On May 15, 2023, Plaintiff commenced the instant action for replevin against Defendant by filing a summons and complaint seeking the ownership of a cat named Lisa/Liza ^[FN1] (the "Cat") that was in the possession of Defendant, together with costs and disbursements associated with the action. Defendant joined the action by filing an answer. Defendant also filed a motion seeking judgment of sole and exclusive possession of the Cat which was denied by Hon. Carol R. Feinman in a decision and order rendered on October 5, 2023. On May 14, 2025, the matter proceeded to a bench trial, where Plaintiff appeared pro se, and Defendant was represented by counsel.

Plaintiff submitted twenty-four exhibits, marked as Plaintiff's Exhibits 1-24. Defendant submitted twenty-six exhibits, marked as Defendant's Exhibits 1-26. Defendant contested the authenticity and completeness of some of Plaintiff's exhibits, but it was not made clear to the Court which exhibits were in question. The Court notes that Defendant failed to follow appropriate trial exhibit nomenclature pursuant to 22 NYCRR §202.20-h(b) by not tabbing their evidence alphabetically. The labelling of Defendant's evidence was amended by the Court and changed to be marked as Defendant's Exhibits A-V. The exhibits were admitted into evidence.

Plaintiff testified that she had adopted the Cat on or about January 2013 from a shelter in Brooklyn. Plaintiff testified that the Cat was originally named Sunrise, and that she changed its name to Liza upon its adoption. Plaintiff claimed that she had been the sole owner of the cat for ten (10) years. The original adoption agreement, microchip verification, and veterinary records dating back to 2018 were submitted to support Plaintiff's claims (see Plaintiff's Exhibits 4, 5, and 8 respectively).

Plaintiff testified that she met Defendant at the birthday party of one of their mutual friends named Dmitriy in October 2021. Plaintiff testified that in September 2022, her mother became very ill, and as a result she needed to return to her home country of Russia to take care of her mother. Plaintiff enlisted Defendant to look after the Cat while Plaintiff was away, and Defendant agreed to take the Cat into Defendant's home. Plaintiff returned to New York in October 2022 but testified that she was unable to take the Cat back immediately as she needed to host her brother as well as a friend at Plaintiff's apartment. Plaintiff claimed that at this time, she visited Defendant's home and asked if Defendant would be willing to keep the Cat for "another week or two" while Plaintiff moved out the guests that were staying over, to which Defendant agreed (the "October Conversation"). Plaintiff testified that the costs associated with helping support her brother financially were more than Plaintiff had anticipated, and she decided that she was no longer able to afford to live in New York City. Plaintiff rented out her apartment and vacated it in the first week of November 2022, leaving the Cat with Defendant. Plaintiff relocated to Florida to temporarily stay with a friend and found an apartment with a lease that had a start date of March 2023. Plaintiff returned to New York in April 2023. When she asked Defendant to return the cat to her, Defendant refused, upon which the current matter between the two began.

Defendant was represented by counsel and testified virtually from Vancouver, Canada, as she was experiencing issues renewing her visa and is expected to return to the United States by July 2025. Defendant largely did not contest any of the factual matters presented by Plaintiff but claimed that Plaintiff had refused to provide certain discovery documents and raised issue with the content of the October Conversation. According to Defendant, when Plaintiff came to visit Defendant in October 2022, the Cat hid from Plaintiff upon Plaintiff's arrival (see Defendant's Exhibit G). Defendant testified that the October Conversation went as follows: Plaintiff asked if Defendant still wanted a pet cat, to which Defendant responded in the affirmative. Plaintiff said that Plaintiff would be moving to Florida in the near future and was unsure if that would be Plaintiff's final destination. Due to Plaintiff's uncertain living situation, Plaintiff stated that it may not be a good idea to constantly move the Cat from place to place. Defendant noted that the Cat seemed to enjoy staying at Defendant's home, upon which Plaintiff allegedly asked if Defendant would be willing to take care of the Cat forever, to which Defendant agreed. Defendant testified that for the period of time beginning from the October Conversation to when Plaintiff asked for the Cat back (the "Relevant Period"), Defendant shouldered the entire financial burden of taking care of the Cat, which amounted to over $2,000.00. Defendant testified that at no point did Plaintiff offer to reimburse Defendant for any of the relevant costs, despite working for a large company and therefore being capable of doing so. Defendant also [*3]claimed that during the Relevant Period, Plaintiff made minimal inquiries regarding the wellbeing or condition of the Cat (see Defendant's Exhibit L), suggesting a lack of care or interest in the Cat. Defendant testified that Plaintiff did not request the return of the Cat until May 2023, and believed that Plaintiff only did so to spite Defendant because of a particularly heated argument that took place in April 2023 which led to Defendant blocking Plaintiff's phone number.

