These motions concern several related actions: 642 East 14th St., LLC v 644 E. 14th Realty, LLC, Index No. 150750/2019 (Sup Ct, NY County) (Action 1); 644 East 14th Street Owner, LLC v 642 E. 14th St., LLC, Index No. 651167/2023 (Sup Ct, NY County) (Action 2); 642 E 14th Street Tenants Association v Lebewohl, Index No. LT-301592-24/NY (Hous Pt Civ Ct, NY County) (Action 3); and 642 E. 14th St., LLC v 644 East 14th Street Owner, LLC, Index No. 159071/2024 (Sup Ct, NY County) (Action 4).

On these motions, 642 East 14th St., LLC (642 Owner) moves to stay Actions 1, 2, and 3, and to consolidate those actions into Action 4. The motion is denied.

The four actions at issue here arise from (i) two successive construction projects at 644 East 14th Street (644 Property); and (ii) alleged resulting damage to the adjoining property, 642 East 14th Street (642 Building). 642 Owner is the plaintiff in Action 1 and Action 4, the respondent in Action 2, and the defendant in Action 3.

642 Owner filed Action 1 on January 25, 2019, against 644 E. 14th Realty, LLC (644 Realty), which formerly owned 644 Property. 642 Owner has alleged that 644 Realty's construction project (Project 1), beginning in October 2016, was performed negligently and resulted in structural damages to 642 Building.

In Project 1, 644 Realty contracted with Ray Builders, Inc., Amerigeo, Inc., and Marine Bulkheading, Inc., which subcontracted with Intertek A/K/A MT Group and Fehringer Surveying PC. In Action 1, 644 Realty, as a third party plaintiff, impleaded Amerigeo, Marine Bulkheading, and Structural Engineering Technologies, P.C.; Marine Bulkheading, as a second-third party plaintiff, impleaded Intertek and Fehringer Surveying PC.; Intertek, as third third-party plaintiff, impleaded Ray Builders. After 644 East 14th Street Owner LLC (644 Owner) purchased the 644 Property in April 2020, 642 Owner added 644 Owner as a defendant in November 2021.

On March 6, 2023, 644 Owner filed Action 2 against 642 Owner for a license to access 642 Building during its construction project (Project 2).

On November 28, 2023, the Department of Buildings (DOB) issued a full vacate order citing compromised structural stability of 642 Building. 642 East 14th Street Tenants Association, Noriyuki Shimizu, Susan Ingraham, Sayed Dawood, Michael Hawley, Varghese Paul, Mohamed Dawod, Chung Wong Lin, Chenfu Lin, Tianlong Wong, and Elena Sundick (collectively, the tenants) then filed Action 3 on January 22, 2024, against 642 Owner Jeremy Lebewohl, the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD), and DOB, seeking court intervention "to correct all violations and hazardous conditions underlying the DOB's vacate order, restore the tenants to full possession of their apartments, ensure immediate access to tenants to retrieve essential personal belongings from the premises, [*2]and enjoin the processing of any application for demolition of the subject premises by DOB until a trial is held. . . ." (Index No. LT-301592-24/NY, NYSCEF No. 1 at 2 ¶ 7.)

642 Owner filed Action 4 against 644 Owner, Moncon Contracting Inc., Urban Foundation/Engineering, LLC, Omnibuild Construction., Inc., and GMART NY 2022 LLC on September 30, 2024, about alleged damage to the 642 Building from Project 2. Causes of action include (1) strict liability against defendants for all damages to the 642 Building; (2) negligence against 644 Owner; (3) nuisance concerning defendants' excavation work; (4) indemnification against 644 Owner; and (5) injunctive relief against 644 Owner. (NYSCEF No. 2 at 33-40.) 642 Owner also joins the owner of 640 East 14th Street (640 Owner), claiming that 640 Owner's rights could be affected by Action 4. 642 Owner asserts no cause of action against 640 Owner. (Id. at ¶ 13.)

