This Decision and Order is being entered following a trial being held pertaining to the above-captioned matrimonial action.

On May 3, 2024, this matrimonial action was commenced by Plaintiff, with the assistance of her then counsel, with the filing of a Summons with Notice,^[FN1] wherein Plaintiff sought the dissolution of the parties' marriage by annulment pursuant to New York State Domestic Relations Law (hereinafter "DRL") § 140(e), or in the alternative, by divorce pursuant to irretrievable breakdown in the parties' relationship pursuant to DRL § 170(7), or the alleged cruel and inhuman treatment of Plaintiff by Defendant pursuant to DRL § 170(1) (hereinafter "Summons"). In addition, the Summons sought the entry of a judgment granting ancillary relief including: (1) enforcing the financial award provided in the prenuptial agreement entered into by the parties on August 27, 2021, (2) spousal support, (3) declaration of Plaintiff's separate property, (4) equitable distribution of marital property, (5) distributive award, and (6) counsel fees and expert fees.

On June 12, 2024, Plaintiff's then counsel filed a request for judicial intervention ^[FN2] seeking the scheduling of a preliminary conference, along with Plaintiff's statement of net worth [*2]as of May 16, 2024 (hereinafter "Plaintiff's First SNW").^[FN3]

On June 13, 2024, a Court notice ^[FN4] was issued advising that the undersigned was presiding over this action and a preliminary conference would be held on June 20, 2024, at 12:00 p.m.

On June 21, 2024, Defendant's then counsel filed a notice of appearance,^[FN5] with correspondence seeking an adjournment of the preliminary conference,^[FN6] which was granted that day by Order,^[FN7] to July 10, 2024, at 3:00 p.m.

On July 3, 2024, Defendant's then counsel filed Defendant's statement of net worth as of June 28, 2024 (hereinafter "Defendant's SNW").^[FN8]

On July 8, 2024, Defendant's then counsel filed a demand for complaint,^[FN9] along with a request that a Spanish language court interpreter be made available for Defendant.^[FN10]

On July 10, 2024, a preliminary conference was held wherein both parties appeared with then counsel and Defendant was assisted by a Spanish language court interpreter, after which a preliminary conference order ^[FN11] was entered. A so-ordered copy of the Court transcript from the preliminary conference was filed (hereinafter "Preliminary Conference Transcript").^[FN12] During the conference, both parties stipulated that the purported prenuptial agreement, executed on August 27, 2021, was null and void, after which they were subject to an allocution.^[FN13]

On August 5, 2024, Plaintiff's then counsel filed a consent to change attorney ^[FN14] wherein [*3]the document noted Plaintiff proceeding as a self-represented litigant, after which the Court entered a notice of rejection ^[FN15] due to the filing having not complied with the Part Rules.

On August 7, 2024, Plaintiff's then counsel filed a motion by order to show cause (hereinafter "Motion Sequence # 1"),^[FN16] seeking the entry of an order relieving her as counsel for Plaintiff, which was conformed ^[FN17] directing: (1) by August 9, 2024, service of Motion Sequence No. 1, on Plaintiff and Defendant's then counsel; and (2) August 15, 2024, at 11:00 a.m., as the return date for Motion Sequence No. 1, wherein all parties and counsel were to appear in person.

On August 15, 2024, all parties and then counsel appeared, wherein oral argument was made with respect to Motion Sequence No. 1, as reflected by the so-ordered Court transcript (hereinafter "8/15/2024 Transcript").^[FN18] The application was granted ^[FN19] on the consent of Defendant,^[FN20] and on consent of Plaintiff.^[FN21] Two documents, in both the English and Spanish languages, were then marked as Court exhibits and provided to both parties: (1) Court Exhibit 1 — Self-Represented Litigant Information Sheet; and (2) Part Rules of the Hon. James L. Hyer, J.S.C. (hereinafter "Part Rules").^[FN22] A decision and order ^[FN23] pertaining to Motion Sequence No. 1 was entered relieving Plaintiff's then legal counsel from representing Plaintiff in this action; directing Plaintiff's counsel to serve Plaintiff with an outgoing attorney file enumerating the contents of Plaintiff's file with annexed copies; advising of Plaintiff's right to be represented by counsel and indicating that she would be held to the same rules as an attorney would before the Court if proceeding as a self-represented litigant; extending Plaintiff's deadline to file a complaint to September 20, 2024, at 9:00 a.m., wherein a status conference would be held; directing Defendant's then counsel to serve all documents on Plaintiff via e-mail; and directing Plaintiff's then counsel to serve a copy of the decision and order with notice of entry by August 20, 2024. On August 16, 2025, Plaintiff's former counsel filed a notice of entry of the decision with proof of service.^[FN24]

On August 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion by order to show cause seeking to proceed as a poor person and the appointment of pro bono counsel (hereinafter "Motion Sequence No. 2"),^[FN25] after which a decision and order [Grossman, V.]^[FN26] was entered pertaining to Motion Sequence No. 2, denying the requested relief after finding that Plaintiff has not established prima facie that she qualified for poor person relief.

On August 19, 2024, Plaintiff's former counsel filed proof of service of an outgoing attorney file with copies of Plaintiff's file on Plaintiff.^[FN27]

On September 20, 2024, a status conference was held where appearances were made by Defendant, Defendant's counsel and Plaintiff as a self-represented litigant, after which an order ^[FN28] was entered setting forth an extended discovery schedule.

On October 4, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint ^[FN29] (hereinafter "Complaint") seeking essentially the same relief requested in the Summons with Notice, asserting three causes of action, being: (1) for annulment pursuant to DRL § 140(e); (2) for divorce pursuant to DRL § 170(7);^[FN30] and, (3) seeking an award of treble damages due to the alleged fraud and deceit of Defendant.

On October 10, 2024, an order of reference to mediator ^[FN31] was entered to permit the parties the opportunity to engage in mediation pursuant to the 9th Judicial District Alternative Dispute Resolution Program.

On October 16, 2024, Defendant's then counsel requested an extension of time to file a Verified Answer and Counterclaim,^[FN32] which was granted by Court order.^[FN33]

On October 23, 2024, a Verified Answer and Counterclaim (hereinafter "Answer"),^[FN34] asserting one counterclaim requesting the entry of a judgment of divorce dissolving the parties' marriage due to the asserted irretrievable breakdown of the parties' relationship pursuant to DRL [*4]§ 170(7), and granting the following ancillary relief: (1) exclusive occupancy of the marital residence; (2) awarding Defendant maintenance; (3) awarding Defendant equitable distribution of marital property; (4) declaring Defendant's separate property; (5) directing Plaintiff to maintain medical and dental insurance coverage for the benefit of Defendant; (6) directing Plaintiff to pay any and all uninsured medical expenses incurred by Defendant; (7) directing Plaintiff to maintain life insurance coverage on Plaintiff's life with Defendant to be designated as irrevocable beneficiary; (8) awarding Defendant counsel fees, expert fees and other litigation expenses; (9) granting each party the right to resume the use of any maiden name or other pre-marriage surname; and, (10) awarding Defendant such other relief as the Court deems appropriate. The Answer was accompanied by an Affidavit of Translator ^[FN35] confirming that the document was translated into the Spanish language for Defendant and confirming Defendant understood the document and did not direct any modifications.

On October 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion by order to show cause (hereinafter "Motion Sequence No. 3),^[FN36] seeking the entry of an order granting inter alia interim relief. Motion Sequence No. 3 was conformed ^[FN37] directing: (1) by November 7, 2024, Plaintiff to serve Defendant's then counsel with Motion Sequence No. 3; and, (2) November 18, 2024, at 9:00 a.m., as the return date, wherein all parties and counsel were directed to appear in person for oral argument when a briefing schedule would be set if needed.

On November 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Reply.^[FN38]

On November 14, 2024, Defendant's then counsel filed a request for pre-motion conference ^[FN39] seeking to be relieved as counsel for Defendant in this action; and, after which a pre-motion conference was held on November 18, 2024, wherein appearances were made by Defendant, Defendant's counsel and Plaintiff as a self-represented litigant. Following oral argument at the conference, the Court entered a written decision and order ^[FN40] pertaining to the application, relieving Defendant's then counsel from representing Defendant in this action; directing Defendant's counsel to serve Defendant with an outgoing attorney file enumerating the contents of Defendant's file with annexed copies; advising of Defendant's right to be represented by counsel and indicating that he would be held to the same rules as an attorney would before the Court, if proceeding as a self-represented litigant; and staying the action until December 20, 2024, at 9:00 a.m., wherein a status conference would be held.

On December 20, 2024, a status conference was held wherein both parties appeared as [*5]self-represented litigants, after which an Order ^[FN41] was entered pertaining to discovery deadlines and a so-ordered court transcript was filed.^[FN42]

On December 31, 2024, Plaintiff served a second statement of net worth as of December 20, 2024 (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Second SNW").^[FN43]

On January 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed a request for pre-motion conference seeking to consolidate a separate action for dissolution of the parties' marriage commenced in New York State Supreme Court, Rockland County, known as Y. C. v. J. L., under Index Number XXXXXX/XXXX (hereinafter "Rockland Action").^[FN44] Thereafter, an Order ^[FN45] was entered directing a pre-motion conference to be held on January 24, 2025, at 9:00 a.m.

On January 24, 2025, a pre-motion conference was held wherein both parties appeared as self-represented litigants, wherein oral argument was received with respect to the relief sought by Plaintiff, after which a decision and order ^[FN46] was entered which consolidated with this action the Rockland Action and directed a settlement conference to be held on April 18, 2025, at 9:00 a.m.

