The defendant is charged by information with one count each of Aggravated Driving While Intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[2-a][a]), Driving While Intoxicated: Per Se (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[2]), Driving While Intoxicated, (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[3]), Driving While Ability Impaired (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[1]) and Leaving the Scene of an Incident Without Reporting (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 600[1][a]).

The defendant moves to suppress all post-seizure observations of the defendant and the results of a breath test as the fruits of an unlawful stop. The defendant further argues that the results of the breath test should also be suppressed because the People failed to demonstrate that test was properly administered.

A combined Dunaway/Ingle/Johnson hearing was conducted before this Court on July 29, 2025, July 30, 2025, August 6, 2025 and August 12, 2025, respectively. The People called Police Officers Maciej Hajbert, Christopher Lucey and Joseph Gamboa of the New York City Police Department ("NYPD") to testify. Based on their credible and reliable testimony and evidence introduced at the hearing, the post-hearing arguments and supplemental materials and argument received via email from both parties, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

On December 24, 2024, Police Officer Christopher Lucey was assigned to patrol in the St. George, New Brighton and Jersey Street areas of Richmond County. He was driving a marked patrol car with his partner, Officer Burns. Both officers were in uniform and wearing, among other things, body-worn cameras ("BWC"). Officer Lucey has been employed by the NYPD for approximately four years, including the last three and a half years at the 120 Precinct. Officer Lucey is assigned to patrol where his duties and responsibilities include responding to radio runs and 911 calls, effecting arrests and issuing summonses for traffic offenses. He has participated in approximately one-hundred arrests during his career, including sixty where he was the arresting officer and, of those arrests, five were related to driving while intoxicated. Officer Lucey further received specialized training regarding identifying signs of intoxication and the administration of chemical breath tests. Officer Lucey testified that the indicia of intoxication include slurred speech, imbalance, the odor of alcohol on the breath and bloodshot or watery eyes.

At approximately 4:29 a.m., Officer Lucey responded to a radio run for a collision and responded to 269 Forest Avenue. Upon arriving at that location, he observed three cars and an ambulance. He observed one car parked diagonally and a dark-colored Nissan Titan pickup truck parked behind it. Officer Lucey testified that the front end of the truck was damaged, including a smashed headlight and the front bumper was hanging from it. He spoke with the Emergency Medical Services ("EMS") personnel on the scene, including EMS Olivo who informed him there was a vehicle collision, indicated that he believed the defendant was intoxicated and identified a victim of the collision who pursued the other driver to 269 Forest Avenue. EMS Olivo further indicated that there were no one else in the vehicle since he had been on the scene. Officer Lucey then spoke to the defendant who was standing next to EMS Olivo behind the truck area of the pickup truck.

Officer Lucey observed that the defendant bore the indicia of intoxication, including that he was imbalanced and unsteady on his feet and had a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage on his breath. Officer Lucey testified that he attempted to engage the defendant in a conversation to determine what had transpired, however, the conversation was, in the officer's opinion, incomprehensible because the defendant's speech was very slurred. Upon learning that the defendant spoke Spanish, Officer Lucey called for Officer Gamboa to translate the defendant's responses. While waiting for Officer Gamboa to arrive, the defendant further indicated that his identification was inside the dark-colored pickup trucker. Officer Lucey further recovered from the floor near the front passenger area of the dark-colored pickup truck a wallet containing the defendant's identification.

Officer Lucey further spoke with the complainant who informed Officer Lucey that he was inside his home at 43 Stanley Avenue at approximately 3:49 a.m., heard a loud bang, observed that his Toyota RAV4, as well as another's Ford Explorer, had been hit, observed a dark-colored pickup truck leaving and pursued the truck in a family member's car because his car was totaled and could not be driven. The complainant stopped the dark-colored pickup truck at 269 Forest Avenue and identified the defendant as the driver of the pickup truck. Officer Lucey later testified on cross-examination that 43 Stanley Avenue and 269 Forest Avenue are approximately between one and one-and-a-half miles apart. The complainant further showed Officer Lucey a video recording from his doorbell camera, which depicted a dark-colored pickup truck resembling the dark-colored pickup truck on the scene colliding with the rear end of a park car, reversing and proceeding forward.

