Statement Pursuant to CPLR § 2219

The Court is in receipt of the following papers: (1) the Notice of Motion, dated March 27, 2025, by Plaintiff ESTEPHANI NICOLLS POLO ROBLES, seeking partial summary judgment pursuant to CPLR § 3212 on the issue of liability against Defendants DANIELLE SILLER and [*2]ABIGAIL SILLER, and seeking to dismiss Defendants' affirmative defenses of comparative negligence (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 14; (2) the Affirmation in Support by Moshe Borukh, Esq., together with annexed deposition transcripts (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 15; 17-19; (3) the Memorandum of Law in Support (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 16; (4) the Affirmation in Opposition by Gregory M. Maurer, Esq. with exhibits (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 25-27; and (5) the Affirmation in Reply (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 29.

This action arises out of a motor vehicle collision that occurred on the evening of June 18, 2024, at approximately 10:00 PM, at the intersection of Richmond Hill Road and North Port Lane, Staten Island, an intersection devoid of traffic control devices governing the vehicles involved.

Plaintiff, traveling straight along Richmond Hill Road, testified that she was proceeding at approximately 15 miles per hour when the accident occurred. Plaintiff's testimony establishes that: "The accident occurred on Richmond Hill Road at the intersection of Northport Lane in Staten Island at approximately 10:00 PM." (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 17 at page 23, line 15-20).

Plaintiff further testified that: "Plaintiff was traveling on Richmond Hill Road the entire time prior to the accident." (see id at page 24, lines 1-6). At no time before the impact did Plaintiff observe Defendant's vehicle: "Plaintiff had not seen the offending vehicle at any time before the impact occurred." (see id at page 29, lines 22-25). The impact occurred to: "Plaintiff's front right passenger door and her front tire. The front of Defendant's vehicle came into contact with the right passenger door and front tire." (see id at page 30, lines 1-11).

As a result of the collision, Plaintiff's vehicle: "Was propelled into a third vehicle that was parked on Richmond Hill Road." (see id at page 33, lines 1-9). At the time of impact, Plaintiff was traveling at: "15 miles per hour." (see id at page 36, lines 15-18).

Defendant ABIGAIL SILLER, operating a vehicle owned by Defendant DANIELLE SILLER, was attempting to execute a right-hand turn from North Port Lane onto Richmond Hill Road. Defendant testified that: "I was approaching the end of North Port Lane. I was trying to make a right onto Richmond Hill Road. I had no stop sign, so I came to a stop myself and I was inching forward. There was a van obstructing my view on the left side so I couldn't fully see oncoming traffic. That's why I began inching forward. I inched forward until I had what I assumed was clear. I began to make a right-hand turn. Then I'm not sure after that." (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 17 at page 20, lines 6-18).

Defendant confirmed the presence of the obstruction: "It was to my left, yes." and "Yes." in response to whether the van obstructed her view. (see id at page 21, lines 10-16). When questioned further regarding the moments immediately preceding impact, Defendant testified: "I'm not sure. I don't know whose car made contact first." (see id at page 24, line 9). "I don't remember." — where her face was directed prior to impact. (see id at page 24, line 12). "I don't remember." — where her right foot was prior to impact. (see id at page 24, line 15). "I don't [recall the speed of my vehicle before the accident occurred.]" (see id at page 24, line 19).

Defendants contend in opposition that the absence of traffic control devices at the intersection renders this a question of comparative fault, that Plaintiff allegedly failed to observe [*3]Defendant's vehicle "inching" forward, and that triable issues remain.

Summary judgment is an exacting but indispensable procedural device. It is warranted when, upon consideration of the entire record, it is established that there is no genuine triable issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law (CPLR § 3212 [b]; see also Andre v. Pomeroy, 35 NY2d 361 [1974] citing Millerton Agway Cooperative, Inc. v. Briarcliff Farms, Inc., 17 NY2d 57 [1966]; Matter of Kiarah V.R. (Virginia V.), 225 AD3d 774 [2d Dept 2024]).

Once the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party must produce competent, admissible evidence raising a triable issue of fact; mere conclusory allegations, speculation, or expressions of hope are insufficient (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]; see also Napolitano v Suffolk County Dep't of Pub. Works, 65 AD3d 676 [2d Dept 2009]; Damas v Valdes, 84 AD3d 87 [2d Dept 2011]; Emigrant Funding Corp. v Agard, 121 AD3d 935 [2d Dept 2014]).