On February 25, 2025, the Court referred mediator filed a letter confirming the parties had appeared at mediation but no settlement was reached.^[FN47]

On March 6, 2025, an order ^[FN48] was entered converting the settlement conference into a pre-trial conference; scheduling a trial to commence on May 27, 2025, and proceed day-to-day until completed, from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. each day; and, directing a note of issue and certificate of readiness for trial to be filed by March 18, 2025.

On March 7, 2025, a pre-trial conference order (hereinafter "Pre-Trial Conference Order")^[FN49] was entered including the pre-trial conference and trial dates previously scheduled, and directing the following:

"6. Motions in limine must be in writing and made returnable on the day of the Pre-Trial Conference. Such motions must be made no less than ten (10) days' notice to opposing counsel and/or self-represented parties. Opposition submissions must be made no less than five (5) days' notice to opposing counsel and/or self-represented parties. No reply [*6]submissions may be made. To the extent possible, the Court will decide such motions prior to commencement of the Trial. To the extent that any Motions in Limine are not made timely as set forth herein, such applications will be waived.

7. At the Pre-Trial Conference, the Court shall be provided with a hard-copy Trial Notebook with the following included with tabs for each section (except for exhibits which shall be in a separate binder with tabs), a copy of which shall be filed on NYSCEF:

a. Marked pleadings.

b. A copy of all prior Decisions or Orders on motions issued in the case.

c. A fully executed Stipulation of relevant facts that are not in dispute. The Court expects that no matter how contentious the case, there will be at least some facts that are not in dispute (e.g., the date of the marriage, the children's names and birth dates, the location of any residential real estate and the approximate date of acquisition, approximate cost, the approximate balance on any mortgage and the dates of creation of financial accounts and deferred compensation).

d. Any forensic reports, appraisals, evaluations conducted in the matter.

e. 3101 (d) Expert Witness Disclosures made in this matter with proofs of service.

f. An exhibit list and pre-marked exhibits. Only those items that are received in evidence will be marked by the reporter. Copies of all exhibits intended to be offered must be presented to the Court in a ringed notebook with a table of contents, with Plaintiff's exhibits numbered, and Defendant's exhibits lettered in the order in which they are generally intended to be used, with external tabs separating each exhibit. Counsel shall exchange their notebooks with proposed exhibits at least seven (7) business days prior to the Pre-Trial Conference. Failure to timely submit an exhibit list and proposed exhibits may result in preclusion. At the Pre-trial Conference, counsel must either stipulate to the admission of the exhibits to be offered by the adverse party or state the ground or any objection to admission of any such exhibit. Such Stipulation must be prepared before the Pre-Trial Conference, in writing, so that it may be presented to the Court at the Pre-Trial Conference. Counsel must be prepared to argue to the Court at the Pre-Trial Conference, the admissibility of any exhibits to which an objection is taken. Counsel are advised that the failure to include an exhibit in the exhibit list and/or to participate in the exhibit exchange provided for herein, may result in preclusion of that exhibit.

g. A List of Witnesses, including the address of each witness, the time anticipated for the witness' direct examination, and the general subject matter of his or her testimony. The failure to identify a witness may result in the preclusion of that witness' testimony.

h. A Joint Statement of Proposed Disposition. To the extent the parties disagree on any item, Plaintiff s position should be set out first, followed by Defendant's position.

i. A Child Support Worksheet, if applicable.

j. A Spousal Support Worksheet, if applicable.

k. Updated Statements of Net Worth (with the latest available supporting documents, such as income tax returns, W-2s, brokerage and retirement plan statements).

l. Memoranda of Law concerning any procedural, evidentiary, or other legal issue which the parties anticipate the Court will need to determine."

On March 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed two motions by notice of motion, including the first [*7](hereinafter "Motion Sequence No. 4"),^[FN50] seeking the entry of an order granting Plaintiff relief, inter alia, compelling Defendant to produce discovery. The second (hereinafter "Motion Sequence No. 5"),^[FN51] seeking the entry of an order granting Plaintiff relief, inter alia, imputing income to Defendant.

On March 18, 2025, a decision and order was entered pertaining to Motion Sequence No. 4,^[FN52] and a second decision and order was entered pertaining to Motion Sequence No. 5.^[FN53] Both decisions denied without prejudice the requested relief due to Plaintiff's failure to comply with the Part Rules by requesting a pre-motion conference prior to engaging in motion practice and scheduled a pre-motion conference to be held on March 20, 2025, at 9:00 a.m. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a request to adjourn the pre-motion conference,^[FN54] which was granted by order ^[FN55] adjourning the date to March 21, 2025, at 9:00 a.m.

On March 21, 2025, a pre-motion conference was held wherein both parties appeared as self-represented litigants during which the Court made decisions on the record as to the relief requested, as reflected by the so ordered Court transcript (hereinafter "3/21/2025 Transcript"). During the conference, the Court directed both parties to comply with the pre-trial conference order by filing updated statements of net worth prior to the scheduled trial:

"THE COURT: So then I'm directing you, sir, by Friday of next week, to make sure this is very clear, by May 28, 2025 — sorry, March 28, 2025, to submit to the Court and serve upon the plaintiff via e-mail an updated statement of net worth. You are to review this carefully and assume that you are on the stand and you are providing information; because one of the responsibilities that I will have, as I always do on the bench trial, is listening to all the testimony from all the witnesses and determining truthfulness and veracity and credibility. And frankly, both of you have a responsibility under the Court rules, which are included in the pretrial conference order, which we will address in a moment, which require to you submit a trial binder. So you are both required to submit updated statements of net worth. But this will give you an opportunity to revisit that. Do you understand all of that, sir?

DEFENDANT: Yes, I understand."^[FN56]

The Court then reminded the parties of the dates for the pre-trial conference and trial, and the pre-trial conference requirements, furnishing both with another copy of the pre-trial [*8]conference Order:

"THE COURT: Very good. I just want to remind you — to the extent you would like another copy, I'm happy to print it out for you — we have a pretrial conference order which consists of four pages. Now, this provides the date of the trial being May 27, 2025 through May 30, 2025, starting each day at 9:00 a.m. and continuing until 5:00 p.m. I customarily take a lunch break from 1:00 to 2:00, so I want you to be aware of that. Also we have a pretrial conference date scheduled for April 18, 2025 at 9:00 a.m. in person. Now, I include my pretrial conference requirements in the order because I'm trying to be user friendly not just for the self-represented litigants, but also for the lawyers that appear here. So there is a list of all of the documents that you need to file in that order. And I'm going to ask that you review it very carefully. Amongst those documents are a witness list of all the witnesses you intend to call at the trial. I want to make it very clear, if you fail to file this with the Court and/or disclose it to the other side timely, there is a strong likelihood that you will be precluded from calling that witness at the trial. Number two, you need to provide me with an exhibit list which will enumerate each exhibit individually that you would like to utilize at the trial. If you fail to enumerate an exhibit and file it separately with the Court, then there is a strong likelihood you will be precluded from utilizing that exhibit at the trial. Now, there are other things that go into this as well. I'm going to remind you, you also need to exchange hard copy notebooks with each other at least seven full business days before the trial. Now, in most cases the lawyers will meet and they will discuss all of the exhibits and whether or not the exhibits can be moved into evidence on consent at the trial. I told the lawyers and I will tell you, you don't have to agree upon anything. However, if you do, it will streamline the process. So for example, if plaintiff has 50 exhibits and defendant has ten, which ones will be marked for identification and moved into evidence on consent on the first day of trial? If you can't come to an agreement, that's perfectly fine. I suggest strongly you review the rules of evidence, because they matter here. If documents don't have a proper foundation, they will not be admitted into evidence. Understood? Okay. Now, to the extent that motions in limine need to be filed, they need to be filed at least ten days before the pretrial conference. The opposition needs to be filed at least five days before. They need to be made returnable on that date. So that's where we are with this case. Plaintiff, do you have a copy of the pretrial conference order? Would you like another copy?

PLAINTIFF: I have a copy, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Defendant, would you like a copy of this order?

DEFENDANT: Yes, I need a copy.

THE COURT: Very good. What I will do is I'm going to print out two copies. And in an abundance of caution I'm going to have the court reporter mark an additional copy as Court Exhibit Number 2. This will confirm on the record in real time that you have received this. And to the extent you do not comply with it, even though you are self-represented litigants, you have now had multiple opportunities to comply with the Court orders. If you fail to do so, I will have to levy the appropriate decision. So we will do that in real time right now.

(Pause.) (Document marked Court Exhibit 2.)

THE COURT: Court Exhibit Number 2 has been marked. Plaintiff, did you receive a copy?

PLAINTIFF: Yes, I did.

THE COURT: Defendant, did you receive a copy?

DEFENDANT: Yes, I received it."^[FN57]

On March 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed a note of issue and certificate of readiness for trial.^[FN58]

On April 18, 2025, a pre-trial conference was held wherein both parties appeared as self-represented litigants for which a so ordered Court transcript was filed (hereinafter "4/18/2025 Transcript").^[FN59] During the conference, Court exhibits were marked and filed: (1) Court Exhibit #1 — Plaintiff's Witness List enumerating ten trial witnesses;^[FN60] (2) Court Exhibit #2 — Defendant's Witness List enumerating two trial witnesses;^[FN61] (3) Court Exhibit #3 — Plaintiff's Exhibit List enumerating Plaintiff's Exhibits A-K;^[FN62] and (4) Defendant's Exhibit List enumerating Defendant's Exhibits A-E.^[FN63] Defendant consented to the following of Plaintiff's Exhibits being admitted into evidence on consent on the first day of trial: B, C, D, E, F, G, I, J, K.^[FN64] Plaintiff did not consent to any of Defendant's exhibits being moved into evidence.