Officer Lucey radioed for his sergeant because he believed the defendant had left the scene of a traffic incident without reporting it and was driving while intoxicated. Upon the sergeant's arrival on the scene, Mr. Juarez confirmed that he observed the defendant driving the dark-colored pickup truck that struck his car. The keys to the truck were also recovered on the scene, however, it is unclear who recovered it or from where they were recovered. The defendant was arrested at approximately 4:40 a.m. and transported to the 120th Precinct by Officers Jason Gamboa and Thykudam where the defendant was searched and placed in a holding cell before being brought into the Intoxicated Driver Testing Unit room ("IDTU"). A copy of Officer Lucey's BWC recordings were entered into evidence as People's Exhibit 3.

The People also called Police Officer Joseph Gamboa, who has been employed by the NYPD for approximately two-and-a-half years during which time he has been assigned to the 120th Precinct. During his career in the NYPD, Officer Gamboa has participated in approximately sixty arrests, of which he was the arresting officer for approximately thirty-five arrests, including five arrests related to driving while intoxicated. Officer Gamboa is certified by the NYPD as a Spanish translator. On December 24, 2024, Officer Gamboa and his partner, Officer Thykudam, were in uniform in a marked vehicle and assigned to patrol in the West Brighton area of Staten Island. Officer Gamboa testified that he responded to 269 Forest Avenue at approximately 4:38 a.m. to translate a conversation between the defendant and the responding officers, including Officer Lucey.

Officer Gamboa further testified that he recovered, among other things, the defendant's wallet, which was inside the truck at the scene. Officer Gamboa further transported the defendant to the 120th Precinct where he brought the defendant to the front desk where the defendant was processed and searched. He then escorted the defendant into a holding cell. Officer Gamboa further observed that the defendant was unsteady on his feet and had slurred speech. A copy of Officer Gamboa's BWC recording was entered into evidence as People's Exhibit 4.

The People also called Police Officer Maciej Hajbert who has been assigned to Highway Patrol Unit 5 for approximately one year. Officer Hajbert's duties and responsibilities include responding to calls for service on patrolling the highways, conducting IDTU testing, issuing traffic summonses and making arrests related to driving while intoxicated. Prior to his current assignment, Officer Hajbert was assigned to the 123rd Precinct for approximately six years where he was assigned to patrol. Officer Hajbert has participated in approximately two-hundred arrests in his career, of which approximately fifty to sixty related to driving while intoxicated including approximately ten to twelve arrests where he was the arresting officer. In addition to his arrest history, Officer Hajbert received specialized training regarding the identification of the indicia of intoxication from the Highway Patrol Specialized Training School, also called the New Wheel School, in March 2024. Officer Hajbert testified that the training lasted approximately three months, during which he was trained on operating Intoxilyzer machines, the recognition of the indicia of intoxication and the performance of standard field sobriety testing.

On December 24, 2024, at approximately 5:15 a.m., Officer Hajbert was present with the defendant inside the IDTU room of the 120th Precinct. Officer Hajbert testified that the IDTU room is equipped with three cameras and microphones that record the proceedings, an Intoxilyzer 9000 instrument for obtaining a sample of the defendant's blood alcohol concentration ("BAC") and a yellow line on the floor required for coordination testing. A copy of the IDTU camera recordings were entered into evidence as People's Exhibit 2. This Court's [*2]review of People's Exhibit 2 reveals that the center of the IDTU room is an open area free of obstruction, and in the middle of the room is a black and yellow taped line that is used for testing. An Intoxilyzer instrument used for the breath test is on the other side of the room. The IDTU room is also equipped with a television and DVR, which can be used to play testing instructions in Spanish. Upon entering the IDTU room, Officer Hajbert began a twenty-minute observation of the defendant to ensure there is no mouth alcohol or burping. During this time, Officer Hajbert observed a strong smell alcohol on the defendant's breath, the defendant to have bloodshot and watery eyes and that the defendant was slurring his speech and swaying. Officer Lucey was also present for the twenty-minute observation period.

