The defendant Joel Gonzalez Acevedo moves for dismissal of the accusatory instrument pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL") §§ 30.30(1)(b) and 170.30(1)(e) based on the People's purported failure to timely discharge their discovery and speedy trial requirements pursuant to CPL §§ 245.20, 245.50(3), and 30.30(5). In the alternative, the defendant, inter alia, asks this Court to grant Huntley/Wade/Crews/Dunaway as well as Sandoval/Ventimiglia hearings.

Upon review and consideration of the submissions, court file, and relevant legal authority, the Court DENIES that branch of the defendant's motion which is for dismissal. The Court grants the Huntley/Wade/Crews/Dunaway hearings. All remaining contentions are reserved for the trial court.

On January 18, 2025, the defendant Joel Gonzalez Acevedo was arrested and charged with Menacing in the Second Degree (PL § 120.14[1]), Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree (PL § 265.01[2]), Menacing in the Third Degree (PL § 120.15), and Harassment in the Second Degree (PL § 240.26[2]). The defendant was arraigned on January 20, 2025, and released on his own recognizance.

At the appearance held on April 29, 2025, the Court noted that the People had filed their Certificate of Compliance ("COC") and Statement of Readiness ("SOR") off-calendar on April 16, 2025. The Court then adjourned the case for a discovery conference.

On May 13, 2025, the parties appeared before this Court for the discovery conference. As the issues at hand remained unresolved, a motion schedule was set. The Defense filed this motion on June 13, 2025. The People filed their response on July 1, 2025. The Defense filed its reply on July 15, 2025.

Pursuant to CPL § 245.20, the People are required to automatically disclose certain [*2]material and information to the Defense within specific timeframes. For example, the People, inter alia, are obligated to disclose "[a]ll statements made by persons who have evidence or information relevant to any offense charged or to any potential defense thereto, including all police reports, notes of police and other investigators" (CPL § 245.20[1][e]). CPL § 245.50(1) further directs that "[n]o adverse consequences to the prosecution or prosecutor shall result from the filing of a [COC] in good faith and reasonable under the circumstances."

In People v Bay, the Court of Appeals found that the "key question in determining if a proper certificate of compliance has been filed is whether the prosecution has exercised due diligence and made reasonable inquiries to determine the existence of material and information subject to discovery," a case-specific inquiry of the record at bar (see People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 211-213 [2023][emphasis added]; see also CPL §§ 245.20 [1], 245.50 [1]). The Bay Court makes clear that to oppose a motion to dismiss claiming that the prosecution's COC is illusory, the People "bear the burden of establishing that they did, in fact, exercise due diligence and made reasonable inquiries prior to filing the initial COC despite a belated or missing disclosure" (Bay, 41 NY3d at 213 [emphasis added]).

The gravamen of the Defense's motion is that the People's COC and SOR were invalid due to the People's failure to exercise due diligence in timely and properly disclosing Body-Worn Camera ("BWC") Footage and the corresponding Audit Trail Logs. The Defense posits that the Bronx Defenders and the Office of the District Attorney of Bronx County have an agreement wherein all discovery must be sent to the Bronx Defenders' discovery hub email address. However, the Defense asserts that the Axon.com link, which is the website the Office of the District Attorney uses to transmit BWC footage, had only been sent to the assigned defense counsel on April 15, 2025. The Defense then asked for the link to be shared with the discovery hub email address. On April 25, 2025, Defense Counsel learned that the discovery hub did receive a link sharing BWC footage on April 15, 2025, but it did not contain information identifying which client it related to. The Defense asserts that the People never replied to emails from the discovery hub requesting additional information. On April 29, 2025, the Defense emailed the People stating that they had not received any BWC footage. The Defense posits that the People did not successfully share the BWC footage until May 2, 2025, and that any human error leading to this alleged belated disclosure is not a sufficient excuse for the alleged belated disclosure. The Defense further argues that they never received the Audit Trail Logs that correspond with the BWC.

The People maintain that they did share the BWC footage and the Audit Trail Logs on April 15, 2025, one day before filing their COC and SOR. The People also state that although it is common practice for the BWC footage to be sent to the Bronx Defenders' discovery hub email address, there is no agreement requiring this in every case nor is it a mandatory practice. The People also maintain that they replied over email and over the phone to resolve the issue. The People attach the actual Audit Trail Logs to their response to corroborate their assertion.

Both parties agree that BWC footage constitutes automatic discovery under CPL 245.20(1)(g) as the footage is an electronic recording made in connection with the alleged criminal incident. The People attach as an exhibit to their motion each Audit Trail Log for each item of BWC footage. Upon review of the actual Audit Trail Logs, the Court finds that People [*3]did send the BWC footage to both the assigned defense counsel's email address and the Bronx Defenders' discovery hub email address on April 15, 2025, with permissions to view, download, and view the audit trail, and again sent the link on May 2, 2025.

