Plaintiff Karen Paquette commenced this action on October 11, 2024, and then filed an [*2]Amended Verified Complaint (the "Complaint") on December 2, 2024, prior to answering papers being served. The Complaint set forth causes of action sounding in retaliation, discrimination and breach of contract by her employer, defendant Hudson Valley Community College ("HVCC" or the "College"), as well as defendant Roger A. Ramsammy in his capacity as President of HVCC. Specifically, Paquette asserts that in terminating her on November 15, 2022, defendants violated the New York State Human Rights Law, codified as Executive Law § 296 (First, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Causes of Action), Labor Law §§ 215 and 740 (Second and Fourth Causes of Action) and Civil Service Law § 75-b (Third Cause of Action), and supports causes of action sounding in negligent infliction of emotional distress (Eighth Cause of Action), and breach of her Management Confidential Employment Contract (Ninth Cause of Action) (Complaint ¶¶ 192-284).

The Complaint sets forth the following allegations:

Prior to her termination from employment with HVCC, Paquette worked for approximately six years as the College's Director of Human Resources, reporting directly to President Ramsammy (id. ¶¶ 15-18). Also employed in HVCC's Department of Human Resources was Heather Henry, who served as a "Human Resource Administrator" and had been the College's employee for a "number of years" (id. ¶ 51).

In July 2022, HVCC received a job application from a prospective employee for a position in HVCC's Financial Aid Department (id. ¶ 54). After reviewing the application and the results of a background investigation, "HVCC did not hire Prospective Employee" and on or about July 27, 2022, Henry notified the prospective employee in writing "that HVCC would not hire this person as result of their background check" (id. ¶¶ 55-57). Paquette became aware of this communication on or about July 30, 2022, and determined that Henry's issuance of such a letter was a discriminatory act against the prospective employee, and she notified President Ramsammy and Henry of her determination (id. ¶¶ 58-59).

On August 1, 2022, plaintiff issued a formal "Corrective Action Report" for Henry "in order to remedy and oppose such discrimination, prevent any further discrimination," and imposed "progressive disciplinary measures" on Henry (id. ¶¶ 65-67). On the same day, Plaintiff and HVCC Chief Diversity Officer Ainsely Thomas met with Henry to discuss the matter (id. ¶ 68). During this meeting, "Henry committed acts of aggressive behavior, rising to the level of Workplace Violence ^[FN1] . . . [including] intentional displays of force" (id. ¶¶ 74-75). Plaintiff claims that these actions gave her "reason to fear or expect bodily harm . . . [and] fear for her own safety" (Complaint ¶¶ 76-77). Plaintiff further alleges that Henry had a known history of "intentional displays of force" in the workplace (id. ¶¶ 84-86).

As a result of Henry's actions during the August 1 meeting, plaintiff notified President Ramsammy of what she describes as a "violation of Defendant's Workplace Violence Prevention Policy(ies)" and "occupational safety hazards" ( ¶¶ 88-90). Some time following the August 1 [*3]incident, Henry filed a "complaint" with HVCC against Paquette which led HVCC to undertake an investigation (id. ¶ 95). According to Paquette, HVVC engaged in this investigation "in retaliation to Plaintiff's notifications concerning [Henry's] acts of aggressive behavior and intentional displays of force," as well as plaintiff's determination that Henry had issued an alleged discriminatory letter to a prospective employee (id. ¶¶ 96-97). The investigation, which included plaintiff being deposed under oath, was carried out by outside legal counsel (id. ¶¶ 99-102). Plaintiff asserts that President Ramsammy and other senior HVCC staff took no action against Henry (id. ¶¶ 109-112).

Notwithstanding the August 1, 2022 incident with Henry, "in or about September 2022, plaintiff was promoted by Defendant HVCC from Director of Human Resources to Executive Director of Human Resources" (id. ¶ 19). As a result of this promotion, "Defendant HVCC and Plaintiff entered into a Management Confidential Employment Contract" ("Contract"),^[FN2] which was signed by Paquette and Ramsammy in his capacity as President of HVCC (id. ¶ 21). Under the terms of this Contract, the parties agreed that Paquette's new position as Executive Director of Human Resources was "an At-Will position and that either the College or the Employee has the discretion to terminate employment at any time, for any reason or no reason" (Contract at 1). As for plaintiff's responsibilities, the Contract provided as follows:

"The Executive Director Human Resources shall be an administrator of the College reporting to the Vice President of Administration and CFO of the College. The Executive Director Human Resources shall be responsible for those duties outlined in their Job description attached hereto, goals for the year, the terms of this Agreement and other duties as assigned by the Vice President for Administration and CFO and as may be from time to time amended and modified. The job description shall be reviewed on at least an annual basis and updated, amended or modified as necessary" (Contract ¶ 5).

Although the express terms of the Contract required plaintiff to report to the Vice President of Administration and CFO of the College ("VP") Donal Christian, in her complaint she contends that as a result of her reporting Henry's alleged improper behavior to President Ramsammy and HVCC senior staff, Ramsammy "demoted" plaintiff and "reassigned her to report to [VP Christian]" (Complaint ¶ 116). Plaintiff further characterizes her having to report to Christian — which was part of her promotion — "as an adverse employment action against her" (id. ¶ 120). She also alleges that Christian is a "male" of a "a different race than that of plaintiff" (id. ¶¶ 117-118).