642 Owner contends there are common questions of law and fact in Actions 1, 2, 3, and 4, and thus, this court should consolidate the actions to promote judicial efficiency. (See NYSCEF No. 55 at 8-9.) CPLR 602 (a) provides that trial courts have discretion, in the interest of judicial economy, to consolidate cases that have common questions of law and fact. (E.g. Geneva Temps, Inc. v New World Communities, Inc., 24 AD3d 332, 334 [1st Dept 2005].) Joint trials allow for joint proceedings while maintaining separate verdicts and judgments. (HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Francis, 214 AD3d 58, 62 [2d Dept 2023].) 642 Owner argues it would be prejudiced without consolidation due to a potential gap in damages and inconsistent verdicts across Actions 1, 2, 3, and 4. (NYSCEF No. 55 at 5.)

A party opposing consolidation or joint trial must show prejudice of a substantial right. Prejudice may include undue delay, actions in differing procedural stages, jury confusion, and significant burdens on a party, such as compelling one to participate in more complex litigation. (See HSBC Bank USA, 214 AD3d at 63; National Arbitration & Mediation v Feinstein & Nisnewitz, P.C., 38 Misc 3d 10, 13 [App Term, 2d Dept 2012].)

644 Owner, Moncon (defendant in Action 4), Structural Engineering Technologies, P.C. (third-party defendant in Action 1), 644 Realty (defendant/third party plaintiff in Action 1), Ray Builders, Inc. (third third-party defendant in Action 1), Marine Bulkheading, Inc. (third-party defendant/second third-party plaintiff in Action 1), tenants, HPD, and DOB all oppose consolidation. They contend consolidation is improper because the actions are at various procedural stages and involve distinct claims and different parties. They further argue that consolidation would cause undue delay, confuse the jury, and burden defendants with more complex litigation, thereby prejudicing their substantial rights.

644 Owner also raises procedural defects, including that 642 Owner never properly served 644 Owner with process in Action 4. (See NYSCEF No. 118 at 15.) However, 644 Owner does not move to dismiss based on those claimed defects.

This court agrees with the parties opposing consolidation for the reasons delineated below.

Action 1 and Action 4 concern who or what entities caused the damage to the 642 [*3]Building, whereas Action 3 is rooted in landlord-tenant law. Action 2 concerns a license to access 642 Building for construction/safety-related purposes.

642 Owner filed Action 1 against 644 Realty, alleging Project 1 caused structural damage to 642 Building. Project 1 began in October 2016, several years before 644 Owner acquired 644 Property in April 2020. (NYSCEF No. 118 at 2.)

642 Owner filed Action 4 against 644 Owner for alleged damage to 642 Building from Project 2. Project 2 began around 2022. (NYSCEF No. 2 at 7 ¶ 41.)

The Projects are distinguishable: 642 Owner's expert Stuart Gold, a professional engineer, has already apportioned the alleged damage between Project 1 and Project 2, evidencing that the harm is divisible and can be tried in separate actions. (NYSCEF Doc. No. 81; NYSCEF No. 2 at ¶¶ 35, 48.) Thus, even though Action 1 and Action 4 both have claims of strict liability for damage to 642 Building, they do not cover the same facts. When cases arise from the same construction site yet rest on distinct contracts, projects, or parties, courts will deny consolidation. (See e.g. H.H Robertson Co. v New York Convention Center Dev. Corp. 160 AD2d 524, 525 [2d Dept 1990] [holding that consolidation is properly denied when two actions arise from the same construction site but have different contracts and parties].) In these circumstances, separate trials pose no risk of inconsistent admission of evidence or an unaccounted for "gap in damages," contrary to 642 Owner's suggestion. (See NYSCEF No. 91 at 5.) Additionally, 642 Owner leaves out the possibility that it may be accountable for damage to 642 Building. (Id.)

Unlike Actions 1, 3, and 4, Action 2 is an RPAPL 881 proceeding. Action 2, brought by 644 Owner against 642 Owner, granted 644 Owner a temporary license with limited access to 642 Building. The license was contingent on various conditions, like a monitoring plan to safeguard both properties. (Index No. 651167/2023, NYSCEF No. 39.) Action 2 is an RPAPL 881 proceeding, granting 644 Owner a temporary license, rather than a tort or damage suit.

