Claimant Luis Charriez filed this claim for unjust conviction and imprisonment under Court of Claim Act § 8-b.

Before the Court is defendant's motion to dismiss the claim, pursuant to CPLR 3211, on two grounds: first, defendant argues that Charriez's cause of action is based on a non-actionable ground under the Unjust Conviction and Imprisonment Act and must therefore be dismissed. Second, defendant contends that Charriez failed to state a cause of action because he failed to allege that he was actually innocent and that he did not by his own conduct cause or bring about his conviction—two prima facie elements of an unjust conviction and imprisonment cause of [*2]action.^[FN2]

Charriez opposes the motion.

For the reasons that follow, defendant's motion is denied.

Charriez's underlying murder conviction was vacated by the Supreme Court (the "Hearing Court") because, during the course of the trial, the prosecution had failed to disclose to defendant that it had conferred benefits upon several of its witnesses in exchange for their testimony. Compounding this violation under Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963), the prosecution not only elicited testimony from its witnesses denying that they had received any benefits for their testimony, the prosecutor also capitalized on those misleading statements by vouching for the credibility of those witnesses during summations.

Charriez's attorney moved to vacate the conviction on three grounds under CPL 440.10 (1): (c) (conviction procured through evidence known by the prosecutor to be false); (f) (improper and prejudicial conduct not appearing in the record which would have required reversal on appeal); and (g) (newly discovered evidence), however, the Hearing Court did not designate a specific 440.10 subdivision in its Decision and Order (NYSCEF Doc. No. 2 [the "First Decision"]).^[FN3]

Instead, the Hearing Court explained that its decision was based broadly upon Brady violations. The Hearing Court found that because Charriez did not have the opportunity at trial to cross-examine the People's witnesses with this Brady material—the disclosure of which would likely have resulted in a different outcome—"the defendant ha[d] met his burden on this motion by demonstrating that a Brady violation occurred" (The First Decision at p.15). Accordingly, the Hearing Court granted Charriez's motion and vacated his conviction (id.).

Thereafter, the People moved to renew their opposition to Charriez's CPL 440 motion, but the Hearing Court adhered to its decision granting vacatur of the conviction, finding that "[n]othing in the People's motion to renew suggests that [the People] made full Brady disclosures" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 3 [the "Second Decision"]).

Ultimately, the charges against Charriez were dismissed and this claim followed.

Charriez filed the instant claim pursuant to § 8-b. The claim quotes extensively from the Hearing Court's factual findings in the First and Second Decisions concerning the Brady violations. Both decisions are appended to the claim as attachments. Additionally, Charriez also attached the certificate of disposition memorializing the dismissal (NYSCEF Doc. No. 4 [the [*3]"Certificate of Disposition"]), a transcript of the People's motion to dismiss, a transcript of the Hearing Court's oral order dismissing the indictment (NYSCEF Doc. No. 5 [the "Dismissal Minutes"]), and all of the Brady material in question (NYSCEF Docs. Nos. 10 ["Brady material re. Nadine Bailey and Robert Franklin"]; 11 ["Brady material re. Marcus Lucien"]; 12 ["Brady material re. Robert McCreary"]; and 13—15 ["Brady material re. Althemease Cort"]).

In the claim, Charriez alleges that he "was falsely accused of the killing of Larry Bird" (Claim at p. 1) and the prosecutor "suborn[ed] perjury," "elicited [] false testimony," and "intentionally hid [] [Brady material]" by failing to correct trial testimony concerning the benefits conferred upon his witnesses (Claim at pp. 2—4). These acts, Charriez argues, resulted in Charriez's wrongful conviction for which he was "incarcerated for over twenty-four years" (id.).

To present a claim for unjust conviction and imprisonment pursuant to § 8-b of the Court of Claims Act, Charriez must establish by documentary evidence that his judgment of conviction was vacated on one of the grounds set forth in CPL 440.10 (1) (Court of Claims Act § 8-b [3] [b] [specifying CPL 440.10 (1)(a), (b), (c), (e), or (g) as actionable grounds for unjust conviction and imprisonment]). Vacatur of a judgment of conviction on any other ground not enumerated under Court of Claims Act § 8-b (3) (b) is not actionable in the Court of Claims (see Rosario v State of New York, 191 AD3d 586 [1st Dept 2021], lv denied, 37 NY3d 915 [2021] [affirming this Court's dismissal of a § 8-b claim premised on a vacatur for ineffective assistance of counsel under CPL 440.10 (h)]; see also Jeanty v State of New York, 175 AD3d 1073, 1074 [4th Dept 2019] [holding that in order to "recover under Court of Claims Act § 8-b the criminal judgment must have been reversed or vacated on one or more statutorily enumerated grounds (under CPL 440.10)"]).

Charriez's conviction was vacated on the grounds that the People failed to disclose Brady material (the First Decision at p.14). Such violations generally fall within CPL 440.10 (1) (h) which is not one of the qualifying grounds under § 8-b (3) (Court of Claims Act, § 8-b [3] [b] [ii] [B]; see also Leka v State of New York, 16 AD3d 557, 558 [2d Dept 2005], lv denied, 5 NY3d 704 [2005][noting that vacatur of a conviction due to the People's failure to disclose certain Brady material is not based on any of the grounds set forth in the [8-b] statute]; Baba-Ali v State of New York, 19 NY3d 627, 636 [2012] [holding that a Brady violation on its own is not a sufficient factual predicate for relief under §8-b]).

However, in at least three cases, Turner v State of New York, 50 AD3d 890 (2d Dept 2008), Baba-Ali v State of New York, 19 NY3d 627 (2012), and most recently, in Cooper v State of New York, 236 AD3d 749 (2d Dept 2025), appellate courts have addressed instances where convictions were explicitly vacated on Brady grounds but were nevertheless determined to be actionable under § 8-b.

