Claimant Desmond Laverpool filed this claim to recover damages against the State pursuant to the Court of Claims Act § 8-b. The claim alleged that Mr. Laverpool was wrongfully convicted and incarcerated for more than 23 months. (See New York State Electronic Filing System [NYSCEF] Doc. No. 1 [claim] at 1-2.) Mr. Laverpool's claim maintains that he did not commit the crimes charged and has consistently maintained his innocence. (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1 at 2, ¶ 2.) The claim asserts that "the police officer(s) who initiated the case against Claimant falsely claimed that they observed him stealing a cellular phone from a female's bag," and that after being found guilty at an earlier trial and having had that conviction reversed and remanded for a new trial, he was acquitted.^[FN1] (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1 at 2, ¶¶ 3 — 4.) Attached to the claim were two documents, a Certificate of Disposition and a document that appears to be unrelated to [*2]this matter.^[FN2] (NYSCEF Doc. No. 2.) The Certificate of Disposition reflects that the case and charges were dismissed. (Id.)

Defendant answered the claim, generally denying the allegations. Defendant asserted four affirmative defenses including that the claim did not comply with Court of Claims Act § 8-b (3) and § 8-b (4) because claimant failed to submit documentary evidence that the accusatory instrument was dismissed and that he failed to state facts in sufficient detail to allow the court to find that claimant is likely to succeed at trial that he did not commit any of the acts charged in the accusatory instrument. (See NYSCEF Doc. No. 5 at 1-2, ¶ 4 and ¶ 5.)

Now before the Court is defendant's motion to dismiss the claim. The motion was made pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) and Court of Claims Act § 8-b (3) and § 8-b (4). The State argues that the claim fails to state a cause of action because it does not comply with the requirements of Court of Claims Act § 8-b (3) and § 8-b (4). (NYSCEF Doc. No. 32.) Defendant also raises a novel issue concerning whether claimant has served qualifying time in custody. (Id.) Claimant opposes the motion and cross-moves to amend his claim. (NYSCEF Doc. No. 44.) Claimant argues generally that he satisfied the pleading requirements because the documentary evidence he attached to his claim combined with the additional information he provided in his Bill of Particulars and during discovery satisfies the requirements of the Court of Claims Act. Further, he maintains that he provided, although brief, sufficient detail in his claim to meet the pleading requirements. The State opposes claimant's cross-motion, arguing that a jurisdictionally defective claim cannot be cured by amendment. (NYSCEF Doc. No. 45.)

The standard governing a motion to dismiss a claim under Court of Claims Act § 8-b is the same as any other claim before this court. (Warney v State of New York, 16 NY3d 428, 435 [2011].) That is, when reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 on the ground that the claim fails to state a cause of action, the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction. (See CPLR 3026; see also Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994].) In deciding the motion, the Court must deem the allegations in the claim to be true. (Id.; see Connaughton v Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 29 NY3d 137, 141 [2017]; Morone v Morone, 50 NY2d 481, 484 [1980].) Indeed, the Court of Appeals has warned that this is not the time to be making credibility and factual determinations. (Warney v State of New York, 16 NY3d 428, 435 [2011].)

The Unjust Conviction and Imprisonment Act, Court of Claims Act § 8-b, provides a way for "innocent persons who can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that they were unjustly convicted and imprisoned . . . to recover damages against the state." (Court of Claims Act § 8-b [1]; see also Warney v State of New York, 16 NY3d 428, 434 [2011]; Ivey v State of New York, 80 NY2d 474, 479 [1992].) Claimants may avail themselves of the remedies offered under Court of Claims Act § 8-b if they meet its "strict pleading and evidentiary burdens." (Warney v State of New York 16 NY3d 428, 434 [2011].)

