On February 5, 2025, at approximately 12:35 AM., inside of 225 W 129th Street, New York, New York, defendant, Christopher Callender, and his ex-girlfriend of five years, the complaining witness, engaged in consensual sexual activity before she told defendant to stop. Defendant struck her in the face with a closed fist, bit her, and kicked her in the head, causing her substantial pain, annoyance, and alarm. The complaining witness sustained a laceration to her face, bruising to her neck, redness and swelling. The complaining witness called 911 and officers responded subsequently thereafter, observing the complaining witness' injuries.

For these acts, defendant was arrested and charged with one count each of Assault in the Third Degree (Penal Law [PL] §120.00[1]), Aggravated Harassment in the Second Degree (PL 240.30[4]), Attempted Assault in the Third Degree (PL §110/120.00[1]), and Harassment in the Second Degree (PL 240.26[1]).

On that same date, an accusatory instrument was filed, and defendant was subsequently arraigned the following day in New York County Criminal Court, where the People were not ready for trial, and the case was adjourned to March 24, 2025, for supporting deposition in Part D.

On March 24, 2025, the People filed and served a supporting deposition, and the criminal court complaint was deemed an information. The People were not ready for trial on that date, and the case was adjourned to May 9, 2025, for the People to file a Certificate of Compliance (COC) and Statement of Readiness (SOR), and for trial.

In the interim, the People filed an off-calendar COC, and accompanying SOR, along with an Automatic Discovery Form (ADF) on April 24, 2025, after sharing approximately well over 250 items of discovery. These disclosures included, inter alia, ADA notes, bodyworn camera (BWC) videos, photographs, various types of arrest paperwork, officer impeachment materials, such as NYPD Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) paperwork and Civilian Complaint Review Board [*2](CCRB) paperwork, along with civil lawsuit information, certified medical records, phone records, 911 calls, radio runs, and sprint reports, activity logs, and witness correspondence, and more. The People filed Supplemental Certificates of Compliance (SCOCs) on April 28, 2025, April 30, 2025, and May 7, 2025.

Specifically, the April 28, 2025, SCOC reflected that the People were additionally disclosing four Axon BWC timeseries files because the originally disclosed files in that regard were erroneous due to a technical update in the system. The April 30, 2025, SCOC reflected that being disclosed was (1) a duplicative copy of the certified medical records previously disclosed, (2) information that the complaining witness had previously received witness fees and a car service, and (3) Law Enforcement Disclosure (LED)/ Giglio information related to a non-testifying officer witness. Finally, the May 7, 2025, SCOC reflected that the People were disclosing DD5 follow up reports, not originally in existence. All SCOCs additionally contained accompanying restatements of readiness.

At the subsequent May 9, 2025, calendar call, the Court asked, "Are the People ready?" (Proceedings: 2). The standing ADA replied, "Yes, your Honor," before noting the dates of the filed COCs/SCOCs, along with the plea recommendation (Proceedings: 2). The Court then asked defense counsel, "Counsel, are you ready for trial?" (Proceedings: 3). Defense stated, "Your Honor, I am not in receipt of any of those documents. I did receive discovery; however, I have not received anything to my email. I wasn't in my Harlem office this morning to be able to check whether I've received anything in the mail. I will need to do so, but at this time I am reserving any contest to the prosecution's statement of readiness." (Proceedings: 3). The standing ADA then stated, "Your Honor, also we are not ready." (Proceedings: 3). The Court replied thereafter, "Okay, I thought you were. Let's pick a trial date. Ms. Branz, there are a few dates in front of your client, available dates." (Proceedings: 3). Defense counsel asked the Court, "Can we have June 9th, please," (Proceedings: 3), which the Court granted. The case was accordingly adjourned to June 9, 2025, for trial, in Part D.

On June 5, 2025, defense counsel emailed the assigned ADA to ask if the People would be conceding CPL §30.30 dismissal at the June 9, 2025, court date. The ADA ordered the May 9, 2025, calendar call minutes and, having learned of the record made on that date, filed a new SOR, on June 5, 2025, explaining that the People were ready on the May 9, 2025, court date, and that the standing ADA had no recollection, once asked, as to why he answered "not ready" on that date, after previously having said "ready." The SOR also reflects that the People continued to be ready from the May 9, 2025, calendar date onwards.

