The following numbered papers were used on this motion: NYSCEF Document Numbers 102-115, 122-127.

Upon the foregoing papers and having heard oral argument on the record, the within motion is determined as follows.

Yesterday, on July 2, 2025, at 1:13 p.m., an email was sent to the Part Clerk purportedly to inform the latter of a stipulation to adjourn the motion on for today, July 3, 2025. Since the Part Clerk was not in yesterday, the email was not viewed until this morning. Regardless, the stipulation was submitted late, was not filed on NYSCEF, and was submitted without notice to the law clerks. IAS Part 2 Rules, at Part II, Subpart D, pertaining to adjournments, was not complied with.^[FN1]

A trial court possesses the right to enforce the rules governing practice and procedure before it (e.g. Anuchina v Marine Transp. Logistics, Inc., 216 AD3d 1126 [2d Dept 2023] [motion relating to disclosure must be accompanied by moving counsel's affirmation attesting to having conferred with opposing counsel in good faith effort to resolve issues]; McGee v Putnam County Assistant Dist. Attorney David M. Bishop, 192 AD3d 1446 [3d Dept 2021] [memorandum of law page limit]; Hornsby v Cathedral Parkway Apts. Corp., 179 AD3d 584 [1st Dept 2020] [affirmation page limit]; Basie v Wiggs, 173 AD3d 1127 [2d Dept 2019] [Matrimonial Part rules]; Appleyard v Tigges, 171 AD3d 534 [1st Dept 2019] [60-day summary judgment motion deadline]; Shah v RBC Capital Mkts. LLC, 115 AD3d 444 [1st Dept 2014] [all outstanding discovery matters to be raised at compliance conferences]; Biscone v Jetblue Airways Corp., 103 AD3d 158 [2d Dept 2012] [provide working copies of electronically-filed documents]; Maddaus v Bowman, 12 AD2d 626 [2d Dept 1960] [Statement of Readiness Rule requiring plaintiff to furnish authorization to obtain hospital records]; Shmerelzon v Gravesend Mgt., Inc., 80 Misc 3d 1233[A], 2023 NY Slip Op 51155[U] [Sup Ct, Kings County 2023] [adjournment requests must contain specified data and be submitted three days in advance]; Wade v Khadka, 80 Misc 3d 1222[A], 2023 NY Slip Op 51058[U] [Sup Ct, Kings County 2023] [identify party seeking adjournment and good cause reason]; Brick&Mortar LLC v Momo Sushi Inc., 79 Misc 3d 1239[A], 2023 NY Slip Op 50838[U] [Sup Ct, Kings County 2023] [submission of referenced electronically-filed documents as exhibits to motion papers]; Stipa Sprecase v Tenreiro, 2023 WL 3972435 [Sup Ct, NY County 2023] [motions to reargue or renew be made by order to show cause]; Latorre v Rahman, 2022 NY Slip Op 32044[U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2022] [no motions allowed until conference is held]; Bedingfield v Dairymade Farms, Inc., 46 Misc 2d 146, 148 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 1965] [rule requiring statement of readiness be filed with note of issue "is consistent with the inherent power of the Court to control its business"]; Scully v Jefferson Truck Renting Corp., 43 Misc 2d 48 [Sup Ct, Kings County 1964] [statement of readiness be filed with note of issue]; cf. Crawford v Liz Claiborne, Inc., 11 NY3d 810 [2008] [IAS Part rule not in effect when preliminary conference order issued, resulting in application of Local Rules]). "[I]t is within the court's inherent and statutory power to control the order of its business, and to so conduct its business as to safeguard the rights of all litigants, to preclude unfair procedural advantage to any party, and to prevent needless disruption of orderly court procedures" (Maddaus v Bowman, 12 AD2d at 626).

Therefore, oral argument was conducted on the motion today.

