This action concerns allegedly rent-stabilized leases. Plaintiffs, Jack Wilde, Ashley Teater, Alexandria Lee, Anton Warendh, Aly Warendh, Robert Knox Hayes, Paul-Sebastian Japaz, Delia Salcedo Hernandez, Heather Mackie, Joseph Muzikar, Bryan Perri, Dragan Panic, Melissa Hendrax, and Ritsuko Nakajima, are tenants living in several buildings on Manhattan's Upper West Side. Defendants Lorent Realty LLC, JJR 1315, LLC, and Arbel Properties, LLC, owned the buildings until January 2024. Defendant UWS Portfolio, LLC (UWS), bought the buildings and is the current owner. The landlords of the building are UWS subsidiaries: [*2]defendants 114 West 74th Street, LLC, 153 West 74th Street, LLC, 13 West 82nd LLC, and 15 West 82nd Street LLC. Defendant 3rd Avenue Real Estate Management, Inc., manages the buildings. Defendant Anh Do is the managing member of UWS, the landlords, and 3rd Avenue. She is also managing member of defendant Tran Group Management, LLC.

Plaintiffs allege that they were subjected to rent overcharges and improper lease-termination notices. Plaintiffs assert individual claims for (1) declaratory relief that the buildings are rent-stabilized and that they are entitled to reform their leases; (2) rent overcharge; (3) harassment; and (4) violating the Good Cause Eviction Law (Real Property Law § 216). Plaintiffs also assert class-action claims for (5) declaratory relief; (6) rent overcharge; (7) harassment; (8) violating the Good Cause Eviction Law; and (9) unlawful eviction.

On motion sequence 001, defendants UWS, 114 West 74th Street, LLC, 13 West 82nd Street, LLC, 15 West 82nd Street, LLC, 3rd Avenue, and Do move to dismiss several parts of plaintiffs' complaint. The motion is granted in part and denied in part. On motion sequence 002, defendants Lorent Realty, JJR 1315, and Arbel Properties move to dismiss plaintiffs' causes of action for rent overcharge and eviction. The motion is granted. And on motion sequence 003, plaintiff moves for default judgment against defendant Tran Group. The motion is denied.

I. Motion Sequence 001

On motion sequence 001, defendants UWS, 114 West 74th Street, LLC, 13 West 82nd Street, LLC, 15 West 82nd Street, LLC, 3rd Avenue, and Do move to dismiss (1) plaintiffs' complaint against Do individually; (2) plaintiffs' harassment claims against these defendants (the third and seventh causes of action); and (3) plaintiffs' complaint to the extent their claims involve the building located at 153 West 74th Street. The motion is granted in part and denied in part as set forth below.

A. Branch of Motion to Dismiss Claims Against the Individual Defendant

Defendants UWS, 114 West 74th Street, 13 West 82nd Street, LLC, 15 West 82nd Street, LLC, 3rd Avenue, and Do move to dismiss the action against individual defendant Anh Do. Defendants argue that the action should be dismissed against Do, because as a member of the defendant LLCs she is not personally liable for the actions of the LLC. Defendants also contend that plaintiffs' allegations are insufficient to allege piercing of the corporate veil. According to defendants, plaintiffs do not allege that Do "exercised complete dominion of the entity defendants with respect to the alleged overcharges." (NYSCEF No. 12 at 8.)

Plaintiffs allege that "Do is the lynchpin in a convoluted and interlocking mesh of LLCs, the sole purpose and creation of which was to perpetrate a deregulation scheme and empty four entire buildings of their residential tenants, an unlawful contrivance." (NYSCEF No. 41 at 11.) They claim that she "exerts complete control all the way down the line from owner to landlord to property manager" and therefore that she should be held personally liable in this action. (Id.)

The court agrees with defendants. Limited Liability Company Law § 609 provides that a member of an LLC is not liable for the obligations or liabilities of the LLC. An exception exists, though, if a member "participate[s] in the commission of a tort in furtherance of company business." (Board. of Mgrs. of Beacon Tower Condominium v 85 Adams St., LLC, 136 AD3d 680, 681-682 [2d Dept 2016].) Here, however, plaintiffs' allegations do not identify what Do's individual conduct was or how she participated in the alleged scheme. (Cf. 277 Mott St. LLC v Fountainhead Const., LLC, 83 AD3d 541, 542 [1st Dept 2011] [holding that fraudulent-conveyance claim was properly pleaded against principal of LLC due to his "personal participation"].)