After completing the twenty-minute observation of the defendant, the defendant was offered a series of tests at approximately 5:36 a.m., Officer Hajbert played a video, which the officer explained asked the defendant, in Spanish, whether the defendant would consent to a breath test. The People did not provide a translation of the video into evidence. The defendant then nodded his head, indicating yes, and replied, in sum and substance, si, meaning yes. Officer Hajbert resumed the video, which provided instructions in Spanish to the defendant as to the proper technique for providing a breath sample. Officer Hajbert testified that he played the video a total of three times to ensure the defendant knew the proper technique. Officer Hajbert further provided additional visual instructions as the instructions continued playing in Spanish. After providing the defendant with a new mouthpiece and waiting for the machine to calibrate, at approximately 5:38 a.m., the defendant approached the machine, breathed into the tube. The defendant's first attempts to produce a sufficient sample were unsuccessful, and, while Officer Hajbert provided the defendant with a new mouthpiece and did not touch it with his bare hands, the defendant is observed grabbing the mouthpiece with his own bare hand during the following attempts. On cross-examination, Officer Hajbert testified that if there is something on the mouthpiece, it could alter the result of the breath test, and the defendant should not touch the mouthpiece. He further added that it would be the proper procedure to have the defendant not touch the mouthpiece.

Officer Hajbert then removed the defendant's hand from the mouthpiece, the defendant blew into the tube again, an audible tone was emitted to indicate that the defendant provided a sufficient breath sample, and a printout was produced from the machine, indicating a BAC of .231 per centum. A copy of the printout was entered into evidence as People's Exhibit 1. The printout further indicates that the breath sample was collected at 5:39 a.m.

Officer Ada Officer Hajbert attempted to conduct the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus ("HGN") test and provided the instructions in English. However, due to the language barrier, Officer Hajbert could not gain a proper or fair reading. Officer Hajbert did not attempt to perform any other coordination exams. Officer Hajbert further testified that it was his conclusion, based upon his personal and professional experience, that the defendant was intoxicated by alcohol.

The defendant argues that the record failed to establish probable cause to arrest the defendant. In particular, the People failed to establish the defendant's identity as the driver of the [*3]dark-colored pickup truck. The People oppose, arguing that the identity of the defendant as the driver of the dark-colored pickup truck was established by circumstantial evidence and the record established the officers possessed probable cause to arrest the defendant

At a suppression hearing, the People have the initial burden presenting evidence establishing the legality of police conduct. See People v Dodt, 61 NY2d 408 (1984); People v Wise, 46 NY2d 321 (1978); People v Baldwin, 25 NY2d 66 (1969); People v Malinsky, 15 NY2d 86 (1965). Once the People have met this burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove the illegality of police conduct. People v DiStefano, 38 NY2d 640 (1976); People v Berrios, 28 NY2d 361 (1971).

The first issue is whether the police had a sufficient basis to approach the defendant and inquire. In People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210 (1976), the Court of Appeals established the basic framework for measuring the intrusiveness of police action in New York as follows: (1) a law enforcement official may approach a citizen and request information provided that there is an objective, credible and articulable reason to do so; (2) the second level "common law right of inquiry" permits a momentary stop when there is a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot; (3) the third level of inquiry permits an officer to forcibly stop and detain a person when such officer has a reasonable suspicion that the individual has committed, is committing or is about to commit a felony or misdemeanor; and (4) an officer may initiate an arrest when there is probable cause to believe that an individual has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime. When a defendant's vehicle is already stopped, police need only have an articulable reason to approach the vehicle and make an inquiry. People v Harrison, 57 NY2d 470, 475 (1982); People v Blajeski, 125 AD2d 582, 582 (2d Dept 1986). In such a scenario, a police officer may approach an individual "when there is some objective credible reason for that interference not necessarily indicative of criminality." De Bour, 40 NY2d at 223; see also People v Spencer, 84 NY2d 749, 753 (1995); People v Fabian, 178 AD2d 544, 545 (2d Dept 1991). Initial questioning comprises such information gathering. New York v Hollman, 79 NY2d 181 (1992). Such an intrusion must be predicated on more than "whim, caprice, or idle curiosity." DeBour, 40 NY2d at 217.

