The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 004) 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 164, 165, 166, 172, 173, 178, 179, 185, 186 were read on this motion to/for STAY.

ORDERED that this motion by defendants New Jersey Transit Corporation, New Jersey Transit Bus Operations, Inc. and Ana Hernandez (hereinafter collectively as "NJT"), to stay this action pursuant to CPLR § 2201 is denied.

This action involves a motor vehicle accident which occurred on February 9, 2017. Jeffrey Colt was allegedly struck by a New Jersey Transit bus at the intersection of West 40th Street and Dyer Avenue, in the City and State of New York, while he was a pedestrian in a pedestrian crosswalk. The bus was driven by defendant Ana Hernandez, an employee of New Jersey Transit. This case was commenced on September 15, 2017, with the filing of a summons and complaint.^[FN1]

On July 15, 2020, defendants NJT moved for dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(2) (Motion Seq. No. 002), on the basis that this court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because NJT is immune from being sued in New York State Court. The motion was filed after many discovery conferences, and after several depositions were conducted. The motion was filed after the expiration of the New Jersey statute of limitations for the commencement of this action. Additionally, the basis of the motion was the US Supreme Court decision in Franchise Tax Bd of California v. Hyatt (587 US 230 [2019]) ("Hyatt III") - decided on May 13, 2019, approximately 14 months before NJT filed the motion.

By order dated October 6, 2020, the court (Hon. Adam Silvera) denied defendants' motion to dismiss (NYSCEF Doc No 98). An appeal was taken and by order dated May 24, 2022, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's order. An appeal was thereafter taken to the Court of Appeals and, by order dated November 25, 2024, the Court affirmed the decision by the Appellate Division, First Department, that NJT was not immune from being sued in New York State Court.

A note of issue was filed by plaintiff on February 9, 2021. By order dated January 19, 2022 (Hon. Lisa Headly), partial summary judgment as to liability was granted against defendants and it was ordered that the matter proceed to trial on damages (NYSCEF Doc No. 138). The parties have appeared for multiple settlement conferences, and the matter appeared in the Trial Ready Part on two (2) occasions, and the matter is currently marked "final" for jury selection on September 15, 2025.

NJT now moves by notice of motion for an order staying this matter pursuant to CPLR § 2201, based upon petitions for a writ of certiorari filed with the United States Supreme Court in: (i) Galette v NJ Transit (332 A3d 776 [Pa 2025]; and in this matter (ii) Colt v NJ Transit Corp., 43 NY3d 463 [Nov 25, 2024]) (the "petitions").^[FN2] The petitions, involve the conflicting rulings by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals (the ruling in this matter), with respect to whether New Jersey Transit is an arm of the State of New Jersey, entitled to sovereign immunity.

Defendants argue that a stay of this case is warranted, because the United States Supreme Court will be deciding whether NJT benefits from immunity. Specifically, defendants argue that based on Hyatt III, a decision by the US Supreme Court holding that NJT is entitled to sovereign immunity would effectively end this case. NJT further argues that if the US Supreme Court rules that NJT is not entitled to immunity, this case would proceed to a damages trial thereafter. NJT also argues that a denial of their request for a stay would be a waste of judicial resources and plaintiffs would not suffer undue prejudice since a decision from the US Supreme Court is expected by June 2026. This court disagrees.

CPLR §2201 provides that, "[e]xcept where otherwise prescribed by law, the court in which an action is pending may grant a stay of proceedings in a proper case, upon such terms as may be just."

It is well settled that a court has broad discretion to grant or deny an application for a stay (see 215 W. 84th St Owner LLC v. Ozsu, 209 AD3d 401, 401 [1st Dept 2022]; Lauria v. Kriss, 147 AD3d 575, 575 [1st Dept 2017]). Whether a stay is warranted is wholly discretionary and such decision "is primarily addressed to the discretion of the court" (Pierre Assoc. Inc. v. Citizens Cas. Co. of New York, 32 AD2d 495, 496 [1st Dept 1969]; see also Berger-Tilles Leasing Corp. v. York Assoc. Inc., 28 AD2d 1132, 1133 [2d Dept 1967], affd 22 NY2d 837 [1968]). When a party seeks to stay compliance with a court's lawful mandate, such as to proceed to trial, such a stay should be denied unless the proponent of the stay can demonstrate prejudice if no stay is granted (Peerce v. Peerce, 97 AD2d 718, 719 [1st Dept 1983]).

