When they declared ready 73 days into the prosecution of this misdemeanor case, the People had neither obtained nor disclosed materials from Officers Holguin and Reyes, the two NYPD warrant-squad officers who had actually arrested defendant S. Clarke.^[FN1] The People's discovery disclosures did not even name the officers, or acknowledge their roles in the case. But after the defense flagged the problem by email upon an examination of the underlying discovery documents, the People managed to obtain and disclose the missing materials, including the officers' body-worn cameras, within 11 days of the alert—albeit after the § 30.30 deadline would have expired.

The primary issue is whether this belated disclosure retroactively invalidates the People's Certificate of Compliance (COC) and declaration of readiness. Were the People to have conceded an oversight, or to have otherwise provided some pre-readiness record suggesting diligence in connection with this material, the question might be straightforward. But the People argue instead that they believed the warrant squad did not wear body-worn cameras or prepare memo books—a position that does not explain the total omission of the two arresting officers from the People's COC.

Regardless of this shortcoming, the People exercised reasonable diligence overall. So, with some reservations, the defense's motion to deem the COC invalid and dismiss the accusatory instrument under C.P.L. § 30.30 is DENIED. The People are also ORDERED to disclose the relevant CCRB information or seek a protective order.

Defendant S. Clarke is charged by information filed October 1, 2024 with criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation (P.L. § 121.11(a)), a class A misdemeanor, and second-degree harassment (P.L. § 240.26(1)), a violation. The charges arose out of an alleged September 7 incident involving Clarke's ex-girlfriend.

Although an I-Card was issued for Clarke's arrest on September 10, he was not taken into custody by the warrant squad until around noon on October 1, apparently at his workplace. The NYPD's arraignment verification card named the arresting officer as Detective Johnson of the NYPD's 40th Detective Squad, who also oversaw the girlfriend's photographic identification of Clarke. As Clarke seems not to have made any statements to officers during his arrest, the People did not file and serve C.P.L. § 710.30(1)(a) statement notice.

The case was arraigned on October 2, and the complaint was converted into a misdemeanor information on November 14. The case was then adjourned to January 10, 2025 for the filing of a COC.

The People instead filed their compliance materials off-calendar on December 13, 73 days after the commencement of the case and about a month before the next in-court appearance. According to their COC, the People had disclosed, among other things, the body-worn cameras and memo books of four officers who had responded to the home on the September 7 incident date; the memo books and cameras of officers who had conducted post-incident home visits on September 9, October 10, and November 6; the DD5 paperwork of several other officers (including Detective Johnson); and CCRB reports. The People indicated that they had not yet been able to obtain FDNY records, which they had subpoenaed on November 29.

As will be relevant shortly, the People's actual COC did not mention Officers Reyes and Holguin, although the People appear to have provided other materials arising out of the arrest.

Three weeks later, on January 3—94 days after the case commenced, and just beyond the 90-day § 30.30 deadline—defense counsel emailed the assigned assistant district attorney, writing that counsel had "just finished" reviewing the discovery and "ha[d] a few questions." Jan. 3, 2025 email from Defense Counsel to the People. In particular, defense counsel flagged an issue that had been revealed by the DD5s: "The DD5s make clear that although Detective Johnson processed Mr. Clarke's arrest at the precinct, PO [] Reyes arrested Mr. Clarke at his work." Id. Defense counsel thus asked the People to share Reyes's body-worn camera and activity log, along with materials associated with "any partners or other detectives on the scene during Mr. Clarke's actual seizure," none of whom had been named by the COC. Id. She also sought disclosure of an I-Card, and objected to the partial redaction to a CCRB history report for testifying Officer Quiles.

In an emailed response five days later, the prosecutor explained that she was looking into the warrant squad issue, and mentioned a policy under which the warrant squad did not use memo books or body worn cameras:

My understanding is that the warrant [squad,] much like detectives document action on a case in DD5s as opposed to patrol officers who use memo books. Moreover, it was my understanding that warrant squad does not have body worn camera. When I asked Detective Johnson earlier this afternoon, he himself was unclear and unsure whether the policy has changed. . . . I will follow up with warrants tomorrow when I get in and see if warrant squad does in fact wear body worn camera. . . . If I am in receipt of any body worn camera from the warrant squad, I will provide it to you ASAP.

Jan. 8, 2025 email from the People to Defense Counsel. Defense counsel replied that she "kn[e]w for a fact" that the warrant squad used body-worn cameras and prepared memo books, because she had successfully obtained them in other cases—and because a January 2024 policy change now mandated that warrant squad members wear cameras. Jan. 9, 2025 email from Defense Counsel to the People.

Across several days, the assigned prosecutor reached out directly to Officers Reyes and Holguin by telephone and email. By January 14—32 days after filing their COC, and 105 days after filing the complaint—the People had disclosed all material associated with Reyes and Holguin to the defense, including their body-worn camera footage and memo books.

