Recitation, as required by CPLR § 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of respondent's order to show cause (Seq. 7) and the Department of Social Services' motion (Seq. 8) and any other relief as the court may find appropriate:

This proceeding has had a long history that need not be recapped here. What is before the court now are two motions: one (Seq. 8) from the non-party Department of Social Services seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the represented respondent, W.W., and another from W.W.'s attorneys seeking to join DSS as a party to this proceeding under the authority of CCA §110(d) and a further stay (Seq. 7).

While out of order, the court should address the request seeking a GAL first. As a preliminary matter as it could have substantial effect on the proceeding itself. The court, having previously written about the various issues facing the GAL program (354 Chauncey Realty LLC v. B.M., 86 Misc 3d 501 [Civ Ct, Kings County 2025]; 5712 Realty LLC v Ricketts, 85 Misc 3d 867 [Civ Ct, Kings County 2025]), must address the function of guardians in these types of proceedings, not just in general but as these functions arise in different procedural postures. It is established Divisional authority that guardians ad litem are not in "decision-making position[s]" but rather ones who provides aid in applying for "public assistance or arranging clean-ups" (Prospect Union Associates v DeJesus, 167 AD3d 540 [1st Dept 2018]). Generally speaking, GALs are limited to those types of assistive functions. The Appellate Division has noted that in some situations, the GAL in a summary proceeding may be out of their depth when helping a ward with severe needs and that an Article 81 guardianship would be more appropriate (New York Foundation for Senior Citizens v Hamilton, 170 AD3d 543 [1st Dep 2019]). Previously in this proceeding, APS had rejected the respondent as a client for a variety of reasons. After re-referrals and multiple fair hearings, APS accepted the respondent as a client. What follows is the instant motion brought by DSS seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem. When asked at argument, OLA counsel was unable to satisfactorily answer what DSS expected the guardian to do in this particular case, especially given respondent's very capable counsel.^[FN1] The court appreciates that there are a variety of tasks that fall outside the role, capabilities, and bandwidth of a tenants' attorney. However, the court must ask whether those tasks are appropriate responsibilities to place upon a GAL?

Here, OLA, relying on its psychiatric evaluation report, states that the respondent would benefit from "involuntary financial management, assistance in obtaining a grant to pay rent [*2]arrears, city FHEP[S], help with relocation planning, continued home care services, and connection to outpatient psychiatric tx [sic] and continued outpatient medical treatment." The court notes that the report is sealed and the underlying data and information are not available to the parties, and the formulation aspect and recommendations do not disclose any medically protected diagnosis or information.

However, appellate courts have found, as cited above, that these recommended acts fall outside of the scope of a GAL. A guardian ad litem cannot, in all likelihood, provide home care services or relocate an individual or take over financial management of the respondent in an involuntary manner. Rather, these duties fall within the powers and capacities of an Article 81 guardian. Article 81 petitions are routinely litigated by DSS/APS/OLA. Here, DSS has chosen not to follow that course. Instead DSS seeks to have the court appoint an Article 12 guardian ad litem even though that type of guardian will be inadequate for the tasks that DSS itself is currently recommending.

The court can only posit that, in certain situations, requests for GALs in housing court are used by society at large as a pro forma protection allowing the eviction process to go forward with all parties involved, including the court, complicit in allowing a fig leaf to cover up the inadequacy. This is an attempt to fill a sizeable gap in social services with a moral salve rather than a practical solution. The legislature and executive branches have the power to appropriately fill these gaps, through existing programs, such as CityFHEPS. However, despite the psychiatric evaluation report's conclusion that housing stability through CityFHEPS is the desired goal, OLA has stated that the successful CityFHEPS application is impossible. As such, the court will not give itself, the agency or society at large the cover of appointing a GAL for what amounts to a public relations device. As the court has stated in its prior orders DSS could approve the application as an exception to policy or could have taken the respondent's case during the timeframe between APS referrals or during the time the offer for a new lease was still open. Additionally, DSS could still move for an Article 81 guardian and obtain an indefinite stay from Supreme Court. It was only through multiple fair hearings and extended advocacy by respondent's counsel that APS even considered taking W.W. on as a client. To now move for an entirely inadequate guardian appears disingenuous. After argument and taking into account the above listed papers and various arguments, the court denies the motion sequence 8 for lack of good cause.

With regard to sequence 7, the court grants the motion in part and denies motion in part. Namely, the court grants the motion seeking to join DSS as a party, pursuant to CCA §110(d). Respondent's counsel is ordered to serve a copy of this order and the commencing papers on DSS through OLA. This may be done by email. The court further denies the application seeking a further stay. In the interest of justice, the warrant may execute after service of the marshal's notice which may be done by mail with reasonably contemporaneous email notification to respondent's counsel and OLA counsel as soon as August 11, 2025. The court finds the petitioner's argument unconvincing that the respondent is able to obtain appellate review of this court's declinations to sign orders to show cause not as a miscarriage of justice but rather as commendable advocacy on the part of respondent's counsel. The court explicitly requires re-service of the marshal's notice because APS must be informed of any scheduled eviction prior to [*3]execution.

The court has considered, in this discretionary exercise, the longevity of the proceeding, that OLA/DSS appeared and stated on the record that, despite prior statements to respondent's counsel, the FHEPS application is incomplete in a fatal way as OLA states, on the record, that, despite the petitioner filling out an "Intent to Rent" form in April of 2025, in order to process the application the petitioner would have to provide a new lease agreement, and all of the other arguments made on the record. This constitutes the decision/order of the court.