Based on parties' testimony and the admitted exhibits, this Court will address (1) whether there was an enforceable oral agreement between the parties that conveyed ownership of the Cat from Plaintiff to Defendant; (2) whether Defendant has a claim to ownership based on abandonment; and (3) which party is entitled to ownership and possession of the Cat moving forward.

Here, the nature of the matter at hand is in relation to the superior possessory right to a companion animal. Under New York Law, companion animals are treated as personal property (see Schrage v. Hatzlacha Cab Corp., 13 AD3d 150, 150, 788 N.Y.S.2d 4 [1st Dept 2004] ["[P]ets are treated under New York law as personal property"]). This indicates that pet owners are free to convey or transfer their pets under their fundamental right of alienation. While it was not disputed that Plaintiff was the original owner of the Cat, Defendant argued that the Cat was conveyed to her by contract. It is well established that an enforceable contract requires an offer, acceptance of the offer, consideration, mutual assent, and an intent to be bound (see Kolchins v. Evolution Markets, Inc., 128 AD3d 47, 59, 8 N.Y.S.3d 1 [1st Dept 2015] citing 22 NY Jur 2d, Contracts § 9). In addition, there must be a meeting of the minds between all contracting parties, such that there is a "manifestation of mutual assent sufficiently definite to assure that the parties are truly in agreement with respect to all material terms" (see Thome v. Alexander & Louisa Calder Foundation, 70 AD3d 88, 103, 890 N.Y.S.2d 16 [1st Dept 2009] [Internal citation omitted]). In the alternative, Defendant also argued that the Cat was conveyed to Defendant in the form of a gift. It has been found that "to make a valid inter vivos gift there must exist the intent on the part of the donor to make a present transfer; delivery of the gift, either actual or constructive to the donee; and acceptance by the donee" (see Gruen v. Gruen, 68 NY2d 48, 53, 505 N.Y.S.2d 849, 496 N.E.2d 869 [1986] [Emphasis added] [Internal citation omitted]). The onus is on the proponent of the gift to prove the existence of these elements by clear and convincing evidence (id. [Internal citation omitted]).

The preliminary issue at hand is whether the October Conversation created an enforceable contract or gift that granted sole ownership of the Cat from Plaintiff to Defendant. Defendant insisted on the validity of Defendant's version of the October Conversation, and that it was corroborated by Plaintiff's alleged lack of interest in the well-being of the Cat as well as Plaintiff's negligible financial support during the Relevant Period. In support of such claim, Defendant introduced documentary evidence, consisting of a series of searches for the keywords "Lisa" and "Лиза" across multiple messaging platforms between August 2022 to April 2023 (see Defendant's Exhibit L). Defendant claimed that the relatively low number of returned results suggested that Plaintiff had acknowledged and accepted the transfer of ownership. Defendant also contended that Plaintiff's refusal to pay for or reimburse Defendant for a veterinary procedure the Cat would be required to undertake that would cost between $2,000.00 - $3,000.00 [*4](see Plaintiff's Exhibit 13, p. 27), and Plaintiff's cancellation of an auto-order of pet supplies (id., pp. 28-29) was evidence that Plaintiff had relinquished ownership of the Cat to Defendant.