Plaintiff further asserts that, as a result of Paquette reporting on and disciplining Henry, VP Christian ignored plaintiff's phone calls; cancelled meetings; removed plaintiff from HVCC Labor Management and Union Official Meetings (which she alleges were essential to her job); refused to respond to plaintiff's work-related requests for his signature; and reassigned certain categories of plaintiff's work to the "former Director of Human Resources," the "Vice President of Academic Affairs," and "others" (id. ¶¶ 133-146). Plaintiff eventually "had no work to do" and HVCC failed to respond to her request for funding to attend "leadership trainings" (id. ¶ 147-153).

Paquette also alleges that President Ramsammy "made personal insults against Plaintiff . . . spread rumors and gossip regarding Plaintiff . . . called Plaintiff on her personal cell phone to tell Plaintiff of purported rumors and gossip regarding Plaintiff . . . [and] assigned her menial tasks" (id. ¶¶ 157-160). This culminated with President Ramsammy telling plaintiff that her position with HVCC was no longer necessary, reassigning Human Resource personnel to VP Christian's department, and terminating plaintiff on November 15, 2022 (id. ¶ 161-163, 168). According to plaintiff, defendants engaged in this behavior in retaliation for Paquette reporting on and disciplining Henry for alleged improper behavior that occurred in July and August 2022 (Complaint ¶ 169).

Defendants have now filed separate motions to dismiss the complaint.

Both defendants argue that the first through eighth causes of action in the complaint must be dismissed because plaintiff failed to serve Rensselaer County with a notice of claim as required under County Law § 52 and General Municipal Law § 50-e (Attorney Affirmation of Robert F. Manfredo, Esq., dated January 30, 2025 ["Manfredo Aff"] ¶ 5; (Affirmation of Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Esq. In Support of Motion to Dismiss, dated January 31, 2025 ["Fitzgerald Aff"] ¶¶ 20-40). HVCC also challenges particular causes of action on various other grounds, including that the causes of action for retaliation under Labor Law §§ 215 and 740 do not apply to a public employer such as HVCC, and plaintiff has failed to plead any facts establishing that she reported any activity that would meet the statutory definition of "workplace violence" (id. ¶ 9-10). It argues further that the eighth cause of action for negligent infliction of emotion distress is barred because such a claim can only be pursued through the Workers' Compensation Law (id. ¶ 12), and the ninth cause of action for breach of plaintiff's employment contract with HVCC is at odds with the contract's express provision that Paquette's employment was "At-Will" and could be terminated at any time (id. ¶ 13).

The College also asserts that plaintiff's various causes of action for discrimination and retaliation fail to state a claim because she has not pled a causal connection between her reporting on and disciplining of Henry in July and August 2022, and plaintiff's termination (id. ¶ 8). In addition, it argues that the complaint is devoid of factual allegations that would give rise [*4]to a reasonable inference of discrimination,^[FN3] as necessary to sustain the claims brought under the Human Rights Law (id. ¶ 11).

Ramsammy, who was sued "in his capacity as President of [HVCC]" (Complaint at 1), is not mentioned in the first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh causes of action, and he seeks their dismissal against him on this basis (Fitzgerald Aff ¶ 8). Moreover, he argues that since each of these causes of action are asserted under the State Human Rights, Civil Service, or Labor Laws, they can only apply to the College, as Ramsammy was not plaintiff's "employer" within the meaning of these statutes (id. ¶¶ 10, 17, 21-23). Finally, he contends that plaintiff has failed to plead a prima facie case of negligent infliction of emotional distress (Fitzgerald Aff ¶ 26) and cannot hold him liable for breach of a contract between plaintiff and HVCC, to which Ramsammy is not a party and only executed as President of the College (id. ¶ 28).

In opposition, plaintiff has submitted an affidavit providing further detail concerning Heather Henry and the August 1, 2022, meeting (Affirmation of Karen Paquette, affirmed April 9, 2025 ["Paquette Aff"] ¶¶ 13-20). According to Paquette, Ms. Henry had an "aggressive and violent outburst" during the meeting during which she "stood up and began yelling," said "[t]his is bullshit" and "I am not going to take this shit!", used the "F-word" and stated "[t]hey want me out of here" (id. ¶¶ 24-26, 30-31). Henry is also alleged to have paced around the room and shoved the conference table toward plaintiff, causing Paquette to move her chair back so that the table would not come in contact with her (Paquette Aff ¶ 27). Plaintiff contends that she is shorter and weighs less than Henry, and that the "aggressive" behavior displayed by Henry caused Paquette to "fear[] and expect[] that Heather was able to harm [her]" (id. ¶ 29). She states, however, that Henry left the room and there was no physical altercation (id. ¶ 32).

In response to defendants' argument that the complaint is devoid of facts evidencing a causal connection between plaintiff's alleged protected activity in July and August 2022 concerning Henry and her November 2022 termination, Paquette avers that the retaliation was "clear," and "typical" of the College and Ramsammy (id. ¶¶ 44-45). She states that "if someone raised an issue he did not like, he would actively and significantly diminish that person's responsibilities, chastise that person amongst other employees, and make it so uncomfortable to eventually force the person to quit" (id. ¶ 45). As to her discrimination claim, she asserts that both Ramsammy and VP Christian are of South Asian descent, identify as Black (Ramsammy) or as a person of color (Christian), "celebrate[ ] middle-eastern traditions," and are married (id. ¶ 61-63), while in her pleading plaintiff notes that she is white, female and divorced (see [*5]Complaint ¶¶ 4, 6-7). She says that Ramsammy "considered" Christian's race, age,^[FN4] and marital status in "transferring [her] responsibilities to him" (Paquette Aff ¶ 64). According to her memorandum of law, Paquette also "believes" that "employees younger than her" — which she does not identify — were asked to take over her duties and "a younger person" — who she also does not identify — was hired to replace her (Memorandum of Law in Support of Cross-Motion & In Opposition to Defendant Hudson Valley Community College's Motion to Dismiss ["Pl MOL H"] 29-30). Further, she "believes" that her termination was due to her race and marital status (id. at 30-32).^[FN5]