Court of Claims Act §§ 8-b (3) and (4) establish the pleading requirements for bringing an unjust conviction and imprisonment claim, supplanting the pleading requirements of Court of [*3]Claims Act § 11 (b). Section 8-b (3), in relevant part, requires a claimant, in order to "present" their claim, to "establish by documentary evidence" that they were convicted, sentenced, and served all or part of their sentence. (Court of Claims Act § 8-b [3] [a].) It also requires them to demonstrate by documentary evidence that they were pardoned, the conviction reversed or vacated, and the accusatory instrument dismissed, or that they were found not guilty when retried. (Court of Claims Act § 8-b [3] [b] [i]-[ii].) This section also identifies the grounds on which the conviction was vacated or reversed and the accusatory instrument dismissed in order to be eligible for relief under the statute. (Court of Claims Act § 8-b [3] [b] [ii].)

Court of Claims Act § 8-b (4), on the other hand, while not requiring documentary evidence, does require the claim to "state facts in sufficient detail" to allow the Court to conclude that the claimant will likely succeed at trial in proving that they did not commit any of the acts charged and did not, by their own conduct, cause their conviction. This is a higher pleading standard than the CPLR. (Warney v State of New York, 16 NY3d 428, 435 [2011] [The Court "must consider whether the allegations are sufficiently detailed to demonstrate a likelihood of success at trial."].) As noted above, the Court does not make credibility or factual determinations at this stage. (Warney v State of New York, 16 NY3d 428, 435 [2011].) ^[FN3] Said another way, at this juncture, the Court is accepting the facts as true and evaluating whether claimant has met the pleading requirements outlined in Court of Claims Act § 8-b (4) and provided enough detail in their claim to the allow the Court to find that claimant will be able to succeed at trial.

The parties unsurprisingly disagree about whether claimant has met his burden. The State argues that claimant has failed to comply with the requirements of Court of Claims Act §§ 8-b (3) and (4) and the claimant insists that he did. First claimant offers the many ways he believes he has met the pleading requirements of Court of Claims Act § 8-b (3). (See NYSCEF Doc. No. 44 at 3, ¶ 11 and 7, ¶ 20 [the Bill of Particulars, filed more than two years after the claim and not included with the motion papers, included the required information]; 5 — 6, ¶ 16 [the certificate of disposition attached to the claim includes claimant's NYSID number which can be "used to determine prison time"]; 6, ¶ 17 [reference in the claim to "People v Laverpool 2020 NY Slip. Op. 03745" "[c]learly" reflects claimant's intention to incorporate the decision as documentary evidence, despite the fact that the decision was not attached to the claim]; 6, ¶ 18 [the Court can take judicial notice of information in a document that was "intended" to be incorporated].) While it is true that no particular type of documentary evidence is identified in the Act, what is abundantly evident here is that Mr. Laverpool did not include with his claim any documentary evidence that he had been convicted, sentenced, or served any of that sentence. Nor did he provide with his claim documentary evidence that he was found not guilty at the new trial. The document he did attach to his claim, the certificate of disposition, simply established that on October 25, 2021 case number 03610-2015 and all pending charges related to the action were dismissed. (NYSCEF Doc. No. 2 at 1.)

Claimant fares no better in meeting the requirements of Court of Claims Act § 8-b (4). [*4]Although this section of the Act does not require claimant to provide documentary evidence establishing his innocence (Warney v State of New York, 16 NY3d 428, 434 [2011]), it does require the claim to include facts "in sufficient detail" that would allow the Court to find claimant "is likely to succeed at trial in proving that . . . he did not commit any of the acts charged in the accusatory instrument." (Court of Claims Act § 8-b [4].) However, Mr. Laverpool's claim offers only conclusory assertions of his innocence. (See NYSCEF Doc. No. 1 at 2, ¶ 2 ["Claimant did not commit the crimes charged and consistently maintained his innocence"]; ¶ 3 ["the police officer(s) who initiated the case against Claimant false claimed that they observed him stealing a cellular phone from a female's bag"]; ¶ 4 [after three trials, claimant was found not guilty].) The claim fails to provide any detail, let alone sufficient detail, to allow the Court to find that claimant would be successful at trial. And just last month, the Appellate Division, Third Department reiterated that a "claimant was required to set forth more than conclusory assertions of innocence to satisfy the pleading requirements of Court of Claims Act § 8-b (4)." (Mack v State of New York, — AD3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 04282, *2 [2025].)