The Court held the trial on May 27, 2025; May 29, 2025; May 30, 2025; June 2, 2025; June 3, 2025, June 4, 2025; June 5, 2025; and June 6, 2025. At the trial both parties proceeded as self-represented litigants. Transcripts for the trial were filed (collectively "Trial Transcript").^[FN65] At the trial, the parties were the only witnesses called to provide testimony and the exhibits admitted into evidence are reflected in the Trial Transcript copies of which are filed on NYSCEF.

At trial, Plaintiff provided her e-mail address [email protected] (hereinafter "Plaintiff's E-Mail Address") and physical address as XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXX, New York (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Address").^[FN66] Defendant provided his e-mail address [email protected] (hereinafter "Defendant's E-Mail Address") and his [*9]physical address as XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXXX, New York (hereinafter "Defendant's Address").^[FN67]

The Court addressed the application of Plaintiff, submitted in writing on May 22, 2025,^[FN68] to permit witness testimony in written form, which was not consented to by Defendant, and which was denied by the Court.^[FN69] The Court then confirmed that both parties consented to providing direct testimony in narrative form, rather than the traditional question and answer format.^[FN70]

A. Witness Credibility.

Determinations of credibility depend in large part on the court's assessments of the character, temperament, and sincerity of the parties, the trial court's determination should be accorded deference, and its determination should not be disturbed unless it lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record (Sanchez v. Rexhepi, 30 N.Y.S.3d 170 [2d Dept 2016]). "In matters of this character 'the findings of the nisi prius court must be accorded the greatest respect'" (Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167 [1982], quoting, Matter of Irene O., 381 N.Y.S.2d 865 [1975]).

"The memory, motive, mental capacity, accuracy of observation and statement, truthfulness and other tests of the reliability of witnesses can be passed upon with greater safety by a trial judge who sees and hears the witnesses than by appellate judges who simply read the printed record" (Barnet v. Cannizzaro, 3 AD2d 745 [2d Dept 1957]).

[1] Plaintiff

With respect to Plaintiff, the Court determined her to be entirely credible. The Court made this determination following direct observation of Plaintiff's testimony during the hearing which included answers which were responsive to the questions presented that appeared to be sincere.

[2] Defendant

With respect to Defendant, the Court determined him not to be entirely credible and while not disregarding his testimony entirely, provided it with the appropriate weight. The Court made this determination following direct observation of Defendant's testimony during the trial which at times included non-responsive answers which at times, appeared evasive. In addition, the Court took into consideration Defendant's character, which included conflicting information provided in the sworn statements of Defendant, and evidence presented at trial pertaining to Defendant's finances.

Initially, the Court notes Defendant's SNW reports his employment as "Self-Employed — [*10]Construction Worker" with employer "W.F.C."^[FN71] Defendant's SNW then provided total monthly expenses of $9,775.00 ^[FN72] which equates to total yearly expenses of $117,300.00, despite Defendant reporting in the same document, a gross income of $41,600.00 ^[FN73] and reflecting no debt to explain the $75,700.00 shortfall. Tellingly, despite being directed to produce as part of his pre-trial discovery an amended statement of net worth, Defendant failed to do so. This direction was cited in the Part Rules, Pre-Trial Conference Order and a reminder was provided during the conference on March 21, 2025, at which time Defendant was provided another copy of the Pre-Trial Conference Order. Further, at trial when asked to provide his annual income he responded, "I don't know, it would be 60, 70,000," and continued, "In previous years, I didn't know how to manage that. I just got an accountant and we are working to get that settled."^[FN74] When asked if the expenses listed in his statement of net worth were true, he responded that the list was "superficial"^[FN75] seemingly acknowledging that the information was not accurate.

The Court's concerns regarding Defendant's veracity regarding his finances were increased upon review of his income tax returns for the tax years 2021 through 2023 which were admitted into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit F,^[FN76] each of which will be reviewed individually herein. For 2021, the parties filed jointly listing as their combined total income as $68,508.00 arising entirely from Plaintiff's W-2 employment, with Defendant reporting no income. The Court notes Defendant's lack of reported income, despite indicating on his Supplemental Information for Spouse Beneficiary Form I-130 A, admitted into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit B, that he was employed during the period 7/2020 to present (document signed September 19, 2020).^[FN77] Notably, this document was certified by Defendant with the following language above his signature, "I certify, under penalty of perjury, that I provided or authorized all of the information in this form, I understand all of the information contained in, and submitted with, my form, and that all of this information is complete, true and correct."^[FN78] Accordingly, as Defendant certified that he was employed during the 2021 tax year, but reported no income in his income tax returns, the Court can only conclude that Defendant has not complied with [*11]applicable law pertaining to State and Federal income tax filing,^[FN79] which the Defendant appeared to confirm during his testimony, wherein he acknowledged not having included his income on the parties' joint 2021 income tax return, and/or that he provided false information in his immigration filing, either way appearing to be non-compliant with applicable law.^[FN80] Moreover, Defendant's banking statements for the period 2021 through 2024, from his personal Chase Bank Account Ending in XXXX (hereinafter "Chase Account"),^[FN81] admitted as Plaintiff's Exhibit C, reflect total deposits for 2021 into Defendant's savings account of $34,481.14 and Defendant's checking account of $98,503.63. which appear to represent income of Defendant during this period.

Upon review of Defendant's income tax returns for 2022,^[FN82] the Court finds these returns to also lack credibility as they do not reflect an income reflecting the true lifestyle and spending of Defendant. Defendant claims in this filing, $0.00 as taxable income, with reported gross income of $8,397.00 which includes reported business income of $4,123.00. Moreover, Defendant's Chase Account banking statements for 2022 reflect deposits into his savings account total $63,043.12 and his checking account total $206,628.48, which appear to represent income of the Defendant during this period.

Having also found Defendant's income tax returns for 2023 ^[FN83] to lack credibility for the same reasons noted for the 2022 filings, Defendant again lists in this filing, $0.00 as his reported taxable income, with a reported gross income of $1,057.00 which includes prior to adjustments, reported business income of $4,136.00. Moreover, Defendant's Chase Account banking statements for 2023, which are missing the statement for the period July 13, 2023, through August 10, 2023, reflect deposits into his savings account total $54,294.93 and his checking account total $181,834.06, which appear to represent income of Defendant during this period. Finally, while this Court was not provided with Defendant's 2024 income tax returns, [*12]Defendant's Chase Account banking statements for 2024, which do not include statements for the period October 11, 2024, through December 31, 2024, reflect deposits into his savings account total $41,740.06 and his checking account total $161,632.75, which appear to represent income of Defendant during this period. In an apparent recognition that his income tax returns were not credible and likely contained false information, at trial Defendant testified that he had retained an accountant to assist him as he was unaware of how to manage his business finances.^[FN84]

In addition, the Court is concerned that Defendant's business practices and financial management beyond his tax returns are deceptive, possibly running afoul of compliance with applicable law with respect to his employment of individuals in his company, use of cash transactions, registration/insurance of his vehicle. Each concern will be reviewed individually including the potential lack of disclosure of his business accounts.

While Defendant testified at trial that he employed a number of individuals, the payment of such individuals is not reflected on his income tax returns, admitted into evidence, including the schedules listing business expenses. Defendant also testified that while many people pay him in cash he doesn't deposit all of the cash receipts from his business, spending some,^[FN85] using cash to pay employees,^[FN86] using cash to pay child support,^[FN87] using cash to pay his rent,^[FN88] and further testified that he had given cash to Plaintiff, sending her money via Zelle so that he could pay bills in cash.^[FN89]

With respect to his vehicle, Defendant confirmed that he had utilized Allstate for his automobile insurance where his ex-girlfriend L.M. works.^[FN90] When presented with Plaintiff's Exhibit I, he confirmed that this was his automobile insurance declarations page provided during discovery, which contained the name of L.M. and the Defendant, listing both as married to each other, which he claimed she did without his authorization.^[FN91] Then when asked about the address listed on the policy, he initially confirmed that he lived there during the time of the policy and then acknowledged that he did not. Defendant asserted that Ms. M. included this address without his permission.^[FN92] The Court found Defendant's testimony to lack veracity and it appears that Defendant may have failed to comply with applicable law with respect to the insuring of his [*13]automobile,^[FN93] as well as registering his vehicle, as he registered it listing an address where he was not residing.^[FN94]

The Court is further concerned that while Defendant testified that he has a business account at Chase,^[FN95] no such accounts are referenced in Defendant's SNW,^[FN96] leading this Court to have concerns that Defendant is concealing assets which adversely impact this Court's ability to ascertain the scope and value of the assets involved in the marital estate, including the business interests of the Defendant. Accordingly, while Defendant's testimony is replete with excuses for his dubious financial transactions, business operations and tax filings, the Court finds these explanations to lack veracity as Defendant's conduct appears to be intentional and calculated to [*14]advance Defendant's financial gain. Accordingly, the Court must take these concerns into consideration when determining the credibility and veracity of Defendant.

B. Request for Dissolution of the Parties' Marriage.

In this action, Plaintiff requested the dissolution of the parties' marriage by annulment, or in the alternative, by divorce pursuant to DRL § 170(1) or DRL § 170(7), and Defendant further sought dissolution pursuant to DRL § 170(7). Therefore, the Court will first review the request for annulment.

[1] Request for the Entry of Judgment of Annulment.

In assessing Plaintiff's allegations of fraud pursuant to the foregoing statute, the Court must first determine if Plaintiff's action was timely filed. To that end, the New York State Civil Practice Law and Rules (hereinafter "CPLR") § 214(7) provides as follows:

"The following actions must be commenced within three years:

* * *

7. An action to annul a marriage on the ground of fraud; the time within which the action must be commenced shall be computed from the time the plaintiff discovered the facts constituting the fraud, but if the plaintiff is a person other than the spouse whose consent was obtained by fraud, the time within which the action must be commenced shall be computed from the time, if earlier, that that spouse discovered the facts constituting the fraud."