In support of her contention that her treatment by Ramsammy was "typical" of him, Paquette cites the examples of two other former HVCC employees. The first, Gloria Baez, was hired in September 2020 as the HVCC Vice President of Administration (id. ¶ 47). Paquette avers that Baez was "willing to raise mistakes or policy violations at HVCC, and did so" (id. ¶ 49). According to Paquette, Ramsammy transferred Baez's responsibilities to Christian, and then she was terminated in May 2021 (id. ¶ 51).

The second individual mentioned was Gina Ricci, who was HVCC Director of Budget from 2014 to 2022, and who is said to have "brought up financial concerns to Dr. Ramsammy regarding practices and entries that did not align with SUNY procedures" (id. ¶ 52). In response, claimant asserts, Ramsammy and Christian began "ignoring" her and discussing her termination with Paquette (id. ¶ 54). Ricci's responsibilities were transferred from her, and she resigned in April 2022 after accepting another position (id. ¶¶ 56-57). Plaintiff states that Ms. Baez was about 55 and divorced and Ricci about 50 and single, when they left (id. ¶¶ 47, 52); otherwise, she says nothing about any of their protected characteristics, or why the circumstances described would give rise to an inference of discrimination.

In regard to defendants' various legal arguments, plaintiff asserts that she was not required to serve a notice of claim on Rensselaer County, since HVCC is not a county, municipal corporation or local government, but rather a community college (Pl MOL H 6-7, 11-12). Similarly, in support of her Labor Law claims for retaliation, plaintiff argues that as a community college, HVCC is not a municipal or public employer and, therefore, is not exempt from the application of the Labor Law §§ 215 and 740 ^[FN6] (id. at 22-24). And as to defendants' [*6]contention that she has failed to show a causal connection between her conduct vis-a-vis Henry and her termination, Paquette maintains that her firing closely followed the incident with Henry, and the 3.5 month temporal proximity is sufficient to support a causal connection (id. at 19).

Plaintiff further argues that her termination was not only retaliatory, but also discriminatory based on her age, race and marital status, and such can reasonably br inferred from the factual allegations in her complaint (Pl MOL H 28). According to Paquette, because her work responsibilities were transferred to Vice President Christian's department, and he was married at the time and of Southeast Asian origin, she "believes" that this reassignment of her duties was based on a discriminatory motive of President Ramsammy (id. at 29-32).

As for her breach of contract claim, plaintiff argues that, because her termination was based on unlawful retaliation in violation of the College's own employment policies, it is a breach of her employment contract, even though she was an "at-will" employee (id. at 33).

As to Ramsammy's motion, Paquette takes the position that because the President had the authority to make personnel decisions including termination, and because she pled that Ramsammy acted on "personal and/or professional reasons," he may be held personally liable for discrimination and retaliation as if he were an employer (Memorandum of Law in Support of Cross-Motion & In Opposition to Defendant Roger A. Ramsammy's Motion to Dismiss ["Pl MOL R"] 9-13). Plaintiff further argues that Ramsammy is personally liable for negligent infliction of emotional distress on Ms. Paquette because HVCC had a duty to protect its employees from Workplace Violence and HVCC breached such duty, and that duty was also owed by Ramsammy as the College's President (Pl MOL R 14). According to plaintiff, upon her reporting Heather Henry's alleged workplace outburst to Ramsammy, he failed to take action — such as reporting the incident to the College's Public Safety Department — and, as a result, Paquette asserts that Ramsammy "unreasonable endangered [her] physical safety"^[FN7] (id.).

Plaintiff also moves to amend her pleading to modify the case caption and the headings for each cause of action to indicate that this case and each of her claims is asserted not only against defendant HVCC, but also against defendant Ramsammy both "personally" and in his capacity as the President of HVCC (Pl MOL R 5; Pl MOL H 5; see also Affirmation in Support of Cross-Motion and in Opposition to Motions to Dismiss of Graham A. Thompson, Esq., dated April 11, 2025 ["Thompson Aff"] at Ex A [Proposed Second Amended Complaint]). According to plaintiff, "the proposed Second Amended Complaint simply conforms the caption to the allegations in the Amended Complaint and clarifies which parties the causes of actions are against; it does not add new parties or causes of action" (Pl MOL H 5-6).

Notice Under County Law § 52

Before I address the substance of each of plaintiff's causes of action, I must address defendants' threshold argument that plaintiff was required to comply with the notice of claim requirements of County Law § 52. For reasons set forth below, the caselaw clearly required that [*7]a notice of claim be served on the County in regard to all non-contractual causes of action presented by plaintiff against defendant Ramsammy, and her failure to do so requires dismissal of those claims. Since there is some ambiguity as to whether this is the case in regard to the claims against HVCC, I decline to dismiss on this issue, particularly as those claims must be dismissed on other grounds, as set forth below.