To the extent that claimant relies on his acquittal to demonstrate that he is likely to succeed at trial, courts have consistently found that acquittal alone is insufficient to show innocence because, by itself, it only shows that the People were unable to sustain their higher burden of proof at a criminal trial. (Reed v State of New York, 78 NY2d 1, 7 [1991] ["An acquittal of criminal charges is not equivalent to a finding of innocence"].) Moreover, the First Department's decision ordering a new trial, although not attached to the claim, found that claimant was not entitled to a dismissal of the indictment because the verdict in that trial "was supported by legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence." (People v Laverpool, 185 AD3d 431, 432 [1st Dept 2020].) Because Mr. Laverpool has provided neither the documentary evidence required by Court of Claims Act § 8-b (3) nor included sufficient facts in his claim to permit the Court to find that he is likely to succeed at trial as required by Court of Claims Act § 8-b (4), the claim cannot survive the State's motion to dismiss.

Anticipating that the Court could find that his claim did not meet the requirements of Court of Claims Act §§ 8-b (3) and (4), claimant cross-moves, pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b), to amend his claim to "more fully and accurately set forth the Claim of wrongful conviction pursuant to Court of Claims § 8-b." (NYSCEF Doc. No. 43 at 1.) He argues in his affirmation that the State would not be prejudiced by the amendment because it has notice of the facts and circumstances and discovery has been exchanged. (NYSCEF Doc. No. 44 at 10, ¶ 31.) He further argues, in essence, that because the inadequacies of his claim — or at least his failure to attach documentary evidence required by Court of Claims Act § 8-b (3) - are pleading deficiencies and not jurisdictional defects, he should be permitted to amend the claim. (Id. at 10 — 11, ¶¶ 33 — 36.) Defendant urges the Court to deny claimant's cross-motion, arguing that the claim is jurisdictionally defective because it fails to comply with the requirements of Court of Claims Act § 8-b and a jurisdictionally defective claim cannot be cured by amendment. (NYSCEF Doc. No. 45 at 8 — 9, ¶¶ 18 — 19.)

CPLR 3025 (b) governs amendments to pleadings and instructs that where permission is sought to amend a pleading "[l]eave shall be freely given upon such terms as may be just." Whether to grant permission to amend a pleading is at the Court's sound discretion. (Edenwald Contr. Co. v City of New York, 60 NY2d 957, 959 [1983].) Leave to amend will generally be [*5]granted if amending the original claim will not result in prejudice or surprise to the nonmoving party and the proposed amendments are not "palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit." (Watkins-Bey v MTA Bus Co., 174 AD3d 553, 554 [2d Dept 2019] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].) The burden to show prejudice or surprise is on the party opposing the motion. (Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Groder, 218 AD3d 542, 545 [2d Dept 2023].) Although defendant does not feign surprise or prejudice, the State argues that a pleading may not be amended to cure a jurisdictional defect. (NYSCEF Doc. No. 45 at 8 - 9, ¶ 18; see Hogan v State of New York, 59 AD3d 754, 755 [3d Dept 2009]; Nasir v State of New York, 41 AD3d 677, 677 [2d Dept 2007].) Therefore, in order to decide whether the claim can be amended, the Court must first determine whether the claim is jurisdictionally defective or, as claimant argues, it merely suffers from a pleading deficiency that may be cured by amendment.