In discussing the need for actions seeking annulment based upon fraud to be commenced timely, the Appellate Division Second Department noted:

"Even prior to the enactment of section 140 of the Domestic Relations Law and CPLR 214 (subd. 7), which provide that an action to annul a marriage on the ground of fraud must be commenced within three years from the time the plaintiff discovered the facts constituting the fraud, there was an obligation imposed upon the victim of the fraud to discover the fraud within a reasonable time after the marriage and to disavow the marriage (Matter of Rivette, 283 App.Div. 439, 440, 128 N.Y.S.2d 325; Marks v. Marks, 283 App.Div. 1136; Jennings v. Jennings, 186 Misc. 1021, 63 N.Y.S.2d 294; Ackerman v. Ackerman, 35 Misc 2d 890, 231 N.Y.S.2d 493). Where there is knowledge of facts sufficient to suggest to a person of ordinary intelligence the probability that he has been defrauded, a duty of inquiry arises." (Mienik v Meinik, 91 AD2d 604 [2d Dept 1982]).

There is no dispute that the parties were married on August 28, 2021,^[FN97] and that this matter was commenced on May 3, 2024, within three years of the marriage. Accordingly, the Court finds that the action was filed timely.

Next, this Court must determine if granting the Plaintiff's request for annulment is warranted on the basis of alleged fraud by Defendant. Pursuant to New York State Domestic Relations Law (hereinafter "DRL") § 140(e):

"Consent by force, duress or fraud. ***An action to annul a marriage on the ground that the consent of one of the parties thereto was obtained by fraud may be maintained by the [*15]party whose consent was so obtained within the limitations of time for enforcing a civil remedy of the civil practice law and rules. Any such action may also be maintained during the life-time of the other party by the parent, or the guardian of the person of the party whose consent was so obtained, or by any relative of that party who has an interest to avoid the marriage, provided that in an action to annul a marriage on the ground of fraud the limitation prescribed in the civil practice law and rules has not run. But a marriage shall not be annulled *** on the ground of fraud, if it appears that, at any time before the commencement thereof, the parties voluntarily cohabited as husband and wife, with a full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud."^[FN98]

Further, pursuant to DRL § 144:

"1. In an action to annul a marriage, a final judgment annulling the marriage shall not be rendered by default for want of an appearance or pleading, or by consent, or upon a trial of an issue, without proof of the facts upon which the allegation of nullity is founded. Plaintiff shall prove that there has been no such cohabitation between the parties as would bar a judgment except that in an action under subdivision (c) of section one hundred forty the plaintiff may prove instead that the mental illness still continues.

2. In any action, whether or not contested, brought to annul a marriage, the declaration or confession of either party to the marriage is not alone sufficient as proof, but other satisfactory evidence of the facts must be produced."

In discussing the burden of proof a movant must meet, in order to obtain a judgment of annulment arising out of the alleged fraud of a defendant, the Court of Appeals noted:

"***the fraud must be material to that degree that, had it not been practiced, the party deceived would not have consented to the marriage.

* * *

The statutes of this state declare that marriage, so far as its validity in law is concerned, is a civil contract, to which the consent of parties, capable in law of contracting, is essential. It certainly does differ from ordinary common-law contracts by reason of its subject-matter and of the supervision which the state exercises over the marriage relation which the contract institutes. In such respects it is sui generis. While the marriage relation, in its legal aspect, has no peculiar sanctity as a social institution, a due regard for its consequences and for the orderly constitution of society has caused it to be regulated by laws in its conduct as in its dissolution. Judge Story said of it that it is 'something more than a mere contract. It is rather to be deemed an institution of society, founded upon the consent and contract of the parties; and in this view it has some peculiarities in its nature, character, operation, and extent of obligation different from what belong to ordinary contracts.' While, then, it is true that marriage contracts are based upon considerations peculiar to themselves, and that public policy is concerned with the regulation of the family relation, nevertheless our law considers marriage in no other light than as a civil contract. The free and full consent which is of the essence of all ordinary contracts is expressly made by the statute necessary to the validity of the marriage contract. The [*16]minds of the parties must meet in one intention. It is a general rule that every misrepresentation of a material fact, made with the intention to induce another to enter into an agreement, and without which he would not have done so, justifies the court in vacating the agreement. It is obvious that no one would obligate himself by a contract if he knew that a material representation, entering into the reason for his consent, was untrue. There is no valid reason for excepting the marriage contract from the general rule." (DiLorenzo v. DiLorenzo, 34 N.Y.Civ.Proc.R. 105 [1903] [internal citations omitted]).

In a recent decision pertaining to a party seeking annulment based upon alleged fraud by the defendant to obtain an immigration benefit, the Appellate Division Third Department held:

"Where the consent of either spouse to a marriage was obtained by fraud, the marriage is voidable by way of an annulment action. To obtain an annulment, the plaintiff spouse must prove that the defendant spouse knowingly made a material false representation to the plaintiff spouse with the intent of inducing the plaintiff spouse's consent to marriage, that the misrepresentation was of such a nature as to deceive an ordinarily prudent person, that the plaintiff spouse justifiably relied on the misrepresentation in consenting to marriage and that, once aware of the false representation, cohabitation ceased. Generally, "[p]remarital falsehoods as to love and affection are not enough" to warrant an annulment based upon fraud. However, proof that a defendant spouse induced the plaintiff spouse to marry with the sole objective of obtaining an immigration or citizenship benefit may, in certain cases, constitute grounds for an annulment. An annulment may not be granted solely upon "the declaration or confession of either party"; rather, the plaintiff spouse must produce "satisfactory evidence of the facts", that is, evidence consisting of "other material from other sources, substantial and reliable enough to satisfy the conscience of the trier of the facts." Where the plaintiff spouse seeks an annulment based upon fraud in the inducement, such fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence." (Travis A. v. Vilma B., 197 AD3d 1401 [3d Dept 2021] [internal citations omitted]).

In Travis A., Id., the Court denied the annulment due to a determination that the plaintiff had not proven fraudulent premarital intent by the defendant, noting that Plaintiff's proof "primarily consisted of testimony establishing premarital and marital discord between the parties," and continued, "Although the husband sought to attribute that discord to a fraudulent premarital intent, he ultimately failed to demonstrate 'that the marital break was due to any cause other than the general discontent and incompatibility of the parties'" (quoting Schact v. Schact, 24 AD2d 614 [2d Dept 1965]).

In another matter similar to this, the Court declined to grant the plaintiff an annulment based upon fraud to obtain an immigration benefit:

"From the time she first met Defendant, Plaintiff was aware that he did not have permanent resident status in this country and was staying here on a student visa.

* * *

In hindsight she now feels like she was manipulated. Plaintiff also described Defendant as being controlling, abusive, isolating her from family, and her need to engage in therapy. She also noted that he did not openly share their marriage with relatives and [*17]friends and was angry when she did so. Once they got married, Defendant immediately asked Plaintiff to participate/sponsor his Green Card and to set up a joint bank account.

* * *

Separately, Plaintiff testified that long before they were married there were warning signs that he may have been unfaithful and had profiles on various dating apps. When she confronted him about these concerns, he made many excuses. In any event, she never thought he was cheating on her until the end of their relationship.

* * *

Ultimately, Plaintiff feels that Defendant did not in fact want to build a life together with her as he had promised, and wanted to use her solely to obtain a Green Card.

* * *

Here, there was no proof of a material misrepresentation that induced Plaintiff to marry. In fact, Plaintiff knew of Defendant's immigration status all along and she asked him to get married.

* * *

To the extent Plaintiff relies on Defendant being unfaithful or not actually caring for her, "[p]remarital falsehoods as to love and affection are not enough" to warrant an annulment based upon fraud. This matter is quite similar to the facts in Travis A., in which the Court found that the testimony of "false representations of love," and "premarital and marital discord" in fact "fell far short of demonstrating a fraudulent premarital intent on the part of the wife" (197 AD3d at 1403). There was insufficient evidence here to establish that Defendant had the intent to induce Plaintiff to marry with the sole purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit. As in Travis A., the discord and infidelity of Defendant cannot be solely attributed to a fraudulent premarital intent." (A.K. v. A.J., 78 Misc 3d 1228(A) [Sup Ct. NY County 2023]).

Here, Plaintiff's request for the entry of a judgment of annulment must be denied as it presents facts similar to Travis A., Id., and A.K., Id., wherein Plaintiff's testimony of false representations of love and, premarital and marital discord, have not met the burden of demonstrating fraudulent premarital intent on the part of the Defendant, and there was insufficient evidence to establish that Defendant had the intent to induce Plaintiff to marry him with the sole purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit. To the contrary, Plaintiff was aware of Defendant's undocumented immigration status prior to the parties' marriage,^[FN99] assisted him in obtaining his New York State Driver's License despite his undocumented status,^[FN100] assisted him in obtaining a bank account despite his undocumented status ^[FN101] and assisted him with the completion of an immigration petition shortly following their marriage.^[FN102] Moreover, she [*18]attended the immigration interview with him ^[FN103] as she wanted to help him gain independence from the problems of depending upon others that came with being undocumented.^[FN104] Following the parties' filing Defendant's immigration petition, Defendant received his permanent residence card in May 2022 with an expiration date of May 2024.^[FN105]

Further, while Plaintiff asserts that Defendant engaged in actions that reflected a lack of intent to be married to her,^[FN106] the Complaint and her testimony at trial reflected that to the extent any asserted fraud existed (which this Court determines did not), Plaintiff continued to cohabitate with Defendant after discovery of such fraud to the extent that the parties continued to remain married and have marital relations including romantic relations up to a short time before trial commenced,^[FN107] testifying at trial that she discussed with Plaintiff her desire for an annulment in December of 2022 but didn't move forward with it as she thought the parties were reconciling.^[FN108] This testimony was in line with that of Defendant who testified that in the months following the parties' marriage, upon arguing, Plaintiff would indicate that she wanted a divorce.^[FN109] Finally, even while Plaintiff's testimony has been determined insufficient to support the grant of an annulment, notably it was not corroborated by any sufficient evidence or testimony.