The theories of law at issue in Action 3 are distinct from Actions 1, 2, and 4. Action 3 arises the landlord's duty to maintain premises free from unsafe conditions—rather than who or what entities caused those conditions. (NYSCEF No. 142 at 8; NYSCEF No. 118 at 3.) Tenants bring Action 3 against 642 Owner, HPD, and DOB, seeking an order compelling 642 Owner to correct conditions underlying the vacate order issued by DOB, civil penalties against 642 Owner if it does not correct the outstanding housing and building code violations in a timely manner, and an order to restore tenants' possession once the vacate order is lifted. (NYSCEF No. 115 at 6.)

642 Owner argues that the tenants' claims do not concern the landlord-tenant relationship (NYSCEF No. 142 at 7.) This court disagrees. Every landlord, including 642 Owner, has a non-delegable duty to maintain the premises in a safe and habitable condition, even if the damage is attributable to a third party. (RPL 235-B; Heights 170 LLC v York, 2010 NY Slip Op 52045(U), *1 [App. Term 1st Dept 2010].)

Although some conditions underlying the property damage to 642 Building underlie claims in Action 3 and the other actions, consolidation is still not warranted. The core of Action 3 is rooted in the landlord-tenant relationship and the distinct legal duties a landlord has, not in tort liability.

The court disagrees that 644 Realty and 644 Owner are necessary parties to Action 3. The court in Action 3 may order 642 Owner alone to correct the violations cited in the vacate order as required by the Housing Maintenance Code. The tenants can obtain the relief they seek without adding 644 Owner and 644 Realty. Furthermore, 644 Realty and 644 Owner cannot provide all the relief the tenants seek, as they are non-owners of 642 Building. (NYSCEF No. 115 at 7.)

Although repairs may implicate 644 Owner's responsibilities under the license in Action 2, outsiders, even if "useful," are not indispensable. (See Department of Hous. Preserv. & Dev. of the City of New York v Simply Better Apt. Homes, 2020 NY Slip Op 50637(U), *9 [Civ Ct, Bronx County 2020] [reasoning outsiders, even if useful to effectuate relief, are not necessary parties where respondents can comply with legal obligations without them].)

That 644 Owner must indemnify 642 Owner under the license in Action 2 does not change the analysis: indemnification and contribution can be pursued later. Likewise, 642 Owner's duty as a landlord to provide temporary accommodations does not preclude contribution under CPLR 1401. Contribution turns on liability for the same injury, not identical legal theories. (See Nassau Roofing & Sheet Metal Co. v Facilities Dev. Corp. 71 NY2d 599, 603 [1988].) Thus, 642 Owner's speculation about inconsistent verdicts ignores contribution and indemnity rights. If parties in Action 1 or 4 are found liable, 642 Owner can seek contribution or indemnification against 644 Owner, even after complete adjudication of Action 3.

Even though a future tenant settlement could theoretically trigger a General Obligations Law 15-108 bar, that risk is self-created and too remote to justify consolidation, as parties commonly waive the § 15-108 bar in settlement agreements. (See Velazquez v Mosdos Mehram Brisk of Tasnad, 234 AD3d 893, 894 [2d Dept 2025].) A hypothetical contractual bar is not a sufficient reason to consolidate unrelated actions.

Consolidation would not further CPLR 602 (a)'s aim of "avoiding unnecessary cost or delay." (See Skelly v Sachem Cent. Sch. Dist. 309 AD2d 917, 918 [2d Dept 2003] [finding that consolidation does not contribute to CPLR's goal when actions are in different procedural stages, would cause jury confusion, and may prove unwieldy].)

