On February 23, 2025, Cherrine Jackman ("defendant"), was arraigned and charged on a misdemeanor complaint with two counts of aggravated harassment in the second degree - one in violation of PL § 240.30 (1) (a), and the other in violation of PL § 240.30 (1) (b), and one in violation of PL § 240.30 (2), in addition to one count of harassment in the second degree in violation of PL § 240.26 (1). The factual portion of the complaint alleges that defendant called the complaining witness T.M. ("CW") and stated in sum and substance: "Bitch watch your back, when you walk out of the door I'm going to stab you." CW allegedly "recognized the defendant's voice" in the "above-mentioned message." The Complaint Room Screening Sheet notes that the relationship between CW and defendant is that they share an ex-husband. On April 7, 2025 the people filed a supporting deposition ("SD") signed by the complainant under penalty of perjury: "I have read the accusatory instrument filed in this action. The facts in that instrument stated to be on information furnished by me are true to my personal knowledge."On May 21, 2025, the people served and filed their certificate of compliance ("COC"), notice and disclosure form, and statement of readiness ("SOR").

Defendant moves for an order deeming the accusatory instrument facially insufficient pursuant to CPL §§ 100.40, 170.30(1)(a), and 170.35(1)(a). Defendant also moves to an order finding that the COC was invalid and the SOR illusory because the People failed to produce records that were discoverable under CPL 245.20(1). Finally, defendant moves to dismiss pursuant to CPL §§ 170.30(1)(e), 30.30, and 245.80(2) on the ground that she was denied to right to a speedy trial. For the reasons set forth below, this court finds the accusatory instrument to be facially insufficient and the motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

A misdemeanor complaint "serves merely as the basis for commencement of a criminal action, permitting court arraignment and temporary control over the defendant's person where there is as yet no prima facie case." People v. Slade, 37 NY3d 127, 136 (2021), citing People v. Weinberg, 34 NY2d 429, 431 (1974). In order to proceed with a prosecution, "a misdemeanor complaint must be replaced by an information." Slade, supra, 37 NY3d at 136. An information must designate the offenses charged [CPL § 100.15(2)], and the "factual part of such instrument must contain a statement of the complainant alleging facts of an evidentiary character supporting or tending to support the charges." [CPL § 100.15(3)]. "Every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof must be supported by non-hearsay allegations of such information and/or any supporting depositions." Id. Pursuant to CPL 100.20, a supporting [*2]deposition is a written instrument accompanying or filed in connection with a misdemeanor complaint "subscribed and verified by a person other than the complainant of such accusatory instrument, and containing factual allegations of an evidentiary character, based either upon personal knowledge or upon information and belief, which supplement those of the accusatory instrument and support or tend to support the charge or charges contained therein." The "complainant" in the context of CPL 100.15 and 100.20 means "any person having knowledge, whether personal or upon information and belief, of the commission of the offense or offenses charged." CPL 100.15.

An information is "sufficient on its face" when it substantially conforms to the requirements of CPL 100.15 [CPL 100.40(1)(a)], the factual part of the information, "together with those of any supporting depositions which may accompany it, provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged in the accusatory part of the information," [CPL 100.40(1)(b)] and the "non-hearsay allegations of the factual part of the information and/or of any supporting depositions establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof." [CPL 100.40(1)(c)]. See, People v. Hill, 38 NY3d 460, 463-464, 174 N.Y.S.3d 340, 195 N.E.3d 47 (2022); People v Smalls, 26 NY3d 1064, 1066, 23 N.Y.S.3d 134, 44 N.E.3d 209 (2015)]. Reasonable cause "exists when evidence or information which appears reliable discloses facts or circumstances which are collectively of such weight and persuasiveness as to convince a person of ordinary intelligence, judgment and experience that it is reasonably likely that such offense was committed and that such person committed it." [CPL 70.10(2)]; People v McCain, 30 NY3d 1121, 1123 (2018). "Without a fully converted, facially sufficient information, any statement of readiness by the People is illusory and ineffective." People v. Maslowski, 187 AD3d 1211, 1214 (2d Dept. 2020).

A person is guilty of harassment in the second degree under PL § 240.26 (1) when "with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person, they "strike, shove, kick or otherwise subjects such other person to physical contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same." A person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the second degree under PL 240.30(1)(a) when with intent to harass another person, they communicate, anonymously or otherwise, by telephone a threat to cause physical harm to another person, when they know or reasonably should know that such communication will cause the other person to reasonably fear harm to their physical safety. PL § 240.30(1)(a). A person is guilty of the same offense under PL 240.30(1)(b) when they "cause" such a communication to be initiated anonymously or otherwise. This court finds that according to the plain language of the statute, the distinction between PL 240.30(1)(a) and (b) is that aggravated harassment in section (a) involved initiation of a communication by a defendant, whereas section (b) involves initiation of a communication by a person other than the defendant.. At the outset this court dismisses the count charging defendant with PL 240.30(1)(b) as facially insufficient since there is no factual allegation that defendant initiated any communication with CW through another person.

