Defendant Julio César Cuevas Felix seeks, among other things, to dismiss the misdemeanor accusatory instrument on C.P.L. § 30.30 speedy-trial grounds, contending that the People did not disclose certain core pieces of discovery prior to declaring ready on the 88th day. With admirable candor, the People concede nondisclosure, but argue that their certificate of compliance ("COC") is nevertheless valid because they demonstrated due diligence overall and shared the central pieces of discovery shortly after the deadline expired.

While this dispute presents a close call, it falls narrowly on the wrong side of the line for the People. Absent an above-and-beyond showing of diligence, the 90-day § 30.30 deadline for misdemeanor cases does not currently permit a premature certification followed by a few-days-late correction when the People know (as they did here) that certain core pieces of discovery will not be delivered in time. Accordingly, the branch of Cuevas Felix's motion seeking dismissal is GRANTED, and the accusatory instrument is DISMISSED.

The parties are the primary audience for this decision, which assumes some familiarity with the facts and procedural history of the case.

Via a misdemeanor complaint dated December 29, 2024, Cuevas Felix was charged with drunk driving under V.T.L. § 1192(1), (2), (2-a), and (3). He allegedly drove into another car around the intersection of E. 175th Street and Webster Avenue in the Bronx, and later blew a .25 at the Intoxicated Driver Testing Unit ("IDTU").

The complaint was sworn by the arresting officer, Officer Pikulinski, who had responded to a radio run with his partner, Officer Nembhard. People's Resp. at 2 (Aff. of ADA Malik A. Ketcham). Officers Pikulinski and Nembhard apparently found Cuevas Felix nearby in a convenience store, purchasing gum and an energy drink; the officers observed indicia of intoxication before walking him back to the scene of the accident. People's Resp. at 2 (Aff. of [*2]ADA Malik A. Ketcham). A third officer, Officer Peña, oversaw the chemical breath test at the IDTU. People's Resp. at 3 (Aff. of ADA Malik A. Ketcham).

Cuevas Felix was charged only with drunk driving. He was not charged with offenses arising out of the collision itself, such as reckless driving or leaving the scene of the accident.

Cuevas Felix was arraigned on December 30, 2024. Between January 2 and January 8, the People reached out by email to officers and various discovery liaisons, seeking 911 calls, Giglio impeachment material on Officers Pikulinski and Nembhard, and a V.T.L. § 1192 compliance packet, among other items. See People's Resp. at 4 (Aff. of ADA Malik A. Ketcham); see also id., Exs. 1—4. The People followed up on February 3 with a specific request for officer activity logs;^[FN1] an aided report;^[FN2] body camera footage, including video from the IDTU; a roll call; invoices; chains of custody; and any photos or video surveillance. People's Resp., Ex. 7.

The People obtained some of what was requested fairly quickly, and were able to share that material with the defense in turn. For instance, the non-IDTU body cameras were disclosed by the end of January. See People's Resp. at 4 (Aff. of ADA Malik A. Ketcham).

Correspondence continued sporadically through February and March. On February 7, IDTU Officer Peña emailed the assigned ADA to clarify that the IDTU video had been "already shared" with the Bronx DA's office. People's Resp., Ex. 9. About a month later, in early March, the People sought (and quickly received) Giglio materials for Officer Peña. See People's Resp. at 6 (Affidavit of ADA Malik A. Ketcham) & Ex. 10.

The record reflects a break in activity after early March. On March 27—day 87 of 90—the People emailed both an NYPD discovery liaison and Officer Pikulinski to renew the early-February request for officer activity logs, an aided report, body camera footage, roll call, invoices, chains of custody, and any photos or video surveillance, as well as an ICAD.^[FN3] People's Resp., Ex. 12.

The People also apparently realized around this time that the IDTU video, which per Officer Peña had been shared with the People in early February, had not been properly "tagged" for disclosure to the defense. On March 27, the People emailed the Bronx DA's body camera unit to request a fix so that the video could be "share[d] with [the d]efense." People's Resp., Ex. 11. One day later, on March 28, the People followed up with a Trial Preparation Assistant in the Bronx DA's Vehicular Crimes Unit, asking for the video to be properly tagged "so that the People could gain access to the IDTU videos for sharing with" the defense. People's Resp. at 7 (Aff. of ADA Malik A. Ketcham); see also id., Ex. 13 ("Please place videos under [the] arrest [tag] so I can share with Defense.").

The People filed their COC and other readiness materials on Friday, March 28, 2025. The discovery receipt attached to the People's COC reflected extensive disclosures, including 911 calls, scene photos, body cameras, IDTU documents, and Giglio material for several of the officers.