While Plaintiff asserts other alleged fraud of Defendant to induce her into the parties' marriage as a basis for the requested annulment, this Court determines that Plaintiff has failed to establish a basis for this relief arising out of those separate allegations.

Accordingly, based upon the submissions made to this Court, along with the testimony and evidence received at trial, Plaintiff's request for the entry of a judgment of annulment dissolving the parties' marriage is denied.

[2] Request for Entry of Judgment of Divorce Based Upon Cruel and Inhuman Treatment.

Pursuant to DRL § 170(1), "An action for divorce may be maintained by a husband or wife to procure a judgment divorcing the parties and dissolving the marriage on any of the following grounds: (1) The cruel and inhuman treatment of the plaintiff by the defendant such that the conduct of the defendant so endangers the physical or mental well-being of the plaintiff as renders it unsafe or improper for the plaintiff to cohabit with the defendant."

The Appellate Division Second Department has provided guidance on the burden that [*19]must be met to obtain a judgment of divorce due to cruel and inhuman treatment:

"It is well established that a plaintiff seeking a divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment must demonstrate serious misconduct on the part of the defendant, not mere incompatibility. Thus, a plaintiff, in seeking a divorce on that ground, must establish "a course of conduct by the defendant spouse which is harmful to the physical or mental health of the plaintiff and makes cohabitation unsafe or improper." It has been recognized that "riotous quarrels" or claims that the marriage is "dead" do not constitute cruel and inhuman treatment. The evidence adduced at the divorce trial herein, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff wife, indicated that the parties were incompatible and that the defendant refused to communicate with the plaintiff, had minimal involvement with the parties' children and refused to have sexual relations with the plaintiff. Although this evidence portrays an unhappy, acrimonious and incompatible relationship between the parties, it does not rise to the level of endangering the plaintiff's mental or physical well-being." (Meier v. Meier, 156 AD2d 348 [2d Dept 1989]).

Here, it is without question that sufficient evidence was presented to the Court at trial, derived from the testimony of both parties, that their marriage deteriorated into a relationship which was unhappy, acrimonious and incompatible. However, no evidence was presented for this Court to determine that the conduct that the Defendant engaged in during the parties' marriage endangered the physical or mental well-being of the Plaintiff, rendering it unsafe or improper for the Plaintiff to cohabit with the Defendant.

Accordingly, based upon the submissions made to this Court, along with the testimony and evidence received at trial, Plaintiff's request for the entry of a judgment of divorce dissolving the parties' marriage pursuant to DRL § 170(1) is denied.

[3] Request for Entry of Judgment of Divorce Based Upon Irretrievable Breakdown.

Pursuant to New York State Domestic Relations Law § 170(7):

"An action for divorce may be maintained by a husband or wife to procure a judgment divorcing the parties and dissolving the marriage on any of the following grounds:

* * *

(7) The relationship between husband and wife has broken down irretrievably for a period of at least six months, provided that one party has so stated under oath. No judgment of divorce shall be granted under this subdivision unless and until the economic issues of equitable distribution of marital property, the payment or waiver of spousal support, the payment of child support, the payment of counsel and experts' fees and expenses as well as the custody and visitation with the infant children of the marriage have been resolved by the parties, or determined by the court and incorporated into the judgment of divorce."

A spouse's statement under oath that the marriage was irretrievably broken for a period of six months is, by itself, sufficient to establish a cause of action for divorce as a matter of law (Hoffer-Adou v Adou, 121 AD3d 618 [1st Dept 2014]).

Based upon the submissions made to this Court, along with the testimony and evidence received at trial, Plaintiff's request is granted to the extent that a judgment be entered granting Plaintiff a divorce in her favor and against Defendant, dissolving forever the bonds of matrimony existing between Plaintiff and Defendant upon the grounds of the Irretrievable Breakdown of the [*20]Relationship pursuant to DRL § 170(7).

C. Equitable Distribution, Allocation of Debts, Declaration of Separate Property.

The Appellate Division, Second Department has noted the manner in which a trial court is to make a determination as to equitable distribution in the context of a matrimonial action:

"The Equitable Distribution Law mandates that, whenever a marriage is terminated, absent an agreement of the parties, the court must determine the rights of the parties in their separate and marital property and provide for the disposition of the property in the final judgment (Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5][a]).

* * *

The court is obligated to render a decision in which it sets forth the factors it considered and the reasons for its decision, a requirement that cannot be waived. In the absence of express findings of fact and of a detailed discussion of the enumerated factors, meaningful appellate review is precluded and a remittal for further fact finding may be required. Facts must be sufficiently developed at trial to enable a reasoned determination of the issues of equitable distribution and, if not, a new trial may be ordered." (Kaufman v. Kaufman, 189 AD3d 31, 52 [2d Dept 2020] [internal citations omitted]).

DRL § 236[B][5] notes, in part, that:

"b. Separate property shall remain such.

c. Marital property shall be distributed equitably between the parties, considering the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties.

d. In determining an equitable disposition of property under paragraph c, the court shall consider:

(1) the income and property of each party at the time of marriage, and at the time of the commencement of the action;

(2) the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties;

(3) the need of a custodial parent to occupy or own the marital residence and to use or own its household effects;

(4) the loss of inheritance and pension rights upon dissolution of the marriage as of the date of dissolution;

(5) the loss of health insurance benefits upon dissolution of the marriage;

(6) any award of maintenance under subdivision six of this part;

(7) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having title, including joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services as a spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the career or career potential of the other party. The court shall not consider as marital property subject to distribution the value of a spouse's enhanced earning capacity arising from a license, degree, celebrity goodwill, or career enhancement. However, in arriving at an equitable division of marital property, the court shall consider the direct or indirect contributions to the development during the marriage of the enhanced earning capacity of the other spouse;

(8) the liquid or non-liquid character of all marital property;

(9) the probable future financial circumstances of each party;

(10) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any interest in a business, corporation or profession, and the economic desirability of retaining such asset [*21]or interest intact and free from any claim or interference by the other party;

(11) the tax consequences to each party;

(12) the wasteful dissipation of assets by either spouse;

(13) any transfer or encumbrance made in contemplation of a matrimonial action without fair consideration;

(14) whether either party has committed an act or acts of domestic violence, as described in subdivision one of section four hundred fifty-nine-a of the social services law, against the other party and the nature, extent, duration and impact of such act or acts;

(15) in awarding the possession of a companion animal, the court shall consider the best interest of such animal. "Companion animal", as used in this subparagraph, shall have the same meaning as in subdivision five of section three hundred fifty of the agriculture and markets law; and

(16) any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper.

e. In any action in which the court shall determine that an equitable distribution is appropriate but would be impractical or burdensome or where the distribution of an interest in a business, corporation or profession would be contrary to law, the court in lieu of such equitable distribution shall make a distributive award in order to achieve equity between the parties. The court in its discretion, also may make a distributive award to supplement, facilitate or effectuate a distribution of marital property.

f. In addition to the disposition of property as set forth above, the court may make such order regarding the use and occupancy of the marital home and its household effects as provided in section two hundred thirty-four of this chapter, without regard to the form of ownership of such property.

g. In any decision made pursuant to this subdivision, the court shall set forth the factors it considered and the reasons for its decision and such may not be waived by either party or counsel."

"Although in a marriage of long duration where both parties have made significant contributions to the marriage, a division of marital assets should be made as equal as possible, there is no requirement distribution of each item of marital property be made on an equal basis" (Chalif v. Chalif, 298 AD2d 348 [2d Dept 2002]; Repetti v. Repetti, 147 AD3d 1094 [2d Dept 2017]). "Courts have discretion to value 'active assets' such as a professional practice on the commencement date [of the action], while 'passive assets' such as securities, which could change in value suddenly based on market fluctuations, may be valued at the date of trial but such formulation should be treated as helpful guideposts and not immutable rules" (Lieberman-Massoni v. Massoni, 215 AD3d 656 [2d Dept 2023]; Daniel v. Friedman, 22 AD3d 707 [2d Dept 2005]; Grunfeld v. Grunfeld, 94 NY2d 696 [2000]).

In a divorce action, the party seeking to overcome the statutory presumption that all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage is marital property has the burden of proving that the property in dispute is separate property (Nerayoff v. Rokhsar, 168 AD3d 1071 [2d Dept 2019]). Property acquired by a spouse by gift from a party other than the spouse is separate property (Vogel v. Vogel, 156 AD2d 671 [2d Dept 1989]). A party is generally entitled to a credit for any contribution of separate property toward the purchase of a marital asset, and in the context of an alleged gift utilized towards the downpayment on a parcel of real property, the spouse seeking a separate property credit must provide evidence establishing that such [*22]contribution to the downpayment is a gift to that spouse alone (Robinson v. Robinson, 133 AD3d 1185 [3d Dept 2015]).

It is further appropriate for the Court to allocate responsibility for the payment of debts between the parties involved in a matrimonial action (Goddard v. Goddard, 256 AD2d 545 [2d Dept 1998]; see also, Dellafiora v. Dellafiora, 54 AD3d 715 [2d Dept 2008]).

Furthermore, when there are inconsistencies or outright misrepresentations among financial records, sworn affidavits, and testimony, and a party is recalcitrant in providing financial document disclosure, the Court may find that the party lacks credibility and draw a negative inference related to those discrepancies (Racquel L.J. v. Derwin J.J., 64 Misc 3d 1221, 2019 NY Slip Op 51219 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2019]). The unequal distribution of marital assets has been determined appropriate due to a finding of a spouse engaging in conduct constituting economic fault such as dissipation of marital assets (Stewart v. Stewart, 133 AD3d 493 [2d Dept 2015]).