Under Education Law § 6301, "[c]ommunity colleges" are defined as colleges that may be established and operated by various local governments including counties, and approved by the state university trustees ^[FN8] (Education Law § 6301[2]). The relevant local government entity is referred to as the "[l]ocal sponsor" that is "sponsoring or participating in the establishment or operation of a community college" (id. at §6301[3]). In this case, "the County of Rensselaer . . . is the local sponsor for HVCC" (Santandrea v Board of Trustees of Hudson Valley Community College, Hudson Valley Community Coll., 25 Misc 3d 429 [Sup Ct Rensselaer County 2009], affd 70 AD3d 1238 [3d Dept 2010]).

Education Law § 6308 provides that "[a]s the local sponsor, [Rensselaer County] is under a statutory obligation to indemnify the [College's] board of trustees if a judgment is rendered against them . . . " (Butterfield v Board of Trustees Schenectady County Community College, 131 AD2d 963, 964 [3d Dept 1987]). This indemnification requirement also extends to employees and former employees such as Ramsammy in any civil action "arising out of any alleged act or omission which occurred or is alleged in the complaint to have occurred while the employee was acting within the scope of his employment or duties" (Education Law § 6308[2][a]). Because Rensselaer County is under a statutory duty to defend and indemnify Ramsammy, "it is a real party in interest regardless of the fact that it was not named as a defendant in the lawsuit" (Butterfield, 131 AD2d at 964). Thus, "[w]hen a public corporation ^[FN9] such as [Rensselaer] County has a statutory obligation to indemnify its employees, a plaintiff who chooses to sue only the public corporation's employees must nevertheless comply with the provisions of the law pertaining to the commencement of an action against the public corporation" (id.).

In short, when there is a suit against a community college's employees, the County must receive notice as the employee's sponsor whenever the statute requires it. In Santadrea, supra, the Court found that while no notice of claim was required on HVCC, "[a] notice of claim must be served upon the local sponsor [i.e., the County] . . . if that local sponsor would otherwise be entitled to a notice of claim"^[FN10] (70 AD3d at 1239). Per Butterfield, this is the case when a party [*8]entitled to indemnification is sued.

Pursuant to County Law § 52:

"Any claim or notice of claim against a county for damage, injury or death, or for invasion of personal or property rights, of every name and nature, and whether casual or continuing trespass or nuisance and any other claim for damages arising at law or in equity, alleged to have been caused or sustained in whole or in part by or because of any misfeasance, omission of duty, negligence or wrongful act on the part of the county, its officers, agents, servants or employees, must be made and served in compliance with section fifty-e of the general municipal law. Every action upon such claim shall be commenced pursuant to the provisions of section fifty-i of the general municipal law. The place of trial shall be in the county against which the action is brought" (County Law § 52[1] [emphasis added]; see also Santandrea,70 AD3d at 1238-1239 [finding County Law § 52 applicable to suite brought against HVCC requiring county to be served with notice of claim]).^[FN11]

The commencement provisions of section 50-i of the General Municipal Law provide in relevant part that:

"(a) a notice of claim shall have been made and served upon the . . . county . . .in compliance with section fifty-e of this article ^[FN12]. . . and (c) the action or special proceeding shall be commenced within one year and ninety days after the happening of [*9]the event upon which the claim is based . . ." (General Municipal Law § 50-i [1]).

Nevertheless, plaintiff contends that service of a notice of claim is only required for common law tort actions and does not apply to the various retaliation and discrimination claims set forth in the Complaint (see Pl MOL R at 22). But that is not so. County Law § 52 "mandates notices of claim in a much broader scope of matters than the General Municipal Law" (Sager v County of Sullivan, 145 AD3d 1175-1177 [3d Dept 2016]). Thus, while the GML's notice requirement is limited to "tort claims or claims for personal injury, wrongful death or damage to real or personal property," as previously noted section 52 states that service of notice is required for "[a]ny claim . . . against a county for damage" or "any other claim for damages arising at law or in equity" (id. [cleaned up]). This language has been found to encompass claims for discrimination under the Human Rights Law, as well as whistleblower/retaliation causes of action such as those set forth in Civil Service Law § 75-b (see id. [claims under Civil Service Law § 75-b subject to section 52 notice requirement]; Mills v County of Monroe, 59 NY2d 307, 309—310 [1983], cert denied 464 US 1018 [1983] [discrimination claims under federal and state law subject to section 52 notice requirement]; Zarate v Nassau County Medical Center, 9 AD3d 427 [2d Dept 2004] [notice of claim required under County Law § 52 in employment discrimination suit]). The same is true for plaintiff's cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress (Grasso v Schenectady County Public Library, 30 AD3d 814, 816 [3d Dept 2006]).

Therefore, as provided for in Education Law § 6308(3), plaintiff was required to serve Rensselaer County as HVCC's local sponsor before she could bring suit against former President Ramsammy on all of these causes of action. Moreover, this cannot be rectified by service of a late claim since more than a year and ninety days has passed since the accrual of the action on November 15, 2022 (see Butterfield, 131 AD2d at 964; see also Sager, 145 AD3d at 1177 [application to file late notice of retaliation claim unavailable where over 1 year and 90 days had passed since plaintiff's termination]). The only exception to this requirement is that it does not apply to plaintiff's breach of contract action (see RSRNC, LLC v Wilson, 220 AD3d 1139, 1141[3d Dept 2023]). The merits of that cause of action are therefore addressed below.

The application of County Law § 52 to the claims against HVCC itself presents a more complicated question, since any cause of action against HVCC as an entity does not implicate the indemnification requirement (see Grasso, 30 AD3d at 818, quoting Bardi v Warren County Sheriff's Dept., 194 AD2d 21, 23-24 [3d Dept 1993] ["Service of a notice of claim upon an . . . employee of a county is not a condition precedent to the commencement of an action against such person unless the county is required to indemnify such person"]). There is no definitive appellate caselaw on this question, and lower courts have addressed this issue in one of three ways.