On June 9, 2025, the People maintained their readiness, contending that only 78 days were attributable to them. Defense counsel requested a motion schedule, which was granted.

Now, in papers, dated, June 16, 2025, defendant, through counsel, moves this Court for an Order deeming the People's initial April 24, 2025, COC improper and invalid, on the ground that certain materials were belatedly disclosed, and its accompanying statement of readiness deemed illusory, and dismissing the information on speedy trial grounds. In response papers, dated, June 30, 2025, the People oppose, arguing that their COC and SCOCs were proper and valid, and that they are well within their speedy trial allowances. Defendant filed a reply to the People's response on July 8, 2025.

After a thorough review of the parties' moving papers, along with the annexed exhibits therein, the court file, and the court minutes, the Court's Opinion is as follows:

Defendant moves to invalidate the People's April 24, 2025, COC and the People's subsequent SCOCs, on the ground that items were belatedly disclosed. Specifically, he argues that the belatedly disclosed BWC timeseries files and the belatedly disclosed witness fee and car service information, disclosed to defendant on April 28, 2025, rendered the initial April 24, 2025, COC invalid. In this regard, he argues that the BWC timeseries files were created and in existence before the April 28, 2025, SCOC date and that the witness fees and car service information were known to the People at the time of the filing of the People's initial COC. Defendant does not take issue with any other SCOC or other belatedly disclosed information.

The People oppose defendant's motion, arguing that the belated disclosures do not vitiate the propriety of the initial COC. Firstly, with respect to the BWC timeseries files, the People note that timeseries files differ from the BWC footage itself, as timeseries files merely store data points collected or recorded over sequential time intervals. They also aver that they provided BWC videos for ten different officers in the initial COC, along with timeseries data for those videos. They continue that following the COC, they learned that timeseries data related to the BWC videos from two officers was erroneous due to an Axon technical update, and promptly downloaded and shared the correct files once alerted to the technical update and the erroneous files (People's Response at 5).

Next, the People additionally contend that they inadvertently failed to disclose that the complaining witness was provided with witness fees and a car service home from the DA's Office (People's Response at 6). They point out that in the same section for, "Promises, Rewards, or Inducements," they had disclosed that the complaining witness received a housing referral, housing assistance, and counseling services, along with notes and documents pertaining to that. However, they unintentionally omitted the witness fees and car service home.

CPL Article 245 requires the People to disclose to a defendant "all items and information that relate to the subject matter of the case and are in the possession, custody or control of the prosecution or persons under the prosecution's direction or control," and provides a non-exhaustive list of materials subject to "automatic" disclosure. CPL § 245.20(1). Pursuant to CPL §245.20(2), the People are required to "make a diligent good faith effort to ascertain the existence of material or information discoverable under [CPL §245.20(1)] and to cause such material or information to be made available for discovery where it exists but is not within the prosecutor's possession, custody or control."

The People must also certify their discovery compliance in writing by filing a COC. The COC must "state that, after exercising due diligence and making reasonable inquiries to ascertain the existence of material and information subject to discovery, the prosecutor has disclosed and made available all known material and information subject to discovery. It shall also identify the items provided." CPL §245.50(1). If the People provide additional discovery in connection with their ongoing obligations outlined in CPL § 245.60, they must file "a supplemental certificate" that "identif[ies] the additional material and information provided." CPL §245.50(1). A SCOC will not impact the validity of the original COC if filed in good faith and after exercising due diligence or when the additional discovery did not exist when the initial COC was filed. See CPL §245.50(1-a).

Once the People file a COC, a defendant must notify the People of any potential deficiencies in the COC "as soon as practicable," and shall also file any challenges to a COC by motion "as soon as practicable." CPL § 245.50(4)(a)-(c). Significantly, the statute further [*3]specifies that "[n]o adverse consequences to the prosecution or the prosecutor shall result from the filing of a certificate of compliance in good faith and reasonable under the circumstances; but the court may grant a remedy or sanction for a discovery violation as provided in [section 245.80]." CPL §245.50(1). Any such remedy or sanction must be "appropriate and proportionate to the prejudice suffered by the party entitled to disclosure." CPL §245.80(1).