Addressing this question requires starting with the Court of Claims Act itself. Article II, Section 8 of the Court of Claims Act provides that the State "waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby assumes liability and consents to have the same determined in accordance with the same rules of law as applied to actions in the supreme court against individuals or corporations, provided the claimant complies with the limitations of this article." (Alston v State of New York, 97 NY2d 159, 163 [2001] [emphasis in original] [internal quotation marks omitted].) The Court of Appeals explained that the plain language of the Court of Claims Act and the Act's legislative history compels the conclusion that compliance with Article II of the Court of Claims Act is required to secure jurisdiction; that is, the State's waiver of sovereign immunity is conditioned on compliance with the Act. (Id.; see also Lepkowski v State of New York, 1 NY3d 201, 206 [2003] ["The State's waiver of immunity from suits for money damages is not absolute, but rather is contingent upon a claimant's compliance with specific conditions placed on the waiver by the Legislature"]; Dreger v New York State Thruway Auth., 81 NY2d 721, 724 [1992] [because lawsuits against the State are permitted solely because the State has waived sovereign immunity, statutory requirements for "suit must be strictly construed," and claimants who fail to meet the "literal" jurisdictional requirements of the Court of Claims Act have not properly commenced their claims].)

It is well-settled that claims that fail to meet the pleading requirements of Court of Claims Act Article II, §§ 10 and 11 are jurisdictionally defective and require dismissal. (Wright v State of New York, — NY3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 01564, *3 [2025] [a claim that does not meet the specificity requirements of § 11 (b) is jurisdictionally defective and requires dismissal]; Kolnacki v State of New York, 8 NY3d 277, 281 [2007] [failure to satisfy any of the requirements set out in § 11[b] is a jurisdictional defect]; Alston v State of New York, 97 NY2d 159, 164 [2001] [failure to timely file as required by Court of Claims Act § 10 (4) is a jurisdictional defect]; Lichtenstein v State of New York, 93 NY2d 911, 913 [1999] [claim dismissed as jurisdictionally defective for failing to comply with Court of Claims Act § 10 (2)]; Dreger v State of New York Thruway Auth., 81 NY2d 721,724 [1992] [claim jurisdictionally defective for failing to comply with Court of Claims Act § 11's filing and service requirements].) It is similarly well-established that these defective claims cannot be remedied by amendment. (Sacher v State of New York, 211 AD3d 867, 870 [2d Dept 2022]; Matter of DeMairo v State of New York, 172 AD3d 856, 857 [2d Dept 2019]; Hogan v State of New York, 59 AD3d 754, 755 [3d Dept 2009]; Manshul Constr. Corp. v State Ins. Fund, 118 AD2d 983, 985 [3d Dept 1986].)

Article II of the Court of Claims Act, entitled "Jurisdiction," includes, in relevant part, § 8-b,"Claims for unjust conviction and imprisonment," discussed supra; § 10, "Time of filing [*6]claims and notices of intention to file claims"; and § 11, "Filing, service and contents of claim or notice of intention." Courts have universally explained that the requirements of the Court of Claims Act generally, and Article II requirements in particular, including § 8-b, are to be "strictly construed" (Furrs v State of New York, 227 AD3d 957, 957 [2d Dept 2024] [citations and internal quotations omitted]); Fudger v State of New York, 131 AD2d 136, 140 [3d Dept 1987]; Ortiz v State of New York, 203 AD3d 1731, 1732 [4th Dept 2022].) The Court of Appeals too has concluded that the requirements of Court of Claims Act § 8-b must be strictly construed. (Long v State of New York, 7 NY3d 269, 276 [2006] [failure to comply with the verification requirement of Court of Claims Act § 8-b (4), that the claimant themselves must verify the claim, requires dismissal because the requirements of the Act must be strictly construed]; see also Warney v State of New York, 16 NY3d 428, 434 [2011] [stating that Court of Claims Act § 8-b has "strict pleading and evidentiary burdens"].)