As set forth above, the Court has determined Defendant to lack credibility and veracity, as it relates to representations made to this Court pertaining to his finances. The Court has further recognized the inconsistencies and outright misrepresentations among Defendant's SNW, his financial records and his testimony. Therefore, this Court draws a negative inference related to Defendant's discrepancies in his financial representations and due to same, has adjusted the allocation of marital assets between the parties. In making the determination to proceed in this manner, the Court has further taken into consideration the economic fault of Defendant throughout the parties' marriage, wherein he engaged in excessive spending for non-marital purposes (i.e., travel without the knowledge and consent of Plaintiff)^[FN110] and failed to assist Plaintiff in the payment of living expenses of the family, including debts that were incurred specially for his benefit (i.e., rent for the marital domicile and payment of auto loan).^[FN111]

[1] Equitable Distribution of Marital Assets and Declaration of Separate Property.

a. W.F.C. (hereinafter "Company").

Where a spouse is seeking an interest in business interests of the other, the non-titled spouse must identify the business interests and proof of value of those business interests (Post v. Post, 68 AD3d 471 [2d Dept 2009]). The determination of the value of business interests is a function properly within the fact-finding power of the court (Amodio v. Amodio, 70 NY2d 5 [1987]). Absent evidence to establish net worth of a business a trial court may substitute the businesses annual earnings for the net worth figure (Griffin v. Griffin, 115 AD2d 587 [2d Dept 1985]). Upon a determination that the non-titled spouse continued their own career and made only indirect contributions to the business interests of the titled spouse the grant of a distributive award to the non-titled spouse equal to 25% of the value of the business interest has been determined appropriate (Wagner v. Dunetz, 299 AD2d 347 [2d Dept 2002]; see also, Grande-[*23]Bastuck v. Bastuck, 249 AD2d 444 [2d Dept 1998])

Here, Defendant's SNW ^[FN112] lists as a business interest the Company, being a corporation for which Defendant holds one hundred percent interest, having acquired his interest for $2,000.00 on May 11, 2022, approximately 9 months after the parties' marriage and approximately 24 months prior to the commencement of this action. No evidence has been presented to this Court to determine Plaintiff's interest in the Company to be Plaintiff's separate property. Accordingly, it is determined that the Company is a marital asset subject to equitable distribution, for which the Court determines a value as of the date of commencement and trial to be $200,000.00 based upon the annual earnings of the Company imputed by the Court. Having found Defendant's income tax returns to lack credibility, the Court makes this finding upon review of the Defendant's Chase Account statements reflecting annual deposits for the years provided to the Court, of approximately $200,000.00. Further, the Court notes Defendant's own testimony and submissions beyond the Chase Account statements reflect the annual earnings of the Company as being at least $200,000.00. Defendant's SNW reflects annual expenses of $117,300.00, which the Court determines to be paid solely from Defendant income received from the Company as Defendant's SNW provides no other source of income or source of these funds (i.e., debts). Moreover, while not providing their individual salaries, Defendant testified at trial that the Company employs numerous other individuals,^[FN113] for which Defendant noted are paid in cash, similar to other cash payments for expenses, including rent.

Based upon the submissions made to this Court, along with the evidence and testimony received at trial, Plaintiff is awarded as her equitable distribution from the Company a 25% interest in the Company by way of a distributive award of $50,000.00 (being 25% of the $200,000.00 value of the Company) which shall be paid to Plaintiff from Defendant by July 31, 2025. The Court determines that this award is appropriate, taking into consideration the contributions made by Plaintiff to the Company, including the purchasing of tee shirts for the Company,^[FN114] purchasing of equipment for the Company,^[FN115] assisting in the preparation of job estimates and contracts for the Company,^[FN116] assisting Defendant in the preparation of his resume to obtain work,^[FN117] in addition to the indirect contributions made in supporting Defendant as a spouse, including caring for Defendant's hospitalized son.^[FN118]

b. Defendant's Chase Bank Checking Account Ending "XXXX" (hereinafter [*24]"Defendant's Checking Account").

Defendant's SNW ^[FN119] indicates that Defendant is the sole title holder to Defendant's Checking Account and while no date of commencement balance is listed, Plaintiff's Exhibit C provides the amount as $130.23.^[FN120] At trial, this Court was presented with no testimony or evidence to support a finding that Defendant's Checking Account is separate property and accordingly determines it to be marital property. Based upon the submissions made to this Court, along with the evidence and testimony received at trial, Defendant shall remain the sole title holder of Defendant's Checking Account and Plaintiff is awarded as equitable distribution from the Defendant's Checking Account the sum of $78.14, which shall be paid to Plaintiff from Defendant by July 31, 2025. The Court determines this uneven award of equitable distribution from this asset, equating to 60% of the date of commencement value of the asset, to be appropriate due to the negative inference made against Defendant leading this Court to conclude that he has not engaged in full disclosure of his assets or income and that the award of a larger percentage of the value of this asset is appropriate.

c. Defendant's Chase Bank Savings Account Ending "XXXX" (hereinafter "Defendant's Savings Account").

Defendant's SNW ^[FN121] indicates that Defendant is the sole title holder to Defendant's Checking Account and while no date of commencement balance is listed, Plaintiff's Exhibit C provides the amount as $6,095.05.^[FN122] At trial, this Court was presented with no testimony or evidence to support a finding that Defendant's Savings Account is separate property and accordingly determines it to be marital property. Based upon the submissions made to this Court, along with the evidence and testimony received at trial, Defendant shall remain the sole title holder of Defendant's Savings Account and Plaintiff is awarded as equitable distribution from the Defendant's Savings Account the sum of $3,657.03, which shall be paid to Plaintiff from Defendant by July 31, 2025. The Court determines this uneven award of equitable distribution from this asset, equating to 60% of the date of commencement value of the asset, to be appropriate due to the negative inference made against Defendant, leading this Court to conclude that he has not engaged in full disclosure of his assets or income and that the award of a larger percentage of the value of this asset is appropriate.

d. Defendant's Bancolombia Account Ending "XXXX" (hereinafter "Defendant's Bancolombia Account").

Defendant's SNW ^[FN123] indicates that Defendant is the sole title holder to Defendant's Bancolombia Account and while no date of commencement balance is listed, Plaintiff's Exhibit E confirms that funds existed in this account as of the date of commencement. At trial, this [*25]Court was presented with no testimony or evidence to support a finding that Defendant's Bancolombia Account is separate property and accordingly determines it to be marital property. Based upon the submissions made to this Court, along with the evidence and testimony received at trial, Defendant shall remain the sole title holder of Defendant's Bancolombia Account and Plaintiff is awarded as equitable distribution from the Defendant's Bancolombia Account the sum total to 60% of the date of commencement balance in Defendant's Bancolombia Account, which shall be paid to Plaintiff from Defendant by July 31, 2025. The Court determines this uneven award of equitable distribution from this asset, equating to 60% of the date of commencement value of the asset, to be appropriate due to the negative inference made against Defendant, leading this Court to conclude that he has not engaged in full disclosure of his assets or income and that the award of a larger percentage of the value of this asset is appropriate.

e. Plaintiff's JPMorgan Chase Bank Checking Account Ending "XXXX" (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Checking Account").

Plaintiff's Second SNW ^[FN124] indicates that Plaintiff is the sole title holder to Plaintiff's Checking Account and no date of commencement balance is listed. At trial, this Court was presented with no testimony or evidence to support a finding that Plaintiff's Checking Account is separate property and accordingly determines it to be marital property. Based upon the submissions made to this Court, along with the evidence and testimony received at trial, Plaintiff shall remain the sole title holder of Plaintiff's Checking Account and Defendant is awarded no equitable distribution from the Plaintiff's Checking Account as the account had a balance of $0.00 as of the date of commencement.

f. Plaintiff's JPMorgan Chase Savings Account Ending "XXXX" (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Savings Account").

Plaintiff's Second SNW ^[FN125] indicates that Plaintiff is the sole title holder to Plaintiff's Savings Account and no date of commencement balance is listed. At trial, this Court was presented with no testimony or evidence to support a finding that Plaintiff's Savings Account is separate property and accordingly determines it to be marital property. Based upon the submissions made to this Court, along with the evidence and testimony received at trial, Defendant shall remain the sole title holder of Plaintiff's Savings Account and Defendant is awarded no equitable distribution from the Plaintiff's Savings Account as the account had a balance of $0.00 as of the date of commencement.

g. Tangible Personal Property.

Each party is hereby awarded any tangible personal property held in title in their respective names or otherwise in their possession, including, but not limited to, clothing, jewelry, furniture and household contents.

[2] Allocation of Responsibility for Marital Debts.

a. Plaintiff's Chase Freedom Debt (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Chase Freedom Card").

Plaintiff's Second SNW lists as a liability Plaintiff's Chase Freedom Card, solely listing Plaintiff as debtor, with an original debt of $7,500.00, incurred in November of 2018, with no [*26]purpose listed and a date of commencement amount due of $7,425.32.^[FN126] As Plaintiff's own sworn statement of net worth acknowledges that this debt was incurred prior to the parties' marriage and this Court has been provided with no compelling evidence that this is a marital asset, any debt associated with Plaintiff's Chase Freedom Card shall be the sole debt of Plaintiff for which Defendant shall have no responsibility.

b. Plaintiff's Barclays Debt (hereinafter "Barclay's").