As the Court of Appeals held in People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200 (2023), "the key question in determining if a proper COC has been filed is whether the prosecution has exercised due diligence and made reasonable inquiries to ascertain the existence of material and information subject to discovery." Id. at 211 (internal quotation marks omitted). Notably, "[a]rticle 245 is not intended for use as a 'sword,' whereby [ADAs] are expected to run themselves ragged in at times futile or near-futile attempts to procure material in which defense counsel has no substantive interest beyond exhausting the People's statutory speedy trial time or hoping that the People, in frustration, opt to abandon the prosecution." People v Barrios, 82 Misc 3d 606, 613 (Crim Ct Bronx Co 2024); see also People v Thompson, 79 Misc 3d 1220(A), *2 (Crim Ct Kings Co 2023) (article 245 "does not require the impossible; it does not demand that every scrap of discoverable information be turned over before the People may file a [COC]") (internal quotation marks omitted).

Rather, due diligence is a "flexible standard that requires the People to make reasonable efforts to comply with statutory directives." Bay, 41 NY3d at 211 (internal quotation marks omitted). "Reasonableness, then, is the touchstone—a concept confirmed by the statutory directive to make 'reasonable inquiries.'" Id. at 211-12. Moreover, the Court recognized that, "[a]lthough the relevant factors for assessing due diligence may vary from case to case, courts should generally consider, among other things:" (1) "the efforts made by the prosecution and the prosecutor's office to comply with the statutory requirements;" (2) "the volume of discovery provided and outstanding;" (3) "the complexity of the case;" (4) "how obvious any missing material would likely have been to a prosecutor exercising due diligence;" (5) "the explanation for any discovery lapse;" and (6) "the People's response when apprised of any missing discovery." Id. at 212.

Importantly, the Bay decision made clear that, in assessing the validity of a COC, the reviewing court should engage in a "holistic assessment of the People's efforts to comply with the automatic discovery provisions, rather than a strict item-by-item test that would require [a court] to conclude that a COC is improper if the People miss even one item of discovery." People v Cooperman, 225 AD3d 1216, 1220 (4th Dept 2024); see also People v Williams, 224 AD3d 998, 1006-07 (3d Dept 2024) (People's COC was valid even though three discoverable items had not been disclosed where People provided "extensive" discovery before filing COC, identified missing items when they filed the COC, and acknowledged their duty to provide missing items upon receipt).

Furthermore, certain delays or discovery issues should not invalidate a COC that was made in good faith, after the exercise of due diligence and efforts made by the prosecution to comply with statutory obligations. Bay at 210-213. If the delay is a result of oversights in the production of material, delayed discovery of the existence of certain items, a good faith position that the material in question was not discoverable, or voluminous files, the Bay decision clearly posits that a court should apply a "holistic assessment" of the efforts made by the People to comply with their discovery obligations when evaluating the validity of a COC. Id. Moreover, several courts have found that certain delays or discovery issues should not invalidate a COC [*4]that was made in good faith, after the exercise of due diligence, and where, for example, the delay was a result of oversights in the production of material, delayed discovery of the existence of certain items, voluminous discovery, non-existent items, material unrelated to the case. People v Cano, 71 Misc 3d 728 (Sup Ct, Queens County 2020); People v Lustig, 68 Misc 3d 234 (Sup Ct, Queens County 2020) (Zayas, J) (court found the People's certificate of compliance to be valid, since it was clearly filed in good faith under CPL 245.50(1) and, therefore, no adverse consequence to the prosecution should result from the fact that the certificate was filed prior to the disclosure of the database search results).