The Court finds that these exhibits are insufficient to prove that Plaintiff intended to be bound by contract or by gift. "An oral agreement may be enforceable as long as the terms are clear and definite and the conduct of the parties evinces mutual assent sufficiently definite to assure that the parties are truly in agreement with respect to all material terms" (see Kramer v. Greene, 142 AD3d 438, 439, 36 N.Y.S.3d 448 [1st Dept 2016] [Internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Conspicuously absent from Defendant's Exhibit L is a search of the name "Liza", which is the English spelling that Plaintiff adopted and exclusively used when referring to the Cat. This calls into question the credibility of Defendant's argument, regardless of whether the omission of this query was done intentionally or if it was something Defendant simply overlooked. In addition, the records of text conversations between Plaintiff and Defendant between March 5, 2022 to April 17, 2023 conflict directly with Defendant's claims, as the verbiage used by Plaintiff — making references to the Cat and its care in the present tense rather than the past tense — suggested that Plaintiff had not forfeited ownership of the Cat or was unwilling to forfeit ownership of the Cat and eventually want the Cat returned to her, thereby indicating a lack of both mutual assent as well as intent to make a present transfer (see Plaintiff's Exhibit 13, pp. 10, 16, 18, 19, 23, 32, 33, 36; Plaintiff's Exhibit 6, p. 1). As Defendant's argument relied heavily upon the text interactions with Plaintiff that took place during the Relevant Period, Defendant is therefore unable to prove that parties were truly in agreement with respect to all material terms to establish an enforceable contract or give "clear and convincing" evidence to prove the existence of a valid gift. Parties' competency or capacity to contract or give and receive gifts was not raised by either party and will accordingly not be addressed by this Court in its analysis.

While never explicitly argued by Defendant, the Court must also undergo an examination of whether Defendant has a claim of ownership of the Cat under the rule of abandonment. Abandonment has been defined as "the relinquishing of all title, possession or claim to or of [property] — a virtual intentional throwing away of it. It is not presumed. Proof supporting it must be direct or affirmative or reasonably beget the exclusive inference of the throwing away" (see Foulke v. New York C. R. Co., 228 NY 269, 273, 127 N.E. 237 [1920]). Like gifts, the burden of proof of establishing abandonment falls to the party that is claiming it (see Olivo v. Medvedeva, 80 Misc 3d 742, 749-750, 197 N.Y.S.3d 415 [NY Cnty. Civ. Ct. 2022]). As stated, it has already been determined that Defendant lacked the evidence to definitively prove the relinquishing of title or ownership of the Cat by Plaintiff, in conjunction with the conflicting testimonies regarding the October Conversation.

Furthermore, parallels can be drawn between the facts of the instant action and those in Olivo that would also defeat a claim of abandonment. In Olivo, the plaintiff needed to leave his cat with the defendant as plaintiff was out of town; the plaintiff ended up having the duration of his absence extended; the plaintiff remained in contact with the defendant during his absence; and the plaintiff commenced a replevin action to reclaim his cat within a month of returning to New York City (id.). While the plaintiff in Olivo had a much more robust defense to abandonment given his more frequent and direct communications to the defendants requesting the return of his cat, this was in part due to the relationship between the two souring at a much [*5]earlier stage as compared to the one between Plaintiff and Defendant (id.). There was a notable increase in urgency in Plaintiff's actions after Defendant refused to return the Cat to her and blocked her on SMS, demonstrated by Plaintiff's attempts to contact Defendant via alternative means such as through email or mutual friends (see Plaintiff's Exhibit 21-22).

The evidence presented contradicts the idea of a valid contract, gift, or a claim of abandonment. As such, this Court finds that Plaintiff at no point ever forfeited ownership of the Cat and is therefore still the legal owner of the Cat.