Here, with respect to Officer Lucey's initial approach of the defendant and initial questioning, it was proper under the De Bour because Officer Lucey had an "objective, credible and articulable reason to do so." Specifically, it was based upon the officer receiving a radio transmission regarding a vehicle collision at the location and, upon arrival, observing a dark-colored pickup truck bearing damage to its front headlight and bumper. Additionally, Officer Lucey was provided additional information from the EMS personnel on the scene that the defendant had collided with the complainant's parked vehicle, fled after the collision and their opinion that the defendant was intoxicated. Officer Lucey further observed the defendant standing behind the damaged dark-colored pickup truck. Therefore, the report of the collision, the information supplied to the officer on the scene and the officer's own observations provided the officer with an objective, credible reason to approach the defendant's vehicle and request information. People v. Ocasio, 85 NY2d 982, 985 (1995); People v Karagoz, 143 AD3d 912, 914 (2d Dept 2016).

Next, at a Dunaway hearing, the People have the burden of showing that there was probable cause to arrest the defendant. The defendant, however, has the ultimate burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the police acted illegally. Berrios, 28 NY2d 361. "Probable cause does not require proof to a mathematical certainty, or proof beyond a [*4]reasonable doubt." People v Mercado, 68 NY2d 874, 877 (1986). Rather, it must be "more probable than not that a crime has taken place and that the one arrested is its perpetrator." People v Carrasquillo, 54 NY2d 248, 254 (1981). Stated another way, the existence of probable cause to arrest requires information which "would lead a reasonable person who possesses the same expertise as the arresting officer to conclude, under the circumstances, that a crime is being or was committed" by the defendant. People v McRay, 51 NY2d 594, 602 (1980); see also People v Cooper, 38 AD3d 678, 679 (2d Dept 2007). Additionally, pursuant to People v Johnson, 134 Misc 2d 474, 476—477 (Crim Ct, Queens County 1987), just as "a stop without probable cause constitutes a legal basis for the suppression of physical evidence," it thus may also be the "legal basis for the suppression of a breathalyzer test result."

In order to determine whether there was probable cause to arrest a person for a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192, the standard is whether "it is more probable than not that the defendant is actually impaired." People v Vandover, 20 NY3d 235, 239 (2012). Additionally, "The quantum of proof necessary to support an arrest for driving while impaired is far less rigorous than that required for driving while intoxicated." People v Freeman, 37 Misc 3d 142(A), 2012 NY Slip Op 52281(U), at *2 (App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). A person violates Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 when he or she exhibits "actual impair[ment], to any extent, [of] the physical and mental abilities which [a person] is expected to possess in order to operate a vehicle as a reasonable and prudent driver." Id. at 239 (citing People v Cruz, 48 NY2d 419, 427 [1979]). Therefore, the People should provide evidence that the accused person exhibited "dimensions of actual physical coordination impairment." People v Gullo, 51 Misc 3d 150(A), 2016 NY Slip Op 50835(U), at *1 (App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016); see also People v Rich, 25 Misc 3d 126(A), 2009 NY Slip Op 52014(U), at * 1 (App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2009). Furthermore, the police are permitted to effectuate a warrantless arrest for suspected driving while intoxicated where the arrestee was involved in a traffic collision, and the police have reasonable cause to believe the arrestee was intoxicated and driving at the time of the collision, even if the police did not witness such events. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(1)(a).

Additionally, while probable cause requires the People to prove that defendant operated a vehicle while in a condition that violated any subsection of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192, it is not necessary that they produce "eyewitness testimony that the defendant had actually been observed operating the vehicle." People v Ramlall, 47 Misc 3d 141(A), 2015 NY Slip Op 50621(U), at *1 (App Term, 2d Dept., 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015); see also People v. Booden, 69 NY2d 185, 187-188 (1987). Rather, "Generally speaking, operation of a vehicle can be proved by circumstantial evidence." People v Salerno, 36 Misc 3d 151(A), 2012 NY Slip Op 51699(U), at *2 (App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2012).