After a thorough review of the moving papers, court file, COC, and supplemental COCs filed, the Court applied a "holistic assessment" of the People's efforts to comply with their discovery obligations, being mindful that perfection is not required. See Bay, 41 NY3d at 212. Here, the People's discovery list demonstrates that they initially disclosed well over 250 items prior to certifying compliance. That disclosure included activity logs, BWC footage, arrest paperwork, law enforcement disclosures, audio relating to tapes and electronic recordings of 911 calls and more, demonstrating good faith and due diligence. The People's initial disclosures were extensive and voluminous, especially in comparison to the belatedly disclosed and undisclosed materials that defendant cites (Defendant's Motion ¶5). Taken together, this demonstrates that the People's initial COC, and subsequent SCOCs, made in good faith and after exercising due diligence, were valid and proper.

Moreover, this Court also finds that the People's belated disclosures were entirely reasonable under the circumstances. While defendant argues that the timeseries files should have been disclosed with the initial COC because they were created prior to the COC date and in the People's constructive possession, the timeseries files for the two officers could not have been shared with the initial COC since the People did not know about the Axon technical update. Consequently, they had no reason to know that the timeseries files they disclosed were incorrect. Once alerted of the technical update, they were able to download and share the correct files for the two officers, a mere four days after the initial COC (People's Response at 5). The Court also agrees with the People, finding that, unlike the BWC footage itself, the timeseries files for the BWC are of arguable minimal importance and decline to invalidate a COC on that basis alone. Accordingly, on these grounds, the People's COC, and subsequent SCOCs, was valid and proper, made in good faith after exercising due diligence, and reasonable under the circumstances.

Next, this Court also accepts the People's proffered explanation of inadvertent error and/or minor oversight as to belatedly disclosing the witness fees and car service reimbursement. Indeed, under the "Promises, Rewards, or Inducements" section of their ADF, the People checked the box and disclosed that the complaining witness received housing referrals, housing assistance, and counseling services, and additionally disclosed notes from the complaining witness' interactions with the DA Office's Survivor Services Bureau, but inadvertently did not disclose the witness fees and car service reimbursement. This Court finds that given the substance of the other disclosures in this regard, the inadvertent omission of witness fees and car service reimbursements is a very easy and reasonable mistake to make. Unlike promises, rewards, and inducements such as cooperation agreements, U-Visas, or social services, witness fees and car service reimbursements do not stand out and are arguably of minor significance. And, in any event, defendant received the very information that he now complains as a defect. Here, too, the People's COC/SCOCs were valid and proper, made in good faith after exercising due diligence, and reasonable under the circumstances.

And as initially outlined above, "belated disclosures should not invalidate a [COC] that was made in good faith after the exercise of due diligence where the delay resulted from, for example, minor oversights in the production of material, delayed discovery of the existence of certain items, or a good faith position that the material in question was not discoverable." People v Perez, 73 Misc 3d 171, 176 (Sup Ct Queens Co 2021). So, too, here, the People's COC was valid as the People exercised due diligence, "as evidenced by the extensive, voluminous documents" initially provided, and the People's belated disclosures, were "minimal, insignificant, and voluntarily provided to the defense once the People were made aware of the existence of the undisclosed material," were made in good faith. People v Macaluso, 230 AD3d 1158 (2d Dept 2024) See also People v Williams, 224 AD3d 998, 1006-07 (3d Dept 2024) (COC valid even though three discoverable items had not been disclosed where People provided "extensive" discovery before filing a COC, identified missing items when they filed the COC, and acknowledged their duty to provide missing items upon receipt); People ex rel. Nieves obo Taipe v McGinley-Liddie, 2024 WL 4660126 (2d Dept November 4, 2024) (COC upheld where People disclosed additional materials after filing it); People v Pondexter, 76 Misc 3d 349, 356 (Crim Ct NY Co 2022) ("once alerted to the single missing document—which was of minimal importance—the People immediately sought and disclosed it and provided a reasonable explanation for its belated production"). In addition, as noted above, defendant hasn't received "any evidence or information that he had not received or that he had received too late to use effectively." People v Elmore, 211 AD3d 1536 (4th Dept 2022) and is entirely unprejudiced as a result.

For all these reasons, too, this Court finds that the initial COC and subsequent SCOCs were valid and proper, made in good faith after exercising due diligence, and were reasonable under the circumstances and defendant's claims to the contrary are without merit and denied.

