[*1]
C.S. v S.S.
2025 NY Slip Op 51305(U) [86 Misc 3d 1258(A)]
Decided on July 22, 2025
Supreme Court, Westchester County
Hyer, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected in part through August 25, 2025; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on July 22, 2025
Supreme Court, Westchester County


C.S., Plaintiff,

against

S.S., Defendant.




Index No. XXXXX



Plaintiff — Ernestine J. Mings, Esq., Blank Rome, LLP, 1271 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10020

Defendant — Mudita Chawla, Esq., Chemtob, Moss, Forman & Beyda, LLP, 527 Madison Avenue, 7th Fl., New York, NY 10022


James L. Hyer, J.

The following documents were considered in connection with the motion by Order to Show Cause of the Plaintiff-Petitioner, dated June 5, 2025, (hereinafter "Motion Sequence No. 1"), seeking the entry of an Order granting the following relief:

1. Directing that all documents, including but not limited to: pleadings, papers, affidavits, affirmations, exhibits, evidence, transcripts, judgments, orders and decisions filed with or issued by this Court in the above-captioned proceeding shall be SEALED; and
2. Directing that any of the aforesaid pleadings, papers, affidavits, exhibits, evidence, judgments, orders, decisions, and transcripts of hearings filed with this Court in this above-entitled proceeding be kept in the custody of the Clerk of this County or the County Clerk at the County Courthouse for the County of Westchester; and
3. Directing the Clerk of this Court and the County Clerk not to permit any person other than a party or their counsel to appear herein to copy, examine, or peruse the aforesaid pleadings, papers, affidavits, exhibits, evidence, judgments, orders, decisions, and transcripts of hearings; and,
4. Authorizing the use of New York State Courts Electronic Filing System ("NYSCEF") in this case and directing the Chief Court [Clerk] of the Civil Court to convert this matter [*2]to electronic form pursuant to 202.5-b(2)(iv) and 208.4-a(b) of the Uniform Rules of the Trial Courts; and,
5. Directing such other and further relief as the Court may determine to be just and proper;
and a second motion by Order to Show Cause of the Plaintiff-Petitioner, dated June 5, 2025, (hereinafter "Motion Sequence No. 2"), seeking the entry of an Order granting the following relief:

1. Determining that New York is the home state of S.M.S. (DOB: XX/XX/XXXX) and E.G.S. (DOB: XX/XX/XXXX)(hereinafter the "Subject Children"); and,
2. Awarding the parties joint legal custody of the Subject Children herein; and,
3. Awarding Petitioner visitation with the Subject Children as follows:
(i) Regular parenting time on Saturdays and Sundays in [Plaintiff-]Petitioner's New York City home or other place of his choosing and outside of Respondent's presence from 10:00 AM to 6:00 PM on an interim, with a transition to overnight visits from Friday at 6:00 PM through Sunday at 3:00 PM on the second and fourth weekends of each month within thirty (30) days after the commencement of the regular parenting time; and,
(ii) Equal (50/50) division of all school holidays and breaks with the Subject Children; and,

4. Directing such other and further relief as the Court may determine to be just and proper;
and considered in connection with Defendant-Respondent's initial cross-motion (hereinafter "Motion Sequence No. 3"), dated June 20, 2025, seeking the entry of an Order:

1. Dismissing [Plaintiff-]Petitioner's motion as there is a child custody proceeding already pending in Florida in conjunction with the parties' pending divorce in the Circuit Court of the 19th Judicial Circuit in and for Indian River County Florida, or in the alternative, that the court stay the action in order to comply with the procedures of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA") and DRL § 76-e; and,
2. Directing such other relief as to this Court seems just and proper;
and considered in connection with Defendant-Respondent's second cross-motion (hereinafter "Motion Sequence No. 4"), dated June 20, 2025, seeking the entry of an Order:

1. Dismissing [Plaintiff-]Petitioner's motion as there is a child custody proceeding already pending in Florida in conjunction with the parties' pending divorce in the Circuit Court of the 19th Judicial Circuit in and for Indian River County Florida, or in the alternative, that the court stay the action in order to comply with the procedures of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA") and DRL § 76-e; and,
2. Seeking a denial of Petitioner's request for a sealing order; and,
3. Directing such other relief as to this Court seems just and proper.