Since a stay of an action can be a drastic remedy, on the legal maxim that justice delayed is justice denied, it should therefore be refused, unless the proponent shows good cause for granting it (see Patrick M. Connors, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C2201:7; David I. Ferber SEP IRA v. Fairfield Greenwich Group, 28 Misc 3d 1214 [A] [Sup Ct, NY County 2010]). In considering whether a stay is warranted, the "[f]actors to consider include avoiding the risk of inconsistent adjudications, [duplication] of proof and potential waste of judicial resources" (Britt v International Bus Servs., 255 AD2d 143, 144 [1st Dept 1998]; see also Zonghetti v Jeromack, 150 AD2d 561, 563 [2d Dept 1989]; One Beacon America Ins. Co. v Colgate-Palmolive Co., 96 AD3d 541, 542 [1st Dept 2012]).

Applying those factors here, including whether defendants demonstrated prejudice if no stay was granted, the court finds that a stay is not warranted.

Risk of Inconsistent Adjudications

As mentioned above, the posture of this case is that summary judgment as to liability has been granted in plaintiff's favor, with only a trial on damages remaining. Jury selection is scheduled to commence on September 15, 2025. It is unfathomable that any ruling by the United States Supreme Court would include any determination regarding plaintiff Jeffrey Colt's injuries and/or value of any compensable damages. A decision by the Supreme Court that New Jersey [*2]Transit is entitled to immunity would therefore, not be inconsistent with any finding of damages by a jury. Thus, there is little to no risk of inconsistent adjudications.

Duplication of Proof

Similarly, it is not likely that there would be an overlap or duplication of proof in the damages-only trial as the United States Supreme Court will not be evaluating plaintiff Jeffrey Colt's injuries.

Waste of Judicial Resources

As this matter has proceeded through the trial court, the Appellate Division, First Department and the Court of Appeals, the New York State courts have already expended significant judicial resources in having this case adjudicated in New York. To deny plaintiffs their day in court at this juncture, would (in this court's view) not be a waste of resources but rather, resources well utilized in bringing this eight (8) year old matter to fruition. Notably, plaintiffs estimate that the trial on damages will involve no more than six (6) witnesses and take less than one (1) week to complete.

Additionally, while there is a possibility that a Supreme Court ruling could render a damages trial unnecessary, it is just as likely that the United States Supreme Court decision may not obviate the need for a damages trial. Moreover, even if the Supreme Court ruled that defendant New Jersey Transit is entitled to immunity, it may not eliminate the need for a damages trial as to defendant Ana Hernandez, the driver of the bus that struck plaintiff Jeffrey Colt, as the Supreme Court could rule that she is not an arm of the State of New Jersey (see State Emp. Bargaining Agent Coalition v Rowaland, 718 F3d 126, 137 [2d Cir 2013], quoting Berman Enterprises, Inc. v Jorling, 3 F3d 602, 606 [2d Cir 1993] (" '[w]here a complaint 'specifically seeks damages from [] defendants in their individual capacities[,]...the mere fact that the state may reimburse them does not make the state the real party in interest'"); Farid v Smith, 850 F2d 917, 923 [2d Cir 1988] ["the law is clear that a state's voluntary decision to indemnify its public servants does not transform a personal-capacity action against a state official into an official-capacity action against the state"); Wilson v Beebe, 770 F2d 578, 588 [6th Cir 1985] [same]).

Prejudice

NJT argues that it will be prejudiced if forced to proceed to a damages-only trial where they will expend resources for attorneys and experts, which will be unnecessary if they prevail at the United States Supreme Court. However, NJT fails to cite to any cases where a court has held that litigation expenses would constitute undue prejudice. In fact, there are a multitude of cases that have declined to hold that incurring the usual costs of litigation would constitute prejudice (see Tuker v. Hicks, 2022 NY Slip Op 51097[U] [Sup Ct, Kings County 2022]; Matter of PPDAI Group Sec. Litig, 2019 Slip Op 51075(U) [Sup Ct, NY County 2019]; Jackson v. Citywide Mobile Response Corp., 2024 NY Misc LEXIS 10221 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 2024]; Saldana v. Riess, 2022 NY Misc LEXIS 29973 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 2022]; Century Indem. Co. v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 2024 NY Slip Op 51791 [U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2024]; Trump v. Trump, 81 Misc 3d 1228 [A] [Sup Ct, New York County 2024]). Moreover, should a jury award money damages in plaintiffs' favor, at that juncture, NJT can move to stay the enforcement of the judgment.