First, at least two old trial court decisions, which predate much of the caselaw set forth above, found that a community college is an independent entity capable of being sued, and that section 52 does not apply to such suits (see Brown v North Country Community Coll., 63 Misc 2d 442, 446-447 [Sup Ct Essex County 1970] ["It is the opinion of this court that a community college such as the North Country Community College is an independent entity" as to which "compliance with the provisions of County Law Section 52, and General Municipal Law Sections 50-i and 50-e is not a condition precedent to the maintenance of the present action"]; [*10]see also Bernhard v Dutchess Community Coll., 1982 WL 193, at *6 [SD NY 1982] [following Brown]^[FN13] ). Brown was subsequently cited by the Third Department in Santandrea, in support of the principle that HVCC — as opposed to the County — need not be served with a Notice of Claim (see 70 AD3d at 1239). But the Third Department did not address the specific question of what occurs to a suit against the community college itself when no notice is made on the County, because such notice was served in Santandrea.

Second there is a line of federal and state trial court decisions — cited by HVCC here — for the proposition that the Community College is "an extension of the county for purposes of any action against a county community college," and thus in any action against such college the County must be served with a Notice of Claim. This is not because of any indemnification obligation, but because it is actually the party in interest in such a suit (Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Defendant Hudson Valley Community College's Motion to Dismiss 5 [citations and emphasis removed]). For example, Carren v Westchester County Community Coll. (176 Misc 2d 490 [City Court Mt Vernon 1998]) held that "[s]ince the defendant is a county college, the provisions of the County Law, as well as the General Municipal Law, are applicable" (id. at 491; see also Carpenter v Mohawk Valley Community Coll., 2023 WL 5289439, at *6 [ND NY Aug 17, 2024] [dismissing claims against community college for failure to serve notice of claim on the county pursuant to County Law § 52]; Russell v Westchester Community College, 2017 WL 4326545 [SD NY Sept. 27, 2017] [County Law § 52 requires notice of claim on county for claims against community college]).

Such caselaw is arguably at odds, however, with at least one Third Department Decision — albeit in a different context — that recognizes that a community college has a legal existence distinct from that of its county sponsor (see Matter of Keefe v Rensselaer County, 108 AD2d 998 [3d Dept 1985] [upholding finding that discrimination complaint against Rensselaer County lacked probable cause in case involving HVCC, "because [HVCC], an independent legal entity, was petitioner's employer, not Rensselaer County"]). There is, moreover, a third school of thought in the trial court caselaw which presents a different potential ground for dismissal: that community colleges do not have an independent legal existence at all, and must be sued either through their trustees or employees (see Stockwicz v Corning Community College, 90 Misc 2d 55, 55 [Sup Ct, Rensselaer County 1977] [directing that Board of Trustees be substituted for the college as the proper defendant]^[FN14] ; see also Butterfield, 131 AD2d at 963 n 2 ["Supreme Court [*11]noted that defendant should properly be designated as the Board of Trustees of Schenectady County Community College and directed that the caption be changed pursuant to CPLR 2001," citing Stockwicz]). Under this line of authority, the question of whether a notice of claim must be served on the County when HVCC itself is sued never arises, because HVCC should not be a defendant in the first place. And since individual employees entitled to indemnification are the proper parties, section 52 Notice on the County would be required on that ground.

As the foregoing demonstrates, the law on this issue is not entirely settled, although the weight of the limited authority that exists generally supports defendant's contention that notice is required under section 52, albeit on different theories. But given that the record here provides no real detail on the relationship between the County and HVCC so as to allow for a definitive ruling on the question, I decline to dismiss the claims against HVCC on this basis and proceed to address those other contentions.^[FN15]

The Substance of the Claim

The primary basis for defendants' remaining arguments is that the allegations in the complaint do not support the causes of action pled. I find these arguments provide ample grounds to dismiss the complaint against HVCC.^[FN16]

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court must "afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept the facts alleged as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference and determine only whether the alleged facts fit within any cognizable legal theory" (Gagnon v Village of Cooperstown, NY, 189 AD3d 1724, 1725 [3d Dept 2020]; see also McQuade v Aponte-Loss, 195 AD3d 1219, 1220 [3d Dept 2021] [same]). Moreover, a court may "freely consider affidavits submitted by the plaintiff" — like the affirmation submitted by Ms. Paquette here — "to remedy any defects in the complaint" (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 88 [1994]). That said, "the favorable treatment given a plaintiff's complaint is not limitless, and conclusory allegations — claims consisting of bare legal conclusions with no factual specificity — are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss" (F.F. v State of New York, 194 AD3d 80, 83-84 [3d Dept 2021] [internal quotation and citations omitted], appeal dismissed and lv denied 37 NY3d 1040 [2021], cert denied 142 S Ct 2738 [2022]).

To state a cause of action for discrimination under the Human Rights Law (see Executive Law § 296), "a plaintiff must plead facts that would tend to show (1) that he or she was a member of a protected class, (2) that he or she . . . suffered an adverse employment action, (3) that he or she was qualified to hold the position for which he or she . . . suffered [the] adverse employment action, and (4) that the discharge or adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of . . . discrimination" (Godino v Premier Salons, Ltd., 140 AD3d 1118, 1119 [2d Dept 2016] [emphasis added]; see also Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 305 [2004] [same]).

