Petitioner, Shanni Khalili, brings a CPLR article 78 proceeding against respondents, Yeshiva University and Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law ("CSL"), challenging her dismissal from CSL. She seeks reinstatement and damages. The petition is denied, and this proceeding is dismissed.

Petitioner originally applied for and was accepted into CSL's Class of 2025, beginning with the Summer 2022 term. She then requested to begin her studies at CSL in the Fall 2022 term instead. (NYSCEF No. 18 at 3.)

At the Fall 2022 CSL orientation in August, petitioner initially contacted CSL's Office of Student Services to request permission to withdraw from the law school. (NYSCEF No. 31 at 6.) She met with CSL Dean of Students Jenn Kim to discuss finalizing her withdrawal. (Id. at 4.)

A few days later, petitioner emailed Dean Kim again, asking to take a leave of absence instead of withdrawing. (Id. at 3.) Dean Kim replied, telling petitioner that a leave of absence for longer than a semester would result in an administrative withdrawal, which would require her to undergo a "re-admission process." (Id. at 2.) Petitioner thereafter submitted a completed leave of absence form to Dean Kim, who approved it. (NYSCEF No. 30 at 3.) Petitioner's leave of absence ultimately lasted longer than a semester.

Sometime after Dean Kim approved petitioner's leave of absence, petitioner enrolled in Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University's part-time program for the 2023-2024 academic year. (NYSCEF No. 1 at 2.) During that academic year, petitioner received poor grades, resulting in her academic dismissal from Hofstra Law on June 4, 2024. (Id.; NYSCEF No. 27 at 2.)

Petitioner re-applied for admission to CSL by submitting an application through the Law School Admission Council's (LSAC) website on June 25, 2024. (NYSCEF No. 22 at 2.) But she did not update any part of the LSAC application with anything about her Hofstra Law attendance.

Part 6 of the application asks applicants to "list ALL educational institutions attended." (Id. at 5.) But petitioner did not include Hofstra Law among the educational institutions she attended. (Id.) Part 11 of the application asks applicants whether they have ever attended law school and, if so, to provide details about the applicant's attendance at that law school. (Id. at 6.) But petitioner answered "no" to the former question and left her answers blank to all the other questions under the Part. (Id.) Part 17 of the application asks applicants whether they have "been required to withdraw from any school for academic reasons" and, if so, to provide an explanation. (Id. at 9.) Petitioner again answered "no" to the former question and left her answer to the latter question blank. (Id.)

Part 18 of the application requires applicants to acknowledge that they have a "continuing obligation to notify the Office of Admissions of any material adverse new information, or changes to furnished information, arising at any time during the application process or prior to matriculation. Misrepresentation or omission may result in denial of admission, rescission of an offer of admission, dismissal from the Law School." (Id. at 10.) Petitioner acknowledged this certification on June 25, 2024, alongside her submission of the application. (Id.) But she did not abide by this certification: She did not disclose to CSL her [*2]Hofstra Law attendance before her CSL matriculation.

On July 18, 2024, petitioner met with CSL Associate Dean of Admissions Jeanne Widerka. (NYSCEF No. 18 at ¶ 15.) Petitioner alleges in ¶ 10 of her verified petition that during this meeting, "she was advised to submit her previous application that she had submitted" in 2022, and an addendum explaining her leave of absence (and why she was ready to return). (NYSCEF No. 1 at 2.) On this motion, petitioner has provided a copy of the addendum that she provided to Dean Widerka (see NYSCEF No. 23 at 3-4), but not the additional copy of her 2022 application. And that addendum does not mention petitioner's enrolment at, or dismissal from, Hofstra Law. (See id.)

Less than a week later, on July 24, 2024, petitioner was admitted into CSL's Class of 2027. (NYSCEF No. 24 at 2.) She began her studies there in Fall 2024.

In October 2024, CSL's admissions office discovered that petitioner's Credential Assembly Service (CAS) report, a summary of a student's prior academic history, showed that petitioner had attended Hofstra Law. (NYSCEF No. 25 at 2.) Following this discovery, CSL's deans held a series of meetings with petitioner to discuss her alleged misrepresentations and omissions. (NYSCEF No. 10 at 12-14.) These meetings led to her dismissal from CSL. (Id.) Petitioner's dismissal was made without prejudice; CLS gave petitioner the opportunity to re-apply in the future. (NYSCEF No. 37 at 5-6.) Petitioner now brings this Article 78 petition.

I. Petitioner's Argument that Her Dismissal from CSL was Arbitrary and Capricious

Petitioner's first basis for her claim for relief under CPLR article 78 is to challenge CSL's decision to dismiss her as arbitrary and capricious. Petitioner also argues that her dismissal as the consequence of her omission is disproportionate to the offense.

Respondents argue that petitioner fails to state a claim for relief, and that her dismissal was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Respondents contend that CSL adhered to its Code of Conduct. They also argue that CSL's rescission of admission without prejudice is proportionate. Under these facts, respondents argue, petitioner's dismissal is not open for judicial review.

The Court of Appeals has upheld the decision of a law school to rescind admission of a student whose application contained material misrepresentations or omissions, and dismissed an article 78 proceeding on that ground. (See Matter of Powers v St. John's Univ. Sch. of Law, 25 NY3d 210, 213 [2015].) In that case, a law student had his admission rescinded upon the school's discovery that the student had misrepresented in the criminal-history section of his law-school application the criminal offenses of which he was convicted. (Id. at 213-214.) The Court concluded that the law school's decision to rescind "was not arbitrary and capricious, and d[id] not warrant judicial intervention." (Id. [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Matter of Powers v St. John's Univ. Sch. of Law, 110 AD3d 888, 889 [2d Dept 2013].)

