Samantha O'Hara, appellant pro se. Nyesha Bates, respondent pro se (no brief filed).

Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Keisha M. Alleyne, J.), entered June 11, 2024. The judgment, insofar as appealed from, after a nonjury trial, dismissed plaintiff's cause of action.

ORDERED that the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is reversed, without costs, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for the entry of a judgment in favor of plaintiff in the principal sum of $400.

Plaintiff commenced this small claims action to recover the sum of $5,000 from defendant, her former landlord. That sum represented her $2,500 security deposit and $2,500 in punitive damages.^[FN1] Plaintiff appeals from so much of a judgment of the Civil Court (Keisha M. Alleyne, J.), entered July 11, 2024, following a nonjury trial, as dismissed plaintiff's cause of action, arguing that she should have been awarded her $2,500 security deposit.

In a small claims action, our review is limited to a determination of whether "substantial justice has . . . been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law" (CCA 1807; see CCA 1804; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125 [2000]). Furthermore, the determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as a trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility (see Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564 [1992]; Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510, 511 [1991]). This deference applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court (see Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d at 126).

"[A] security deposit remains the property of the tenant" (General Obligations Law § 7-103 [1]) and "must be returned at the conclusion of the tenancy absent proof, for example, that tenant caused damage beyond that attributable to ordinary wear and tear" (Gelbart v Spota, 81 [*2]Misc 3d 136[A], 2023 NY Slip Op 51404[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2023]; see Mazzarelli v Moniaci, 21 Misc 3d 129[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 51967[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2008]). " 'Where a landlord establishes that the tenant caused such damage, it is the landlord's further burden to establish the reasonable value of any of the repairs allegedly made to the premises' " (Cuevas v Rowinski, 70 Misc 3d 130[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 51522[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2020], quoting Hermida v Blochwitz, 55 Misc 3d 149[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50722[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2017] [internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted]).

Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff had paid a $2,500 security deposit and that defendant retained the entirety of the security deposit after plaintiff moved out. Defendant provided plaintiff with an itemized statement within 14 days of plaintiff's vacatur from the apartment, specifying the repairs that formed the basis for defendant's retention of the deposit as required by General Obligations Law § 7-108 (1-a) (e). The record supports the Civil Court's implicit finding, based in part on credibility determinations, that defendant established that plaintiff had damaged the apartment beyond what is attributable to ordinary wear and tear. However, the paid invoice provided by defendant to establish the reasonable value and necessity of repairs (see CCA 1804) established that defendant had paid only $2,100 for such repairs, despite retaining the full $2,500 security deposit. Thus, substantial justice (see CCA 1804, 1807) requires that plaintiff be awarded the remaining $400 of her security deposit.

Accordingly, the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for the entry of a judgment in favor of plaintiff in the principal sum of $400.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., BUGGS and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.