The matter then moves to who should have possession of the Cat moving forward. The case of Raymond v. Lachmann held that "we think it best for all concerned that, given his limited life expectancy, [the cat], who is now almost ten years old, remain where he has lived, prospered, loved and been loved for the past four years" (see Raymond v. Lachmann, 264 AD2d, 340, 341, 695 N.Y.S.2d 308 [1st Dept 1999]). This measure of "best for all concerned" has become the standard when deciding pet ownership cases in the state of New York (see Feger v. Warwick Animal Shelter, 59 AD3d 68, 72 [2d Dept. 2008]; L.B. v. C.C.B., 77 Misc 3d 429, 433-435 [Kings Cnty. Sup. Ct. 2022]; LeConte v. Kyungmi Lee, 35 Misc 3d 286, 287-288 [NY Cnty. Civ. Ct. 2011]). Such standard has been interpreted as "[striking] the best balance between a strict property analysis and the more extensive interests analysis involved in child custody cases" (see Mundo v. Weatherson, 74 Misc 3d 1215[A] 160 N.Y.S.3d 856 [NY Cnty. Civ. Ct. 2022] [Internal citations omitted]). The court is therefore required to consider intangible factors such as why each party would benefit from having the Cat in their life and why the Cat has a "better chance of prospering, loving and being loved in the care of one party or the other" (see Mitchell v. Snider, 51 Misc 3d 1229[A], 41 N.Y.S.3d 450 [NY Cnty. Civ. Ct. 2016] [Internal citation omitted]).

Beginning with an examination of what would be in the best interest of the Cat, both parties have submitted evidence that show a deep personal investment in the Cat's health and well-being. The veterinary records submitted by both parties indicate that it had been well taken care for and had not suffered from any serious health conditions stemming from owner mistreatment or neglect (see Defendant's Exhibits A-B; Plaintiff's Exhibit 8). Additionally, the evidence submitted by the respective parties has convinced this Court that both Plaintiff and Defendant hold great affection toward the Cat and see it as a member of their own family, with both parties including multiple witness declarations attesting to this fact (see Defendant's Exhibit U; Plaintiff's Exhibits 20).

Defendant also provided two written testimonies from expert witnesses specializing in cat behavior that commented on the high quality of care Defendant has provided for the Cat, as well as the potential deleterious effects of rehoming or relocating the Cat, especially given its advanced age (see Defendant's Exhibit V). While the Court finds these opinions to be credible and reliable, it does not find them to be entirely relevant or persuasive for the purpose of determining an outcome in the instant action. It is not at issue as to whether Defendant provided the Cat with a high quality of life, and it is agreed that it would be in the best interest of the Cat to remain in a stable environment. However, this Court has not been presented with sufficient evidence to assert that one party takes objectively better care of the Cat than the other and will thus reserve judgment on this matter. In addition, Defendant has been required to relocate twice [*6]in the past year and has stated an intention to do so a third time to New York City once her visa issues are resolved. While it is stated that Defendant made the necessary accommodations to help the Cat adjust to the new locations, this frequency of travel and exposure to new environments may have led to negative effects on the Cat's health as per Defendant's own expert witness testimonies (id.), and there is no evidence to suggest that a similar circumstance may not arise again in the future.

Having established then that Plaintiff has a superior possessory right to the Cat and that both parties have historically acted in the Cat's best interest and are willing and able to continue doing so, the final component of the analysis is determining which party would benefit more from having the Cat in their life. While it is true that the Cat has "prospered, loved, and been loved" by Defendant for the past two and a half years, this case distinguishes itself from Raymond in the time spent by the Cat with each party. While there is no doubt that Defendant and the Cat have formed an incredibly strong connection with each other in the past two and a half years, this Court must acknowledge that Plaintiff shared at least a similar connection with the Cat for the ten years prior (as compared to the four and six years the cat spent with the respective parties in Raymond). This amount of time represents both a significant portion of both the Cat's as well as Plaintiff's lives, which they shared not just as pet and owner, but together as a family.

Upon consideration of the analysis above in conjunction with the parties' submissions and testimonies, the Court finds that the best outcome for all concerned is for the Cat to live out the rest of its days with whom it spent the vast majority of its life. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to the return of the Cat. While there is no legal obligation to do so, this Court hopes that the parties may be able to arrange a way for Defendant to remain a part of the Cat's life in some capacity.

ORDERED that the Cat be returned to Plaintiff on or before October 1, 2025; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff contact Defendant/Defendant's counsel to arrange for the pick-up of the Cat at Plaintiff's expense, and that Defendant make her best effort to cooperate with Plaintiff in returning the Cat to Plaintiff within the court-mandated deadline; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff shall reimburse Defendant for all reasonable expenses incurred by Defendant in caring for the Cat from the date when the Cat was dropped off at Defendant's home through May 15, 2023.

This constitutes the DECISION and ORDER of the Court.