PAPERS               DOC. NO.
Order to Show Cause (Seal)/Affirmation in Support/Exhibit "1" 1-3 [FN1]
Notice of Cross-Motion/Respondent Affirmation in Support of Cross-Motion/Attorney Affirmation in Support of Cross-Motion and Opposition [FN2] /Exhibit "A-B" 4-8
Attorney Affirmation in Opposition To Respondent's Cross-Motion 9 [FN3] (Sealing)
Order to Show Cause (UCCJEA)/Petitioner Affirmation in Support of Order To Show Cause/Attorney Affirmation (UCCJEA)/Exhibits "A-C" 10-15 [FN4]
Notice of Cross-Motion(UCCJEA)/Respondent Affirmation in Support of Cross-Motion/Attorney Affirmation in Support of Cross-Motion and Opposition [FN5] /Exhibits "1-24" 16-42
Attorney Affirmation in Opposition To Respondent's Cross-Motion (UCCJEA)/Exhibits "D-G" 43-47 [FN6]

Relevant Factual and Procedural Background

This plenary proceeding regarding custody and visitation was commenced on June 5, 2025, with the filing of a petition with exhibits [FN7] (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Petition") requesting that this Court to assert its jurisdiction over custody and visitation pertaining to the parties' children: (1) S.M.S. [D.O.B: X/XX/XXXX]; and, (2) E.G.S. [D.O.B: XX/XX/XXXX] (hereinafter "Children").[FN8] The Plaintiff-Petitioner seeks an order sealing the pending proceeding and, inter alia: (1) Determining that New York is the home state of the Children; (2) Awarding the parties [*3]joint legal custody of the Children; (3) Awarding Plaintiff-Petitioner visitation with the Children; and, (4) Directing such other and further relief as the Court may determine to be just and proper.

Simultaneously, Plaintiff-Petitioner filed a request for judicial intervention [FN9] (hereinafter "RJI"), and by respective orders to show cause, Motion Sequence No. 1 [FN10] and Motion Sequence No. 2,[FN11] were filed seeking the above-referenced relief.

Notably, Motion Sequence No. 2 provided information to this Court regarding a prior divorce and custody action between the parties, pending in the State of Florida, Circuit Court of the 19th Judicial Circuit in and for Indian River County, bearing Case No.: XX XXXX XX XXXXXX, currently pending before Circuit Court Judge Victoria L. Griffin (hereinafter "Florida Custody Action").[FN12] It appears based on the collective motion practice before this Court that custody applications are ongoing in the Florida Custody Action.[FN13]

On June 10, 2025, the orders to show cause for Motion Sequence No. 1 and Motion Sequence No. 2 were conformed by this Court.[FN14] In doing so, this Court directed: (1) Motion Sequence Nos. 1 and 2 were to be served by overnight traceable delivery by June 10, 2025; and, (2) all parties and counsel were directed to personally appear on June 12, 2025, at 2:00 p.m., to engage in oral argument as to the relief sought within Motion Sequence Nos. 1 and 2, wherein a briefing schedule would be provided if needed.

On June 12, 2025, the parties appeared and engaged in a conference before this Court on the pending motions, and an Order [FN15] was entered providing a formal briefing schedule to the parties. The parties were directed as follows: (1) all answering submissions and/or cross motions were to be flied via NYSCEF by June 20, 2025; and, (2) all answering submissions to any cross motions were to be filed via NYSCEF by June 27, 2025, acting as the return date of the motions, with no reply submissions accepted, and no appearances or oral argument at that time.

On June 20, 2025, Defendant-Respondent filed Motion Sequence No. 3,[FN16] as a cross motion seeking the above-referenced affirmative relief, and as opposition to Motion Sequence No. 2; as well as Motion Sequence No. 4 [FN17] as a cross motion seeking the above-referenced affirmative relief, and as opposition to Motion Sequence No. 1.