Further, despite conventional wisdom, a verdict for money damages, even if unenforceable, has some (intangible) value. This is why numerous inquests are conducted daily, in courthouses throughout our state, against defaulting parties who are most likely "judgment proof," where the plaintiff will never recover any of the monetary damages. The court is reminded of a recent trial, where dozens of women came to testify before a jury in this court about unwanted sexual acts committed by a famous and influential writer and movie maker against them. The plaintiffs in that case testified that they understood that they would likely not recover any monetary damages from the defendant, but nonetheless, they each spoke of wanting to tell their story and getting some vindication from a jury that what the defendant had done was wrong, and that the injuries they suffered had value. The jury returned a verdict of $1.68 billion, which (to the court's knowledge) remains uncollectible to date, yet the plaintiffs were grateful to have had their day in court. Likewise, plaintiffs in this case are entitled to their day in court and would be prejudiced if they were prevented from having an opportunity to present their case to a jury, after eight (8) years of litigation.

The CPLR prescribes several factual scenarios warranting an automatic stay barring the enforcement of an order or judgment from which an appeal was taken. When no basis for an automatic stay is available however, a party may move for a discretionary stay under CPLR § 5519 (c), which defendants elected not to do here. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, this court will analyze the applicability of CPLR § 5519 (c) to defendants' request for the stay sought herein.

CPLR 5519 (c) provides, in relevant part that, "Stay and Limitation of Stay by Court Order. The court from or to which an appeal is taken or the court of original instance may stay all proceedings to enforce the... order appealed from pending an appeal...".

Similar to CPLR 2201, whether to grant a stay under section 5519 (c) is generally a matter of discretion (Grisi v. Shainswit, 119 AD2d 418, 421 [1st Dept 1986]); however, section 5519 (c) also requires that the proponent of the stay demonstrate the merits of the appeal (Da Silva v. Musso, 76 NY2d 436 [1990] [footnote 4]). The court in evaluating whether to grant a stay will also be influenced by any relevant factor, including "any exigency or hardship confronting any party" (Richard C. Reilly, Practice Commentaries McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, CPLR C:5519:4; see also Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Royal Blue Realty Holdings, Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 3150 [U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2016]. Here, defendants failed to address their likelihood of success on the appeal before the United States Supreme Court as required under CPLR 5519 (c), and instead merely set forth the basis for their appeal - regurgitating the arguments they made in their original motion for immunity - and therefore, the application would fail under section 5519 (c). Additionally, defendants failed assert any exigency or hardship they may confront if a stay is not granted. Further, as discussed above, defendants failed to establish any undue prejudice if a stay is denied.

In conclusion, the court finds that this is not a proper case in which a stay should be granted pursuant to CPLR 2201 (nor CPLR 5519 [c]).

This is a case where a New Jersey Transit bus struck a pedestrian in the State of New York. However, under New Jersey Law (NJSA 4:3-2), a suit against New Jersey Transit can only be brought in New Jersey and only in the county where the incident occurred. Based on a plain reading of the New Jersey statute, there is no right of redress for someone struck by a New Jersey Transit bus in New York State. Notably, in their submissions, defendants fail to reference any way a person injured by a New Jersey Transit bus in New York could commence a suit and obtain justice.

Additionally, it is clear from every decision in this case regarding sovereign immunity, that New York Courts have a compelling interest in holding NJT accountable for its alleged negligence, in the courts of this state. At each level of review, the judges deciding the issue found varied and different reasons to deny NJT's request to hold that it is entitled to immunity. In fact, at the Court of Appeals, two judges, including Chief Judge Wilson, wrote compelling concurring opinions holding NJT accountable in New York state. Even the lone dissenting opinion by Judge Rivera wrote about her distain for the "gamesmanship" by NJT, throughout this litigation. It is clear that New York has an interest in protecting its residents from negligence of others, including buses owned and operated by New Jersey Transit. To issue a stay of the damages trial at this time, pending a decision from the US Supreme Court, would be an extreme miscarriage of justice to plaintiffs. After litigating the action for approximately eight (8) years, plaintiffs are entitled to a verdict.

Based upon the above and given that "justice delayed" is often "justice denied," (Patrick M. Connors, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C2201:7), it is

ORDERED that defendants' motion for a stay is denied.