The matter before the Court arises from yet another post-judgment application by Plaintiff GH, by way of Order to Show Cause (Mot. Seq. 10), seeking to modify the parenting time provisions set forth in the parties' Judgment of Divorce dated July 17, 2023. Specifically, Plaintiff now again seeks unsupervised access to the parties' two minor children, a summer parenting schedule, and other related relief. Defendant MH has opposed the motion in its entirety and has interposed a Cross-Motion (Mot. Seq. 11) seeking dismissal of Plaintiff's application without a hearing, imposition of sanctions for frivolous conduct pursuant to 22 NYCRR §130-1.1, reappointment of the attorney for the children, admission of the prior forensic report into the record, an updated forensic evaluation at Plaintiff's expense, and an order restricting future filings absent leave of court.

The procedural and factual matrix presented here, plagued by redundancy, strategic forum shifts, and serial withdrawals on the eve of adjudication, compels this Court to address not only the merits (or lack thereof) of the application, but also the integrity of the litigation process itself.

I. Facts

The parties were divorced by a Judgment of Divorce entered on July 17, 2023, which incorporated but did not merge a comprehensive Stipulation of Settlement dated March 2, 2023. The stipulation provided that Defendant would retain sole legal and residential custody of the parties' two minor children: VH (born XX XX, 2017) and SH (born XX XX, 2019). The Plaintiff was afforded parenting time, but only under strict supervision, to be conducted with designated supervisors including JB and CR, or an approved agency.

Crucially, the stipulation provided a procedural and evidentiary roadmap for any post-judgment application seeking increased or unsupervised access. It mandated, inter alia, that such an application filed within one year of the stipulation's execution must be brought before this Court, and must incorporate the forensic report of Dr. Andrew Propper into the record.

The record now reflects that Plaintiff has filed three substantively indistinguishable post-judgment applications seeking precisely such relief:

1. First Application (Dec. 18, 2023): Plaintiff filed a post-judgment motion in Supreme Court to eliminate the supervision condition. Defendant opposed and cross-moved. The Court calendared a hearing on March 20, March 21, and April 9, 2024. Plaintiff failed to file any hearing documents and unilaterally withdrew the application on March 15, 2024, just days before the hearing.

2. Second Application (June 28, 2024): Plaintiff filed a custody modification petition in Richmond County Family Court under Docket No. XXXXX. Attorney Ian Berliner was reappointed as attorney for the children. The matter was scheduled for trial on June 3-4, 2025. However, once again, Plaintiff withdrew the petition on May 5, 2025, one month before trial, and an Order of Dismissal was entered the next day. Notably, Plaintiff failed to notify opposing counsel or the children's attorney.

3. Third Application (May 22, 2025): Plaintiff filed the instant Order to Show Cause seeking unsupervised visitation, holiday and summer parenting schedules, and other relief. This filing occurred a mere 17 days after voluntarily discontinuing the Family Court proceeding.

Meanwhile, Plaintiff's participation in court-ordered visitation has been, by his own [*2]admission, sparse and inconsistent. According to Defendant, Plaintiff participated in a mere four hours of supervised parenting time over the course of 15 months, specifically in August and September 2024, before ceasing all efforts. The Defendant credibly avers that Plaintiff refused to schedule further visitation and rebuffed all offered supervisors. Efforts to arrange supervised visitation through agency and non-agency means were rejected by Plaintiff, who claimed financial hardship, scheduling difficulty, or vague philosophical objections.

Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy a monetary judgment in the amount of $18,105.39 entered against him on April 23, 2024, for unpaid support-related obligations and expenses. A separate support enforcement petition remains pending in Family Court, with Plaintiff failing to appear for the last scheduled date despite having assigned counsel.

Defendant contends, and the Court finds no competent rebuttal to the assertion, that Plaintiff's repeated filings, each followed by strategic withdrawals, and his refusal to meaningfully engage with his children under the terms set forth in the Judgment of Divorce, evince not a genuine interest in reestablishing a parenting relationship, but a pattern of litigation calculated to harass, delay, and manipulate judicial proceedings.