The defense now moves to invalidate the People's COC,^[FN2] contending that the People were not actually ready on December 13, as shown by the belated disclosure of Reyes's and Holguin's digital activity logs, body-worn camera footage, and body-worn camera audit trail logs, along with Holguin's name and work affiliation (as he had not been identified in the COC or earlier DD5s) and defendant Clarke's I-Card. Defense Mot. at 6—7. The defense also identifies two documents that have still not been disclosed: an ambulance call report and an unredacted CCRB history report for Officer Quiles. Id. at 7—8.

In their response, the People contend that the record of this case, as a whole, shows that they exercised reasonable diligence and "made their best efforts" to obtain all discoverable material before declaring ready. People's Resp. at 3. The People make no record about their pre-declaration attempts to obtain the warrant squad material, and argue instead that they did not initially seek it because they had been "[p]reviously told" that the squad did not utilize memo books or body worn cameras. Thus, to demonstrate diligence, the People rely only on their post-readiness efforts to obtain the missing discovery after the defense alerted them to the omission. People's Resp. at 7—8. The People do not suggest that the warrant squad materials were unrelated [*2]to the prosecution, although they do contend that, once disclosed, the materials did not reveal anything useful or novel. Id. at 8—9.

The People otherwise respond that (1) the People still have not received certain FDNY materials, including the ambulance call report, despite making multiple requests both before and after declaring ready; (2) the I-Card sought by the defense was not discovered to be its own document until January 10, and in any event duplicated material already provided; and (3) the minor redactions in Officer Quiles's CCRB reports pertained only to related CCRB matters that were not pending or deemed substantiated/unsubstantiated.

The defense has replied in further support of its motion. Among other things, the defense emphasizes that the People made no effort to obtain any material related to Officers Reyes and Holguin prior to filing their COC, and observe that the People's policy-based rationale for not seeking the body worn cameras and memo books has no application to Holguin's very identity, the omission of which from the COC is not explained by the People.

Where, as here, the highest charge is a misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three months, the People are required to be ready for trial within 90 days from the commencement of the criminal action. See C.P.L. § 30.30(1)(b). The People cannot declare ready for trial, however, unless they have also complied in good faith with their disclosure obligations under New York's revised discovery laws. See id. § 30.30(5).

To assess good faith, the "key question" is "whether the prosecution has 'exercis[ed] due diligence and ma[de] reasonable inquiries to ascertain the existence of material and information subject to discovery,'" which itself requires "reasonable" efforts to comply with discovery obligations. People v. Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 211 (2023) (quoting C.P.L. § 245.50(1)). And in responding to a motion to dismiss based on a belated, incomplete, or missing disclosure, the People always bear the burden of showing that they "did, in fact, exercise due diligence and made reasonable inquiries prior to filing the initial COC." Id. at 213.

Good faith and reasonable diligence are "case-specific" inquiries, and do not demand a "perfect prosecutor." Id. at 212. Relevant factors include:

the efforts made by the prosecution and the prosecutor's office to comply with the statutory requirements, the volume of discovery provided and outstanding, the complexity of the case, how obvious any missing material would likely have been to a prosecutor exercising due diligence, the explanation for any discovery lapse, and the People's response when apprised of any missing discovery.

The Warrant Squad Materials

The warrant squad materials present a close call—close in large part because the People's change-of-policy argument does not explain the lack of pre-COC efforts to obtain this material. But the People's rapid response once the omission was brought to their attention, coupled with the volume of discovery otherwise provided, are sufficient—if just that—to suggest an appropriate exercise of good faith and due diligence.

As recounted above, the People do not claim to have made any pre-readiness effort to obtain the materials associated with Officers Holguin and Reyes, who actually arrested Clarke at work. Nor do the People suggest in any way that this material was not discoverable, or somehow did not "relate to the subject matter of the case." C.P.L. § 245.20(1); see also People v. Coley, No. 2023-05142, ___ AD3d ___, 2025 NY Slip Op. 01945, at *6—9 (2d Dept. Apr. 2, 2025) (emphasizing the breadth of the relevant statutory language in relation to impeachment).

Instead, the People attribute their failure to provide this discovery entirely to their belief—inaccurate, as it turns out—that the warrant squad did not utilize body-worn cameras or create memo books. In the People's telling, once this change in policy was brought to their attention by defense counsel, they acted swiftly to obtain the missing materials—which, they emphasize, were of little note—and disclose them to defense. Thus, in the People's view, there was no harm caused by the belated disclosure, and their swift reaction shows their diligence.