Moreover, "As a general rule, hearsay is admissible at a suppression hearing," (People v Edwards, 95 NY2d 486, 491[2000]; CPL 710.60[4]) and probable cause "may be supplied, in whole or in part through [such] information" (People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417, 423 (1985). Indeed, information received from an identified citizen is sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest defendant pursuant to the two-part Aguilar—Spinelli test. See Spinelli v United States, 393 US 410 (1969); Aguilar v Texas, 378 US 108 (1964); People v Ketcham, 93 NY2d 416, 420 (1999); People v Parris, 83 NY2d 342, 349-350 (1994).

Here, Officer Lucey was provided with information from the complainant that he observed the defendant shortly after his vehicle was struck rendering it inoperable. The [*5]complainant further informed the officer that he followed the defendant's vehicle and observed the defendant operating it. The complainant's information was further corroborated by the video of the collision provided by the complainant showing a dark-colored pickup truck that resembled the truck behind which the defendant stood at the incident location, and which bore damage consistent with the collision described by the witness and in the video. This Court's review of Officer Lucey's BWC further reveals the defendant's wallet and identification were recovered from inside the truck. Once Officer Lucey approached the defendant, he recounted several indicia of intoxication, including imbalanced and unsteady on his feet, a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage on his breath and slurred speech.

Furthermore, there was no evidence adduced at the hearing that demonstrates that anyone else other than the defendant had driven the dark-colored pickup truck or that the defendant had become intoxicated after parking the truck. Rather, given the temporal and spatial proximity between the collision and the officer's arrival, the evidence at the hearing demonstrates that Officer Lucey encountered the defendant where there is "no other rational explanation than that defendant had driven his vehicle to the location where he had parked, and that he had parked in that location at a time sufficiently proximate to when he was approached by the officer to permit the inference that the degree of intoxication defendant exhibited in the course of the investigation pertained to that operation." People v Turner, 34 Misc 3d 159(A), 2012 NY Slip Op 50443(U), at *1 (App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2012). Rather, the evidence "point[s] logically to the defendant's operation of the automobile while intoxicated, even though there is no direct proof that he drove [the vehicle]." People v Blake, 5 NY2d 118, 120 (1958). Therefore, Officer Lucey possessed probable cause to arrest defendant for a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192. See People v Parker, 197 AD3d 741 (2d Dept 2021) (officers had reasonable suspicion that the defendant was driving while intoxicated and could detain him after responding to a call about an accident, observing the defendant's vehicle to be damaged and observing that the defendant had red eyes, slurred speech, and anxious behavior); People v Kurovics, 64 Misc 3d 77 (App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2019) (identified citizen informed the officers that the defendant drove the vehicle involved in the collision, the defendant's identification was inside the vehicle, and the defendant displayed indicia of intoxication).

For the foregoing reason, the defendant's Johnson/Ingle/Dunaway motion and related motion to suppress the post-seizure observations of the defendant and the results of a breathalyzer test as the fruits of an unlawful stop are denied.

The defendant further seeks suppression of the results of the Intoxilyzer test, arguing that the People failed to prove that the test was properly administered, leading to an unreliable result. The People oppose, arguing that the defendant voluntarily consented to the examination and the defendant's touching of the mouthpiece prior to the result does not prevent its admissibility at trial.

Consent to a breath test can either be voluntarily given or obtained pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(2), the implied consent statute. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(2)(a) provides, "Any person who operates a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of the blood." There are two pre-requisites before the implied consent provision is triggered. The first [*6]is that the officer must have "reasonable grounds" that a driver violated any subdivision of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192. The second is that the test must take place within two hours of the arrest or two hours after a field test showed the presence of alcohol. The Court of Appeals has held that when the requisite reasonable grounds exist, even an unconscious person is deemed to have given consent to a chemical test, so long as the test is conducted within the two-hour limit. See People v Kates, 53 NY2d 591, (1981).

Here, as explained above, there was reasonable grounds or probable cause to believe the defendant violated, at a minimum, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(1). Turning to the second requirement, the arrest time is noted by the Intoxilyzer printout in evidence as People's Exhibit 2 as 4:44 a.m., however, the officer's BWC recording in evidence as People's Exhibit 1 reveals that the defendant was placed under arrest at approximately 4:40 a.m. Regardless, Officer Hajbert began administering the exam by reciting the instructions at approximately 5:36 a.m. and the sample, indicating a BAC of .231 per centum, was collected at 5:39 a.m., less than two hours from the defendant's arrest. Therefore, the test was administered in accordance with Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(2) and the defendant is deemed to have consented to the exam.

