In this CPLR 3213 motion-action, plaintiff has sought to domesticate what plaintiff contends to be a large money judgment entered against defendants in Algeria. Plaintiff contends that two decisions of the Supreme Court of Algeria constitute, in effect, a judgment in plaintiff's favor for the amount claimed. (See Algeria Long Leap Asset Holdings, LLC v Banque De L'Agriculture et du Dev. Rural, 2024 NY Slip Op 51225[U], *2-3 [Sup Ct, NY County 2024].)

On motion sequence 001, this court denied plaintiff's motion, and granted defendants' cross-motion to dismiss, concluding that the decisions relied on by plaintiff "are not judgments within the meaning of CPLR 3213," but instead merely "reversed a lower-court ruling [*2]dismissing the plaintiff's claim, and remanded for further proceedings." (Id. at *2-3 [emphasis in original].) Absent a judgment, this court concluded, plaintiff lacked a cause of action to enforce that judgment in New York. (Id. at 3.) The court therefore dismissed the action altogether.

On motion sequence 003, plaintiff moved under CPLR 2221 (d) to reargue this court's decision on motion sequence 001. (See NYSCEF No. 85 at 1 [notice of motion].) Plaintiff contended, in substance, that this court had misinterpreted the Algerian Supreme Court decisions at issue; and that, properly read in light of Algerian law, those "decisions alone definitively establish that plaintiff is entitled to a sum certain in damages from defendants." (See NYSCEF No. 104 at 1 [decision on mot seq 003].) This court denied leave to reargue. The court concluded that, based only on plaintiff's proffered "hard-to-follow translation" of the Algerian Supreme Court decisions, absent "expert affidavits, English-language treatises, or the like, to aid this court's understanding of the relevant legal principles," plaintiff had not established that this court's interpretation of the Algerian decisions was incorrect. (Id. at 2.)

Plaintiff now moves under CPLR 2221 (d) to reargue this court's decision on motion sequence 003 denying leave to reargue. (See NYSCEF No. 106 at 1 [notice of motion]; NYSCEF No. 107 at 4 [plaintiff's mem. of law].) But plaintiff does not identify an issue of fact or law that this court overlooked or misapprehended in its decision on motion sequence 003—as required to warrant leave to reargue. (See William P. Pahl Equip. Corp. v Kassis, 182 AD2d 22, 27 [1st Dept 1992].) Plaintiff does not, for example, argue that this court erred in concluding that "contrary to Plaintiff's belief, it needed expert affirmations from attorneys with an expertise in Algerian law and the statutes discussed in the motions." (NYSCEF No. 107 at 2 [plaintiff's mem. of law].)

Instead, as plaintiff candidly acknowledges, the current motion is intended to put before this court "the affirmations of such legal experts." (Id.) But contentions based on new information—as opposed to "only the papers presented on the original application"—"is not a ground for reargument." (James v Nestor, 120 AD2d 442, 443 [1st Dept 1986]; cf. Weiss v Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 63 AD3d 1045, 1047 [2d Dept 2009] [construing the motion as seeking reargument, rather than both renewal and reargument, "because it was not based on new facts and was based on the plaintiffs' assertion that the court misapprehended the facts"].)

Plaintiff's motion is specifically denominated and argued as one for reargument under CPLR 2221 (d), rather than for renewal under CPLR 2221 (e). But even if this court were nonetheless to construe it as seeking renewal, the motion would still be denied. Renewal motions "generally should be based on newly discovered facts that could not be offered on the prior motion." (Mejia v Nanni, 307 AD2d 870, 871 [1st Dept 2003] [emphasis added].) Plaintiff here has not shown that it was unable to have compiled earlier the expert affirmations and other materials that it offers on the current motion. Although courts do "have discretion to relax this requirement . . . in the interest of justice" (id.), this court is unpersuaded that relaxing that requirement would be warranted here—particularly given that this is plaintiff's second motion to reargue. For similar reasons, plaintiff's prior belief that this court could understand and properly interpret, unaided, translations of Algerian judicial decisions does not constitute "a reasonable justification" under CPLR 2221 (e) (3) for plaintiff's failure to provide expert affirmations describing and explaining the relevant legal and interpretive principles. (Farahmand v Dalhousie [*3]Univ., 96 AD3d 618, 619-620 [1st Dept 2012] [denying renewal].) Leave to renew would not be warranted in these circumstances.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that plaintiff's second motion for leave to reargue is denied.