Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of this motion:

This holdover proceeding is predicated upon a 90-day termination notice. The petition was filed on January 9, 2024 and assigned a court date of March 21, 2024. Respondent Genevieve Gonzalez appears by the offices of Queens Legal Service. An Answer was filed.

Respondent has moved by Notice of Motion for an order granting summary judgment dismissing this proceeding. Respondent argues that the predicate notice is defective under RPL Section 232-a, and that petitioner has reinstated the tenancy pursuant to RPAPL Section 711. Respondent argues that petitioner accepted rent payments during the "window period" and upon doing so petitioner has reinstated the monthly tenancy and thereby the termination notice is cancelled. Respondent also argues the termination notice has a termination date which is short; it seeks to end term prior to the last day of the month. The monthly term has been from the 1st to the 30th day of the month. Respondent further argues that the subject premises are not legal.

Petitioner argues that it gave more than a 90-days' notice. Petitioner denies receipt of payment and argues that there is a question of fact that preclude granting summary judgment dismissing the case.

Respondent has attached to its moving papers numerous documents from "Housing Court [*2]Report (Phase VI)." The data is comprehensive and complex and would require some expertise in the interpretation of what was paid and when. The termination states that the tenancy is terminated on September 25, 2023. The documents from the shelter program indicate that checks were generated with a date after September 25, 2023 through April 2024. The court, however, cannot discern what the code means or where to begin the analysis of the data. If the code indicates that payments were made and cashed by the petitioner after September 25, 2023 and continued thereafter, then dismissal is in order. Upon showing that rents were accepted after the termination of the term, the tenancy is renewed by operation of law. See, RPL Section 232-c.

Similarly, the question as to the legal status of the subject premises and the documents from the New York City Department of Buildings (DOB) are not clear to make a finding that the unit is not a legal unit. Nor does the legality of the subject premises affect the predicate notice.

Finally, the question of whether the termination date is proper under RPL Section 232-a, must be examined with RPL Section 226-c. Section 226-c amended the required notice to be based on the cumulative amount of time the tenant occupied the residence, or the length of the tenancy in each lease, whichever is longer. Here respondent was given a 90-day termination notice to vacate instead of the 30-day notice. Before passage of the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act (HSTPA) month-to-month tenancy were given a 30-day notice. Section 232-a provides that the date of termination of the tenancy is the "day designated in the notice." See, 140 Ash Assoc. LLC v. Yu Wei Wang, 2024 NY Slip Op 34650(U)[Civ Ct, Queens County 2024], Allaico v. Rodriguez, 2024 NY Slip Op 34651(U)[Civ Ct, Queens County 2024].

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that Respondent's Motion Seq. No. 1, seeking summary judgment is denied without prejudice as to the question of rental payments during the window period, which may be raised at trial.

This matter is now restored to the calendar in the Small Property Part (SPP) to be heard on April 24, 2025 at 9:30 am for settlement or trial.

This Decision/Order will be filed to NYSCEF.

This constitutes the Decision/Order of the Court.