In sum, after a thorough review of the moving papers, court file, COC, and supplemental COCs filed, the Court applied a "holistic assessment" of the People's efforts to comply with the discovery. The People have demonstrated that they acted in good faith and exercised due diligence by describing the detailed actions they took to comply with discovery obligations. They meaningfully addressed and delineated the items listed in the defendant's papers. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that the People have in fact complied with their discovery obligations pursuant to CPL §245, and therefore, the COCs are valid. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to invalidate the People's COC filed on April 24, 2025, is denied. Defendant's remaining contentions are denied as meritless.

Defendant moves this Court to dismiss this action on the basis that he has been denied his right to a speedy trial, claiming that the People have exceeded their statutory speedy trial allowances under CPL §30.30. In support of his claim, he argues that the People are attributable with well over their 90-day limit, and that the People — having repeatedly failed to validly declare their readiness on April 24, 2025, April 28, 2025, and April 30, 2025, to the present — are attributable with 124 chargeable days, from the commencement of the criminal action on February 5, 2025, to June 9, 2025, the day the Court set a motion schedule. The People oppose, contending that they have not exceeded their statutory allowances and are within their 90-day window, with 78 chargeable days when accounting for the date of the filing of their COC and periods where they rely on a statutory exclusion.

In order to prevail on a motion to dismiss under CPL § 30.30 (1)(a), a defendant must [*5]present sworn allegations of fact establishing an unexcused delay that exceeds the statutory limit. People v Allard, 28 NY3d 41 (2016); People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 215-216 (1992); People v Santos, 68 NY2d 859, 861 (1986); People v Lomax, 50 NY2d 351, 357 (1980). At a minimum, the defendant must claim that the People failed to announce their readiness for trial within the statutorily prescribed period in order to meet their initial burden. People v Beasley, 16 NY3d 289, 292 (2011); People v Allard, 28 NY3d 41 (2016); People v Luperon, 85 NY2d 71 (1995). Once the defendant has asserted that more than the statutorily prescribed time period has elapsed since the commencement of a criminal action without a valid declaration of readiness from the People, the People bear the burden of establishing sufficient excludable delay. People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333 (1980).

Pursuant to CPL §30.30(1)(b), the People must be ready for trial within "ninety days of the commencement of the criminal action" where a defendant is charged with "a misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three months " See CPL §30.30(1)(b). Here, the criminal action commenced, on an misdemeanor with a sentence of imprisonment of more than three months, on December 1, 2024, where the accusatory instrument was filed and defendant arraigned the same day, so speedy trial began to run the same day with an allowable ninety-days.

At all times until the People announce that they are ready for trial, the People are chargeable with the time that elapses unless they can show that the specific delay is not chargeable to them pursuant to an exception enumerated in the statute. CPL §§ 30.30(1), (4); People v Torres, 205 AD3d 524, 525-26 (1st Dept 2022). Moreover, under the newly enacted discovery laws defined in CPL article 245 of the Criminal Procedure Law, the People's compliance with their discovery obligations is now a prerequisite to asserting trial readiness. See CPL §§ 245.50(3); 30.30(5). Specifically, CPL §245.50(3) states that "the prosecution shall not be deemed ready for trial for purposes of §30.30 of this chapter until it has filed a proper certificate pursuant to subdivision one of this section." CPL §30.30(5) provides that "[a]ny statement of trial readiness must be accompanied or preceded by a certification of good faith compliance with the disclosure requirements of section 245.20." Once the People have met this statutory predicate by filing a proper COC, an accompanying statement of readiness is "presumed truthful and accurate and that a defendant who challenges such a statement must demonstrate that it is illusory" People v Brown, 28 NY3d 392 (2016). Thus, "[i]n the absence of proof that [a] readiness statement did not accurately reflect the People's position ..., the People [have] discharged their duty under CPL 30.30" People v Carter, 91 NY2d 795 (1998)).