Petitioner argues that CSL acted arbitrarily and capriciously by rescinding her admission in the absence of clear intent that her omission of her attendance at Hofstra Law had been intentional or grossly negligent. Whether a misrepresentation is affirmative or is clearly intentional is not necessary or material, however. The First Department has ruled that a law school may "rescind a student's admission or to dismiss a student from the school, even after course work has begun or been completed, where there were material misrepresentations or omissions in the student's application." (Matter of Salvador v Touro Coll., 139 AD3d 1, 7 [1st Dept 2016].) The petitioner in Salvador had omitted "that the school from which he had received his J.D. degree was not a foreign law school. . . . Indeed, he did more than omit that information; he allowed respondents to proceed with his admission knowing that they harbored a misconception regarding the nature of the institution that had awarded him a J.D. degree." (Id.)

Petitioner had at least two opportunities before her matriculation to come forward about her attendance at Hofstra Law. She could, and should, have included on her LSAC application information about a prior law school attendance when she submitted it to CSL on June 25, 2024. And she could, and should, have included the information in her written request for re-admission following her meeting with Dean Widerka on July 18, 2024.

Petitioner argues that CSL still should have known about her Hofstra Law attendance before her re-acceptance due to the corresponding notation on her CAS report. Respondents do not deny this. But even if CSL's admissions office had overlooked the Hofstra Law notation from the CAS report before the October review, that does not excuse petitioner's obligation to come forward with that material information at some point during the re-admission process.

As in Salvador, petitioner's omission here allowed CSL's admissions office to proceed with her re-admission without her ensuring that the office knew about her Hofstra Law attendance. Previous law-school attendance is plainly material information for any applicant applying to any law school to provide, if the law school asks for that information as CSL did.

Nor does petitioner's argument that her dismissal was disproportionate find a basis in caselaw. An administrative sanction, such as dismissal, is judicially reviewable only if the sanction imposed "was so harsh and excessive, so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one's conscience." (Pell v Board of Educ., 34 NY2d 222, 239 [1974].)

Petitioner's dismissal is not disproportionate. Dismissal from a law school is a logical consequence of a material misrepresentation or omission on an application for admission to law school. (See Powers, 25 NY3d at 218.)

Petitioner's LSAC application required her to disclose to CSL's admissions office her Hofstra Law attendance. The consequences for failing to make the necessary disclosures include dismissal, according to the LSAC application's certification. The dismissal in Powers can seem even more harsh than the punishment in petitioner's case, given that in Powers, petitioner had already completed three semesters of law school at the time of his dismissal and made a misrepresentation about the nature of his criminal history, rather than omitting all information about this history. (See id. at 214-215.) Here, petitioner failed altogether to mention her Hofstra [*3]Law attendance before CSL's October 2024 review and before the completion of her first semester.

II. Petitioner's Argument that CSL Breached an Implied-in-Fact Contract

Petitioner argues that CSL breached the implied-in-fact contract between herself and CSL. The implied contract, as she argues, is that students will obtain degrees they seek if they comply with the university's terms. (See Vought v Teachers Coll., Columbia Univ., 127 AD2d 654, 654-655 [2d Dept 1987].) Petitioner points out that the parties' contractual "rights and obligations" are "contained in the university's bulletins, circulars and regulations made available to the student." (Id. at 655.)

Respondents argue that petitioner's breach-of-contract claim duplicates her Article 78 proceeding and that she does not plead all the elements of a breach-of-contract claim. Specifically, a breach-of-contract claim must include allegations that "(1) a contract exists, (2) plaintiff performed in accordance with the contract, (3) defendant breached its contractual obligations . . . ; and (4) defendant's breach resulted in damages." (34-06 73, LLC v Seneca Ins. Co., 39 NY3d 44, 52 [2022].) Respondents further argue that CSL's Code of Conduct, Article II.A.6, expressly provides for disciplinary action against students who misrepresent "any academic, financial, or employment-related matter" to "law school personnel" before admission to CSL. (NYSCEF No. 12 at 4.) Therefore, respondents argue, petitioner's misrepresentation of her Hofstra Law attendance to the CSL admissions office is a legitimate ground for her dismissal, and not a breach of contract.

The Court of Appeals has held that "a CPLR Article 78 proceeding is the route for judicial review of" a controversy involving a university, "not a plenary action." (Maas v Cornell Univ., 94 NY2d 87, 92 [1999].) In other similar proceedings, causes of action based in contract have been dismissed because "the causes of action, at the core, arise from the private college's decision to dismiss petitioner from the PA Program as an available disciplinary sanction"—in other words, the same challenge to the decision to expel petitioner that she is already asserting through a claim under article 78. (Mirza v Coll. of Mount St. Vincent, 85 Misc 3d 1234[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 50342[U], *12 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 2025].) The same is true here.

Even if an implied-in-fact contract existed and did not duplicate petitioner's article 78 cause of action, petitioner still would fail to state a claim for breach of an implied-in-fact contract. The First Department held in Salvador that "a school has the authority to rescind a student's admission or to dismiss a student from the school, even after course work has begun or been completed, where there were material misrepresentations or omissions in the student's application." (Salvador, 139 AD3d at 7.) And as respondents argue, CSL's determination to rescind petitioner's admission was consistent with—rather than breaching—CSL's Code of Conduct.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the petition is denied, and this CPLR Article 78 proceeding is dismissed, [*4]with costs and disbursements as taxed by the Clerk upon the submission of an appropriate bill of costs; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent serve a copy of this order with notice of its entry on petitioner and on the office of the County Clerk (using the NYSCEF document type "Notice to the County Clerk - CPLR § 8019 (c)"), which shall enter judgment accordingly.