Thus, where a plaintiff pleads allegations in his or her complaint devoid of facts from which it could reasonably be inferred that plaintiff was discriminated against due to her race, gender or other protected class category, such pleading is "insufficient to survive [a] defendant's motion to dismiss" (Cagino v Levine, 199 AD3d 1103, 1105 [3d Dept 2021]; see also Matter of England v New York City Dept. Of Envtl. Protection, 150 AD3d 996, 997 [2d Dept 2017] [affirming dismissal of Article 78 petition seeking appointment to position, on ground that it failed to state discrimination claim when such claim was supported by no more than "speculation and bare legal conclusions without any factual support"]; Askin v Department of Educ. of City of NY, 110 AD3d 621, 622 [1st Dept 2013] [complaint dismissed when plaintiff failed to plead fourth element of a prima facie claim of employment discrimination under State and City HRL and relied solely on mere legal conclusions]).

According to plaintiff, "upon information and belief" she was terminated and replaced by a "younger person" (Complaint ¶ 244). She also notes that she is Caucasian, and the person who terminated her, Ramsammy, is of a different race, and concludes on this basis that "[u]pon information and belief President Ramsammy favored other employees over plaintiff, at least in part, due to her race" (id. ¶¶ 246, 253). Finally, she expressed the belief that her termination occurred because she is divorced and "upon information and belief" her job duties were transferred to married people (id. ¶¶ 260-261).

Such bald claims, however, do not contain any factual allegations showing that HVCC terminated plaintiff under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination (see Cagino, 199 AD3d at 1104-1106 [noting, in dismissing employment discrimination claim, that "conclusory allegations — claims consisting of bare legal conclusions with no factual specificity" — are insufficient to state a cause of action]; see also Groschlaude v Lawlor, 78 Misc 3d 679, 685 [Civil Ct NY County 2023] ["Speculative allegations made 'upon information and belief' do not state facts"]; Newell v Atlantic Express Transp. Corp., 35 Misc 3d 1240[A], *2 [Sup Ct Bronx County 2012] ["Conclusory allegations that are made only 'upon information and belief' are insufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss"]).

Beyond the bare assertion that defendant acted out of a discriminatory motive, however, the complaint is devoid of the sort of allegations that can support such a claim. The complaint does not allege that any of plaintiff's supervisors made remarks that showed any discriminatory intent (see Brown v City of New York, 188 AD3d 518, 519 [1st Dept 2020]). Nor does it allege facts that would establish that similarly situated persons who did not share her protected characteristics were treated more favorably than she was (see id.). The assertions in Paquette's affirmation regarding the treatment of two other women, Ms. Baez and Ms. Ricci, do not remotely support such a conclusion. Beyond the fact that Ms. Baez was terminated, there is nothing in the complaint or affidavit to indicate that she was treated differently because of her age or marital status — the only two characteristics that she is alleged to have shared with Ms. [*12]Paquette. Indeed, the affidavit specifically notes that Baez was hired by Ramsammy and was terminated only after she was "willing to raise mistakes or policy violations," while Ricci's responsibilities were allegedly re-assigned from her before she left when she "brought up financial concerns to Dr. Ramsammy regarding practices and entries that did not align with SUNY procedures" (see supra p 7). To the extent such conduct impacted their treatment, as the affirmation implies, it cuts against the notion that their age or marital status was a factor in such.

There is simply nothing in these allegations that gives rise to any inference of discriminatory intent. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to plead a cause of action for discrimination under the Human Rights Law (see Brown, 188 AD3d at 519; Askin, 110 AD3d at 622; see also Levy v 103-25 68th Ave. Owners, Inc., 223 AD3d 728, 730 [2d Dept 2024] [housing discrimination complaint dismissed when "plaintiffs made only conclusory allegations, without any factual basis, that the co-op defendants acted in bad faith or with a discriminatory motive"]).

The complaint's allegations that HVCC violated Civil Service Law § 75-b, and Labor Law §§ 215 and 740 by retaliating against plaintiff by terminating her employment due to plaintiff disciplining and reporting on Heather Henry, or otherwise not acting appropriately to Henry's alleged "violent" conduct are also deficient.

To prevail on a section 215 cause of action, plaintiff must show that an employer took adverse action against her because she engaged in certain conduct (including making a complaint, bringing suit or cooperating in an investigation), regarding conduct that she "reasonably and in good faith" believes to have violated the Labor Law (Labor Law § 215[1][a]; see also Diluglio v Liberty Mutual Group, Inc., 230 AD3d 643, 646 [2d Dept 2024]["under [section 215], it is unlawful to retaliate against an employee 'because such employee has made a complaint to his or her employer ... that the employer has engaged in conduct that the employee, reasonably and in good faith, believes violates any provision of this chapter, or any order issued by the commissioner' with '[t]his chapter' refer[ring] to any provision of the Labor Law"] [citation and internal quotation marks omitted]). In regard to section 740, as relevant here plaintiff must show that an employer retaliated against her for disclosing "an activity, policy or practice of the employer that the employee reasonably believes is in violation of law, rule or regulation or that the employee reasonably believes poses a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety" (Labor Law § 740[2][a]). Finally, Civil Service Law § 75-b bars an employer from taking adverse action against a public employee for disclosing information "(i) regarding a violation of a law, rule or regulation which violation creates and presents a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety; or (ii) which the employee reasonably believes to be true and reasonably believes constitutes an improper governmental action," defined as conduct "undertaken in the performance of such agent's official duties, whether or not such action is within the scope of his employment, and which is in violation of any federal, state or local law, rule or regulation" (Civil Service Law § 75-b [2][a]).