Although the Defense argues that the People should have shared the link with their discovery hub, the Audit Trail Logs demonstrate that the People did share the link with the discovery hub. However, even if they did not, there is no mandate by statute that the discovery must be sent to a specific email address at a Defense firm or organization. Sending the discovery to the assigned defense counsel's email address is sufficient. Additionally, even if there was a technical error or a human error contributing to confusion in sending the BWC footage, the People had every reason based on the Audit Trail Logs to conclude that they had sent it and to respond to the Defense that they did so. The People also made multiple efforts to communicate with the Defense about this issue by email and over the phone, and they resent the link on May 2, 2025.

In addition to the BWC footage, the Defense claims that the People did not turn over the Audit Trail Logs that correspond to the BWC footage. In response, the People state that they did turn over the Audit Trail Logs on April 15, 2025, however, the People assert that the Audit Trail Logs do not constitute automatic discovery.

First, the Court finds, akin to the BWC footage, that the Audit Trail Logs submitted to the Court demonstrate that the People did in fact turn over the Audit Trail Logs to the Defense on April 15, 2025. Each Audit Trail Log submitted to the Court clearly shows that in sharing the links with the Defense, the People also granted permissions for the Defense to view the corresponding Audit Trail Logs.

Second, the Court finds that the Audit Trail Logs constitute automatic discovery under CPL § 245.20(1)(e). Indeed, the Audit Trail Logs submitted to the Court by the People contain a statement entered by an NYPD Officer that is relevant to the offenses charged.

The issue of whether Audit Trail Logs constitute automatic discovery has not been settled nor has it reached the Appellate Division or Appellate Term. Trial courts have been split on the issue. Some courts find that the Audit Trail Logs are no more than pieces of metadata containing no additional information, and, thus, are not subject to automatic discovery (see e.g. People v Larkin, 72 Misc 3d 663 [Sup. Ct., Kings County 2021]; People v Rodriguez, 214 NYS3d 666 [Sup. Ct., Kings County 2024]. Other courts find that NYPD officers have the ability to input statements into the Audit Trail Logs, making them subject to automatic discovery (see e.g., People v Ballard, 82 Misc 3d 403 [Crim Ct. Queens County 2023]; People v Torres, 79 Misc 3d 1204[A] [Crim. Ct. Queens County 2023]; People v Champion, 81 Misc 3d 292 [Crim. Ct., NY County 2023]; People v J.M.W., 83 Misc 3d 1289[A] [Sup Ct. Kings County 2024]. Such statements by the NYPD may appear in the form of "notes, comments, and categorizations that police officers are required to enter during the course of an investigation" (Champion, 81 Misc 3d at 295).

Here, one of the Audit Trail Logs provided to the Court by the People contains a statement by the NYPD as contemplated by Ballard, Torres, Champion, and J.M.W. Specifically, one of the Audit Trail Logs has a note filled out by the NYPD officer for whom the BWC footage pertains, stating: "Custom metadata field 'Final Level of Encounter' with value 'Level 1 — Request for information.'" Clearly, this statement refers to one of the levels of People v De Bour and relates to a police encounter with the defendant (see People v De Bour, 40 NY2d [*4]210 [1976] [the seminal case creating a four-tiered framework that dictates the permissible level of police intrusion, for example, the first tier, known as "Level One" allows an officer with a "objective, credible reason" to approach someone and request information]). No Defense Counsel would be able to predict in advance whether an Audit Trail Log contains such a statement. Further, the disclosure of the Audit Trail Logs takes no more than a click of a box when sharing BWC footage (see Ballard, 82 Misc 3d at 418 ["NYPD has set up a sharing system where the evidence audit trails are electronically sent by checking a single box"]). As such, this Court finds that Audit Trail Logs are subject to automatic discovery under CPL § 245.20(1)(e).

Nonetheless, the Court finds the People did turn over the Audit Trail Logs with the BWC footage on April 15, 2025. As there are no further challenges to the validity of the COC, and the items in questions were neither belatedly disclosed nor are they outstanding, the Court finds the COC and SOR valid and any further inquiry into due diligence and good faith is moot.

In a motion to dismiss misdemeanor charges pursuant to CPL § 30.30(1), the defendant has the initial burden to demonstrate that the prosecution failed to declare readiness for trial within the statutorily prescribed time, 90 days (see CPL § 30.30[1][b]; People v Luperon, 85 NY2d 71, 77-78 [1995]). The burden then shifts to the prosecution to identify excludable delays (see Luperon, 85 NY2d at 78).

The accusatory instrument in this case was filed on January 20, 2025, and the defendant was arraigned on the same date. The defendant failed to appear on the next court date, March 4, 2025, but appeared again on March 11, 2025. The defendant appeared at or was excused from all other appearances.

The People filed and served their valid COC and SOR on April 16, 2025, which stopped the speedy trial clock. The Court finds 79 days chargeable against the People. Because the People are within their statutorily allotted time to bring this case to trial, that branch of the defendant's motion which is to dismiss the accusatory instrument is DENIED.

Based upon the foregoing, that branch of the defendant's motion which is for dismissal is DENIED.

The Court orders Huntley/Wade/Crews/Dunaway hearings. The remaining contentions are reserved for the trial court.

This constitutes the opinion, decision, and order of the Court.