The problem with this argument is that it does not explain the lack of any apparent outreach to the warrant squad before the COC was filed, or the absence of warrant-squad information from the COC itself. Even if the People's belief in warrant-squad practices were well-founded, what relevance would that have for the total exclusion of Officers Holguin and Reyes from the COC? After all, the People are required to disclose "[t]he name and work affiliation of all law enforcement personnel whom the prosecutor knows to have evidence or information relevant to any offense charged or to any potential defense thereto," C.P.L. § 245.20(1)(d), and the People have not argued that the arresting officers fell outside of this definition; to the contrary, they included Detective Johnson's DD5s in their initial set of disclosures, through which defense counsel learned Reyes's name. Yet Officers Holguin and Reyes are nowhere to be found in the COC filed on December 13, and Holguin was not referenced in the underlying discovery materials either. Put another way, the record is not quite consistent with identifying Holguin and Reyes, making outreach, and then choosing not to follow up because of a belief that neither officer had anything to provide.^[FN3]

That notable omission notwithstanding, the People exercised reasonable diligence overall. The People's disclosures were otherwise extensive, encompassing even material which [*3]might have been of only arguable discoverability, such as home visits that post-dated the incident. The case was not otherwise particularly complex. And to their credit, the People did move swiftly to provide the missing discovery pertaining to the warrant squad once it was brought to their attention—a relevant factor in an assessment of diligence. See Bay, 41 NY3d at 212.

Moreover, and as set forth below, the other potential lapses are comparatively minor, which distinguishes this case from People v. McDonald, No. CR-001404-24BX (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Bronx Co. 2024) (Ortner, J.). In McDonald, Judge Ortner invalidated a COC on grounds that included a failure to disclose warrant-squad body camera footage. See id., slip op. at 7. But Judge Ortner was confronted with other significant omissions, including the belated disclosure of body-worn cameras from other officers who met with the complainant in the hospital in response to a 911 call, id. at 5, and a delay in providing the complainant's medical records once the People obtained them, id. at 9. No equivalent omission is present here.

Accordingly, the People demonstrated reasonable diligence overall. The branch of the motion seeking to invalidate their COC is DENIED.

Ambulance Call Report

The defense asserts that although the complaining witness was taken to the hospital in an ambulance, the People have not provided the ambulance call report. The People respond that in addition to having subpoenaed these records on November 29, prior to declaring ready (and as disclosed in the COC), they followed up via phone and e-mail on January 8, January 25, and March 11, but have still not received the records.

While the defense argues that the People failed to make a good faith effort to obtain the ambulance call report by subpoenaing them only two weeks before declaring ready, the only argument in support is that "two weeks would not suffice to actually obtain FDNY records."^[FN4] Defense Mot. at 8 n.1. The People have made efforts since declaring ready, but while those efforts have not been fruitful, the defense does not directly suggest that they were inadequate.^[FN5] And it appears "well-settled," at least in this County, that "the disclosure of a complaining witness' medical records after the initial CoC is filed does not serve as a basis to invalidate it where the records were not in the People's possession or control when the initial CoC was filed," so long as there is some representation of diligence. People v. Hernandez, 80 Misc 3d 1035, 1039 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Bronx Co. 2023) (González-Taylor, J.).

Investigation Card (I-Card)

The defense also attacks the belated disclosure of the I-Card. The record reflects that there was some confusion over whether the I-Card was included in the initial DD5 reports, but once the People were alerted of the omission, they were able to obtain and provide the I-Card within a week.

As with the above, the People corrected their mistakes promptly upon being advised of the existence of the I-Card as an independent document. The Court will not invalidate the COC on this ground.

Unredacted CCRB History Report for Testifying Officer Quiles

Finally, the defense asserts that the CCRB History Report originally disclosed for testifying officer Quiles is improperly redacted. Further, the People have not provided an unredacted copy and the People have also not sought a protective order. The defense seeks the following relief:

[I]f this Court does not find the prosecution must turn over an unredacted CCRB History report, the defense requests that the Court conduct an in camera review of the CCRB History Report to ensure that the only allegations that have been redacted are "unfounded" or "exonerated." To the extent that any redacted allegations were disposed with a "complainant unavailable" or "complainant uncooperative" disposition, the defense renews its request for this material.

The CCRB History Report for testifying officer Quiles in the record is redacted and is annexed as Exhibit F; its redactions cannot be readily discerned, and thus their propriety cannot be evaluated. Nevertheless, because this area of the law is fluid, the redaction does not require invalidating the COC. The People are instead directed to disclose the information or seek a protective order.

The People turned over an extensive amount of discovery before declaring ready, generally explained the circumstances surrounding their lapses, and promptly corrected the core mistakes upon being notified by the defense. While the rationale for failing to turn over the warrant squad material does not quite satisfy, that omission does not require a finding of bad faith or lack of diligence in the broader context of the case.

According, it is hereby ORDERED that the COC and SCOCs are declared VALID.

There does not seem to be any dispute that, if the COC and SCOCs are valid, then the People are charged with 73 days from the filing of the complaint on October 1, see C.P.L. § [*4]1.20(16)—(17), to the filing of the COC on December 13. Accordingly, it is further ORDERED that the branch of defendant's motion to dismiss under C.P.L. § 30.30 is denied.

It is further ORDERED that the People are directed to disclose the redacted CCRB information or seek a protective order.

The foregoing constitutes the opinion, decision, and order of the Court.