The discovery receipt also explicitly acknowledged that some items remained outstanding. While the People had disclosed the activity logs for Officers Pikulinski and Peña, they had not yet disclosed the activity log for Officer Nembhard, whom the People intended to call at trial. See Defense's Mot., Ex. L at 128 (pdf pag.). The discovery receipt thus reflected that the People still "[n]eed[ed] and ha[d] requested" five additional activity logs, including Officer Nembhard's. Defense's Mot., Ex. A at 88 (pdf pag.).

The People also acknowledged they were missing the ICAD, chains of custody, and IDTU video. The last of these needed to be "tagged . . . for sharing," which had not yet happened despite the People "request[ing] several times." Defense's Mot., Ex. A at 89 (pdf pag.).

Over the following weekend, the People emailed the DA's office's body camera unit to follow up on the IDTU video. People's Resp., Ex. 16. A District Attorney's Office Bureau Coordinator responded on Monday, March 31; apologized for the delay; said that the video had been "located"; and promised that access would be granted "within an hour." People's Resp., Ex. 17.

The IDTU video was eventually shared with the defense two days later on Wednesday, April 2. People's Resp., Ex. 19.

Regarding the other material, an NYPD discovery liaison also responded on March 31 to explain that the NYPD was "in heavy backlog." People's Resp., Ex. 18. After the assigned ADA followed up on Wednesday, April 2, to again request the officer memo books and ICAD, see id., the NYPD's liaison provided them—as well as the roll calls and certain other documents—via a predawn email on Thursday, April 3. People's Resp., Ex. 20. These were forwarded to defense counsel later that day, alongside a supplemental certificate of compliance. People's Resp., Ex. 21.

The defense sent discovery objections to the People on April 8, and followed up on April 21. Defense's Mot., Exs. C—D. The objections focused on discovery that had not yet been provided, such as a police accident report, transport-officer body cams, Guth Labs reports, and a motor vehicle collision report, while also challenging the scope of the disclosed Giglio material. People's Resp., Ex. 24. The People responded by email on April 22, indicating that they had followed up with the NYPD for some of the items and were maintaining their stance on others [*3](such as the Giglio material and Guth Labs reports); the People otherwise disclosed at least one document that had inadvertently been omitted. People's Resp., Ex. 25.

After additional back and forth, the People obtained and disclosed a police accident report on May 7. People's Resp., Ex. 31.

Following a May 8 discovery conference, the defense requested a motion schedule.

In his counseled motion, Cuevas Felix seeks invalidation of the People's COC and dismissal of the accusatory instrument based on the alleged failure to provide the requisite discovery within the 90-day speedy trial § 30.30 deadline. He argues that the People filed their COC and declared ready before disclosing, among other things, the activity logs of five officers, including Officer Nembhard; the IDTU footage; the ICAD; a motor vehicle collision report; calibration reports; Giglio materials; and scene photos. Cuevas Felix puts particular emphasis on the belated disclosure of the IDTU footage and activity logs, which the People knew were missing when they nevertheless declared ready. See Defense's Mot. at 21—28.

The People concede that they did not provide the relevant discovery materials before their 90-day deadline expired, but argue that the COC was nevertheless valid—and dismissal unwarranted—because it was the product of good faith and due diligence. Relying on both the factors from People v. Bay, 41 NY3d 200 (2023), and the upcoming amendments to C.P.L. Article 245—which, as of the time of writing, have been enacted but are not yet in effect, and which the People frame as a clarification of the Legislature's intent behind the current Article 245—the People contend that a holistic assessment shows they complied with their discovery obligations before declaring ready. The People point to (1) their extensive outreach prior to declaring ready, consisting in part of "multiple back and forth emails"; (2) post-certification and post-objection attempts to obtain outstanding items; (3) their candor in self-reporting certain items as missing in their COC; and (4) the substantial discovery that was disclosed prior to the filing of the COC. People's Resp. at 23—27, 39—40.

The People also address specific discovery items. Regarding the IDTU video, the People emphasize their awareness of the importance of the video and the repeated efforts to provide it to the defense, which were thwarted in part by longstanding and repeating tagging issues that prevented the uploading of the correct video to evidence.com; "[i]f IDTU videos are tagged under a Case ID, the assigned ADA will not have access to those videos and cannot share them." People's Resp. at 27—28. Although the People address items such as the law enforcement photos, police accident report, and Giglio material, they do not substantially discuss the activity logs beyond stating that the logs were shared as of April 4. See People's Resp. at 33—39.

