| Norris v MSG Networks Inc. |
| 2025 NY Slip Op 51223(U) [86 Misc 3d 1246(A)] |
| Decided on July 7, 2025 |
| Supreme Court, New York County |
| Lebovits, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Gary Norris, Plaintiff,
against MSG Networks Inc. and THE MADISON SQUARE GARDEN COMPANY, Defendants. |
This action arises from a slip-and-fall accident at Madison Square Garden (MSG) suffered by plaintiff, Gary Norris.
Plaintiff was at a concert at MSG on August 11, 2018, when he fell after exiting the bathroom. (NYSCEF No. 39 at ¶¶ 2—3.) A custodian employed by MSG was mopping up spilled beer outside the bathroom less than a minute before plaintiff fell. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Video surveillance footage shows that the custodian was still mopping at the time of the fall and that he [*2]helped plaintiff get back up. (Id.) A guest-services supervisor at MSG prepared an incident report in connection with plaintiff's fall. (Id. at ¶ 7.)
Plaintiff brought this action against defendants, MSG Networks Inc. and the Madison Square Garden Company, seeking damages for negligence. Defendants now move for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The motion is denied.
Defendants argue plaintiff should have known to use caution in the area because he could see the custodian mopping the floor nearby. (NYSCEF No. 39 at ¶ 14.) Plaintiff argues that defendants do not make out a prima facie entitlement to relief and that even if they do, there are material questions of fact necessitating denial of their motion. (NYSCEF No. 56 at ¶ 3.) Plaintiff argues that questions of fact include (1) whether the custodian's cleaning efforts made the situation worse; (2) how long the spill occurred before it was cleaned up; (3) whether the condition was open and obvious; and (4) whether defendants should have put out wet-floor warning signs.
Plaintiff argues that a question of fact exists about whether the custodian made the spill worse by spreading it over the area in which plaintiff slipped. Plaintiff relies on video surveillance showing that the custodian did not have a bucket to ring out the mop. (NYSCEF No. 56 at ¶ 19.) Defendants explain that the custodian was using a dry mop; there was no bucket. (NYSCEF No. 59 at 7.) Plaintiff also claims that the surveillance video shows that the custodian was looking around while mopping (NYSCEF No. 56 at ¶ 20); but plaintiff does not explain why the direction in which the custodian is looking should give rise to a genuine dispute about whether his mopping was adequate. In these circumstances, no material dispute of fact exists about the adequacy of the custodian's mopping (or about whether his mopping exacerbated the wet-floor condition).
With respect how long it took defendants to mop the spill, defendants do not provide conclusive evidence of the time elapsed between when the beer was spilled and when it was mopped up. (See NYSCEF No. 49.) However, neither party alleges that plaintiff slipped on spilled beer that had not yet been mopped up. (See NYSCEF No. 39 at ¶ 4.) The surveillance video footage shows that the custodian had already mopped up the area of the floor in which plaintiff slipped. (NYSCEF No. 59 at 6.) And all parties agree that a witness saw plaintiff slip and fall on water, not beer. (See NYSCEF No. 39 at ¶¶ 4, 14.) The length of time between spill and mopping is therefore immaterial.
Plaintiff also argues that a jury question exists about whether the slickness of the floor that led plaintiff to slip was an open and obvious hazard. If a hazardous condition is open and obvious, a property-owner has no duty to warn of the condition. (Tagle v Jakob, 97 NY2d 165, 169 [2001].) Absent a duty, a property-owner's failure to warn cannot support a negligence claim. (Westbrook v WR Activities-Cabrera Mkts., 5 AD3d 69, 71 [1st Dept 2004].) A court should determine as a matter of law that "a risk was open and obvious" only when "the facts compel such a conclusion." (Id. at 72.) Even if a hazardous condition is visible, context is [*3]important in determining whether questions of fact remain about the obviousness of the hazard. (Id.)
Here, context points toward a conclusion that it is for a jury to determine whether the hazardous condition was open and obvious. The surveillance footage indicates that the custodian's mopping would have been visible to the plaintiff. At the same time, the video also reflects that plaintiff fell while walking on a busy, crowded concourse within MSG and that nothing separated (or otherwise called attention to) the area being mopped from the rest of that section of the concourse. In these circumstances, a reasonable jury could find that the custodian mopping effectively blended into the rest of the pedestrian traffic on the concourse enough that the hazard of a slick floor being mopped was not open and obvious. (See Thornhill v Toys "R" Us NYTEX, 183 AD2d 1071, 1073 [3d Dept 1992]; accord Saretsky v 85 Kenmare Realty Corp., 85 AD3d 89, 92-93 [1st Dept 2011].)
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that defendants' summary-judgment motion is denied.
DATE 7/7/2025