Plaintiff's Second SNW lists as a liability Barclay's, solely listing Plaintiff as debtor, with an original debt of $2,000.00, listing "prior" as the date the debt was incurred, listing no purpose for which the debt was incurred and a date of commencement amount due of $1,822.00.^[FN127] As Plaintiff's own sworn statement of net worth acknowledges that this debt was incurred "prior," which the Court interprets to be prior to the parties' marriage, and this Court has been provided with no compelling evidence that this is a marital asset, any debt associated with Barclay's shall be the sole debt of Plaintiff for which Defendant shall have no responsibility.

c. Plaintiff's Chase Sapphire Debt (hereinafter "Chase Sapphire").

Plaintiff's Second SNW lists as a liability Chase Sapphire, solely listing Plaintiff as debtor, with an original debt of $5,000.00, listing October 2022 as the date the debt was incurred, listing travel and sporting events for both parties as the purpose of incurring the debt, and date of commencement amount due of $4,825.00.^[FN128] At trial, Plaintiff provided testimony as to the original amount of this debt and current payoff amount.^[FN129] As the Court has been provided with no compelling evidence that this is not a marital debt, the parties shall each have the responsibility to pay half of the amount due towards the Chase Sapphire debt at the time of commencement totaling $4,825.00. To effectuate this provision, by July 31, 2025, Defendant shall provide to Plaintiff the sum of $2,412.50, after which Plaintiff shall be solely responsible for any debts arising out of Chase Sapphire.

d. Plaintiff's PayPal Debt (hereinafter "PayPal").

Plaintiff's Second SNW lists as a liability PayPal, solely listing Plaintiff as debtor, with an original debt of $3,200.00, providing no date the debt was incurred or purpose for which the date was incurred, and providing as the date of commencement amount due $3,017.00.^[FN130] As Plaintiff's own sworn statement of net worth provides no information as to when this debt was incurred or for what purpose, and this Court has been provided with no compelling evidence that this is a marital asset, any debt associated with PayPal shall be the sole debt of Plaintiff for which Defendant shall have no responsibility.

e. Plaintiff's One Main Financial Debt (hereinafter "One Main Financial").

Plaintiff's Second SNW lists as a liability One Main Financial, solely listing Plaintiff as [*27]debtor, with an original debt of $8,642.19, providing no date the debt was incurred, listing as the purpose for the debt personal loan for dental work, and providing no amount due as of the date of commencement.^[FN131] Defendant testified that he was unaware of this loan, but confirmed that he was aware that during the parties' marriage Plaintiff traveled to Columbia to get dental work completed during which he assisted in transferring money to her for payments to the dentist.^[FN132] At trial, Plaintiff confirmed through testimony the original debt amount and current balance of $5,981.28.^[FN133] As the Court has been provided with no compelling evidence that this is not a marital debt, the parties shall each have the responsibility to pay half of the amount due towards the One Main Financial debt currently due totaling $5,981.28. To effectuate this provision, by July 31, 2025, Defendant shall provide to Plaintiff the sum of $2,990.64, after which Plaintiff shall be solely responsible for any debts arising out of One Main Financial.

f. Plaintiff's Upgrade Debt (hereinafter "Upgrade").

Plaintiff's Second SNW lists as a liability Upgrade, solely listing Plaintiff as debtor, with an original debt of $10,000.00, listing April 2022 as the date the debt was incurred, listing moving expenses and travel and dental work as the purpose for incurring the debt, the amount due as of the date of commencement as $4,300.00, and the amount of the current debt as "charged off."^[FN134] Defendant confirmed that he was aware of a loan three months after it had been obtained by Plaintiff, but was unaware that it was with Upgrade.^[FN135] At trial, Plaintiff testified that following being charged off the Upgrade debt was sold to Crown Asset Management, then sold to Shepherd Outsourcing with a current balance due of $3,331.91. As the Court has been provided with no compelling evidence that this is not a marital debt, the parties shall each have the responsibility to pay half of the amount due towards the Upgrade debt currently due totaling $3,331.91. To effectuate this provision, by July 31, 2025, Defendant shall provide to Plaintiff the sum of $1,665.96, after which Plaintiff shall be solely responsible for any debts arising out of Upgrade.

g. Plaintiff's Upstart Debt (hereinafter "Upstart").

Plaintiff's Second SNW lists as a liability Upstart, solely listing Plaintiff as debtor, with an original debt of $4,300.00, listing December 2022 as the date the debt was incurred, listing expenses caused by Defendant's abandonment as the purpose for incurring the debt, the amount due as of the date of commencement as $3,523.00.^[FN136] At trial, Plaintiff testified as to the existence of this debt confirming the original balance and current payoff amount.^[FN137] As the Court [*28]has been provided with no compelling evidence that this is not a marital debt, the parties shall each have the responsibility to pay half of the amount due towards the Upstart debt at the time of commencement totaling $3,523.00. To effectuate this provision, by July 31, 2025, Defendant shall provide to Plaintiff the sum of $1,761.50, after which Plaintiff shall be solely responsible for any debts arising out of Upstart.

h. Plaintiff's Earnest Debt (hereinafter "Earnest").

Plaintiff's Second SNW lists as a liability Earnest, solely listing Plaintiff as debtor, with an original debt of $5,188.00, listing December 2021 as the date the debt was incurred, listing private loans for undergraduate studies as the purpose for incurring the debt, the amount due as of the date of commencement as $3,306.17.^[FN138] As the Court has been provided with no compelling evidence that this is not a marital debt, the parties shall each have the responsibility to pay half of the amount due towards the Earnest debt at the time of commencement totaling $3,306.17. To effectuate this provision, by July 31, 2025, Defendant shall provide to Plaintiff the sum of $1,653.08, after which Plaintiff shall be solely responsible for any debts arising out of Earnest.

i. Plaintiff's Klarna Debt (hereinafter "Klarna").

Plaintiff's Second SNW lists as a liability Klarna, solely listing Plaintiff as debtor, with an original debt of $779.77, listing June 2024 as the date the debt was incurred, listing gift to parents as the purpose for incurring the debt, the amount currently due as $359.62.^[FN139] As Plaintiff's own sworn statement of net worth provides that this debt was incurred after the time of commencement of this action, it is hereby determined to be the separate non-marital debt of Plaintiff and any debt associated with Klarna shall be the sole debt of Plaintiff for which Defendant shall have no responsibility.

j. Plaintiff's Affirm Debt (hereinafter "Affirm").

Plaintiff's Second SNW lists as a liability Affirm, solely listing Plaintiff as debtor, with an original debt of $755.34, listing December 2024 as the date the debt was incurred, listing Christmas 2024 as the purpose for incurring the debt, fails to list the amount currently due.^[FN140] As Plaintiff's own sworn statement of net worth provides that this debt was incurred after the time of commencement of this action, it is hereby determined to be the separate non-marital debt of Plaintiff and any debt associated with Affirm shall be the sole debt of Plaintiff for which Defendant shall have no responsibility.

k. Plaintiff's Truist Debt (hereinafter "Truist").

Plaintiff's Second SNW lists as a liability Truist, solely listing Plaintiff as debtor, with an original debt of $34,599.00, listing December 2021 as the date the debt was incurred, listing Defendant's car and use as the purpose for incurring the debt, listing the amount due as of the date of commencement $20,000.00 and that the car had been repossessed.^[FN141] At trial, Plaintiff [*29]testified that following repossession, the debt was transferred to Associated Credit Services with a current balance of $4,542.00.^[FN142] Defendant acknowledged that this loan had been obtained to secure a vehicle for his use,^[FN143] and the parties' understanding was that Defendant would be financially responsible for the vehicle,^[FN144] but that Plaintiff had taken his keys away.^[FN145] Plaintiff confirmed that she had taken the keys from Defendant after he stopped paying the vehicle expenses.^[FN146] As the Court has been provided with no compelling evidence that this is not a marital debt, the parties shall each have the responsibility to pay half of the amount due towards the Truist debt at the time of commencement totaling $4,542.00. To effectuate this provision, by July 31, 2025, Defendant shall provide to Plaintiff the sum of $2,271.00, after which Plaintiff shall be solely responsible for any debts arising out of Truist.

l. Plaintiff's US Department of Education Aid Advantage Debt (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Graduate Loan").

Plaintiff's Second SNW lists as a liability Plaintiff's Graduate Loan, solely listing Plaintiff as debtor, with an original debt of $137,000.00, failing to list the date the debt was incurred, listing graduate studies as the purpose for incurring the debt, listing the amount due as of the date of commencement $137,000.00. As Plaintiff's own sworn statement of net worth fails to provide the date this debt was incurred, it is hereby determined to be the separate non-marital debt of Plaintiff and any debt associated with Plaintiff's Graduate Loan shall be the sole debt of Plaintiff for which Defendant shall have no responsibility.

m. Defendant's Chase Sapphire Credit Card Ending XXXX Debt (hereinafter "Defendant's Account Ending XXXX").

Defendant's SNW lists as a liability Defendant's Account Ending XXXX, solely listing Defendant as debtor, failing to list the original debt, listing the amount due as of the date of commencement $200.00, and the purpose for the debt as basic necessitates and medical expenses for [infant-child].^[FN147] As Defendant's own sworn statement of net worth fails to provide the date this debt was incurred, it is hereby determined to be the separate non-marital debt of Defendant and any debt associated with Defendant's Account Ending XXXX shall be the sole debt of Defendant for which Plaintiff shall have no responsibility.

n. Defendant's Chase Sapphire Preferred Card Ending XXXX Debt (hereinafter "Defendant's Account Ending XXXX").

Defendant's SNW lists as a liability Defendant's Account Ending XXXX, solely listing Defendant as debtor, failing to list the original debt, listing the amount due as of the date of commencement "TBD", and the purpose for the debt as basic necessitates and medical expenses [*30]for [infant-child].^[FN148] As Defendant's own sworn statement of net worth fails to provide the date this debt was incurred, it is hereby determined to be the separate non-marital debt of Defendant and any debt associated with Defendant's Account Ending XXXX shall be the sole debt of Defendant for which Plaintiff shall have no responsibility.

o. Defendant's Capital One Platinum Card Ending XXXX Debt (hereinafter "Defendant's Account Ending XXXX").