In a short reply, Cuevas Felix confirms that the defense did receive a police accident report in May 2025; in other words, the document is not still outstanding. Defense's Reply at 3 (Reply Aff. of Oona Wallace). Cuevas Felix otherwise uses his reply to challenge the People's diligence.^[FN4]

When the highest count charged is a misdemeanor punishable by a custodial sentence of more than three months, the People are required to be ready for trial within 90 days of the commencement of the criminal action. See C.P.L. § 30.30(1)(b). The People cannot declare ready for trial, however, unless they have also complied with their disclosure obligations under New York's revised discovery laws. See id. § 30.30(5).

Under the now-familiar standard articulated in 2023 by the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Bay, a COC is valid if it is the product of due diligence and good faith. People v. Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 211 (2023). Factors relevant to diligence are fact- and case-specific, and include the People's efforts to comply with their obligations, the volume of discovery provided, the complexity of the case, "how obvious any missing material would likely have been to a prosecutor exercising due diligence," and the People's response to objections from the defense. Id. at 212. The People bear the burden of demonstrating that they exercised due diligence. Id. at 212—13.

The People's implicit invitation to apply the upcoming revisions to Article 245 is respectfully declined. While the revisions were adopted May 9, their effective date was explicitly delayed by 90 days, although they will apply to all cases "pending" as of that time. See 2025 NY Sess. Laws Ch. 56 (S. 3006-C), Part LL § 8. Any questions of retroactivity, see Regina Metro. Co., LLC v. NY State Div. of Hous. & Cmty. Renewal, 35 NY3d 332, 365 (2020) (addressing the general test for retroactive application of statutes), are ill-suited for decisions rendered in the liminal period between a statute's enactment and its taking effect.

Regardless, most of the relevant alterations to Article 245 either codify the Bay factors or add factors that, while not specifically enumerated by Bay, are in harmony with Bay's inclusive list.^[FN5] Accordingly, even if this case were decided under the revised Article 245, the outcome [*4]would be the same.

The People declared ready on the 88th day out of 90. At the time, the People knew they were missing several discovery items—most significantly, both the IDTU video and the activity logs of at least one of the primary officers who responded to the scene, and whom the People intended to call as a trial witness. Due to the intervening weekend, the "90th" and final day fell on Monday, March 31.^[FN6] See NY Gen. Constr. Law § 25-a(1); People v. Powell, 179 Misc 2d 1047, 1048 (App. Term 2d & 11th Jud. Dists. 1999). Yet as the People concede, see People's Resp. at 7 (Aff. of ADA Malik A. Ketcham), the IDTU video was not shared until April 2, and the activity logs were not disclosed until April 3—both just after the 90-day window had closed.

At issue is whether, as the People contend, the sheer volume of discovery they provided [*5]before declaring ready, their pre-readiness and post-readiness efforts to obtain discovery, and their post-objection responses to the defense all outweigh this belated disclosure (and the other defects argued by defense counsel) and demonstrate the requisite due diligence.^[FN7] As explained below, they do not.

For the sake of simplicity, the discussion that follows focuses on the IDTU video and missing activity log, which themselves would be sufficient to resolve this dispute. Both are (or at least can be) central discovery documents. In a drunk-driving case, an IDTU video is a "critical piece of evidence about an essential element of driving while intoxicated—namely whether the person was intoxicated"—and is "so crucial" to the prosecution that the events in the IDTU are "frequently recorded from multiple angles." People v. McLeod, 2025 NY Slip Op 51108(U), at *5 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Bronx Co. 2025) (Moore, J.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Activity logs are essential to almost any case involving police activity. See People v. Othman, 85 Misc 3d 1240(A), 2025 NY Slip Op. 50392(U), at *2 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Kings Co. 2025) (Torres, J.).

Here, as of the day they declared ready for trial—a Friday, and the 88th day out of 90—the People had not shared either (1) the IDTU video or (2) the activity logs from a testifying officer on the scene. True, the People knew that they were missing both of these and—again with admirable candor—said as much in their COC. But the fact remains that they had disclosed neither, and did not fix the issue within the intervening days prior to the § 30.30 window closing after the following Monday.

The People do not dispute the centrality of this evidence or their own nondisclosure. Instead, they argue that the other Bay factors compel a finding in their favor. But while the People rely primarily on their record of outreach prior to and after declaring ready, as well as on the volume of discovery provided, neither quite outweighs the failure to provide the IDTU video and activity log.

Regarding outreach, the record establishes efforts within the first month or so of the case, from January to early February. This appears to have yielded much of the discovery provided to the defense.

But the same record also reveals a break throughout at least the entire month of March, before attempts resumed in the waning days of the § 30.30 timeline. In particular, there was no IDTU-video outreach at all between Officer Peña's email in early February and the late-March requests to properly tag the video. There also appear to have been no additional efforts to obtain the missing activity log from early February through late March, as the early-March outreach focused entirely on Giglio material.