On June 27, 2025, Plaintiff-Petitioner filed opposition to Motion Sequence No. 3 [FN18] and Motion Sequence No. 4,[FN19] respectively.

No other documents were submitted to this Court for consideration regarding Motion Sequence Nos. 1-4.



Legal Analysis

A. Plaintiff-Petitioner's Request To Seal These Proceedings.

Within Motion Sequence No. 1, Plaintiff-Petitioner requests that this Court: (1) seal this matter, (2) that all documents be kept in the custody of the County Clerk, and (3) that only parties and counsel may copy, examine and peruse the documents herein.

This Court notes for the Plaintiff-Petitioner, the Uniform Rules for New York State Trial Courts (hereinafter "Court Rules") § 202.5(e)(1)(v), reads as follows:

(e) Omission or Redaction of Confidential Personal Information.
(1) Except in a matrimonial action, or a proceeding in surrogate's court, or as otherwise provided by rule or law or court order, and whether or not a sealing order is or has been sought, the parties shall omit or redact confidential personal information in papers submitted to the court for filing. For purposes of this rule, confidential personal information ("CPI") means:
i. the taxpayer identification number of an individual or an entity, including a social security number, an employer identification number, and an individual taxpayer identification number, except the last four digits thereof;
ii. the date of an individual's birth, except the year thereof;
iii. the full name of an individual known to be a minor, except the minor's initials; and
iv. a financial account number, including a credit and/or debit card number, a bank account number, an investment account number, and/or an insurance account number, except the last four digits or letters thereof..; and
v. any of the documents or testimony in a matrimonial action protected by Domestic Relations Law section 235 or evidence sealed by the court in such an action which are attached as exhibits or referenced in the papers filed in any other civil action. For purposes of this rule, a matrimonial action shall mean: an action to annul a marriage or declare the nullity of a void marriage, an action or agreement for a separation, an action for a divorce, or an action or proceeding for custody, visitation, writ of habeus corpus, child support, maintenance or paternity.

Additionally, pursuant to New York State Domestic Relations Law (hereinafter "DRL") § 235(1):
"An officer of the court with whom the proceedings in a matrimonial action or a written agreement of separation or an action or proceeding for custody, visitation or maintenance of a child are filed, or before whom the testimony is taken, or his clerk, either before or after the termination of the suit, shall not permit a copy of any of the pleadings, [*4]affidavits, findings of fact, conclusions of law, judgment of dissolution, written agreement of separation or memorandum thereof, or testimony, or any examination or perusal thereof, to be taken by any other person than a party, or the attorney or counsel of a party, except by order of the court."

This Court notes that both the Court Rules and the DRL set forth that these documents are already sealed and confidential, and limited to use by the parties and counsel herein, as is the case in all matrimonial actions, including any custody proceedings commenced within the State of New York. Moreover, this issue becomes further clarified now that New York State requires mandatory filing by use of the New York State Court Electronic Filing system (hereinafter "NYSCEF"). Court Rule 22 NYCRR § 202.5-bb directs the following in that respect:

"(a) Application.
Except where otherwise required by statute, all documents filed and served in Supreme Court shall be filed and served by electronic means in such classes of actions and such counties as shall be specified by order of the Chief Administrator of the Courts and only to the extent and in the manner prescribed in this section.
Except to the extent that this section shall otherwise require, the provisions of section 202.5-b of these rules shall govern electronic filing under this section.
(b) Commencement of Actions Under this Section.
(1) Mandatory commencement in general. Except as otherwise provided in this section, every action authorized by subdivision (a) of this section shall be commenced by electronically filing the initiating documents with the County Clerk through the NYSCEF site."

The "order" referenced within 22 NYCRR § 202.5-bb is the Administrative Order of the Chief Administrative Judge of the Courts of New York § AO/158/25 (hereinafter "Administrative Order 1") which recently directed that all civil matters initiated within the Supreme Court of the State of New York, including matrimonial matters, are to be initiated by filing on NYSCEF. While the instant application was initiated on June 5, 2025, thirty-one days prior to the effective date of Administrative Order 1, it appears both Plaintiff-Petitioner and Defendant-Respondent have consented to e-filing on NYSCEF for purposes of this proceeding, which would apply the case at bar to the directives set forth in both 22 NYCRR § 202.5-b and § 202.5-bb.