As in the case of a claim for discrimination, to establish retaliation by an employer under these statutes the plaintiff must demonstrate a "causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action" (Forrest, 3 NY3d at 313; see also Reyes v Seaqua Delicatessen, Inc. 234 AD3d 488, 495 [2d Dept 2024] [applying "causal connection" standard to Labor Law § 215]; Hardy v Kraham, 224 AD3d 946, 950 [3d Dept 2024] [applying same standard to Civil Service Law § 75-b]). Although a causal connection can be demonstrated by evidence such as verbal or written remarks, here no such thing is alleged in the complaint. Instead, plaintiff relies for this [*13]showing on the assertion that her November 2022 termination followed closely on the August 2022 incident with Henry. But the sequence of events here is a particularly inauspicious basis on which to build a causal connection. One month after Ms. Paquette's interaction with Ms. Henry, plaintiff received a promotion, with her termination coming two months thereafter. In short, the employment action taken by defendants that most immediately followed on the cause of the alleged retaliation was a positive one for plaintiff, and thus cannot sustain an inference that what occurred later was an act of retaliation.

Further, the basis for the allegation of retaliation here is entirely unclear. While some of these causes of action are premised on the assertion that HVCC terminated Paquette because of her complaint about violations of the Correction Law, i.e., her admonishment of Henry for her letter (see e.g. Complaint ¶¶ 193, 218-219, 228, 232), she does not intimate why internal instruction to an employee of such legal requirements would bring down retaliatory actions upon her from the college brass. Her other claim — that this all had something to do with her complaint of "workplace violence" (see e.g. id. ¶¶ 169, 218-219; 228, 232) is equally opaque. She says that she was retaliated against for her "notification of Workplace Violence" (id. ¶ 169). But such notification does not involve any apparent violation of the Labor Law as needed for a Labor Law § 215 claim, any act which posed a "substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety" as required for a Labor Law § 740 claim, or any "violation of a law, rule or regulation" as necessary for a Civil Service Law § 75-c claim. Although she alleges that she felt herself under threat by Henry, that does not show that any action taken (or not taken) by HVCC or Ramsammy created any danger, or violated any law. And, again, she does not set forth any explanation as to why her complaint about Henry would give rise to retaliation, or what basis she has to believe this was the case. Her conclusory contention that retaliation was "typical" of how the HVCC President acted does not support the assertion that this was his motive in this case. In the absence of any allegation which would support a finding of retaliation, or even a clear assertion of what conduct by defendants implicated the provisions at issue, these causes of action must be dismissed on this basis as well.

Finally, the Labor Law § 215 and § 740 claims do not apply to a public employer like HVCC1 ^[FN17] (Labor Law § 215[1][c] ["This section shall not apply to employees of the state or any municipal subdivisions or departments thereof"]; Trabert v New York State Office of Mental Health, 235 AD3d 1292 [4th Dept 2025 [dismissing section 740 claim brought against public [*14]employer]).^[FN18]

As with her retaliation and discrimination claims, plaintiff has also failed to plead any facts that would give rise to a claim for negligent infliction of emotional stress. First, plaintiff has not alleged that defendants engaged in any negligent actions — on the contrary HVCC's termination of plaintiff was an intentional act, which cannot support a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress (see Santana v Leith, 117 AD3d 711, 712 [2d Dept 2014] [claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress must fail where there are no allegations of negligence in the pleadings]). Further, this cause of action is generally limited to cases where "defendants' conduct unreasonably endangered plaintiffs' physical safety or, as exceptions to this rule, that untruthful information regarding death was transmitted or that a corpse was negligently mishandled" (Dobisky v Rand, 248 AD2d 903 [3d Dept 1998]; see also Weiss v Vacca, 219 AD3d 1375, 1377 [2d Dept 2023] [this cause of action requires a breach of duty to plaintiff "either (1) unreasonably endangers the plaintiff's physical safety or (2) causes the plaintiff to fear for his or her safety"]). Nothing in the complaint would indicate that plaintiff's termination fell remotely within one of these categories. Moreover, the act of terminating plaintiff's at-will employment is not an actionable tort in New York (see Murphy v American Home Products Corp., 58 NY2d 293, 300-301 [1983] [declining to recognize tort of abusive or wrongful discharge of at-will employee]; see also Murphy, 58 NY2d at 303 [act of wrongful termination is not so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community such that it can support claim for infliction of emotional distress]; Bailey v New York Westchester Square Medical Centre, 38 AD3d 119, 125 [1st Dept 2007] [same]).

Plaintiff's status as an at-will employee also poses an insurmountable obstacle to her [*15]breach of contract claim. The contract at issue states explicitly "that either the College or the Employee ha[d] the discretion to terminate employment at any time, for any reason or no reason" (Contract at 1). Thus while plaintiff alleges that her termination was a breach of the contract, she does not state how this was the case, given this term (see Complaint ¶ 283). Under these circumstances, plaintiff cannot state a breach of contract claim for the termination of her employment (see Grebinar v Consolidated Edison of New York, Inc., 12 AD3d 1277 [1st Dept 2004] [claim for breach of employment contract dismissed for failure to state cause of action because employment was at will]], lv denied 4 NY3d 708 [2005]).