Additionally, the court agrees with defendants that plaintiffs' allegations are insufficient to support a piercing-the-corporate-veil theory. In the complaint, plaintiffs allege that Do manages all the LLCs, that some of the LLCs have the same registered addresses, and that the same email address was provided in the termination notices tenants received. (NYSCEF No. 1 at ¶ 63.) But these allegations do not amount to pleadings "that defendant exercised complete domination and control over the corporation and abused the privilege of doing business in the [*3]corporate form to perpetrate a wrong or injustice." (Louis Monteleone Fibres, Ltd. v Hudson Baylor Brookhaven, LLC, 228 AD3d 641, 644-645 [2d Dept 2024] [internal quotation marks omitted].) For instance, the allegations do not address some of the common factors courts consider when determining whether to pierce the corporate veil: "failure to adhere to [corporate or] LLC formalities, inadequate capitalization, commingling of assets, and the personal use of [corporate or] LLC funds." (Id. [internal quotations marks omitted].)

The branch of the motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims against Do is granted.

B. Branch of Motion to Dismiss Claims for Harassment (Third and Seventh Causes of Action)

1. NYC Administrative Code Harassment Claims (§§ 27-2004; 27-2005; 27-2115)

NYC Administrative Code § 27-2004 (a) (48) defines harassment as "any act or omission by or on behalf of an owner that (i) causes or is intended to cause any person lawfully entitled to occupancy of a dwelling unit to vacate such dwelling unit or to surrender or waive any rights in relation to such occupancy, and (ii) includes one or more [certain] acts or omissions." Qualifying acts or omissions include "knowingly providing to any person lawfully entitled to occupancy of a dwelling unit false or misleading information relating to the occupancy of such unit" (id. subd [a] [48] [a-1]); initiating frivolous court proceedings (id. subd [a] [48] [d]); acts disturbing the peace of the occupant or that cause or intend to cause the occupant to vacate (id. subd [a] [48] [g]). Section 27-2005 (d) prohibits a dwelling owner from harassing its tenants. Section 25-2115 provides that a violator of § 27-2005 will incur civil penalties.

Defendants first argue that Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to hear the Administrative Code harassment claims. They contend that only Civil Court's Housing Part has the jurisdiction to hear tenant-harassment claims. Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that Supreme Court does have jurisdiction over its claims.

The court agrees with plaintiffs. The Appellate Division has held that "Supreme Court is a court of competent jurisdiction for the purposes of Administrative Code § 27-2115 (m) (2)." (Carlson v Chelsea Hotel Owner, LLC, 202 AD3d 589, 589 [1st Dept 2022].) Plaintiffs here bring Administrative Code harassment claims under that same provision. (NYSCEF No. 41 at 15.) And the authority defendants cite in opposition is outdated. (See NYSCEF No. 12 at 12 [citing cases].)

Defendants also contend that plaintiffs' allegations fail to state an Administrative Code tenant-harassment claim. The court disagrees. Plaintiffs allege in their verified complaint that defendants have not provided them with rent-stabilized leases. They further allege that defendants sent them notices of termination and threatened them with eviction and Housing Part proceedings. (NYSCEF No. 1 at ¶ 108.) The branch of the motion to dismiss plaintiffs' Administrative Code harassment claims is denied.

2. RPL 235-d, HSTPA Part M §§ 24 and 25 Harassment Claims

Plaintiff raises harassment claims under Real Property Law 235-d and §§ 24 and 25 of Part M of the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019 (now codified as RPAPL 768 and General Obligations Law § 7-108, respectively). Defendants moves to dismiss these branches of plaintiffs' harassment claims. Plaintiff does not oppose. These branches of their claims are dismissed. (See Ferdous v Hasan, 236 AD3d 99, 994 [2d Dept 2025] [holding that plaintiff abandoned causes of action he did not address in opposition to motion to dismiss and on appeal].)

3. 9 NYCRR 2205.1 (b) and Rent Stabilization Code § 2525.5 Harassment Claims

Next, plaintiffs premise claims on 9 NYCRR 2205.1 (b) and Rent Stabilization Code § 2525.5, which prohibit owners from engaging in conduct intended to cause tenants to vacate or disturbs their peaceful use and occupancy of the premises. Under 9 NYCRR 2205.1 (b), this conduct includes but is "not limited to interruption or discontinuance of essential services or filing of false documents with or making false statements to the city rent agency." Under Rent Stabilization Code § 2525.5, this conduct includes but is "not limited to interruption or discontinuance of required services, or unwarranted or baseless court proceedings or filing of [*4]false documents with or making false statements to DHCR," the Department of Housing and Community Renewal.

Defendants argue that plaintiffs do not allege "what false statements were made to DHCR, they ma[ke] no statements that required services were discontinued, they make no claims that any preferential rents have been discontinued," and "do not allege that any court proceedings have been brought against them." (NYSCEF No. 12 at 17.) Defendants argue that the only allegation plaintiffs make "is that notices of termination were served to them" but that termination does not fall within the definition of harassment under these provisions. (Id.)

