The dispute before the Court is relatively narrow. On January 7, 2025, about forty-seven days into this aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle case, see V.T.L. § 511(2)(a)(iv), the People filed their discovery materials and certificate of compliance ("COC") and declared ready. Then, on March 26—an additional seventy-eight days later, spanning at least two intervening court appearances—defendant Jeremy Lantigua objected to the People's COC. He observed, among other things, that the People had disclosed an incomplete activity log for the arresting officer, Officer Kolovic ^[FN1] —the informant in the complaint who had witnessed the alleged unlicensed driving—which appeared to omit the period covering the vehicle stop and Lantigua's arrest despite reflecting entries for the hours surrounding the incident. Additional objections to allegedly improper redactions of Giglio material followed in May, after which a motion schedule was set.

Citing the incomplete activity log and the Giglio redactions, Lantigua now moves to invalidate the COC and dismiss the accusatory instrument under C.P.L. § 30.30. The People counter by arguing, among other things, that Lantigua's objections to the COC were not timely made. See People's Resp. at 13—14. Lantigua has replied in further support of his motion, and defends the timeliness of his objections.

On this particular record, the People mount a persuasive argument about the untimeliness of Lantigua's initial COC objection. The current version of C.P.L. § 245.50(4)(b) requires COC objections to be made "as soon as practicable." As the People observe, see People's Resp. at 13, at least one appellate court has held that untimeliness provides an independent basis for a trial [*2]court to deny a dismissal motion challenging a COC, and that an initial objection raised via motion 72 days after the filing of a COC was untimely under § 245.50(4)(b). See People v. Seymour, 84 Misc 3d 23, 25 (App. Term, 9th & 10th Jud. Dists. 2024).^[FN2] Some trial courts have also looked upon delays of over 60 days with skepticism, especially when COC defects are obvious and the underlying case is not particularly complex (or discovery voluminous). See, e.g., People v. Lanfair, 78 Misc 3d 371, 372, 375—77 (City Ct., Cohoes 2023) (Galarneau, J.) (concluding that a delay of a little over two months was not permissible when the defense should have known of an obvious discovery issue, but that the same delay might have been permissible for a different issue that required "comb[ing] through the discovery" already provided).

Under the reasoning of those cases, Lantigua's objections and subsequent motion were not made as soon as practicable. His first objections were sent about 78 days after the filing of the COC, and focused on a specific item: the activity log of the arresting officer in the case, a central discovery document. While Lantigua attacks the People's diligence in provided discovery by pointing to the obviousness of the omission, the same rationale could be applied to his objection: if the oversight was so apparent, why not object sooner? Lantigua does not otherwise suggest that the circumstances of his case have any bearing on a practicable timeframe for objections, or that those circumstances justify the delay here before initial objections were sent.

Furthermore, while Lantigua is correct that the initial objection in Seymour was via the motion itself, and that Seymour is potentially distinguishable on that basis, the Appellate Term in Seymour specifically cited both C.P.L. § 240.50(4)(b) (relating to the timing of objections) and (4)(c) (relating to the timing of motions) while emphasizing that the first "notification" and "challenge" to the COC in that case came 72 days after the COC was filed. Seymour, 84 Misc 3d at 25. Thus, Seymour was not strictly limited to initial challenges brought via motion, although there is certainly room to argue (as Lantigua does) that the absence of separate pre-motion objections was among the "circumstances presented herein," id., that supported affirmance in Seymour. Regardless, Seymour remains persuasive here even with that distinction taken into account.

Accordingly, Lantigua's motion to dismiss is denied because he did not timely object to the validity of the COC.

But that does not quite resolve the dispute.^[FN3] The People still owe what appears to be a [*3]central discovery document: the main officer's activity log for the period covering the incident in this case. Based on their opposition papers, the People have made some efforts to obtain it, but have not yet secured it. While the People argue that the entire interaction between Officer Kolovic and Lantigua is captured on Kolovic's body camera, see People's Resp. at 11, the activity log nevertheless remains an essential part of the case, as Kolovic's written log of events might shed light on whatever is depicted in the body camera.

Accordingly, pursuant to C.P.L. § 245.35(3)—(4), the People are ORDERED to obtain and provide to the defense the missing activity log for Officer Kolovic within 30 days of the date of this order. When they do so, the People should file a supplemental COC in the relevant court part. If the People are unable to obtain the log within 30 days, the People must file a status update letter with the undersigned by email explaining their efforts to obtain the missing log.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that Lantigua's motion to dismiss pursuant to C.P.L. § 30.30 is DENIED.

It is further ORDERED that the People provide the activity log identified above to the defense within 30 days of the date of this order and file a supplemental COC reflecting the same. If the People are unable to provide the log within 30 days, the People are otherwise ORDERED to email a status update to the undersigned at the expiration of the 30 day period detailing their attempts to obtain the log and its status.

The foregoing constitutes the opinion, decision, and order of the Court.