Aside from being terminated, plaintiff's complaint alleges that she experienced various "adverse employment actions." Most of these are alleged in an entirely conclusory manner, such as that defendants' "prevent[ed] Plaintiff's performance under the contract," "breach[ed] the covenant of good faith and fair dealing," and " retaliat[ed] against Plaintiff" in various conclusory ways (id. ¶¶ 275-281). But plaintiff points to no contract terms that were violated by such, except to make general reference to particular documents, including the annual HVCC catalog, the Middle States Self-Evaluation Report, the HVCC Anti-Discrimination and Harassment Policy and the HVCC Workplace Violence Prevention Policy (see id.) And while she submits extensive excerpts from the catalogue and Workplace Violence policy, she makes no allegation as to what provisions of these documents was violated, or how she was harmed as a result. The vague assertion that some unspecified terms were violated does not suffice to set forth a breach of contract cause of action (see Medical Care of Western New York v Allstate Insurance Company, 175 AD3d 878, 879 [4th Dept 2019] [plaintiff failed to state claim for breach of contract when it "failed to identify the specific insurance contracts that plaintiff had performed services under or the contract provisions that defendant allegedly breached"]; Barker v Time Warner Cable, Inc., 83 AD3d 750, 751 [2d Dept 2011]["In order to state a cause of action to recover damages for a breach of contract, the plaintiff's allegations must identify the provisions of the contract that were breached," and failure to do so was basis to dismiss this cause of action]; Woodhill Elec. v Jeffrey Beamish, Inc., 73 AD3d 1421, 1422 [3d Dept 2011] [failure to identify provision of the contract breached necessitated dismissal]).

Finally, in addition to those claims against Ramsammy in his capacity as President of HVCC, which must be dismissed for failure to give the requisite Notice to the County and for all the shortcomings as to those causes of action noted above, plaintiff also argues that the complaint seeks to hold him liable in his personal capacity ^[FN19] (see Pl MOL R at 6 [" Defendant Roger A. Ramsammy is alleged to have taken adverse employment actions for personal and/or professional reasons" and "omission of the word 'personally' from the caption" — which refers only to him being sued in his official capacity — "is a is a mere irregularity (at most) and must be disregarded"]). But there is no basis provided for such, except the conclusory label itself (see Kats v East 13th Street Tifereth Place, LLC, 73 AD3d 706, 707-708 [2d Dept 2010] [conclusory allegations that corporate officer also acted "personally" are insufficient to establish personal liability independent from that officer's corporate capacity]). Moreover, in his corporate officer role, Ramsammy cannot be held "personally liable for causing [the College] to terminate an employment contract unless his activity involves individual separate tortious acts" (Baer v [*16]Complete Office Supply Warehouse Corp., 89 AD3d 877, 878-879 [2d Dept 2011]). On this ground alone, those causes of action regarding discrimination and retaliation in the complaint must be dismissed as against him as well (id.).^[FN20]

In light of these rulings, plaintiff's cross motion to amend the complaint does not save it from dismissal. The amendments simply make clear that each of the causes of action is brought against "all defendants," i.e., against both HVCC and Ramsammy (in both his official and personal capacity), while the breach of contract claim would be brought against both HVCC and "and Defendant Roger A. Ramsammy, in his capacity as President of Hudson Valley Community College" (Thompson Aff, Ex A). These changes do not resolve any of the defects set forth above, as they would not add any additional factual claims that would rectify plaintiff's failure to plead a valid cause of action, and serve the required notice of claim on Rensselaer County. As a result, such amendment would be futile, and the cross motion must be denied (see Meimeteas v Carter Ledyard & Milburn LLP, 105 AD3d 643, 643 [1st Dept. 2013] [motion for leave to amend in response to a motion to dismiss the complaint is "futile" and properly denied where "the defects [in the complaint] are [not] cured by the proposed ... amended complaint"]).

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint are granted in their entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that plaintiff's cross-motion to amend the complaint is denied.

This Decision & Order is being electronically filed with the Clerk's Office, with copies simultaneously e-mailed to both counsel. The electronic filing of the Decision & Order shall not constitute Notice of Entry, and counsel is not relieved from the applicable provisions of the CPLR respecting to filing and service of Notice of Entry.

1. Notice of Motion and Attorney Affirmation of Robert F. Manfredo, Esq., dated January 30, 2025, with Exhibits incorporated therein, including Amended Verified Complaint, filed December 2, 2024, along with Affirmation in Support of Motion to Dismiss of Donal Christian, affirmed January 30, 2025, with Exhibit annexed thereto, and Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Hudson Valley Community College's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Verified Complaint.

2. Notice of Motion and Affirmation of Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Esq., in Support of Motion to Dismiss, dated January 31, 2025, along with Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion by Defendant Roger A. Ramsammy, in his capacity as President of Hudson Valley Community College, to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Verified Complaint.

3. Notice of Cross-Motions and Affirmation in Support of Graham A. Thompson, Esq., dated April 11, 2025, with Exhibits incorporated therein, including proposed Amended Summons and Second Amended Verified Complaint, with Affirmation of Karen Paquette, affirmed on April 9, 2025, along with Memorandum of Law in Support of Cross-Motion & In Opposition to Defendant Hudson Valley Community College's Motion to Dismiss, and Memorandum of Law in Support of Cross-Motion & In Opposition to Defendant Roger A. Ramsammy's Motion to Dismiss.

4. Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Defendant Hudson Valley Community College's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Verified Complaint, dated April 25, 2025.

5. Reply Memorandum of Law of Defendant Roger A. Ramsammy, dated April 24, 2025.