| Sampson v Hussain |
| 2025 NY Slip Op 51447(U) [87 Misc 3d 1203(A)] |
| Decided on August 28, 2025 |
| Supreme Court, Kings County |
| Frias-Colón, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Ihana
Sampson, PLAINTIFF,
against Police Officer Amir Hussain, the City of New York, Jason McKean, M.D., Scott Pascal, M.D., Rohan Desai, M.D., and Brookdale University Hospital Medical Center, DEFENDANTS. |
Recitation as per CPLR §§ 2219(a) and/or 3212(b) of papers considered on review of this motion:
NYSCEF Doc #s 81-99; 109-112 by City Def.'sUpon the foregoing cited papers and after oral argument on April 22, 2025, pursuant to CPLR § 3212, the motion by Defendants Police Officer Amir Hussain and the City of New York's (collectively "City") for summary judgment is GRANTED.
Plaintiff commenced this negligence and medical malpractice action by summons and complaint filed October 15, 2020 alleging injuries arising from a motor vehicle accident.[FN1] Plaintiff contends the collision was caused by the negligence of the City Defendants.[FN2]
On the date of the accident, PO Hussain, and another officer, received a radio transmission that a red Mustang fled the scene of a shooting.[FN3] The officers soon observed a red Mustang proceeding through a red light.[FN4] After activating lights and sirens and notifying dispatch, the officers began pursuit.[FN5] During the pursuit, the officers observed an object resembling a firearm being discarded from the Mustang.[FN6] Shortly thereafter, the Mustang drove through another red light and struck Plaintiff's vehicle, causing her injuries.[FN7]
The City Defendants move for summary judgment, contending that Officer Hussain was engaged in an emergency operation, did not act with reckless disregard as a matter of law, and that the suspect driver of the red Mustang was the sole proximate cause of the collision with Plaintiff.[FN8] In opposition, Plaintiff contends issues of fact remain, relying on her testimony that she did not observe or hear police lights or sirens prior to the collision and on the officers' failure to activate their body-worn cameras.[FN9]
Summary judgment is warranted only where the movant establishes, through admissible evidence, entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating the absence of material factual disputes. See CPLR § 3212(b); Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 (1986); Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 (1980); Korn v. Korn, 135 AD3d 1023, 1024 (3d Dept. 2016). Failure to make this showing requires denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of opposition. Winegrad v. N.Y.U. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 (1985). If the movant meets this burden, the opposing party must produce evidence in admissible form sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. Conclusory or speculative assertions are insufficient. Banco Popular N.A. v. Victory Taxi Mgmt., 1 NY3d 381, 383 (2004). On summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Fortune v. Raritan Bldg. Servs. Corp., 175 AD3d 469, 470 (2d Dept. 2019); Emigrant Bank v. Drimmer, 171 AD3d 1132, 1134 (2d Dept. 2019).
Vehicle and Traffic Law ("VTL") § 1104 grants qualified privileges to drivers of authorized emergency vehicles engaged in emergency operations, including pursuit of suspected law violators. Thompson v. City of New York, 210 AD3d 1031 (2d Dept. 2022) (citing Fuchs v. City of New York, 186 AD3d 459 [2d Dept. 2020]). Emergency operation includes "pursuing an actual or suspected violator of the law." Id. at 1033 (citing Anderson v. Suffolk County Police Dept., 181 AD3d 765 [2d Dept. 2020]). Liability may only be imposed if the officer acts with reckless disregard for the safety of others. VTL § 1104(e); Baker v. City of White Plains, 169 AD3d 980 [2d Dept. 2019]). The parties do not dispute that Officer Hussain was engaged in the pursuit of a vehicle suspected of involvement in a shooting. Accordingly, the reckless disregard standard governs. Thompson at 1034; VTL § 1104(e).
The City Defendants established that PO Hussain's conduct did not rise to the level of reckless disregard. Baker, 169 AD3d at 981. Their submissions showed that Hussain activated lights and sirens, radioed dispatch, maintained distance behind the fleeing vehicle, and did not collide with Plaintiff's vehicle. See Quintana v. Wallace, 95 AD3d 1287 (2d Dept. 2012).
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that she neither heard nor saw lights or sirens before the collision and that the officers did not activate their body-worn cameras.[FN10] These assertions, however, do not raise a triable issue of fact. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that the collision was caused by the fleeing suspect's vehicle, not by Officer Hussain's patrol car.[FN11] Moreover, the failure to activate body-worn cameras does not establish reckless driving or proximate cause. See Powell v. City of Mount Vernon, 228 AD2d 572 (2d Dept. 1996). Accordingly, Plaintiff has not demonstrated any basis to impose liability under the reckless [*3]disregard standard.
This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.
Date: August 28, 2025