Nor do the post-readiness attempts to obtain the missing discovery outweigh the nondisclosure, or otherwise meet the urgency of the occasion. March 31, the Monday after the People declared ready, was the final day in the § 30.30 period; had the People managed to obtain and disclose the IDTU video and activity log on that day, any prior problems would arguably have been moot. Yet the chronology on which the People themselves rely, see People's Resp. at 7 (Aff. of Malik A. Ketcham), reflects only that the People were informed at around noon by the DA's Office Bureau Coordinator that the videos had been "located" and that access would be [*6]granted "within an hour." People's Resp., Ex. 17.

This intra-DA's-office correspondence does not match the urgency befitting the nondisclosure a crucial piece of discovery on the final day of the § 30.30 timeline. If access was indeed provided within an hour, the actual video was not shared until two days later. And there is no correspondence at all pertaining to the activity log on that final day.

The volume of material disclosed also does not outweigh the nondisclosure of the activity log or IDTU video, in part because of how the case was actually charged. The People alleged that Cuevas Felix's drunk driving caused a serious accident and that he fled the scene—grave allegations all. He was charged, however, only with drunk driving, which limited the relevance of the material pertaining only to the accident. Had he caused the accident while driving under the influence of drugs, for instance, he would not be guilty of the charged counts, no matter how bad the collision may have been or how culpable he was in causing it. See People v. Litto, 8 NY3d 692, 695—96, 706—07 (2007) (holding that "intoxication" in § 1192 refers to alcohol intoxication only).

The volume of material pertaining to the collision, such as the 911 calls, were thus relevant to the charges only as to the element of operation, which the People intended to prove via the testimony of the complaining witness—and which would not itself require proof of the collision. See People's Resp. at 38 (representing that in this case, "operation will be proven by the Complainant"). By contrast, the IDTU video and observations of one of the two officers on the scene would be directly relevant to proving intoxication, without which operation would be irrelevant to the charged offenses.

Relying on this Court's decision in People v. Goggins, 86 Misc 3d 1201(A), 2025 NY Slip Op. 50808(U) (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. 2025, Bronx Co. 2025), the People suggest that their nondisclosure was prevented by the tagging issue, a technical error of the kind that courts have excused in the past and which should be forgiven here. See People's Resp. at 39. But in Goggins, the People thought they had shared the relevant discovery, only to realize later that they had not uploaded the material to Onedrive—a mistake they corrected within hours of being notified by the defense. See Goggins, 2025 NY Slip Op. 50808(U), at *4—5.

Here, the People concede that the tagging issue arose in "several cases" prior to and since this one, and was thus known to the People. People's Resp. at 27—28. See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 392—95 (1993) (addressing the concept of, and factors relevant to, "excusable neglect"). The People also were unable to fix the issue within a span of multiple days despite already being aware of it at the time they declared ready. Thus, assuming without deciding that the tagging issue actually prevented the People from accessing and sharing the video,^[FN8] awareness of tagging issues should have counseled in favor of checking [*7]the video when Officer Peña shared it in early February rather than waiting until late March. And even that explanation would not quite resolve what happened between around noon on the 90th day—when access was promised within the hour—and the actual disclosure of the video well past the 90-day deadline.

In sum, the People declared ready for trial without having disclosed two items that absolutely were relevant to their core trial readiness and to the case they intended to present. Although the People knew they were missing the two items, they did not make extensive efforts to obtain them before the 90 days expired, either before or after declaring ready. And while the volume of discovery provided was otherwise admirable, the missing material was directly relevant to proving intoxication.

Thus, under a holistic assessment of both the missing items and their relevance to the case, contrasted against the other Bay factors, see People v. Cooperman, 225 AD3d 1216, 1220 (2d Dept. 2024), the People have not met their burden of showing due diligence. To be clear, this does not mean the People did not try, or that shortcomings arose only from the District Attorney's office. But it is very difficult to validate a declaration of readiness in a drunk-driving case when the activity log of one of the two responding (and putatively testifying) officers and the IDTU video itself are both missing.

"Difficult," however, does not mean impossible. Reasonable jurists could debate whether the shortcomings here warrant dismissal. In light of the gravity of the offenses charged, the People are encouraged to seek review of this disposition from the Appellate Term.

As set forth above, the People did not fulfill their discovery obligations before declaring ready, and the relevant Bay factors do not weigh in their favor. As a result, their COC was invalid and did not stop the § 30.30 clock. And since at least 91 days elapsed before any valid statement of readiness, or before any time became excludable, dismissal is "require[d]." People v. Labate, 42 NY3d 184, 190 (2024).

Accordingly, the branch of Cuevas Felix's motion seeking dismissal is GRANTED, and the matter is DISMISSED pursuant to C.P.L. §§ 30.30 and 170.30. The remainder of the motion is DENIED as academic.