I. Statement Pursuant to CPLR § 2219

Pursuant to CPLR 2219 [a], the following constitutes the decision and order of the Court on Motion Sequence No. 003. The motion was made by Plaintiff, The Church of St. Andrew, by Order to Show Cause, returnable before this Court at IAS Part 7, Supreme Court, Richmond County, located at 26 Central Avenue, Staten Island, New York, on the 4th day of August, 2025. Oral Argument was heard on the record at that time. Decision was reserved. The motion seeks an order pursuant to CPLR § 3124 compelling Defendant, Western World Insurance Company, to identify and produce the portions of its underwriting guidelines that pertain to additional insured coverage under commercial liability policy no. XXXXXXXXXX, issued to GC Solutions NY, Inc., for the period from the date of issuance through the denial of coverage on or about May 3, 2022. The following papers, numbered NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 43 and 64 through 83, were read and considered in connection with this motion.

II. Facts

The material facts are substantially undisputed. On or about November 17, 2021, St. Andrew retained GC Solutions to perform roofing work at its premises located at 40 Old Mill Road, Staten Island, New York. As a condition precedent to the contract, St. Andrew required GC Solutions to name it as an additional insured under its general liability coverage. On December 13, 2021, GC Solutions provided a Certificate of Insurance naming St. Andrew as an additional insured under the Policy issued by Western World.

On March 25, 2022, while performing work on the roof of St. Andrew's premises, Alexander Gabatashvilli, an employee of GC Solutions, fell to his death. A wrongful death action was thereafter commenced by Mr. Gabatashvilli's estate against St. Andrew in the Supreme Court, Kings County.

St. Andrew tendered its defense and indemnification to Western World. On May 3, 2022, Western World disclaimed coverage, asserting that St. Andrew did not qualify as an additional insured under the Policy.

On November 20, 2024, Plaintiff served a set of interrogatories and document demands, requesting production of the underwriting guidelines governing additional insured endorsements in effect at the time the Policy was issued. After multiple rounds of correspondence and proposed compromises, including confidentiality stipulations and scope limitations, Western World continued to refuse production. Plaintiff now seeks judicial intervention.

III. Conclusions of Law

Pursuant to CPLR § 3101 [a], "[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." The words "material and necessary" are to be interpreted liberally to require disclosure of any facts bearing on the controversy that will assist trial preparation by sharpening the issues and reducing delay. (see Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403 [1968]; Quinones v 9 E 69th St., LLC, 132 AD3d 750 [2d Dept 2015]).

Here, the material sought consists of underwriting guidelines that, according to Western World's own correspondence, "set standards for coverage eligibility." Plaintiff does not seek general claims manuals, internal personnel files, or wholesale production of underwriting protocols. Rather, it seeks a narrowly tailored production limited to those portions relevant to how Western World evaluates additional insured status under its commercial liability policies, specifically under the endorsement present in the Policy issued to GC Solutions.

In opposition, Western World relies principally on the Second Department's decision in [*2]Long Island Rail Road Co. v. NY Marine & Gen. Ins. Co., 198 AD3d 888 [2d Dept 2021], for the proposition that discovery into underwriting materials is improper absent ambiguity in policy language or allegations of insurer bad faith.

This Court finds that reliance unavailing and distinguishable.

In Long Island Rail Road, the court denied coverage because the plaintiff could not establish that a written agreement existed between the named insured and the purported additional insured, as expressly required by the additional insured endorsement. There was no dispute as to the absence of such a contract, and the case was resolved on a cold record without the need for factual development.

In stark contrast, the present case involves a live dispute over whether the Certificate of Insurance and accompanying contractual arrangements between GC Solutions and St. Andrew suffice to trigger additional insured coverage. St. Andrew has submitted documentary evidence of a Certificate of Insurance naming it as an additional insured and contends that there existed an agreement, whether formal or incorporated by reference, satisfying the endorsement's requirement of a written undertaking.