The law distinguishes between delays occurring before the People have announced their readiness for trial from those that occur after the People have announced ready. People v Anderson, 66 NY2d 529, 534 (1985). While pre-readiness delays are excludable only if the People can establish that they fit within a category specifically excludable by statute, post-readiness delays are charged to the People only if they actually cause the People to become not ready for trial and are not specifically excludable by statute. People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 210 (1992); Anderson, 66 NY2d at 534. And once in the post-readiness context of the case, the People will only be charged with delays that are attributable to their inaction and that directly implicate their ability to proceed to trial. People v Nielsen, 306 AD2d 500 (2d Dept 2003).

With respect to the post-readiness posture, the burden shifts to defendant to show that delays occurred under circumstances that should be charged to the People. Cortes, 80 NY2d at 215-16; Anderson, 66 NY2d at 541; People v Collins, 82 NY2d 177 (1993); see also CPL § [*6]210.45(7). However, it is the prosecution's burden, in the first instance, to ensure the that the record of the proceedings with respect to adjournments is clear as to who is attributable with any delay so as to allow courts to make an informed decision on a 30.30 motion. Cortes, 80 NY2d at 215-16; People v Collins, 82 NY2d 177 (1993). In addition, the People are not required to declare their readiness repeatedly through the pendency of a criminal action. Cortes, 80 NY2d at 214.

Cognizant of all the relevant and applicable standards of law, and after reviewing the parties' submissions and their annexed exhibits, along with the court minutes, the Court's speedy trial computation and analysis is as follows:

The criminal action was commenced on February 5, 2025, upon the filing of the accusatory instrument, and defendant was arraigned the next day, where the case was adjourned for supporting deposition for March 24, 2025. The date of reckoning is excluded from the computations. People v Stiles, 70 NY2d 765 (1987). (47 days charged, 47 days total).

At the March 24, 2025, calendar date, the People filed and served a supporting deposition, and the criminal court complaint was deemed an information. The People were not ready for trial on that date, and the case was adjourned to May 9, 2025, for the People to file a COC/SOR, and for trial. In the interim, the People filed a proper COC/SOR, along with an ADF, on April 24, 2025, after sharing approximately well over 250 items of discovery, bringing the case into the post-readiness context. (31 days charged, 78 days total).

The People provided defendant with additional discovery, filing proper SCOCs with an accompanying statement of readiness on April 28, 2025, April 30, 2025, and May 7, 2025. This period is excluded. (0 days charged, 78 days total).

Next, at the May 9, 2025, calendar call, as noted above, the Court asked, "Are the People ready?" (Proceedings: 2). The standing ADA replied, "Yes, your Honor," before noting the dates of the filed COCs/SCOCs, along with the plea recommendation (Proceedings: 2). The Court then asked defense counsel, "Counsel, are you ready for trial?" (Proceedings: 3). Defense stated, "Your Honor, I am not in receipt of any of those documents. I did receive discovery; however, I have not received anything to my email. I wasn't in my Harlem office this morning to be able to check whether I've received anything in the mail. I will need to do so, but at this time I am reserving any contest to the prosecution's statement of readiness." (Proceedings: 3). The standing ADA then stated, "Your Honor, also we are not ready." (Proceedings: 3). The Court replied thereafter, "Okay, I thought you were. Let's pick a trial date. Ms. Branz, there are a few dates in front of your client, available dates." (Proceedings: 3). Defense counsel asked the Court, "Can we have June 9th, please," (Proceedings: 3), which the Court granted. The case was accordingly adjourned to June 9, 2025, for trial, in Part D.

This Court now addresses the record of the May 9, 2025, calendar call, and how many days, if any, are attributable to the People. First, this Court finds that upon the Court's readiness inquiry, the People maintained their prior readiness, answering that they were ready for trial at calendar. Next, the Court turned to defense counsel and asked whether counsel was also ready for trial. Defense counsel's representation that she received discovery, was not in receipt of the COC/SCOCs and needed to check the physical mail at the office and was reserving any objection to the People's COC/SOR, was in effect, defense counsel answering not ready for trial. Next, the People, seemingly in error, answered that they were not ready for trial on that date, effectively withdrawing their readiness on that date. Finally, the Court asked defense counsel for good dates, and defense counsel asked the Court for June 9, 2025, which the Court granted.