Plaintiffs emphasize that these provisions expressly do not limit qualifying prohibited conduct to that enumerated in the statute. The court agrees with plaintiffs. The statutory language does not expressly preclude plaintiffs from raising 9 NYCRR 2205.1 (b) and Rent Stabilization Code § 2525.5 claims arising from the termination notices. The branch of the motion to dismiss this branch of plaintiffs' harassment claim is denied.

C. Branch of Motion to Dismiss Claims Arising From 153 West 74th Street

Defendants argue that no person in this action is or was a tenant at the 153 West 74th Street building and accordingly that the complaint should be dismissed to the extent claims arise from that building. (NYSCEF No. 12 at 19.) Plaintiffs argue that, as a class they can allege an injury against a class of defendants. Plaintiffs allege that all the buildings—including 153 West 74th Street—are owned by UWS and thus a claim lies against all the buildings, because of their involvement in a common scheme.

Under CPLR 902, "a plaintiff must move within 60 days after the window for responsive pleadings has closed for an order to determine whether an action brought as a class action may be so maintained." (Maddicks v Big City Properties, LLC, 34 NY3d 116, 126 [2019].) The court may grant a pre-certification motion to dismiss only if it "appears conclusively from the complaint and from the affidavits that there was as a matter of law no basis for class action relief." (Griffin v Gregory's Coffee Mgt. LLC, 191 AD3d 600, 601 [1st Dept 2021] [internal quotations marks omitted].)

Defendants have not conclusively shown that no basis for class-action relief exists with respect to the 153 West 74th Street building. Although plaintiffs make no allegation against the 153 West 74th Street building itself, plaintiffs allege that the building is owned by UWS and used to perpetuate a common scheme against UWS tenants. These allegations are sufficient to support claims that involve the 153 West 74th Street building. (See Maddicks v Big City Properties, LLC, 163 AD3d 501, 503 [1st Dept 2018], affd 34 NY3d 116 [2019] [holding that the potential for class-action relief was available—although the action concerned 11 buildings and eight owners—when the buildings were managed by one company and the buildings' owners were part of one holding company].)

The branch of defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint to the extent it pertains to the 153 West 74th Street building is denied.

II. Motion Sequence 002

On motion sequence 002, defendants Lorent Realty, LLC, JJR 1315, LLC, and Arbel Properties LLC (the prior owners) move to dismiss plaintiffs' claims against them under CPLR 3211 (a) (1), (3), and (7). Plaintiffs have asserted claims against the prior owners for rent overcharge (second and sixth causes of action) and eviction (ninth cause of action). The motion to dismiss these claims is granted.

A. Individual Rent-Overcharge Claim (Second Causes of Action) & Rent-Overcharge Class Claim (Sixth Cause of Action)

Prior owners argue that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for rent overcharges.^[FN1] They [*5]argue that plaintiffs have not alleged when their leases began, the original rent amounts, or successive rent increases.

Plaintiffs contend that their rent-overcharge claims should not be dismissed. They argue that it is not possible to determine the legal regulated rent at this point, because the only records available so far are certificates of occupancy and unreliable DHCR rent roll records. Instead, plaintiffs contend that we can look at HSTPA's default formula to determine later what the base date rents were. (See 9 NYCRR 2522.6.)

Even if the HSTPA framework applies,^[FN2] the base date is the "date of the most recent reliable annual rent registration statement, filed and served upon a tenant six or more years prior to the filing of a complaint of overcharge or the initiation of a proceeding to determine the legal regulated rent of an apartment." (9 NYCRR 2526.7.) Plaintiffs essentially argue that the DHCR rent roll registration is unreliable, because it is based on self-reported rent history. (NYSCEF No. 46 at 14.) They further argue that "years of rental history were not filed with the DHCR by the prior owners," and that "[i]nstead of providing some explanation for its non-compliance with their obligations, the prior owners rely on their own failure as basis for their arguments that the individual tenants cannot articulate their rent overcharges claims with particularity." (Id.)

The court concludes that plaintiffs do not provide a sufficient basis to believe they were overcharged. Even assuming the subject buildings are rent-stabilized, plaintiffs do not allege when their leases began, when the overcharges began, or by how much they were overcharged. (See Nadler v Carmine Ltd., 231 AD3d 485, 486-487 [1st Dept 2024] [holding plaintiff could not maintain her overcharge claim when the first alleged overcharge occurred 16 years before plaintiff filed her complaint].) In short, plaintiffs do not detail how the subsequent increases were unlawful. (See Spatz v Valle, 2019 NY Slip Op 50452(U), *1 [App Term, 1st Dept 2019] [affirming dismissal of overcharge counterclaim when plaintiff made no allegations supporting "that any subsequent increases in the base date rent were unlawful"].)

The branch of the motion to dismiss plaintiffs' overcharge claims (second and sixth causes of action) is granted. The court does not reach the parties' remaining arguments about dismissal of these causes of action.