Defendant's SNW lists as a liability Defendant's Account Ending XXXX, solely listing Defendant as debtor, failing to list the original debt, listing the amount due as of the date of commencement "TBD", and the purpose for the debt as basic necessitates and medical expenses for [infant-child]. As Defendant's own sworn statement of net worth fails to provide the date this debt was incurred, it is hereby determined to be the separate non-marital debt of Defendant and any debt associated with Defendant's Account Ending XXXX shall be the sole debt of Defendant for which Plaintiff shall have no responsibility.

D. Spousal Support and Maintenance.

With respect to the manner within which a trial Court may award spousal post-divorce maintenance:

"In any matrimonial action, the court, upon application by a party, shall make its award for post-divorce maintenance pursuant to the guidelines set forth in [Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(6)]. The court shall order the post-divorce maintenance obligation up to the income cap in accordance with the statutory formula, unless the court finds that the post-divorce maintenance guideline obligation is unjust or inappropriate, which finding shall be based upon consideration of any one or more of the specifically enumerated factors set forth in the statute" (Harris v. Schreibman, 200 AD3d 1117, 1120, 160 N.Y.S.3d 349 [3d Dept. 2021] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; accord King v. King, 202 AD3d 1383, 1384, 164 N.Y.S.3d 272 [3d Dept. 2022]). "The amount and duration of a maintenance award, if any, are a matter within the sound discretion of Supreme Court, and the award will not be disturbed so long as the statutory factors and the parties' predivorce standard of living were properly considered" (Hughes v. Hughes, 198 AD3d 1170, 1173, 156 N.Y.S.3d 444 [3d Dept. 2021] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see King v. King, 202 AD3d at 1384, 164 N.Y.S.3d 272). "Although the court need not articulate every factor it considers, it must provide a reasoned analysis of the factors it ultimately relies upon in determining maintenance" (King v. King, 202 AD3d at 1384, 164 N.Y.S.3d 272 [internal quotation marks, brackets, ellipsis and citations omitted]; *1018 see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][6][e][1]). (Westbrook v. Westbrook, 212 AD3d 1014 [3rd Dept 2023]).

DRL § § 236[B][6][e][1], [2] sets forth the factors to be considered by the Court when determining the amount of post-divorce spousal maintenance:

"e. (1) The court shall order the post-divorce maintenance guideline obligation up to the income cap in accordance with paragraph c of this subdivision, unless the court finds that the post-divorce maintenance guideline obligation is unjust or inappropriate, which finding shall be based upon consideration of any one or more of the following factors, [*31]and adjusts the post-divorce maintenance guideline obligation accordingly based upon such consideration:

(a) the age and health of the parties;

(b) the present or future earning capacity of the parties, including a history of limited participation in the workforce;

(c) the need of one party to incur education or training expenses;

(d) the termination of a child support award before the termination of the maintenance award when the calculation of maintenance was based upon child support being awarded which resulted in a maintenance award lower than it would have been had child support not been awarded;

(e) the wasteful dissipation of marital property, including transfers or encumbrances made in contemplation of a matrimonial action without fair consideration;

(f) the existence and duration of a pre-marital joint household or a pre-divorce separate household;

(g) acts by one party against another that have inhibited or continue to inhibit a party's earning capacity or ability to obtain meaningful employment. Such acts include but are not limited to acts of domestic violence as provided in section four hundred fifty-nine-a of the social services law;

(h) the availability and cost of medical insurance for the parties;

(i) the care of children or stepchildren, disabled adult children or stepchildren, elderly parents or in-laws provided during the marriage that inhibits a party's earning capacity;

(j) the tax consequences to each party;

(k) the standard of living of the parties established during the marriage;

(l) the reduced or lost earning capacity of the payee as a result of having forgone or delayed education, training, employment or career opportunities during the marriage;

(m) the equitable distribution of marital property and the income or imputed income on the assets so distributed;

(n) the contributions and services of the payee as a spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker and to the career or career potential of the other party; and

(o) any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper.

(2) Where the court finds that the post-divorce maintenance guideline obligation is unjust or inappropriate and the court adjusts the post-divorce maintenance guideline obligation pursuant to this paragraph, the court shall set forth, in a written decision or on the record, the unadjusted post-divorce maintenance guideline obligation, the factors it considered, and the reasons that the court adjusted the post-divorce maintenance obligation. Such decision shall not be waived by either party or counsel."

"The court may impute income to a party based on, among other things, her employment history, future earning capacity, and educational background" (Strohli v. Strohli, 174 AD3d 938 [2d Dept 2019] [internal citations omitted]).

Here, Plaintiff's annual income as reflected by Plaintiff's Second SNW is $82,519.20, while Defendant's income cannot be determined from his testimony provided at trial, his income tax returns or Defendant's SNW, as each contain contradictory information which lack credibility as noted above. When seeking spousal maintenance from Defendant, Plaintiff requested that the Court impute income to Defendant based upon his financial records, cash transactions and [*32]failure to make financial disclosures.^[FN149] Accordingly, this Court has imputed Defendant's annual income to be $200,000.00 based upon his employment history, future earning capacity and educational background.

In further analysis of spousal maintenance, it is clear from the record that the parties' marriage was 2.8 years ^[FN150] in length, which provides a duration of spousal support from 5 months to 10 months, at the discretion of the Court.

Based upon the submissions made to this Court, along with the evidence and testimony received at trial, Plaintiff is awarded spousal maintenance from Defendant in the amount of $1,980.92 per month for a period of 10 months, payable from Defendant to Plaintiff on the first day of each month, commencing on August 1, 2025, and continuing each month thereafter for ten months. All payments shall be by wire transfer or other electronic Deposit to effectuate. Pursuant to this provision, by July 10, 2025, Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendant wire instructions, and/or electronic transfer instructions, by sending same via overnight delivery to Defendant's Address and e-mail to Defendant's E-Mail, and by that date filing a copy of the Notice with an Affidavit of Service, along with a copy of any tracking slip.

E. Child Custody, Access and Support.

Based upon the submissions made to this Court, along with the testimony and evidence received at trial, there are no children of the parties' marriage or expected of the parties' marriage, so this Court takes no action with respect to child custody, access and support.

F. Requests Pertaining to An Award of Attorneys' Fees.

The Appellate Division Second Department has noted how trial court should determine if an award of attorneys' fees is warranted in a matrimonial action:

"In a matrimonial action, an award of attorney's fees is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the issue is controlled by the equities and circumstances of each particular case (see Prochilo v. Prochilo, 165 AD3d 1304, 84 N.Y.S.3d 786; Patete v Rodriguez, 109 AD3d 595, 599, 971 N.Y.S.2d 109). The purpose of Domestic Relations Law § 237(a) is to redress the economic disparity between the monied spouse and the nonmonied spouse by ensuring that the latter will be able to litigate the action on equal footing with the former (see Chesner v. Chesner, 95 AD3d 1252, 1253, 945 N.Y.S.2d 409; Finnan v. Finnan, 95 AD3d 821, 943 N.Y.S.2d 559; Prichep v. Prichep, 52 AD3d 61, 64—65, 858 N.Y.S.2d 667).

In determining whether to award attorney's fees, the court should review the financial circumstances of both parties, together with all of the other circumstances of the case, including, inter alia, the relative merit of the parties' positions, and whether either party has engaged in conduct or taken positions resulting in a delay of the proceedings or unnecessary litigation (see Prochilo v. Prochilo, 165 AD3d 1304, 84 N.Y.S.3d 786; Chesner v. Chesner, 95 AD3d 1252, 945 N.Y.S.2d 409; Prichep v. Prichep, 52 AD3d at 64—65, 858 N.Y.S.2d 667)." (Brockner v Brockner, 174 AD3d 567 [2d Dept 2019]).

When seeking an award of attorneys' fees, parties are required to submit itemized billing statements as proof of the attorneys' fees incurred, both to demonstrate substantial compliance with 22 NYCRR § 1400.2 and § 1400.3 and to establish the "extent and value of [the] services" rendered (Yakobowitz v. Yakobowicz, 217 AD3d 733 [2d Dept 2023] [internal citations omitted]).

At trial, Plaintiff requested attorneys' fees asserting, "estimated $15,000.00 in attorney and court fees accrued as part of this litigation,"^[FN151] and Defendant made no requests. However, neither party presented the Court with any billing statements for attorneys' fees accrued during this post-judgment litigation, nor was any testimony provided by the parties or their counsel regarding the engagement agreements entered into or any attorneys' fees accrued. Accordingly, the Court must deny all requests for awards of attorneys' fees by both parties, and both parties shall be solely responsible for any attorneys' fees and court costs arising out of this action.

G. Request for Other Relief.

Any relief sought in Motion Sequence No. 1 and Motion Sequence No. 2 specifically not granted or otherwise addressed herein is denied.

Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted a judgment of divorce dissolving forever the bonds of matrimony existing between Plaintiff and Defendant pursuant to New York State DRL § 170(7), together with the additional ancillary relief decided herein; and it is further

ORDERED that any payments directed to be made by Defendant to Plaintiff shall be made by certified bank check sent by traceable delivery to Plaintiff's Address; and it is further

ORDERED that any relief sought by either party specifically not granted or otherwise addressed herein is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff shall serve Defendant, via e-mail to Defendant's E-Mail Address and overnight Delivery to Defendant's Address, this Decision and Order with Notice of Entry by July 3, 2025, and shall file an Affidavit of Service by that date.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.