Even if the Court were to assume that the test was not administered within two hours of his arrest, this Court would still find that the defendant voluntarily consented to the test. The determination of "whether defendant gave his voluntary consent to the administration of the test, [ ] generally presents a mixed question of law and fact." People v Odum, 31 NY3d 344, 348 (2018). In the context of a test administered in investigating a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192, the People have the burden of establishing that the defendant "expressly and voluntarily" consented to the breathalyzer test. People v Atkins, 85 NY2d 1007 (1995). The People have the burden of demonstrating such voluntary consent by "clear and positive evidence." People v Capraella, 165 Misc 2d 639, 643 (Crim Ct, Queens County 1995). However, "A simple request to submit to a breathalyzer examination without more can result in a voluntary consent as long as there is no express or implied coercion by law enforcement officials, no material misrepresentation of fact, to induce the consent and no facts to suggest that any law enforcement officials in securing an individual's consent acted in a manner so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a due process violation as to negate any consent." Id. at 645. Once this burden is met by the People, the defendant bears some burden in negating consent, through either the cross-examination of witnesses or the presentation of a defense case. Id. at 644.

Here, the defendant voluntarily consented to the breath test. Officer Hajbert explained that the Spanish speaking video played in the IDTU room provides the questions regarding whether a person wants to take the test. The evidence at the hearing further demonstrated that the defendant, while not proficient in the English language, understood some of the officer's English instructions, frequently nodding, saying yes in Spanish and affirmatively performing the tasks and instructions provided by the officer on numerous occasions during their interactions. In the IDTU room, the defendant continued to nod, indicating that he understood the Spanish instructions, and affirmatively responded to taking the breath test by performing the test, and the evidence is devoid of any indication that the defendant refused to take such test. See People v Mojica, 62 AD3d 100, 114-115 (2d Dept 2009) (where the evidence demonstrated that the defendant was conscious, coherent and capable of exercising his right, and there was no evidence of coercion, illegality, or deception, the defendant voluntarily consented to testing); see also People v Shaw, 72 NY2d 1032 (1988); People v Thomas, 46 NY2d 100, 108 (1978).

Beyond the issue of the consent, the defendant further argues that the result of the chemical test should be suppressed because the defendant touched the mouthpiece prior to the production of the results leading to an unreliable examination and result. The People oppose arguing that any deficiencies in the administration of the examination affects the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.

The defendant's argument that the blood alcohol test result is inadmissible because of the potential placement of a substance on the mouthpiece in violation of the fifteen-minute observation period required by New York State Department of Health Regulations (10 NYCRR) § 59.5(b) is without merit. Proof of the requisite "[c]ontinuous observation" period is not a predicate condition to admit breathalyzer test results. Rather, it "goes only to the weight to be afforded the test result, not its admissibility." People v Schuessler, 14 Misc 3d 30, 32 (App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2006); see also People v Terrance, 120 AD2d 805, 807 (3d Dept 1986). Moreover, the observation requirement is not strictly construed. "Neither the statute, the regulations nor the exercise of reason call for [a] constant vigil." People v Williams, 96 AD2d 972, 973 (3d Dept 1983), rev'd on other grounds 62 NY2d 765 (1984); see also People v McDonough, 132 AD2d 997, 998 (4th Dept 1987). Moreover, the defendant's theory that there may have been a substance on his hands that produced an inaccurate result is unavailing. Indeed, there is nothing in the record to indicate that there was something in the defendant's mouth or on his hand that could have produced an inaccurate result. See People v Lebrecht, 13 Misc 3d 45, 51 (App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2006) ("There was no evidence that the officer failed to observe any event that would have undermined the accuracy of the test results, and in any event, proof of the requisite 'continuous observation' is not a predicate condition for the test results' admission").

Therefore, the defendant's motion to suppress the breath test and its result is denied.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing analysis and discussion, the defendant's Johnson, Ingle, and Dunaway motions are denied; and the defendant's motion to suppress the results of the breath test are also denied.

This opinion constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.