Plaintiff Jermaine Johnson ("Plaintiff Johnson") was employed by Third-Party Defendant Forward Mechanical Corp., a subcontractor hired by Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Mineola Metro LLC ("Defendant Mineola") to install piping connected to a cooling tower on the roof of a construction site. Defendant Mineola was the owner and general contractor of the construction site at 199 2nd Street in Mineola, New York, per Plaintiff's allegations. On October [*2]10, 2019, at around 1:00 p.m., while interlocking a pipe into position next to the cooling tower on the construction site, Plaintiff Johnson's left hand allegedly became wedged between the pipe and the cooling tower, causing injuries.

Defendant Cardiff Development LLC ("Defendant Cardiff") was also a contractor on the project. Defendant DHS Fraco LLC ("Defendant DHS") claims to have supplied sidewalk bridges for overhead protection around the base of the construction site. Defendant Safway Atlantic LLC was originally named but has since been dismissed from the action.

Plaintiff Johnson brought this action for personal injury by reason of negligence of the Defendants' negligent, reckless, and careless ownership, operation, maintenance, control, possession, supervision, direction, construction, inspection, management, renovation, rehabilitation and/or alteration of the said premises in that they failed to provide the Plaintiff with a safe place to work; also alleged were negligence and violations of sections 200, 240, and 241 of the Labor Law and of the Industrial Code.

Defendant DHS brought this motion for summary judgment on all claims against it. Defendant DHS argues that Plaintiff Johnson and the other parties have no valid claims against it because Defendant DHS was not the general contractor responsible for site safety, did not employ Plaintiff Johnson, and only provided sidewalk protection unrelated to the rooftop accident. Defendant DHS further claims it owed no duty of care to Plaintiff Johnson since it had no control over the worksite, had no role in supervising the work, and did not supply or maintain any equipment connected to the accident, as the Labor Law provisions cited by Plaintiff Johnson apply only to owners, general contractors, or their agents with control over the work. Defendant DHS asserts it does not fall into any of these categories. Therefore, since it did not supervise, control, or have any responsibility for the rooftop work where Plaintiff Johnson was injured, Defendant DHS argues there is no basis for liability and therefore requests that all claims against it be dismissed with prejudice and its crossclaims withdrawn if dismissal is granted.

Plaintiff Johnson filed a memorandum of law in opposition arguing that Defendant DHS's request for summary judgment should be denied because it relies on an insufficient affidavit from Daniel Chirila, a company representative, who does not clearly explain his role or personal knowledge of the accident. Plaintiff Johnson contends that this affidavit has no evidentiary value because it lacks proper supporting documents and fails to authenticate the contract Defendant DHS relies on. Plaintiff Johnson further argues that the motion is premature because the representative for Defendant DHS has not yet been deposed, and his testimony is essential to clarify the facts. Plaintiff maintains that further discovery is needed before any ruling on summary judgment can be made and therefore asks the court to deny Defendant DHS's motion and allow more time for depositions and fact gathering.

In the complaint, Plaintiff Johnson claims that Defendant DHS is a lessor of the building where the accident occurred and that Defendant DHS operated, maintained, controlled, and operated the building. The complaint further states that Defendant DHS acted as a general contractor of the building. Defendant DHS, in its answer denies all the aforementioned allegations pertaining to Defendant DHS's involvement with the building. Specifically, in Defendant DHS's affirmation in support and statement of material facts, Defendant DHS claims it "only supplied sidewalk bridges" to the site, did not employ Plaintiff Johnson, did not [*3]supervise any construction workers on the job site, and was not a general contractor. Defendant DHS further claims that Plaintiff Johnson was not working on any equipment installed by Defendant DHS. Defendant DHS supports these claims through Daniel Chirila's affidavit but does not support these claims with anything further to show there is no triable issue of fact.

Defendant DHS provides nothing further to support its claim that it is entitled to summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff Johnson and all other parties are not entitled to any relief against it beyond Daniel Chirila's affidavit. Daniel Chirila's affidavit's does not explicitly state his role in the company, and it states that Defendant DHS "supplied sidewalk bridges," not that it only supplied sidewalk bridges. But regardless, there is a material issue of fact still as to whether Defendant DHS was a general contractor on the project.

Accordingly, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

THE FOREGOING CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THIS COURT.