More importantly, the Administrative Order of the Chief Administrative Judge of the Courts of New York § AO/116/20 (hereinafter "Administrative Order 2"), Appendix B "Rules Governing the Consensual Electronic Filing of Matrimonial Actions in Supreme Court", previously set forth privacy and confidentiality guidelines which support the directives of the Court Rules and the DRL when e-filing documents on NYSCEF in matrimonial actions:

"2. For purposes of this order/appendix:
(i) "Matrimonial actions" shall mean those actions set forth in CPLR § 105(p) and DRL § 236 wherein:
(A) the action is contested, and addresses issues including, but not limited to alimony, counsel fees, pendente lite, maintenance, custody and visitation, child support or the equitable distribution of property; or
(B) the action is uncontested; or
(C) the action is a post-judgment application that either (1) addresses an underlying matrimonial action that was commenced electronically, or (2) is electronically initiated with the purchase of a new index number
* * *
(3) No paper or document filed by electronic means in a matrimonial action shall be available for public inspection on-line or at any computer terminal in the courthouse or the office of the County Clerk."

Important to this analysis, Administrative Order 2, effective as of May 29, 2020, clearly establishes that in "matrimonial actions", inclusive of the custody and access petition before this Court, none of the papers and/or documents e-filed will be available for public inspection (AO/116/20, Appendix B [a][2-3]). Of note, Administrative Order 2 is further codified within 22 NYCRR § 202.16-c(a)(2-3). Therefore, upon Plaintiff-Petitioner's filing of the instant action on NYSCEF, all documents and papers in this matter were automatically restricted from public inspection and consumption.

Further intending to protect the parties privacy and confidentiality, § 202.16-c(8) of the Court Rules directs that any attorneys for the parties or the children of the parties must "remove their representation of such parties or such minor children from the NYSCEF record within sixty (60) days" of: (1) a judgment of divorce, separation, annulment or action to declare a marriage void; (2) ceasing to be the attorney of record or ceasing to be associated with the law firm that is the attorney of record; (3) the filing of a consent to change attorney; (4) the filing of an Order of the court authorizing the withdrawal or changing of attorney; or (5) the filing of a notice of completion of limited scope representation, which ever event is earlier.

The Administrative Order, relevant DRL statutes, and corresponding Court Rules, are based on the premise that "matrimonial matters can involve painful, even embarrassing details, which the parties should have a right to keep private. Absent some overriding importance to the persons who would have access to the file, that privacy should be respected. Moreover, to the extent that the particular matrimonial matter might be subject to media publicity, the statute holds that such potentially embarrassing material should remain private, lest the details be used for spite or for scandal" (NY DRL § 235 McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York, Practice Commentaries [A.D.Scheinkman, J.S.C.] C235:1 "Access to Matrimonial Files", citing to, Stevenson v. News Syndicate Co., 276 A.D. 614 [2d Dept. 1950]).

Herein, the relief sought by the Plaintiff-Petitioner has already been provided by the DRL, Court Rules, and the Court Administrative Orders, and therefore these portions of the pending motion are denied as moot.

Plaintiff-Petitioner also requests that this Court convert this matter to "electronic form" by use of NYSCEF. However, as this proceeding was commenced and remains on NYSCEF, this relief is also denied as moot.

Therefore, Motion Sequence No. 1 is denied in its entirety.

B. Plaintiff-Petitioner's Request For This Court To Assert Jurisdiction Over Child Custody, Notwithstanding The Ongoing Florida Custody Action.

New York's codification of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act [*5](hereinafter "UCCJEA") is set forth within Article 5-A of the DRL, specifically Titles I-IV.[FN20] Of note to the instant application, the State of Florida has also adopted the UCCJEA, which has been identically codified within Florida State Statutes, Title VI "Civil Practice and Procedure", Chapter 61 "Dissolution of Marriage; Support; Time-Sharing", Part II "Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act" (§§ 61.501 — 61.542).

Initial to this Court's analysis is an overview of custody jurisdiction, and an examination of the parties' and the Courts' responsibilities under the relevant provisions of the UCCJEA and DRL. Here, it is undisputed that the Florida Custody Action was filed first; therefore, this Court must be the jurisdiction which provides an analysis of the factors and obligations set forth in the UCCJEA when simultaneous custody proceedings are ongoing.

(a) Mandatory Information Submitted To The Court.

DRL § 76-h(1) directs the following:

"Information to be submitted to the court.
1. Subject to subdivision five of this section, in a child custody proceeding, each party, in its first pleading or in an attached affidavit, shall give information, if reasonably ascertainable, under oath as to the child's present address or whereabouts, the places where the child has lived during the last five years, and the names and present addresses of the persons with whom the child has lived during that period. The pleading or affidavit must state whether the party:
(a) has participated, as a party or witness or in any other capacity, in any other proceeding concerning the custody of or visitation with the child and, if so, identify the court, the case number, and the date of the child custody determination, if any;
(b) knows of any proceeding that could affect the current proceeding, including proceedings for enforcement and proceedings relating to domestic violence, protective orders, termination of parental rights, and adoptions and, if so, identify the court, the case number, and the nature of the proceeding; and
(c) knows the names and addresses of any person not a party to the proceeding who has physical custody of the child or claims rights of legal custody or physical custody of, or visitation with, the child and, if so, the names and addresses of those persons."[FN21]

DRL § 76-h(4) directs the following:

"4. Each party has a continuing duty to inform the court of any proceeding in this or any other state that could affect the current proceeding."[FN22]

This Court finds that it was provided proper and complete notice of the Florida Custody [*6]Action, including the Circuit, County and Case Number associated with same,[FN23] on June 5, 2025, when the Plaintiff-Petitioner filed Motion Sequence No. 2, specifically in providing "Exhibit A" and "Exhibit B"[FN24] within that motion sequence. Notably, the highlighted exhibits provided this Court with a copy of what appears to be a State of Florida custody and access agreement between the parties and an incomplete copy of a State of Florida "Verified Amended Petition For Dissolution of Marriage And Related Relief (With Dependent Or Minor Children),"[FN25] both purportedly filed in the Florida Custody Action. While the custody and access agreement was signed and ordered by the Florida court, the Verified Amended Petition For Dissolution of Marriage And Related Relief (With Dependent Or Minor Children) was not provided as a certified copy. Notwithstanding the incomplete document provided, regarding the Florida Custody Action, this Court was able to unequivocally confirm that there is another custody action pending in the State of Florida pertaining to the Children, which includes open issues regarding child custody, child support, and access.[FN26]

As a result, given this Court's prior determination that the Florida Custody Action was first-in-time to the subject matter, this Court must now comply with the provisions of the UCCJEA regarding simultaneous custody proceedings.

(b) Simultaneous Proceedings And Communication Requirement.

DRL § 76-e (1-2) discusses the obligations of the Court when there are "Simultaneous Proceedings" between jurisdictions:

"1. Except as otherwise provided in section seventy-six-c [§ 76-c] of this title, a Court of this state may not exercise its jurisdiction under this title if, at the time of the commencement of the proceeding, a proceeding concerning the custody of the child has been commenced in a court of another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this article, unless the proceeding has been terminated or is stayed by the court of the other state because a court of this state is a more convenient forum under section seventy-six-f [§ 76-f] of this title.
2. Except as otherwise provided in section seventy-six-c [§ 76-c] of this title, a court of this state, before hearing a child custody proceeding, shall examine the court documents and other information supplied by the parties pursuant to section seventy-six-h [§ 76-h] of this title. If the court determines that a child custody proceeding has been commenced in a court in another state having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with this article, the court of this state shall stay its proceeding and communicate with the court of the other state. If the court of the state having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with this article does not determine that the court of this state is a more appropriate forum, the [*7]court of this state shall dismiss the proceeding."[FN27]

Pursuant to statute, a court is duty-bound prior to making a custody jurisdiction determination, to review the mandatory information submitted by the parties as outlined herein-above, and following said review, if it is determined that a prior child custody proceeding has been commenced within a court of another state having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with the UCCJEA, to stay this proceeding and communicate with the Court of the other state to discuss custody jurisdiction prior to making such a determination (DRL § 76-e; Williams v. Taylor, 20 AD3d 484 [2d Dept 2005]; "[W]hen the mother subsequently commenced a custody proceeding with respect to the subject child in the Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and for Volusia County, Florida (hereinafter the Florida court), the Florida court determined that Florida was an inconvenient forum and that New York was the more appropriate forum [internal citations omitted] Where custody proceedings relating to a child are pending in different states — in this case, New York and Florida — Domestic Relations Law §76-e applies, and the courts of the two states must confer with each other," Guzman v. Guzman, 92 AD3d 679 [2d Dept 2012] citing to, Matter of Javier v. Javier, 264 AD2d 735 [2d Dept 1999]).

The Courts have held that "substantial conformity" with the provisions of New York's DRL Article 5—A includes another "jurisdiction that was either the "home state" when the proceeding was commenced or satisfies one of the other jurisdictional predicates of section 76" (Kilcullen v. Bubanj, 116 AD2d 470 [1st Dept 1986], wherein given the absence of a jurisdictional predicate for Pennsylvania court [as foreign jurisdiction] to make custodial determination, it was unnecessary for the New York trial Court to stay its action; see also Matter of Uhl v. Uhl, 244 AD2d 935 [4th Dept 1997], wherein the Court held that for a proceeding in another state to result in a dismissal of a custody proceeding in New York, the foreign court had to exercise jurisdiction in substantial conformity with the UCCJEA).

"If the court determines that a child custody proceeding has been commenced in a court in another state having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with this article, the court of this state shall stay is proceeding and communicate with the court of the other state [internal citations omitted] a record must be made of the communication between the two courts and the parties must be informed promptly of the communication and granted access to the record [internal citations omitted]" (Vashon H. v. Bret I., 191 AD3d 1120 3d Dept 2021]).

Communication between the courts is statutorily defined by DRL § 75-i, which reads as follows:

"1. A court of this state may communicate and, pursuant to subdivision four of section seventy-six-c, subdivision two of section seventy-six-e [§ 76-e(2)] and section seventy-seven-f of this article, must communicate, with a court in another state concerning a proceeding arising under this article.
2. The court may allow the parties to participate in the communication. If the parties are not able to participate in the communication, they must be given the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision on jurisdiction is made.
3. Communication between courts on schedules, calendars, court records, and similar matters may occur without informing the parties. A record need not be made of the [*8]communication.
4. Except as otherwise provided in subdivision three of this section, a record must be made of a communication under this section. The parties must be informed promptly of the communication and granted access to the record.
5. For the purposes of this section, "record" means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.[FN28]

Therefore, communication with the other Court must: (1) allow the parties the opportunity to participate in the communication, or allow the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments to the courts prior to determination if the parties are not allowed to participate in the communication; and, (2) a record must be made of such communication, being defined as a "tangible medium" "stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable", of which the parties must be promptly informed of and granted access to said record. A failure of the Courts to communicate in this way, and to allow the parties to participate in said communication, prior to making such a determination is a reversable error (Andrews v. Catanzano, 44 AD3d 1109 [3d Dept 2007]; Frankel v. Frankel, 127 AD3d 1186 [2d Dept 2015]; Touchet v. Horstman, 207 AD3d 639 [2d Dept 2022]). Notably, the court seeking to stay its proceeding and communicate "has discretion in determining whether to allow the parties to participate in the intra-court communication, but is required by statute to grant the parties access to the record of that communication and give them 'the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision on jurisdiction is made.'" (Vashon H. v. Bret I., 191 AD3d 1120 3d Dept 2021]).

The Appellate Division, Second Department has only removed the burden of the communication requirement in simultaneous proceedings, DRL § 75-e and § 75-i, in situations where communication between the courts is deemed "not feasible" (Hollander v. Weissberg, 147 AD3d 831 [2d Dept 2017] where the Appellate Division, Second Department found an Israel Family Court's laws and procedures prevented said communication with the New York Court).

Assuming a New York State court determines that a prior custody proceeding has been commenced in another court in substantial conformity with the UCCJEA, and communication between the courts was properly conducted, if the foreign court does not determine that New York is the more appropriate forum, the New York Court shall dismiss the custody proceeding [internal citations omitted]" (Hiles v. Hiles, 165 AD3d 1394 [3d Dept 2018]).

The court where the first of two simultaneous child custody proceedings was filed, has the authority to determine whether or not the second would be a more appropriate or convenient forum (Hiles v. Hiles, 165 AD3d 1394 [3d Dept 2018] citing to DRL § 76-e[1-2]). However, the assumption of jurisdiction by a foreign state does not automatically preclude jurisdiction to a New York court if the foreign jurisdiction's actions regarding the custody determination was not in substantial conformity with the directives of New York's codification of the UCCJEA (Uhl v. Uhl, 244 AD2d 935 [4th Dept 1997]).

The only true exception to an automatic application of the simultaneous proceedings provision outlined within DRL § 76-e is where the state in question possesses absolutely no colorable claim to jurisdiction (Kilcullen v. Bubanj, 116 AD2d 470 [1st Dept 1986] where the [*9]Court concluded that the New York courts should exercise jurisdiction, although a proceeding was pending in Pennsylvania. Neither the plaintiff parent nor the child, who resided with the plaintiff, had ever stepped foot in Pennsylvania, New York was the home state, and there existed no significant connection with Pennsylvania).

In the case at bar, this Court has determined that a child custody proceeding was previously commenced, and is currently pending in the State of Florida. With respect to "substantial conformity", the Plaintiff-Petitioner admits that the parties lived in Florida from April, 2021 through the "summer" of 2024, and the Florida Custody Action commenced in November, 2023.[FN29] With respect to initial child custody jurisdiction, DRL § 76(1)(a) provides: "this state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding, and the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state."[FN30] Therefore, it is clear that the Florida Custody Action has jurisdiction substantially in accordance with the UCCJEA, as Florida was the home state of the children at the time of the commencement of that action.

As a result, this Court must abide by the tenets of the UCCJEA, stay its proceeding and communicate with the State of Florida Circuit Court of the 19th Judicial Circuit in and for Indian River County. This formal communication will help determine: (1) which state has jurisdiction over custody in this matter; (2) which forum is more appropriate; and thereafter, (3) allow this Court to make a determination regarding custody jurisdiction in the State of New York. This Court will schedule a formal communication with the State of Florida Circuit Court. As is the discretion of this Court, the parties will not be permitted to be a part of said communication, but will have the opportunity following the receipt of the record from said communication to submit papers to the court for consideration in the jurisdictional determination at issue, which may require further oral argument and/or a hearing to resolve.

C. Other Relief.

To the extent relief is not granted or otherwise addressed herein, it is hereby denied.



ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY:

ORDERED that Motion Sequence No. 1 is denied in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that Motion Sequence No. 2 is granted to the extent as set forth herein, as the Court shall proceed in accordance with the protocol set forth by the UCCJEA and DRL pertaining to an initial determination as to if this Court has jurisdiction to render a determination as to custody and access of the parties' Children; and it is further

ORDERED that Motion Sequence Nos. 3-4 are granted in part, in that the proceedings herein are stayed in their entirety pursuant to this Order; and it is further

ORDERED that this Court will contact the State of Florida, Circuit Court of the 19th Judicial Circuit in and for Indian River County and advise the parties thereafter of a date in which the courts will communicate on this matter, whereafter a record will be made of such communication and provided to the parties for review; and it is further

ORDERED that within 10 days of the Court providing to the parties the record of the communication, written submissions of fact and law may be submitted for consideration with respect to the Court's determination on the above-outlined issues; and it is further

ORDERED that the parties will be advised by the Court if oral argument and/or a hearing will be scheduled in conjunction with the Court's determination; and it is further

ORDERED that the Defendant-Respondent's counsel shall serve this Decision and Order with Notice of Entry on Plaintiff-Petitioner's counsel via NYSCEF Filing by July 24, 2025, and shall file an Affidavit of Service by July 24, 2025; and it is further

ORDERED that to the extent any relief requested has not been granted or otherwise addressed herein, it is hereby denied.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: July 22, 2025
White Plains, New York
ENTER:
HON. JAMES L. HYER, J.S.C.

Footnotes


Footnote 1:Plaintiff-Petitioner's Order to Show Cause, Motion Sequence No. 1 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 4) included both the "Affirmation in Support" and "Exhibit 1," within the same filed document. Moreover, "Exhibit 1" to the Order to Show Cause, Motion Sequence No. 1 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 5) includes duplicative copies of Plaintiff-Petitioner's Order to Show Cause and Affidavit in Support, as well as the Exhibit itself.

Footnote 2:Defendant-Respondent's Affirmation in Support of Motion Sequence No. 4 is also acting as formal opposition to motion Sequence No. 1.

Footnote 3:The Attorney Affirmation in Opposition To Respondent's Cross-Motion (Sealing) was filed twice with respect to both Motion Sequence Nos. 1 & 4 (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 48-49).

Footnote 4:Plaintiff-Petitioner's Order to Show Cause, Motion Sequence No. 2 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 7) included both the "Affirmation in Support of Order To Show Cause (UCCJEA)" and "Attorney Affirmation (UCCJEA)," within the same filed document.

Footnote 5:Defendant-Respondent's Affirmation in Support of Motion Sequence No. 3 is also acting as formal opposition to motion Sequence No. 2.

Footnote 6:The Attorney Affirmation in Opposition To Respondent's Cross-Motion (UCCJEA), and the attached exhibits, were filed twice with respect to both Motion Sequence Nos. 2 & 3 (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 50-59).

Footnote 7:See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 1-3, Petition & Exhibits "A-B".

Footnote 8:See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 1, Plaintiff's Petition Pg. 1.

Footnote 9:See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 6, RJI.

Footnote 10:See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 4-5, Motion Sequence No. 1.

Footnote 11:See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 7-10, Motion Sequence No. 2.

Footnote 12:See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 7-10.

Footnote 13:See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 16-42.

Footnote 14:See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 12-13.

Footnote 15:See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 15.

Footnote 16:See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 16-42, Motion Sequence No. 3.

Footnote 17:See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 43-47, Motion Sequence No. 4.

Footnote 18:See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 55-59 (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 50-54 are duplicative of these opposition papers).

Footnote 19:See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 49 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 48 is duplicative of these opposition papers).

Footnote 20:See, DRL § 75-78.

Footnote 21:This statute is mirrored within Florida State Statute, Chapter 61 § 61.522(1)(a-c).

Footnote 22:This statute is mirrored within Florida State Statute, Chapter 61 § 61.522(4).

Footnote 23:State of Florida, Circuit Court of the 19th Judicial Circuit in and for Indian River County, Case No.: 31 2023 DR 001152.

Footnote 24:See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 8-9.

Footnote 25:This Court notes that "Exhibit B" appears to be a 29-page document, which ends on "page 27" at ¶ 79, mid-sentence.

Footnote 26:See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 61 Pg. 1-2.

Footnote 27:This statute is mirrored within Florida State Statute, Chapter 61 § 61.519(1-2).

Footnote 28:This statute is mirrored within Florida State Statute, Chapter 61 § 61.511(1-5).

Footnote 29:See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 7, "Petitioner Affirmation in Support of Order to Show Cause (UCCJEA)" ¶¶ 11; 14; 16.

Footnote 30:This statute is mirrored within Florida State Statute, Chapter 61 § 61.514(1)(a).