Curiously, and with minimal discussion, the First, Second, and Third Departments have distinguished Article II, § 8-b from Article II, §§ 10 and 11 and concluded that compliance with Court of Claims Act § 8-b is not jurisdictional, but rather a "pleading deficiency,"^[FN4] and failures to comply with § 8-b's requirements can therefore be cured by amendment. (Acosta v State of New York, 270 AD2d 164, 165 [1st Dept 2000]); ^[FN5] Turner v State of New York, 50 AD3d 890, 892 [2d Dept 2008] [requirements are not jurisdictional and therefore "imperfect compliance can be cured" by amendment]; Harris v State of New York, 38 AD3d 144, 149 [2d Dept 2007] [preliminary proof requirements of § 8-b are not jurisdictional]; Lanza v State of New York, 130 AD2d 872, 873 [3d Dept 1987] [Court of Claims denied State's motion to dismiss finding that an amended claim following the motion complied with § 8-b requirements].) This is peculiar since Court of Claims Act § 8-b appears in Article II, "Jurisdiction," and includes overlapping requirements with §§ 10 and 11, including content and timing requirements. Indeed, the Court of Appeals just this past spring, in explaining that the legislature had not explicitly exempted Child Victim Act claims from the requirements of § 11 (b)'s pleading requirements, referenced how the legislature has adopted different pleading requirements for certain claims, using Court of Claims Act § 8-b as an example of how the legislature "knows how to adjust the conditions on the State's waiver of immunity for certain classes of claims." (Wright v State of New York, — NY3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 01564, *4 [2025].) This decision reflects both that the pleading [*7]requirements of § 8-b are jurisdictional and that they are analogous to § 11 (b)'s pleading requirements.

This all leads the Court to the conclusion that the requirements of Article II, § 8-b of the Court of Claims Act are indeed jurisdictional, nothing less than strict compliance is required, and a defective claim cannot therefore be cured by amendment. To the extent that courts have distinguished between Court of Claims Act § 8-b (3), the requirement that the claimant must "establish by documentary evidence" the facts of the criminal conviction, and § 8-b (4), the requirement for the claim to "state facts in sufficient detail" that permit the court to find it likely that claimant will succeed at trial, the Court is not persuaded that a different analysis or treatment of the requirements is necessary or appropriate. Starting, as this Court believes we must, from the proposition that the requirements of Article II are jurisdictional, a claimant must strictly comply with each and every relevant requirement unless the Act authorizes otherwise. (See Court of Claims Act § 11 (c) which provides that objections or defenses for the failure to comply with the time limitations of Court of Claims Act § 10; the service requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11 (a); or the verification requirements in § 11 (b) are waived unless raised, "with particularity," in either a timely answer or by a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer.)

Having concluded that Court of Claims Act § 8-b requirements are jurisdictional, the question is now whether Mr. Laverpool's claim complied with those requirements. As discussed above, Mr. Laverpool did not include with his claim any documentary evidence required by § 8-b (3) establishing that he had been convicted, sentenced, or served any of that sentence. Nor did he provide with his claim documentary evidence that he was found not guilty at the new trial. Further, absent from his claim were sufficient details that would allow the Court to find that he would be successful at trial. Although he asserts that he did not commit the crime and that "police officer(s)" — one officer? more than one officer? — lied, it is entirely unclear from his claim how he might prove this. Is there forensic evidence? An affidavit from the officer(s)? Trial testimony from the third trial recanting? It is impossible to know from the sparse facts provided in the claim. It is evident, therefore, that the claim did not comply with Court of Claims Act § 8-b requirements, is therefore defective, and cannot be amended to cure the jurisdictional defects.

However, the question of whether the failure of the claim to meet the pleading requirements of Court of Claims Act § 8-b is a jurisdictional defect and the related question of whether claimant may cure those defects by amendment need not be answered today. Claimant's cross-motion to amend his claim is procedurally defective. It does not include the required proposed amended claim. (See CPLR 3025 [b] ["Any motion to amend or supplement pleadings shall be accompanied by the proposed amended or supplemental pleading clearly showing the changes or additions to be made to the pleading"]; McKeon v State of New York, UID No. 2023-069-014 [Marnin, J., Sept. 28, 2023]; Jones v State of New York, 67 Misc 3d 1201[A] *3 [Ct Cl 2020].)

In light of the above and in the interest of judicial economy, the Court elects not to address the remaining ground raised by the defendant in support of its motion to dismiss.

Accordingly, it is:

ORDERED, that defendant's motion to dismiss (M-101572) is GRANTED, claimant's cross motion to amend his claim (CM-102021) is DENIED and claim no. 137394 is dismissed.