As noted above, the People had previously filed a proper COC/SOR on April 24, 2025, bringing the case into the post-readiness context. Post-readiness delays are charged to the People only if they actually cause the People to become not ready for trial and are not specifically excludable by statute. People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 210 (1992); Anderson, 66 NY2d at 534. And once in the post-readiness context of the case, the People will only be charged with delays that are attributable to their inaction and that directly implicate their ability to proceed to trial. People v Nielsen, 306 AD2d 500 (2d Dept 2003).

As relevant here, CPL § 30.30(4)(b) excludes from the speedy trial calculation any "period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendant or his counsel." Such delays "have been caused by the defendant for his own benefit", and, therefore, "the People are not required to causally trace their lack of readiness to defendant's actions before the court is warranted in excluding [them]." People v Worley, 66 NY2d 523, 527 (1985). To be sure, application of this provision of the 30.30 statute requires a "clear" request by defense counsel for an adjournment, or an unambiguous expression of consent to the People's request for a continuance. See Barden, 27 NY3d at 554. But that does not mean that the defense must say to the court, in so many words, "I am requesting an adjournment." See also People v Brown, 207 AD2d 556, 557 (2d Dept 1994) (adjournment when defense counsel "was engaged in another case on trial" not chargeable to the People). And a defense attorney cannot avoid this statutory exclusion by simultaneously acknowledging their unavailability while also refusing to consent to an adjournment. And similarly, where defense counsel actively participated in setting the adjourn date, the adjournment is tantamount to a consent adjournment. See CPL 30.30(4)(b); People v Davis, 80 AD3d 494 (1st Dept 2011).

Here, the case was already in the post-ready context, and the People announced ready at the May 9, 2025, calendar call. Once the Court asked defense counsel if, they too, were ready, while counsel did not expressly state that they were not ready, she effectively answered not ready by stating that she had to check the physical mail for receipt of the COC/SCOCs, but had all of the discovery, and wished to reserve any objection to the People's COC/SOR. The logical clear import of defense counsel's representation is that she could not proceed to trial on that date because she needed to review discovery materials and would decide whether to challenge the People's COC/SOR, which would naturally require an adjournment for defendant's benefit. And, indeed, had she been ready for trial on that date, then she certainly would have said so. She did not. Accordingly, defense counsel was not ready for trial on May 9, 2025.

The mere fact that the People subsequently retracted their readiness following counsel's is of no moment because, as noted above, the People are only chargeable with delays directly attributable to their inaction and that directly implicate their ability to proceed to trial (People v Nielsen, 306 AD2d 500 [2d Dept 2003]) and the People are not required to causally trace their lack of readiness to defendant's actions before the court is warranted in excluding [them]" (People v Worley, 66 NY2d 523, 527 [1985]). Put another way, because defense counsel was not ready for trial on that date and would need time to review discovery materials, consequently needing an adjournment, the People's lack of readiness, therefore, cannot possibly be said to directly impede their ability to try the case on that date. Accordingly, the People cannot be charged for this delay.

For these reasons, the period between May 9, 2025, to June 9, 2025, is properly excluded under CPL § 30.30(4)(b) as a "period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendant or his counsel." In addition, this period is [*7]similarly excludable because where, as here, defense counsel actively participated in setting the adjourn date, the adjournment is tantamount to a consent adjournment. See CPL 30.30(4)(b); People v. Davis, 80 AD3d 494 (1st Dept 2011). Accordingly, the time period between May 9, 2025, to June 9, 2025, is excluded. (0 days charged, 78 days total).

On June 9, 2025, the current motion schedule was set by the Court and the case was adjourned for decision on motion for July 29, 2025. This period is excludable for defendant's motion practice. CPL §30.30(4)(a). (0 days charged, 78 days total).

In sum, the People are attributable with 78 days, well within their 90-day statutory allowances, and defendant's CPL §30.30 motion is denied without a hearing. Defendant's other motions in this branch are also denied for the foregoing reasons.

The foregoing constitutes the Opinion, Decision, and Order of the Court.