relieve Plaintiff of her obligation to proceed in good faith toward consummating the transaction, nor did it authorize her to engage in protracted inaction while occupying the Property to Defendant's detriment.



III. No Right to a Hearing

Plaintiff further contends that a hearing is required because factual disputes exist regarding credits and debits. The Court rejects this contention.

No triable issue was presented as to the predicate facts necessary for the finding of contempt: Plaintiff elected the buyout and then failed to act over an extended period, notwithstanding Defendant's notice of default and good faith efforts to proceed. The resolution of ancillary accounting matters, while perhaps relevant to the ultimate buyout amount, did not excuse Plaintiff's wholesale failure to perform the elected obligation or preclude a finding of contempt.

The Court therefore properly exercised its discretion in resolving the contempt motion on the written submissions.



Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

Plaintiff's motion is a transparent attempt to relitigate issues fully and fairly adjudicated. It advances no matter of fact or law that was overlooked or misapprehended, nor does it present new facts sufficient to warrant disturbing the Court's prior determination.

Accordingly, it is hereby:

ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for leave to reargue and/or renew the May 15, 2025 [*4]Decision and Order is DENIED in its entirety.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court



Dated: June 10, 2025
Staten Island, New York
E N T E R,
HON. RONALD CASTORINA, JR.
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT