Introduction

Richard Timmons, a pro se claimant, filed a claim against the State of New York for an injury he suffered in his cell and for delayed medical treatment. Mr. Timmons alleged that his cell at Sing Sing was too small, in violation of New York Codes, Rules and Regulations (NYCRR) standards, and caused him to injure his left knee on the bed when he entered his cell on September 11, 2021. He further alleged that this incident caused a meniscal tear and that the State negligently delayed medical care for the injury. Surgery for the torn meniscus was authorized on September 29, 2023, but did not occur until March 28, 2025.

In answering the claim, the defendant generally denied the allegations and asserted 13 affirmative defenses. (Defendant's exhibit A, Verified Answer at 1-4.)

A unified trial of this claim was conducted virtually on July 2, 2025, utilizing the Microsoft Teams platform, with the Court presiding at the Court of Claims in New York, New York. The claimant appeared from Sing Sing and the Assistant Attorney General appeared from her work location.

At trial, claimant testified on his own behalf and called Dr. Frederick Parker as a witness. He entered into evidence five exhibits:

Ex 1. Verified Claim;

Ex 1. Claimant's Medical Records, Part 1;

Ex 3. Claimant's Medical Records, Part 2;

Ex 4. Claimant's Medical Records, Part 3; and

Ex 5. Claimant's Medical Records, Part 4.

The State called Lieutenant Brian Bodge, a 35-year employee of DOCCS, as its only witness and offered into evidence one exhibit, Exhibit A, the Verified Answer. All documents offered were admitted into evidence.

The defendant moved to dismiss the claim at the close of claimant's case and at the close of the State's case. Mr. Timmons opposed both motions. The Court reserved judgment.

Mr. Timmons testified that on September 11, 2021, he had just returned from lunch to his gallery when an incident occurred nearby. A correction officer ordered all incarcerated individuals into their cells, but the cell doors were locked so they could not comply. One incarcerated individual stated this problem loudly, also calling the correction officer "stupid." Mr. Timmons was afraid that the correction officer would be embarrassed by someone pointing out his mistake publicly and would "take it out" on whoever was last inside his cell, so once the doors were unlocked, he was eager to enter his cell as quickly as possible. In his haste, he bumped his left knee on his bed.

Mr. Timmons said that the bed partially blocks the entrance to the cell, and due to the respective sizes of the bed and cell and other cell fixtures, the bed cannot be arranged to avoid this obstacle.^[FN2] He said he normally enters the cell by turning his body sideways to get past the bed, but because he was rushing, he walked straight in and struck his knee. Mr. Timmons provided a hand-drawn diagram of his cell that he testified he had measured using a measuring tape from a commissary sewing kit. (Claimant's exhibit 1, verified claim at 9.) Lieutenant Bodge testified that Mr. Timmons's diagram looked generally accurate, but noted that the standard bed size is 36 inches wide by 74 inches long, whereas Mr. Timmons's drawing showed a width of 34 inches and did not include a length. Lieutenant Bodge testified that in some cells, the bed may partially block the entrance but that he was not aware of complaints by other incarcerated individuals about the obstacle, nor did he know of other people injuring themselves on the bed while entering their cells.

Mr. Timmons testified that on the same day he hit his knee, he wrote to Doctor Frederick Parker ("Dr. Parker") about pain in his knee from bumping into the bed. He saw Dr. Parker three days later and was given medication for the pain. Dr. Parker testified that his notes from that visit indicated that Mr. Timmons complained of hitting his right knee, which Mr. Timmons disputed as a mistake on Dr. Parker's part. Dr. Parker also testified that he noted in that visit that [*2]Mr. Timmons had chronic right knee pain from a past diving incident. Dr. Parker testified that the records make no mention of bruising, swelling, or redness of the knee.

The next month, claimant saw Dr. Parker again and told him that the pain had not diminished. Dr. Parker scheduled an X-ray for the knee, which occurred on December 1, 2021. The X-ray did not reveal any breaks, but Mr. Timmons continued to complain to Dr. Parker of pain. On December 14, 2021, Dr. Parker referred Mr. Timmons to physical therapy twice a week for four weeks. (Claimant's exhibit 2 at 14^[FN3] .) Dr. Parker told claimant that he could not receive an MRI until after he had completed physical therapy.

Mr. Timmons testified that on March 9, 2022, he had a consultation to begin physical therapy. The first session occurred May 6, 2022. Mr. Timmons testified that on May 25, 2022, he was in a physical therapy session when a correction officer interrupted and said that Mr. Timmons needed to leave. The session was ended despite the physical therapist's objections. (Claimant's exhibit 5 at 61.) On July 1, 2022, Mr. Timmons wrote to Dr. Parker complaining that he had not received physical therapy since May 25, 2022. (Claimant's exhibit 5 at 21.) Mr. Timmons testified that Dr. Parker told him that his sessions had been discontinued due to a computer error. A handwritten note on the bottom of the physical therapy referral lists dates corresponding to what Mr. Timmons said was his physical therapy consultation and the first four sessions. (Claimant's exhibit 2 at 14.) There are four more dates listed for September. Mr. Timmons testified that this document showed a four-month "gap," although he did not testify that he resumed physical therapy in September or ever. There was no testimony establishing who wrote the note with the dates, when, or for what purpose.

On January 20, 2023, Mr. Timmons had an MRI performed by an external provider. The MRI revealed a torn meniscus. (Claimant's exhibit 2 at 8.) Dr. Parker testified that a torn meniscus is a common injury and is typically caused by a twisting injury to the knee or something that simply occurs over time through wear and tear of the joint. He testified that it would be unusual for a simple contusion of the knee to cause a meniscus tear, particularly one that did not cause swelling, redness, or bruising or damage visible on an X-ray. He said he did not believe the MRI was consistent with a traumatic injury.

On September 22, 2023, Dr. Parker completed a referral for an arthroscopy of the left knee in order to treat the meniscus tear. (Claimant's exhibit 2 at 11.) He testified that such an operation would be requested as "routine" care rather than urgent. Dr. Parker testified that the referral was sent to an organization called Kepro, which was contracted by the State to review and approve or deny medical referrals. Kepro approved the procedure on September 29, 2023. (Id.) Dr. Parker testified that approved referrals are sent to an office in Albany for scheduling.

Dr. Parker and Mr. Timmons both testified that throughout 2024, Mr. Timmons repeatedly communicated with Dr. Parker and other DOCCS officials to ask about when he would have his surgery. (See e.g. claimant's exhibit 5 at 57, November 5, 2024 letter from Susanna Nayshuler, MPH Regional Health Services Administrator, responding to Mr. Timmons that arthroscopy was approved and pending scheduling.) Dr. Parker testified that he, too, sent several emails to the scheduling office inquiring about the status of the surgery and requesting that it be scheduled. Dr. Parker testified that generally there had been scheduling delays due to a [*3]backlog of surgeries from the Covid-19 pandemic and short-staffing, but he acknowledged that "it took a long time" from the referral to the actual surgery.

On March 28, 2025, Mr. Timmons had the arthroscopy. Mr. Timmons testified that after the surgery, the pain in his left knee fully resolved. He said that while he was awaiting surgery, he developed pain in his right knee that Dr. Parker told him was likely caused by his right leg compensating for the injured left knee. He also testified that during the three and a half years between when the pain started and when it ended with the surgery, he was mocked by correction officers for limping and threatened with confinement in segregated housing for being unable to keep up with group movements, often being the last one to arrive to a destination because of the pain in his knee. Although he was grateful that the operation resolved his pain, he bemoans the years that he existed with such pain.

The State has a duty to maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances. (See Basso v Miller, 40 NY2d 233, 241 [1976]; Preston v State of New York, 59 NY2d 997, 998 [1983]; Sebagh v Capital Fitness, Inc., 202 AD3d 853, 855 [2d Dept 2022].) In addition, having assumed custody of an incarcerated individual, the State owes a duty to use reasonable care to safeguard incarcerated individuals from reasonably foreseeable risks of harm. (Sanchez v State of New York, 99 NY2d 247, 252-254 [2002].) This duty does not make the State an absolute insurer of safety, and negligence may not be inferred just because an incident occurred. (Id. at 253.) However, where a dangerous condition is alleged to exist, the State may be held liable when it has actual or constructive notice of the condition and fails to take reasonable measures to correct the danger. (See Friedman v State of New York, 67 NY2d 271, 286 [1986].) Determining whether a dangerous condition exists is a fact-specific inquiry. (Fasano v Green-Wood Cemetery, 21 AD3d 446, 446 [2d Dept 2005].)

In summary, a claimant must demonstrate that the State failed to take protective measures when it knew or had reason to know that the harm claimant suffered was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of a dangerous condition. (Melendez v State of New York, 283 AD2d 729, 729-730 [3d Dept 2001], leave to appeal dismissed 97 NY2d 649 [2001].) Therefore here, claimant must demonstrate that (1) the cell size constituted a dangerous condition; (2) that DOCCS either created the dangerous condition or had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition and failed to alleviate the condition within a reasonable time; and (3) the cell size was the proximate cause of his injury.

Claimant alleges that his cell size constituted a dangerous condition because it was smaller than the minimum cell size required by 9 NYCRR § 7621.^[FN4] The regulation does establish standards for housing units in Correctional Facilities, including its size; however, Mr. Timmons only cites part of the statute, overlooking the exception providing that "an individual occupancy [*4]housing unit may contain less than 60 square feet of floor space if such unit was originally constructed for single occupancy or has been rated for single occupancy by the commission." (9 NYCRR 7621.5 [emphasis added].)

Mr. Timmons did not offer any evidence to establish that Sing Sing was not constructed in compliance with the applicable building code at the time. (Rubin v Trustees of Columbia Univ. in the City of NY, 212 AD3d 544, 545 [1st Dept 2023].) The original cells at Sing Sing were constructed between 1825 and 1855, but by 1943, these cells were fully replaced by new construction. (Brent D. Glass, Center for the Future of Museums Blog, A New Site of Conscience: Sing Sing Prison Museum, https://www.aam-us.org/2022/08/10/a-new-site-of-conscience-sing-sing-prison -museum/ [Aug. 10, 2022].) Sing Sing is currently accredited by the American Correctional Association ("the ACA"). (American Correctional Association, Accredited Facilities, https://www.aca.org/ACA/ACA_Member/Standards_and_Accreditatio n/SAC_AccFacHome.aspx [click "Directory," enter "Sing Sing" in the Facility Name field, and click "Find"][last accessed August 18, 2025]). Accredited facilities must comply with the ACA's standards, including regulations concerning cell size. (American Correctional Association, 2016 Standards Supplement [November 2016], https://www.aca.org/common/Uploaded%20files/2016%20Standards%20Suppl ement.pdf [last accessed August 15, 2025].) Absent from the applicable regulation for single cells, 9 NYCRR 7621.5, is the requirement that cells built prior to its passage in 1997 be renovated, as Mr. Timmons claims. To the contrary, the statute expressly exempts cells originally constructed for single occupancy from its 60 square foot minimum requirement.

Mr. Timmons's belief that the size of his cell is dangerous, alone, is insufficient to sustain his burden of proof that it constitutes a dangerous condition. (See Murphy v Conner, 84 NY2d 969, 971-972 [1994].) Accordingly, he has not met his burden to prove that his cell was a dangerous condition or that the State was liable for his knee injury.

"It is settled that an [incarcerated individual], who must rely on prison authorities to treat [the incarcerated individual's] medical needs . . . has a fundamental right to reasonable . . . and adequate . . . medical care." (Kagan v State of New York, 221 AD2d 7, 11 [2d Dept 1996], quoting Estelle v Gamble, 429 US 97, 103 [1976] and Powlowski v Wullich, 102 AD2d 575, 587 [4th Dept 1984] [internal quotation marks omitted].) Further, the State has a duty to provide medical care "without undue delay." (Marchione v State of New York, 194 AD2d 851, 855 [3d Dept 1993].) Although medical malpractice can only be established through expert testimony to prove that the defendant's treatment constituted a deviation "from the accepted standard of care" (Sachs v State of New York, 143 AD3d 1291 [4th Dept 2016]), medical negligence may be determined by "the fact[]finder using common knowledge without the necessity of expert testimony." (Carter v State of New York, UID No. 2006-013-510 [Ct Cl, Patti, J., Mar. 22, 2006].) Here Mr. Timmons's claim sounds in medical negligence and the Court must determine whether the delays Mr. Timmons experienced in his care were unreasonable based on common knowledge.

Mr. Timmons raised two issues with respect to his medical care: (1) his physical therapy was negligently terminated on May 25, 2022; and (2) the lengthy delay in having surgery after it [*5]was authorized was negligent. Turning to his first allegation, Mr. Timmons relied on the December 14, 2021 referral recommending physical therapy twice a week for four weeks. However, the referral did not state whether those four weeks must be consecutive. Moreover, it could have been, perhaps, possible that the best course of treatment was to terminate or pause this physical therapy based on his progress, or lack thereof. However, it simply is not possible to evaluate whether this course of treatment was negligent without the testimony of an expert.

Even if the Court could accept that the interruption of physical therapy violated the referral's instructions, the delay it may have caused in authorizing an MRI was not unreasonable. The testimony did not clearly address whether Mr. Timmons did, in fact, resume physical therapy on September 7, 2022, as the hand-written date on his referral reflects, or whether he was simply authorized for an MRI on December 2, 2022, without being required to complete the physical therapy prescribed. The three-to-six-month delay did not constitute an undue delay.

The delay between when the surgery was authorized and when it was ultimately performed, however, requires a different conclusion. Mr. Timmons waited more than 18 months from the time the surgery was authorized on September 29, 2023, to when it was performed on March 28, 2025. Dr. Parker testified that this was a "long time" — so long that he attempted to intervene by repeatedly making requests to the State to schedule the surgery. Although Dr. Parker commented that there had been a backlog of surgeries as a result of Covid-19 and mentioned that there are only a few surgeons in the area who perform surgery on incarcerated individuals, the Court finds these rationales unpersuasive without any additional evidence supporting these explanations for the delay of a surgery that was authorized in September of 2023.

New York Courts have found similar length delays — and even shorter delays — to be unreasonable and establish liability for the defendant. For example, in Stanback v State of New York (163 AD2d 298 [2d Dept 1990]), the court found that a one-year delay between diagnosis and surgery for a meniscal tear was an unreasonable delay that rendered the State liable. (See also Davis v State of New York, UID No. 2007-044-008 [Ct Cl, Schaewe, J., Apr. 2, 2007] [seven-month delay created liability]; Stevenson v State of New York, UID No. 2002-030-089 [Ct Cl, Scuccimarra, J., Dec. 20, 2002] [one-month delay in care was negligent].) Here, the State had authorized the procedure as medically necessary and simply did not act in a timely manner. Mr. Timmons received a diagnosis with a clear treatment plan that would have alleviated his suffering, but he was forced to endure unnecessary pain for a year and a half without a legitimate reason.

The Court found claimant's testimony and evidence credible and finds that the State was negligent in failing to provide timely medical care to claimant following the authorization of his surgery.

Awarding damages for pain and suffering is not a precise enterprise and there is no formula for the Court to apply. (McDougald v Garber, 73 NY2d 246, 257 [1989].) To the extent that comparable cases are available, they can help to guide the Court's consideration, but they are not binding. (Garcia v CPS 1 Realty, LP, 164 AD3d 656, 658 [2d Dept 2018].) Awards vary widely depending on the particular facts and circumstances. Damage awards, as with any other type of factual finding is typically left to the fact-finder's common sense and judgment with respect to the evidence presented at trial, including the demeanor of witnesses. (Apuzzo v Ferguson, 20 AD3d 647, 648 [3d Dept 2005].)

Mr. Timmons expressed how he endured years of pain from the unrepaired torn meniscus, as well as the frustration of being repeatedly stonewalled in his efforts to receive necessary medical treatment. He also spoke of the secondary effects of his injury, such as pain in his right knee, heckling by correction officers and threats of reprisal for moving slowly.

Having carefully considered the testimony and documentary evidence received at trial, as well as relevant law, the Court awards Mr. Timmons $7,200 in damages for the harm he has experienced caused by DOCCS' negligence.

The amount awarded herein shall carry interest at the rate of 9% per year from the date of the determination on August 18, 2025. In addition, to the extent claimant has paid a filing fee, it may be recovered pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 11-a (2).

Any motions on which the Court may have previously reserved judgment or which were not previously determined are hereby DENIED.

The Chief Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.