B. Eviction Class Claim (Ninth Cause of Action)

Prior owners argue that plaintiffs provide no allegation to support a class claim for unlawful eviction. According to prior owners, plaintiffs have not alleged any unlawful eviction that would have come within the one-year limitations period for wrongful-eviction claims. (NYSCEF No. 38 at 17.) Plaintiffs do not oppose this branch of the motion. Prior owners' request to dismiss the ninth cause of action for eviction against them is granted.

III. Motion Sequence 003

On motion sequence 003, plaintiffs move for default judgment against defendant Tran Group Management, LLC. Under CPLR 3215 (f), plaintiffs must show that they served Tran Group, Tran Group's default, and proof of the facts constituting plaintiffs' claims. The parties do not dispute that plaintiff served defendants with the complaint or that Tran Group failed to appear timely. The question is whether plaintiffs have provided proof of the facts constituting their claims.

Tran Group argues that plaintiffs have not offered proof supporting their claims, because (1) plaintiffs make no allegations that Tran Group was involved with the leases, rent, ownership or management of the buildings; and (2) Tran Group has nothing in common with the other LLCs, other than being managed by Do. (NYSCEF No. 78 at 3.) Plaintiffs argue that their allegations—that Do is Tran Group's managing member and that the LLCs used a Tran Group [*6]email address to send out termination notices—are sufficient, at least until further discovery can be conducted. (NYSCEF No. 80 at 9.)

In support of their claims, plaintiffs provide only their verified complaint. Although a complaint verified on personal knowledge may establish the facts constituting the claim for default-judgment purposes (see Woodson v Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 NY2d 62, 70 [2003]), plaintiffs' verified complaint does not. Plaintiffs do not allege that Tran Group owns, leases, or manages any subject building or collected rent on those buildings. They allege only that Do is managing member of Tran Group and that a Tran Group email address was listed on plaintiffs' termination notices. They do not allege that Tran Group was otherwise enmeshed with the other current-owner LLCs. And plaintiffs do not allege that Tran Group had any involvement with the buildings or plaintiffs' leases or rent. The court therefore concludes that plaintiffs' factual allegations are insufficient to state claims against Tran Group—and therefore insufficient to entitle plaintiffs to default judgment against Tran Group. (See Matter of Dyno v Rose, 260 AD2d 694, 698 [3d Dept 1999].)

Plaintiffs' motion for a default judgment against Tran Group is denied. The court does not reach the parties' remaining arguments on this motion.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the branch of defendants UWS, 114 West 74th Street, LLC, 13 West 82nd Street, LLC, 15 West 82nd Street, LLC, 3rd Avenue, and Do's motion to dismiss the complaint against Do individually (mot seq 001) is granted, and the complaint is dismissed as against Do with costs and disbursements as taxed by the Clerk upon the submission of an appropriate bill of costs; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of defendants UWS, 114 West 74th Street, LLC, 13 West 82nd Street, LLC, 15 West 82nd Street, LLC, 3rd Avenue, and Do's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' Administrative Code tenant-harassment claims (mot seq 001) is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of defendants UWS, 114 West 74th Street, LLC, 13 West 82nd Street, LLC, 15 West 82nd Street, LLC, 3rd Avenue, and Do's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' Real Property Law § 235-d, HSTPA, 9 NYCRR 2205.1 (b), and Rent Stabilization Code § 2525.5 tenant-harassment claims (mot seq 001) is granted, and this branch of plaintiffs' tenant-harassment claim is dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of defendants UWS, 114 West 74th Street, LLC, 13 West 82nd Street, LLC, 15 West 82nd Street, LLC, 3rd Avenue, and Do's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claiming arising from the 153 West 74th Street building is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that defendants Lorent Realty, JJR 1315, and Arbel Properties' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' causes of action for rent overcharge (second and sixth causes of action) and eviction (ninth cause of action) against them (mot seq 002) is granted; and action is dismissed against Lorent Realty, JJR 1315, and Arbel Properties with costs and disbursements as taxed by the Clerk upon the submission of an appropriate bill of costs and it is further;

ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for default judgment against Tran Group (mot seq 003) is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that the balance of the claims in this action are severed and shall continue; and it is further

ORDERED that the remaining parties shall appear before this court for a telephonic preliminary conference on July 7, 2025; and it is further

ORDERED that UWS, 114 West 74th Street, LLC, 13 West 82nd Street, LLC, 15 West 82nd Street, LLC, 3rd Avenue, and Do serve a copy of this order with notice of its entry on all parties and on the office of the County Clerk (by the means set forth in the court's e-filing protocol, available on the e-filing page of the court's website, https://ww2.nycourts.gov/ courts/1jd/supctmanh/E-Filing.shtml), which shall enter judgment accordingly.