Accordingly, the operative question here is not the mere existence or nonexistence of a writing, but whether what was exchanged between the parties qualifies under the terms of the endorsement. That is a factual inquiry, not amenable to resolution without appropriate discovery.

Moreover, Western World has taken the affirmative position that St. Andrew does not meet its internal criteria for coverage yet refuses to disclose the very criteria it admits "set standards for coverage eligibility." Under such circumstances, Plaintiff is entitled to probe how Western World interprets and applies the language in the endorsement in real-world underwriting practice.

New York law does not require a showing of ambiguity or bad faith to compel disclosure of underwriting materials when those documents are material to the interpretation or application of policy terms. (see Fiserv Solutions, Inc. v XL Specialty Ins. Co., 84 AD3d 480 [1st Dept 2011]). The request here is directly aligned with Fiserv, where the court held that underwriting materials were discoverable where they bore upon the scope of coverage and the application of policy language, even absent a claim of ambiguity. While Fiserv Solutions, Inc. v. XL Specialty Ins. Co., 84 AD3d 480 [1st Dept 2011], is a decision of the Appellate Division, First Department, and therefore not binding on this Court, it is nonetheless persuasive authority in the absence of contrary precedent from either the Second Department or the Court of Appeals. The reasoning in Fiserv is particularly instructive here, as it directly addressed the discoverability of underwriting materials in insurance coverage disputes. There, the First Department reversed the denial of a motion to compel, holding that underwriting policies and procedures were "material and necessary" under CPLR § 3101, even in the absence of allegations of policy ambiguity or insurer bad faith, because they bore directly on the scope of coverage and the insurer's interpretation of policy terms.

This Court finds that logic applicable here. Plaintiff does not seek speculative or broad-[*3]ranging discovery, but instead requests limited portions of Defendant Western World's underwriting guidelines that pertain specifically to how it defines and evaluates additional insured coverage. As in Fiserv, such materials are directly relevant to the core dispute over whether Plaintiff qualified for coverage under the subject endorsement, and whether Defendant's interpretation of that endorsement aligns with its own internal standards for coverage eligibility.

The Second Department has not issued contrary authority precluding such discovery. To the contrary, this Department has consistently affirmed that the test for discoverability under CPLR § 3101 is one of "usefulness and reason," and that discovery should be permitted where the information sought is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. (see Quinones v 9 E. 69th St., LLC, 132 AD3d 750 [2d Dept 2015]; Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v Evanson, 230 AD3d 1091 [2d Dept 2024]). Nothing in Town of Brookhaven v NY Municipal Ins. Reciprocal, 228 AD3d 901 [2d Dept 2024], undermines this principle; rather, Brookhaven involved a request for underwriting materials in a case where the coverage dispute turned solely on unambiguous contract terms, and where the insured failed to articulate any factual dispute as to eligibility. That is not the case here.

Accordingly, even applying Second Department precedent, the Fiserv decision reinforces the propriety of allowing Plaintiff access to narrowly tailored underwriting documents that go to the heart of the declaratory relief sought.

Further, Plaintiff has proposed confidentiality protocols and a scope limitation that would adequately safeguard Defendant's proprietary interests. The discovery sought is not a fishing expedition but is calculated to uncover probative facts that go to the core of this declaratory judgment action.

To the extent that Long Island Rail Road speaks to the substantive burden of proving additional insured status under a policy, it does not limit the scope of discovery under CPLR § 3101 in a pending declaratory judgment action where such status remains contested. In this context, it provides no basis to preclude narrowly tailored discovery into underwriting eligibility standards.

IV. Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

For the foregoing reasons, and considering the liberal construction afforded to New York's disclosure rules, it is hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to compel is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant Western World Insurance Company shall produce, within five (5) days of service of this Order with notice of entry, the portions of its underwriting guidelines that pertain to additional insured coverage under commercial liability policies in effect at the time of issuance of policy no. XXXXXXXXXX through May 3, 2022; and it is further

ORDERED that such production shall be subject to the confidentiality provisions of the protective order previously entered by this Court on May 22, 2025 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 43), or as otherwise stipulated by the parties.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.