Actions 1, 2, 3, and 4 are in significantly different procedural stages. Consolidation, therefore, would prejudice defendants and undermine judicial economy. (Abrams v Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. 118 AD3d 119, 119 [1st Dept 2003] [reasoning that consolidation is properly denied if actions are at different procedural stages and consolidation would unduly delay resolution of either action]; Krembs v NYU Langone Hosps. 214 AD3d 453, 455 [1st Dept 2023] ["Since the two actions are at vastly different stages of litigation . . . consolidation would not serve judicial economy or the interest of justice."])

Discovery and depositions have already occurred in Action 1. (Index No. 150750/2019, NYSCEF No. 191.) Action 2, a special proceeding under RPAPL 881, has been resolved at the trial-court level—the only matters left are appeals noticed by 642 Owner.^[FN1] (Index No. [*4]651167/2023, NYSCEF No. 326; NYSCEF No. 295 at 3.) Action 4 is in the pleading stage. Action 3, an HP proceeding, is nearly trial-ready. (NYSCEF No. 115 at 9.) Consolidation would also undercut the general preference for HP proceedings to be resolved in Housing Court. (See L.B. v Stahl York Ave. Co. 188 AD3d 421, 422 [1st Dept 2020].) Given the different procedural stage each action is in, consolidation would prejudice the defendants.

Consolidation is also inappropriate when there are different contracts and parties in each action. (See H.H Robertson Co., 160 AD2d at 525.) Although 644 Owner was added to Action 1 by 642 Owner, Action 1 contains many parties not involved in Action 2 and Action 3, including Structural Engineering Technologies, and Fehringer Surveying. Moreover, Moncon, involved in Action 4, has no involvement with Action 1. (See National Arbitration & Mediation, 38 Misc 3d at 13 ["Undue prejudice may also result when a litigant in one action is compelled, through consolidation, to participate in other, more complex litigation"]; J.T. Mauro Co. v Genesee Valley Group Health Association, 184 AD2d 998, 999 [4th Dept 1992] [holding consolidation is inappropriate when there are dissimilar claims with different parties, despite stemming from the same construction project].) Relatedly, Moncon, Structural Engineering Technologies, and Fehringer Surveying are involved solely in either Project 1 or in Project 2. Consolidating the actions would unfairly prejudice these parties because the jury would hear testimony and evidence of damages about both projects. (See Pride v Perras, 6 AD2d 842, 842 [2d Dept 1958].)

Consolidating the claims would also result in jury confusion. 642 Owner is the plaintiff in Action 1 and 4, but respondent in Action 2 and defendant in Action 3. If the court consolidates Action 3 and Action 4, 642 Owner would be both plaintiff and defendant, and tenants would be both plaintiffs and defendants. (See Geneva Temps, Inc. 24 AD3d at 335 ["[I]n order to avoid jury confusion the actions should not be consolidated if that results in a party being both plaintiff and defendant. . . ."]; Bass v France, 70 AD2d 849, 849 [1st Dept 1979] [affirming consolidation is inappropriate if a party would be both plaintiff and a defendant]; Addison v New York Presbyterian Hospital/Columbia University Medical Center et al. 52 AD3d 269, 270 [1st Dept 2008].) The sheer number of different parties and different relationships between or among the parties would also cause confusion. (See Passeri v Brody, 199 AD3d 1260, 1264 [3d Dept 2021] [holding the Supreme Court properly denied consolidation in a case where it would have added an additional 14 parties].)

Courts sometimes order a joint trial instead of consolidation when consolidation would risk jury confusion. (e.g. Geneva Temps, 24 AD3d at 335.) However, a joint trial is inappropriate here because it would undermine judicial economy and prove unwieldy for the reasons above. (See Krembs v NYU Langone Hosps. 214 AD3d 453, 455 [1st Dept 2023]; Skelly, 309 AD2d at 918.)

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that 642 Owner's motion to deem sufficient service of the order to show cause on motion sequence 002 (mot seq 003) is granted; and it is further

ORDERED that 642 Owner's motion to stay Actions 1, 2, and 3; and to consolidate Actions 1, 2, and 3 into Action 4 is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that the parties in Action 4 appear before this court for a telephonic preliminary conference on July 7, 2025.