In the Turner case, claimant successfully petitioned the federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus and had his conviction vacated after two unsuccessful CPL 440.10 vacatur motions in state court. The habeas court granted the petition based on an affidavit from the complaining witness in which, in addition to recanting, the complainant also revealed that he had lied at trial about his criminal history. The habeas court found that the prosecution either knew or should have known about the complaining witness's criminal history but failed to disclose it in violation of Turner's due process rights under Brady v Maryland (373 US 83 [1963]).

Turner then brought a § 8-b claim which survived a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss. On [*4]the State's appeal, the Second Department found that "implicit in [the habeas court's] determination were the factual findings that the prosecutor was responsible for the perjured testimony at trial because the prosecutor's office had been in actual possession of the complainant's criminal record at that time" (Turner, 50 AD3d at 892). The Turner court determined that, while not considering the matter in a CPL 440.10 context, the habeas court's findings would have constituted grounds for vacatur under CPL 440.10 (1) (c), i.e., "material evidence adduced at a trial resulting in a judgment was false and was, prior to the entry of the judgment, known by the prosecutor or by the court to be false." Accordingly, the Second Department ruled that Turner's claim properly survived the State's CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss.

In Baba-Ali v State, 19 NY3D 627 (2012), the conviction was vacated on a direct appeal rather than via a collateral attack under CPL 440.10. In assessing whether the vacatur provided a basis for Baba-Ali's § 8-b claim, the Court of Appeals examined the arguments made before the lower appellate court noting that the Appellate Division premised its reversal of claimant's conviction on Brady violations and findings that Baba-Ali had been denied effective assistance of counsel—neither of which qualifies as a predicate for a Court of Claims Act § 8-b claim. Yet, it also further noted that the Appellate Division "identified, in addition to those non-actionable constitutional violations, an element of prosecutorial misconduct going well beyond a simple Brady violation—one consistent with the sort of misrepresentation and fraud described by CPL 440.10 (1) (b)" (Baba-Ali, 19 NY3d at 636-637), an actionable ground. The § 8-b claim was therefore deemed properly grounded.

In the most recent case addressing this issue, Cooper v State of New York, 236 AD3d 749 (2d Dept 2025), the Second Department held that where "the vacatur order fails to specify a CPL 440.10 (1) subdivision, a party may submit extrinsic evidence of the court's 'actual basis' for vacating the judgment of conviction."

Applying that standard, the Second Department ruled that Cooper had stated a cause of action under § 8-b even though the hearing court made no findings of fact. Instead, the conviction was dismissed on the People's motion to dismiss the charges. The prosecutor averred that while one of its witnesses continued to maintain that she had correctly identified Cooper as the perpetrator, two other witnesses had recanted. The hearing court granted the People's motion to dismiss. In accepting these grounds as sufficient to support an § 8-b claim, the Second Department cited Turner v State of New York, 50 AD3d 890 (2d Dept 2008) and considered the CPLR 3211 axiom requiring the motion court to assume facts alleged in the claim as true (Cooper, 236 AD3d at 749). In his §8-b claim, Cooper contended that the prosecution knowingly used false or misleading evidence—facts, that if proven, would support the qualifying CPL 440.10 (1) (b) grounds for vacatur—and had also contended that his conviction was procured through fraud—a qualifying ground under CPL 440.10 (1) (c).

In the instant case, Charriez alleges in his claim that the actual basis for the Hearing Court's vacatur went beyond Brady violations (Roth Aff. at ¶ 8). The Hearing Court's decision, he argues, implicitly included vacatur on two actionable grounds: CPL 440.10 (1) (c) (false material evidence adduced at a trial resulting in the judgment) and (1) (g) (newly discovered evidence) (Roth Aff. at ¶ 14). Applying the holdings in Turner, Baba-Ali, and, now Cooper, this Court finds these allegations sufficient to overcome a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss. The State's [*5]motion to dismiss the claim pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (2) is therefore denied.^[FN4]

As stated by the Court of Appeals, a claimant bringing an 8-b claim must "'state facts in sufficient detail to permit the court to find that claimant is likely to succeed' in meeting his [] burden at trial of proving by clear and convincing evidence that (a) 'he did not commit any of the acts charged in the accusatory instrument' and (b) 'he did not by his own conduct cause or bring about his conviction' " (Warney v State of New York, 16 NY3d 428, 434 [2011] citing Court of Claims Act § 8-b [4]). "'[T]he allegations in the claim must be of such character that, if believed, they would clearly and convincingly establish the elements of the claim, so as to set forth a cause of action'" (id. at 435 citing Solomon v State of New York, 146 AD2d 439, 442 [1st Dept 1989]). "If the court finds after reading the claim that claimant is not likely to succeed at trial, it shall dismiss the claim, either on its own motion or on the motion of the [S]tate" (Court of Claims Act § 8-b [4]).

The First Decision, attached as an exhibit to the claim, includes a recitation of the criminal trial testimony of two defense witnesses. Taken together and accepted as true, their testimony establishes that during their struggle, the victim, Larry Byrd—not Charriez—drove the knife into his own chest (see First Decision at pp. 5—6 [citing to the criminal trial transcript]). These allegations "'if believed, [would] clearly and convincingly establish the elements of the claim, so as to set forth a cause of action'" (Warney, 16 NY3d at 435). Accordingly, defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) is also denied (see Warney, 16 NY3d at 435; see also Cooper v State of New York, 236 AD3d 749 [2d Dept 2025] [reversing dismissal of an 8-b claim dismissed for failure to state a cause of action] citing Grimaldi v State of New York, 133 AD2d 97 [2d Dept 1987]).

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that defendant's motion to dismiss (M-100016) is DENIED.