II. Conclusions of Law

In custody and parenting time matters, the party seeking modification of a final order bears the initial burden of demonstrating a sufficient change in circumstances since the entry of the prior order so as to warrant inquiry into the best interests of the children. (See Matter of Newton v. McFarlane, 174 AD3d 67 [2d Dept 2019]; Matter of Capruso v. Kubow, 226 AD3d 680, 683 [2d Dept 2024]). Absent such a threshold showing, the Court is neither required nor inclined to hold an evidentiary hearing. The party's allegations must be "specific and nonconclusory," and supported by competent evidence.

Plaintiff utterly fails to meet this standard. His motion recites familiar grievances and generic claims of personal improvement, unsupported by any new, objective data. The only purported "evidence" is a conclusory letter from Dr. Blanchfield, devoid of any comparative or forensic rigor and relying entirely on Plaintiff's self-report. The letter fails to demonstrate knowledge of the original forensic report, the history of supervised visits, or the behavioral incidents necessitating supervision. It lacks indicia of reliability, independence, or clinical neutrality.

In contrast, Defendant provides substantial, detailed, and compelling evidence of Plaintiff's failure to comply with the preconditions for modification, including abandonment of court-ordered visitation, rejection of approved supervisors, erratic conduct during scheduled exchanges, and a deeply troubling refusal to communicate with his own children over extended periods. The children's attorney, Mr. Berliner, has been reappointed solely for the purposes of this motion practice, as a prophylactic measure by the court, and his prior involvement in all proceedings to date weighs heavily in favor of judicial continuity and skepticism toward Plaintiff's unsubstantiated claims.

In short, Plaintiff has failed, entirely, to demonstrate a material change in circumstances, and the Court is under no obligation to convene a hearing to indulge an application so bereft of merit.

The Court is further constrained to address Plaintiff's conduct under 22 NYCRR §130-1.1, which permits the imposition of costs or sanctions for frivolous conduct. Conduct is deemed [*3]frivolous when it:

1. Is without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument;

2. Is undertaken primarily to harass or delay; or

3. Asserts materially false facts.

Plaintiff's litigation history here satisfies each prong. Three successive filings, all seeking the same relief, and all voluntarily withdrawn on the eve of adjudication, constitute textbook forum shopping. The latest application was filed less than three weeks after withdrawing the Family Court petition, thus demonstrating not only an abuse of judicial process, but an utter disregard for judicial economy, the opposing party's resources, and the children's stability.

Moreover, Plaintiff's failure to comply with existing orders, both financial and custodial, evinces a disregard for the authority of this Court and renders his invocation of equitable relief particularly offensive.

The Court concludes that Plaintiff's repeated applications and dilatory withdrawals have imposed a tangible and unjustifiable financial burden on the Defendant. Indeed, Defendant's legal fees in responding to the current motion are supported by detailed affirmation and contemporaneous billing records totaling $5,000. The Court finds this amount to be fair, reasonable, and appropriate as a sanction under the rule.

Given the Court's dismissal of the underlying motion, the Defendant's additional requests are resolved as follows:

1. Attorney for the Children: The motion is dismissed without hearing; thus, reappointment is unnecessary at this juncture.

2. Forensic Report and Updated Evaluation: The current application is insufficient to trigger the procedural provisions requiring incorporation of the forensic report or commissioning of a new one. Should any future motion proceed past the threshold stage, the Court will consider those requests anew.

3. Prospective Filing Restrictions: In view of Plaintiff's pattern of serial filings and strategic discontinuances, the Court finds it appropriate to impose prospective safeguards. Plaintiff shall not file any further application seeking modification of custody or parenting time without first submitting an affidavit demonstrating a bona fide change in circumstances and obtaining prior leave of this Court.

III. Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

Accordingly, it is:

ORDERED, that Plaintiff's motion (Mot. Seq. 10) is hereby DENIED in its entirety and dismissed without a hearing; and it is further

ORDERED, that Defendant's Cross-Motion (Mot. Seq. 11) is GRANTED to the extent that:

1. The Court finds Plaintiff has engaged in frivolous conduct within the meaning of 22 NYCRR §130-1.1;

2. Plaintiff is sanctioned in the amount of $5,000.00, payable to Defendant as reimbursement of legal fees incurred in responding to this motion, within thirty (30) days of service of this order with notice of entry;

3. Plaintiff is hereby enjoined from filing any further application to modify custody or parenting time in this action absent prior leave of this Court, supported by an affidavit [*4]establishing a genuine and material change in circumstances.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.