In the context of vehicular negligence, it is well established that a driver is negligent where he or she fails to see that which, through the proper use of senses, should have been seen (Shvydkaya v Park Ave. BMW Acura Motor Corp., 172 AD3d 1130 [2d Dept 2019]; see also Salama v Piccirillo, 223 AD3d 692 [2d Dept 2024]; Laino v Lucchese, 35 AD3d 672 [2d Dept 2006]). Moreover, a driver who has the right-of-way is entitled to expect that other drivers will obey traffic laws and yield accordingly (Shvydkaya v Park Ave. BMW Acura Motor Corp., 172 AD3d 1130 [2d Dept 2019]; Laurent v Bass, 177 AD3d 724 [2d Dept 2019]).

The obligations governing this conduct are enshrined in the Vehicle and Traffic Law:

• VTL § 1140 [a]: "The driver of a vehicle approaching an intersection shall yield the right of way to a vehicle which has entered the intersection from a different highway."

• VTL § 1143: "The driver of a vehicle about to enter or cross a roadway from any place other than another roadway shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on the roadway to be entered or crossed."

Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff has made a compelling prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment on the issue of liability.

The facts are undisputed: Plaintiff was proceeding straight along Richmond Hill Road, with the right-of-way, at a reasonable and moderate speed of 15 miles per hour (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 17 at page 36, lines 15-18). Plaintiff did not observe Defendant's vehicle prior to impact (see id at page 29, lines 22-25) — a fact entirely consistent with lawful conduct and attentiveness.

Defendant, by her own admission, entered the intersection despite an obstructed field of vision, acting upon an assumption that it was safe to proceed: "There was a van obstructing my view ...I inched forward until I had what I assumed was clear." (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 18 at page 20, lines 6-18; page 21, lines 10-16).

This conduct is an unequivocal violation of both VTL § 1140 [a] and § 1143. The law imposes a non-delegable duty upon drivers entering a roadway to yield to approaching traffic. The fact that Defendant's vision was obstructed only serves to aggravate — not mitigate — her [*4]culpability; it is well settled that a driver must not proceed into an intersection unless and until it is safe to do so.

Defendant's testimony reveals further indicia of negligence: she was unable to recall her precise speed, where she was directing her gaze, or even the position of her foot on the pedal in the critical moments preceding impact (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 18 at page 24, lines 7-20). Such testimony bespeaks a lack of situational awareness and control incompatible with the standard of reasonable care.

The Court finds Defendants' attempt to invoke comparative negligence to be unavailing. First, Plaintiff was entitled to assume that other drivers would obey traffic laws and yield as required. As the Second Department has consistently held, a driver lawfully proceeding with the right-of-way is not required to anticipate improper or unlawful conduct by others (Shvydkaya, supra).

Second, the record is devoid of evidence that Plaintiff operated her vehicle in an inattentive or imprudent manner. Plaintiff was proceeding at a moderate speed (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 17 at page 36, lines15-18), on a through street, and testified unequivocally that she did not observe Defendant's vehicle prior to impact (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 17 at page 29, lines 22-25).

Third, this is not a case of conflicting versions of events warranting a trial of credibility. Both parties' testimony is congruent on the material point: Defendant entered the intersection despite having an obstructed view and without confirming the path was clear. Defendants' speculative assertion that Plaintiff "should have seen" the encroaching vehicle lacks evidentiary support and is insufficient to defeat summary judgment (Bullock v. Calabretta, 119 AD3d 884 [2d Dept 2014]; Canales v. Arichabala, 123 AD3d 869 [2d Dept 2014]).

Lastly, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to dismissal of Defendants' affirmative defenses of comparative negligence.

There is no competent evidence in this record that Plaintiff acted in a negligent manner. To the contrary, the uncontroverted evidence reflects that Plaintiff conducted herself lawfully and prudently. To permit the comparative negligence defense to proceed to trial would elevate conjecture above the evidentiary threshold demanded by Zuckerman and its progeny.

The Court finds, as a matter of law, that Defendant's failure to yield was the sole proximate cause of this accident. Plaintiff has established her entitlement to judgment on liability, and Defendants have failed to raise any triable issue of fact.

Accordingly, it is:

ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability as against Defendants DANIELLE SILLER and ABIGAIL SILLER is hereby GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendants' affirmative defenses of comparative negligence are hereby DISMISSED; and it is further

ORDERED that the matter shall proceed to trial on the issue of damages only.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.