This court further finds that defendant's alleged threat to CW that she should "watch your back, when you walk out of the door I'm going to stab you" constitutes hearsay since is a "statement made out of court," which was offered for the truth of the fact asserted in the statement [People v. Goldstein, 6 NY3d 119, 127 (2005)], namely,that defendant threatened the complainant. See, People v Brooks, 31 NY3d 939, 942 (2018) (witness's testimony regarding victim's statement that defendant had previously threatened her constituted double hearsay); Similarly, the deponent's statement in the complaint that CW told him that she "recognized the [*3]defendant's voice" is also hearsay because it is an out of court statement offered for the truth of the assertion that CW recognized defendant.

The issue is whether CW's statement in the SD that she "read the accusatory instrument filed in this action," and that the "facts in that instrument stated to be on information furnished by me are true to my personal knowledge" was sufficient to cure the hearsay allegations in the misdemeanor complaint and convert it to a facially sufficient information. This court finds that CW's SD was not sufficient to transform the deponent police officer's statement in the complaint that he was informed by CW that she received a threatening phone call from defendant into a facially sufficient charge to the extent that the SD was a mere repetition and adoption of her hearsay statement to the deponent and did not add anything to it. CPL 100.20 provides that a supporting deposition must contain factual allegations of an evidentiary character which "supplement" those of the accusatory instrument, i.e., provide "additional or corroborative facts or evidentiary material which may be necessary to demonstrate a sufficient case." People v. Johnson-McLean, 71 Misc 3d 31, 37 (App. Term 1st Dept. 2021). Here, CW's SD did not contain additional or corroborative facts of an evidentiary character to demonstrate that defendant threatened her, i.e., CW did not claim that defendant was actually standing outside her door with a knife. As such, it did not establish reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offenses charged in the accusatory part of the complaint, i.e., PL 240.26 (1) and 240.30(1)(a).

CW's SD did convert the deponent's statement in the complaint that CW recognized defendant's voice from hearsay to non-hearsay since merely identifying defendant's voice does not constitute hearsay. [See, People v. Brower, 81 Misc 3d 4, 6-7 (App. Term 2d Dept. 2023) (detective's identification of a defendant in a surveillance video, which had no audio and included no nonverbal assertions, did not constitute hearsay). However, the SD did not contain corroborative facts as to how CW recognized his voice; i.e., how CW and defendant were known to each other. This court finds that CW's alleged recognition of defendant's voice, taken together with the uncorroborated hearsay threat, did not rise to the level of establishing reasonable cause to believe that defendant threatened CW, since that information was not of such weight and persuasiveness as to convince a person of ordinary intelligence, judgment and experience that it is reasonable likely that defendant committed the offenses of aggravated harassment in the second degree [PL 240.30(1)(a)] and harassment in the second degree [PL 240.26(1)]. See, People v. Willis, 2025 NY Slip Op 01405, 2025 NY LEXIS 270, *5-6 (2025) ("Reasonable cause exists when information which appears reliable discloses facts or circumstances which are collectively of such weight and persuasiveness as to convince a person of ordinary intelligence, judgment and experience that it is reasonably likely that [an] offense was committed and that [a particular] person committed it"). Accordingly, this court deems the accusatory instrument facially insufficient.

The People were required to file their COC and announce their readiness for trial on May 27, 2025 (the next business day following the holiday weekend), which was over 90 days after the commencement of the criminal action on February 23, 2025, since the most serious offense, PL 240.30(1)(a), is a class A misdemeanor punishable by up to 364 days in jail. People v. Benavente, 2022 NY Slip Op 50552(U), 2022 NY Misc. LEXIS 2846 (Crim. Ct. Bronx Co. 2022); CPL § 30.30 (1)(b).People v. Santos, 2023 NY Misc. LEXIS 3783, *6, 79 Misc 3d 1233(A), 192 N.Y.S.3d 479 (Crim. Ct. Bronx Co. 2023). However, the People's statement of readiness which they filed on May 21, 2025 was rendered illusory since the accusatory [*4]instrument was facially insufficient.. Maslowski, supra, 187 AD3d at 1214. Since the People have exceeded their 90 day speedy-trial time limitation and the accusatory instrument was facially insufficient, the motion to dismiss is granted. This constitutes the decision and order of the court.